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ABSTRACT 
The principal claim of this thesis is that the mystical 
experience is a wide-ranging influence upon literature. It is 
a recurrent thematic concern of poets, novelists and 
playwrights; but even when mysticism is not an overt element 
in a text, analysis of its symbols can reveal references to 
emotions and experiences of a mystical character - as is 
frequently the case with fantasy. In a more essential way, 
certain widely-used techniques of poetry effectively reproduce 
the character of mystical events for the reader. Some theory 
does indeed imply that the mystical bearing is quite 
fundamental, at a certain level, to all creative literature. 
This thesis explores the link between mysticism and 
literature through widely differing examples, to show how it 
continues to be found in otherwise divergent texts and 
contexts. Indeed, no attempt is made to provide an exhaustive 
overview; rather, certain special areas of interest are 
represented by selected cases. Mystical elements in Modernism, 
for example (especially in T.S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf), are 
contrasted with Romantic attitudes to mysticism, which 
Wordsworth and Coleridge are taken to represent. 
A further goal is to analyse the character of literary 
mysticism, and to account for the connection between mysticism 
and literary practice. The view is adopted that the 
circumstances in which the infant first acquires language is 
of crucial importance in this regard, and that literary 
language often draws upon submerged recollections of these 
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early circumstances. Literature, it is argued, can employ 
signs and patterns of symbolisation in ways that actually 
attempt to 'undo' many of the everyday functions of words. The 
ultimate ideal of such literary techniques is to 'reverse' the 
process by which language was acquired and to 'return' the 
reader to a state resembling pre-linguistic experience, a goal 
which has much in common with the ambitions of mystics. 
Jacques Lacan's theoretical writings touch at many points 
upon the early development of the child and the significance 
of its acquisition of language. This thesis consequently has 
recourse to Lacan's work and, where relevant, to related 
psychoanalytic writings by Sigmund Freud and Julia Kristeva. 
After an investigation of the main characteristics of mystical 
experience as such, the Introduction broadly outlines Lacan's 
theoretical position. Chapter 1 is concerned more specifically 
with Lacan's discussions of mysticism. 
Part Two (Chapters 2-4) deals principally with the links 
between mystical yearnings and the Romantic ideal of the 
'sublime'. In Part Three (Chapters 5-7) the relation between 
mysticism and Modernist developments affecting both theme and 
artistic technique is examined in works by three writers: T.S. 
Eliot, Virginia Woolf, and Fernando Pessoa. Part Four 
discusses particular literary presentations of 'evil' and of 
'good' as embodiments of mystical perceptions. Late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 'supernatural' fiction 
is selected to represent the first case, and certain New 
Testament and early Christian texts the second. 
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TEXTUAL NOTE 
I have retained unemended the original spelling or punctuation 
patterns of quotations incorporated into my text. Biblical 
quotations of any length, where they occur (they are common in 
Chapters 10 and 11), are from the New English Bible. However, 
where I discuss a particular writer's interpretation of a 
Biblical passage, I have preferred to remain with the version 
their own text uses, most commonly the Authorised Version. 
Obvious textual clues readily indicate when the change occurs. 
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PART ONE: ORIGINS 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
The main proposition of this thesis is that there is an innate 
connection between mysticism and many of the functions of 
language in art. What I set out to demonstrate is that both 
thematically and in its techniques much verbal art gravitates 
irresistably towards a 'zero point' of its own dissolution, a 
place where ordinary signifying functions are overcome - and that 
it does so in order to provide an artistic equivalent to the 
'direct experience of reality' which mystics have spoken of down 
the ages. 
In a sense, there is no special originality to this claim. 
Indeed, my whole argument is that the link in question - between 
mysticism and certain ways that language can work in poetry, 
drama and fiction - has been known and used by artists for a very 
long time, even if sometimes this use has been intuitive and 
unconscious. I am sure, too, that the principle in question is 
innately understood and exploited by many theorists of 
literature; the only real difficulty is that, for reasons that 
are not altogether clear, there is no very plain or explicit 
statement of the principle or direct investigation of what makes 
it happen, in precisely these terms. 
For example, I believe that it is really to the mystical 
experience that Roland Barthes is referring when he talks of the 
reader's 'bliss' or 'jouissance' in The Pleasure of the Text'. 
Certainly his descriptions could as easily suggest the transport 
of the mystic: especially when he talks of the 'loss of self' 
that the reader experiences in his enjoyment of literature. He 
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sees the reader as a subject who 'is never anything but a "living 
contradiction": a split subject, who simultaneously. enjoys, 
through the text, the consistency of his selfhood and its 
collapse, its fall' (Barthes 1975: 21). These terms are very 
close to those in which, traditionally, mystics have spoken of 
their ecstasies. 
Again, Barthes's insistence that 'pleasure can be expressed 
in words, bliss cannot' (Ibid.) resembles the mystics' sense of 
the ineffable, inexpressible nature of their special experience. 
Bliss is unspeakable, inter-dicted. I refer to Lacan 
('what one must bear in mind is that bliss is forbidden 
to the speaker, as such, or else that it cannot be 
spoken except between the lines •.. ') and to Leclaire 
(' ..• Whoever speaks, by speaking denies bliss, or 
correlatively, whoever experiences bliss causes the 
letter - and all possible speech - to collapse in the 
absolute degree of the annihilation he is 
celebrating'). (Ibid.) 
Hence it is only in the sense of a half-truth - that what 
has never been stated openly is also never quite known - that 
this study has innovative value, for its main aim is the 
exploration and clarification, in so many words, of the 
connection between mysticism and the practice of literary art. 
While there are certainly implications for other arts, I have 
chosen to demonstrate the connection mainly through analysis of 
widely varying examples drawn from literature, the art of words. 
Although I believe that the mystical element is quite 
fundamental as a potential of verbal art, I know that the best I 
can hope to show through examples alone is simply that a wide 
range of literary works displays such a connection, not that 
there is anything intrinsic about it - though it may perhaps be 
possible to go a little further than this by means of theory, 
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where I may. Hence in what follows I shall be drawing extensively 
at times upon the illuminations that modern psychoanalytic theory 
can provide about mystical experience and its meaning. In 
particular, I shall follow Barthes's hint above, and make use of 
the theories of the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, who has 
given attention to this question. 
To return for a moment to the question of originality with 
which I started. It was Jacques Lacan's view - as it was that of 
socrates before him - that all true knowledge is simply recovery 
and expression in words of what is already unconsciously known. 
In terms of his own close relation to the work of Freud, Lacan 
had this to say: 'The originality we are allowed is limited to 
the scrap of enthusiasm we have adopted ••• concerning what Freud 
was able to name' (tr. from Scilicet2 I, vi, by Felman3 1987: 
54) • 
In the nature of things, however, we can never refer back to 
an exact version of the past 'as it really was'; what is always 
inevitably recovered is only a 'reading' of the past, not the 
.. "". past itself. Lacan's own pr~nc~ple of meconna~ssance suggests 
that we must expect meaning to be changed as it is handed on and 
understood in new contexts: that is the only way meaning 
operates. 
For the same reasons, I cannot claim to be 'true' to Lacan 
in what follows - for that would be in a strange way to deny the 
spirit of his teaching. He vehemently rejected the idea that he 
had a 'system' of thought (cf. Lacan4 1977 b : vii-xv). since the 
world does not - cannot - resemble the systems of language, any 
system, in his view, must inevitably be false from the start. In 
what was almost a last gesture, he dissolved his own school when 
he believed his pupils were treating his work as an object of 
devotion, as something final and authoritative. Anxious as he 
undoubtedly also was to correct or repudiate direct mistakes on 
their part, he could still say 'I leave everyone to go his own 
way in the direction that I point out' (LacanS 1986: 217). 
It is in this spirit that I have taken Lacan's thought as a 
point of departure for what follows. Shoshana Felman's apt 
description of the proper relation of psychoanalysis and reading 
helps to illuminate this question: 
Psychoanalysts know well from their clinical practice 
that there are no simple applications of psychoanalytic 
concepts. In practice (as a therapist or as a reader, a 
literary critic), one can use theories (as I am here 
trying to use Lacan and Freud) only as enabling 
metaphorical devices, not as extrapolated, preconceived 
items of knowledge. In much the same way that one 
cannot simply 'apply' Freud's concepts to a patient, 
one cannot apply Freud (or Lacan) to a literary text. 
The practice of psychoanalysis (as well as the 
experience of a practical reading) is a process, not a 
set of doctrines. In the process, one can implicate the 
doctrines, one can imply them, not apply them •.. it is 
never simply there, at our disposal to apply. It is 
something that we necessarily keep losing and have to 
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keep working at to find again. But we cannot find it 
(have it) once and for all. Like the purloined letter, 
psychoanalysis always has to be recovered. 
(Felman 1987: 11) 
This state of affairs is a fortunate one, for I am obliged 
to be less prudent and evasively paradoxical than Lacan usually 
is when it comes to the mystical dimension of language. For 
Lacan,the symbolic order - meaning, primarily, words and 
language - constitutes an absolute and distinct territory. since 
mysticism seems to be mostly about escaping the bounds of 
language and appearances, Lacan would probably have denied that 
there is a mystical dimension to language - or at any rate, to 
the fact of language (as I maintain). For Lacan, the mystical 
dimension is that 'impossible' realm which lies outside and 
annihilates the force of language - or WOUld, if it 'ex-isted'. 
My view is that, whenever it is not being deliberately 
repressed, and especially when the merely utilitarian functions 
of words are no longer to the fore, the 'other' dimension 'comes 
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along with' words, affecting our responses to them. Puck-like, it 
transforms, dissolves, displaces, condenses, metamorphoses these 
logical counters we believed we were sure of: it makes them slip 
away under our hands, in the very act of taking them up. 
Especially at the uncertain borderlands of our fixed concepts - a 
place where art frequently transports us - we feel ourselves 
confronted with a different kind of reality, a reality which is 
not actually determined by the verbal. It is this subversive, 
unpredictable, 'plastic' quality to words that the literary 
artist may choose to make use of, for his own particular ends -
which are also perhaps, ultimately, the ends of language itself. 
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Lacan would disagree with none of the paragraph above -
after all, it was he himself who first pointed out the 'sliding 
of the signified beneath the signifier' and identified its poetic 
uses (Lacan6 1977: 156ff). But he would say that the dimension I 
spoke of above is simply the unconscious - an aspect of the field 
of language and culture, and essentially still continuous with 
this field (although differently organised and not available, by 
definition, to conscious view). Because its effects may irrupt 
into the domain of supposed clear, conscious thought through the 
'gaps' of speech, and the borderlines of concepts, the 
unconscious cannot be related directly to the mystical domain, in 
Lacan's view. The dimension mystics usually talk of is something 
utterly and radically beyond the field of language itself: 
something, indeed, more like what he refers to as the 'Real' 
order, where language plays and can play no part at all. 
For the present I wish to reply only by saying that the very 
uncertainty about the appearances of our world which the 
'sliding' of language produces in the hands of a skilful author 
or poet can have the effect of 'destabilising' our reality, as we 
ordinarily see it - and making us more open to another, non-
verbal, mode of being behind it. Though these effects are usually 
held at the unconscious level, they are still there and affect us 
quite as much because of it. 
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What we as readers may experience on entering a new novel or 
poem might be a vague 'disquiet', 'anxiety', 'nausea', 
'displacement' - something not very pleasant, perhaps, at first. 
But this 'unsettling' can actually have the result of setting us 
on the path towards the 'beyond' experience of mysticism, 
coloured by the imaginative character of the book or poem. 
Entering the new reality of the imaginative work we do, to an 
extent; put our own in question. Such effects happen, I believe, 
only because there is something about the nature of language 
itself which permits it. 
Many of the most powerful devices of poetry - but of other 
kinds of writing too - depend on just this subversive potential 
of artistic language to act as a 'solvent' to our everyday ways 
of thinking and perceiving; we uncover an agent capable - at the 
farthest extreme - of inducing in us a return to the origins of 
the speaking process itself: one which takes us back to the 
'borderline' conditions of the time in our lives when we first 
began to acquire and use words. 
What I wish, therefore, to make the centre of attention in 
this study is what J. Hillis Miller once attempted in an 
interview7 to explain as the unspeakable element of language, the 
unsayable 'nothing' that literature somehow evolves itself out 
of: 'One might think of passages where Heidegger says that people 
think that nothing isn't anything, but in fact it's an occulted 
revelation of being' (in Saluzinsky 1987: 229): 
there is an aspect of what happens to me when I read 
stevens or Shelley or Dickens, which is the experience 
of something to which I could give no name; which, in 
that sense, is nothing, but which at the same time 
seems to be the encounter with something other than 
language which is woven into language and causes these 
effects. It is impossible to talk about this without 
mystification, without the misleading implication that 
you're falling back into some kind of religiosity. 
Nevertheless, that's the way it seems to me. 
(1987: 230) 
Though some will understandably disagree, it seems to me 
that the value of Lacan's psychoanalytic theory here is that it 
allows us for the first time to discuss the source and hidden 
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nature of these mysterious effects of language with the least 
amount of mystification - the least amount, at any rate, that the 
circumstances demand. 
2 
It is true that in many minds, the word 'mysticism' is hardly 
distinct from 'mystification'; it connotes simply some secret, 
vague, remote form of religiose edification, practised perhaps in 
solitary caves or corners of mosques or monasteries, or else in 
the equally cloudy pages of only half-intelligible manuscripts. 
Its adherents are consequently not expected to be particularly 
lucid or much in touch with the world. This popular impression is 
a pity, for, difficult as it is to describe, the mystical 
experience is an entirely concrete one for those who undergo it. 
William James, who was as down-to-earth as an adventurous 
psychologist can be - part of his fame, after all, was as a 
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founder of philosophic Pragmatism - has left a lively account of 
different aspects of the experience in his varieties of Religious 
Experiences: 
The simplest rudiment of mystical experience would seem 
to be that deepened sense of the significance of a 
maxim or formula which occasionally sweeps over one. 
'I've heard that said all my life,' we exclaim, 'but I 
never realized its full meaning till now.' ••• This 
sense of deeper significance is not confined to 
rational propositions. Single words, and conjunctions 
of words, effects of light on land and sea, odours and 
musical sounds, all bring it when the mind is tuned 
aright. Most of us can remember the strangely moving 
power of passages in certain poems read when we were 
very young, irrational doorways as they were through 
which the mystery of fact, the wildness and the pang of 
life, stole into our hearts and thrilled them. The 
words have now perhaps become mere polished surfaces 
for us; but lyric poetry and music are alive and 
significant only in proportion as they fetch these 
vague vistas of a life continuous with our own, 
beckoning and inviting, yet ever eluding our pursuit. 
We are alive or dead to the eternal inner message of 
the arts according as we have kept or lost this 
mystical susceptibility. (in Knight, ed. 9 1950: 208) 
It is instructive to recall the actual line of Wordsworth 
half-submerged in James's text: 'the light that never was, on sea 
or land'; Wordsworth's own mystical poetics will be discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. James actually experimented with nitrous oxide 
in an attempt to reproduce the full quality of the mystical 
experience by chemical means, and is unusually articulate about 
the results: 'Depth upon depth of truth seems revealed to the 
inhaler. This truth fades out, however, or escapes, at the moment 
of coming to'. Despite the evanescence of the state, 'the sense 
of a profound meaning having been there persists': 
Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge 
towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help 
ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote 
of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the 
opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and 
conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were 
melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted 
species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of 
the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the 
genus. and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into 
itself. This is a dark saying, I know, when thus 
expressed in terms of common logic, but I cannot wholly 
escape from its authority. I feel as if it must mean. 
something, something like the hegelian philosphy meatis, 
if one could only lay hold of it more clearly. 
(1950: 211; James's emphasis) 
For all his natural plainness of speech, James encounters here 
the difficulty that attends any description of the heightened 
form of the experience: that it escapes the bounds of words 
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altogether, and is consequently somehow intrinsically 
inexpressible (the Tao Te ching'O, incidentally, begins with the 
line: 'The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao' (Feng and 
English 1973: 3]). One of the reasons for this James gives hints 
of above: it is that the binary oppositions on which speech 
depends are somehow abrogated and merged in the experience. 
The 'wordlessness' or ineffability of the mystic state is 
one of the seven characteristics F.C. Happold" educes to define 
it (Happold 1970: 46). Another, the noetic, is the sense of 
profundity and enhanced meaning the world takes on - which comes 
out well in James's account. Others partially reflected there 
include the consciousness of the Oneness of Everything: the 'All 
in One and One in All' found in many religions with a mystical 
base. We think at once of the way that in Taoism the Ying and 
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Yang stand for the (illusory) opposites of experience drawn out 
of the primal unity. One thinks also of the meaning of Brahma in 
Hindu theology, and of the experience of sunyata12 in Buddhism 
(Hoover 1980: 10) - or else of darsang (Dass 1976: x), the 
revelatory encounter with the Buddha13 • In this context Happold 
quotes the Christian mystic Nicholas of Cusa, to the effect that 
God is found beyond 'the coincidence of contradictories' (1970: 
46) . 
Other characteristics that Happold lists are passivity - the 
sense of grace, a 'something given' - and an impression of 
timelessness that persists in spite of the actual transiency of 
the experience itself. Although according to st John of the Cross 
'the soul has in its power to abandon itself, whenever it wills, 
to this sweet sleep of love' (an opinion that not all mystics 
share), the illumination is not long-lasting (46). 
Lastly, and not least in importance, is the conviction that 
'the familiar phenomenal ego is not the real I' (48). Happold is 
reminded here of the Hindu notion of the atman, the 'deep self' 
that lies hidden behind the mundane personality. Certainly a 
common denominator among mystics is an intuition of the 
contingency and relative worthlessness of the everyday ego, which 
appears to be overwhelmed in a merging of subject and object at 
the highest moment of cosmic consciousness. 
The Neo-platonist Plotinus14 , writing in the first century, 
insists that in this matter 'we are thinking of a soul as 
simultaneously one and many, participant in the nature divided in 
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body, but at the same time a unity by virtue of belonging to that 
order which suffers no division' (Ennead IV.9.3i tr. MacKenna 
1954: 185). Our 'divided' personality is left behind in mystic 
contemplation, for in this state 'we must withdraw from all the 
external, pointed wholly inwardsi no leaning to the outer' 
(Ennead 1.6.3; 1954: 247). with such preparation, the pure 
'lover' is open to his own loss into the One of being: 
all learning left behind, established now in its own 
beauty, the seeker is suddenly swept beyond everything 
by the very crest of the wave of universal mind (nous) 
surging beneath, and is lifted on high, and sees, never 
knowing howi the vision floods the eyes with light but 
it is not a light that shows some other thing; the 
light is itself the vision. (Ennead VI.7.37. My 
emendin~ translation. See MacKenna 1954: 204-5, and 
O'Brien 1964: 28) 
The motif of the contemplative as a 'lover' appears again in 
the ecstatic lyrics of st John of the Cross. Strange as this 
choice of motif might seem in a spiritual context, it should be 
treated neither as a distressing 'symptom' nor, for that matter, 
simply as a poetic conceit - as happens at moments, in a reverse 
way (lovers as disembodied souls), in Donne's 'The Ecstasy'. It 
serves rather to invoke the actual overthrow and merging of all 
opposites in mystical communion; the union of sexes acts as a 
paradigm for the event's other mergings and amalgamations. In 
this very broad sense, the sexual and the spiritual are hardly to 
be seen apart: mystical and sexual are equivalents. 
As Jerzy Peterkiewicz explains st John's 'paradox of 
becoming the other person in love' in his book The Other Side of 
silence: The Poet at the Limits of Language'6: 'The Bride and 
Bridegroom, Esposa and Esposol were familiar representations of 
the soul united in Christl and they communicated their joy in 
passionate dialogue' (Peterkiewicz 1970: 100). 
Oh night that was my guide! 
Oh darkness dearer than the morning's pride, 
Oh night that joined the lover 
To the beloved bride 
Transfiguring them each into the other. 
(tr. campbell'7 1960: 29) 
Lest there should be any doubt I this stanza is from the poem 
entitled 'Songs of the soul in rapture at having arrived at the 
height of perfection, which is union with God by the road of 
spiritual negation' (1960: 27). 
Peterkiewicz aptly describes the state of the poet - any 
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poet - in these circumstances where 'the poet most resembles the 
mystic': 'the words l laid down in lines like a track, end 
abruptly in nowhere' (Peterkiewicz 1970: 97). It is important to 
see that in spite of the theological titles, st John's lyrical 
effusions are first and foremost poems as such I and their poetic 
technique is essential to their effect and meaning, and entirely 
of a piece with the aim of mystical expression. It is Roy 
Campbell's merit as translator to have remained remarkably true 
to the original versification. He enables us to see how st John's 
paradoxical metaphors poignantly evoke the meaning of the loss of 
self he invites - 'change my death to life l even while killing! ' 
(45) - as well as the destruction of everyday wisdom and 
language: 
I entered in, I know not where, 
And I remained, though knowing naught, 
Transcending knowledge with my thought. 
(47) 
It is in the repeated refrain that poetic device and theophanic 
purpose most clearly meet: the effect is to defeat the time-
bound metonymic progression of prose; to undermine, in other 
words,the prose-power of the sense alone: 
The man who truly there has come 
Of his own self must shed the guise; 
Of all he knew before the sum 
Seems far beneath that wondrous prize: 
And in this lore he grows so wise 
That he remains, though knowing naught, 
Transcending knowledge with his thought. 
(47-49) 
The repetitions of the poem function here like a kind of 
'stammering' which impedes and finally subverts 'logocentric' 
verbal directness, in the service of mystical apprehension. 
Tan embedido, 'so drunken-reeling' in Roy Campbell's 
version, is a characteristic phrase. Balbuciendo, 
stammering, goes further in trying to suggest an 
uncertain state between the known language and the 
sudden knowledge without understanding (este saber no 
sabiendo) . (Peterkiewicz 1970: 100) 
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But this 'disruptive' function of repetition cannot be seen 
as limited to st John's practice alone; repetitions are, after 
all, a feature of almost all verse. Interestingly, Peterkiewicz 
will not allow st John to be seen as both a mystic and, 
separately, a poet: 'the image of a disturbed stammerer is 
nearer to the nature of the poet. st. John, reeling drunk with 
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God, hurls his exclamations into mystical night' (Peterkiewicz 
1970: 101). 
st John's 'images of wilful contradiction' (104), images 
like 'luminous darkness' (Ibid.), function in the same way, to 
subvert clarity and ordinary apprehension. As Peterkiewicz puts 
it: 'Perhaps the unknown silence is at its closest to poetic 
truth when mystical opposites become the only language expressing 
the poet's via negationis' (105). Usefully, he quotes Jacob 
Boehme here: 'Every Divine good power has in the hellish 
foundation, as in the No, a contrarium or opposite, in order that 
the Yes or the truth may be known. And thus the darkness, as the 
foundation of God's wrath, has also come into a state of form' 
(104). Mysticism recognises that the binary oppositions of 
language are not ultimate, and may be used to undo each other. 
Another feature of the Saint's poetry is less easily 
demonstrated. It is best described as a curious kind of freshness 
and illumination which somehow informs the 'things' referred to 
once they are 'transferred' into the poetic medium. Peterkiewicz 
interpets this as an almost preternatural precision of language, 
which 'suggests that he acts like a traveller returning from the 
other side [of silence], each object, each word has to be known 
again, for nothing is recognizably familiar' (98) • 
• 
This freedom must surely extend to the language which 
can no longer possess him, even when it is ecstatically 
used .... This explains why some words become reversible 
in order to be precise, as in the paradox of arrimo, 
support, i.e. being without it in the world of things 
and yet having it all the time in God.... (98-9) 
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Significantly, we encounter all these techniques again in 
Wordsworth's poetic practice, with, I would claim, a similar 
mystical intention and effect: the attempted 'supernatural' 
precision and simplicity of the Lyrical Ballads, for example; the 
curiously self-defeating images like 'houseless woods', which 
succeed somehow only in amalgamating the idea of a natural scene 
and a domestic dwelling; the paradoxical phrases ('a light that 
never was, on sea or land'; 'the unimaginable touch of time'); 
the expected and unexpected repetitions, and the recurrent 
'strange fits' of logic and of grammar. 
If it has been instructive to examine the case of a mystic 
who turned to poetry, then as a final case we might consider a 
novelist who in later life delved deeply into the connection 
between art - principally visual art - and mystical experience. 
In his two treatises The Doors of Perception and Heaven and 
Hel118 , Aldous Huxley meditates on the results of his 
experimentation with mescalin. Through the drug he learns that 
what, in religious terms, 'is called "this world" is the universe 
of reduced awareness, expressed and, as it were, petrified by 
language', where man 'is all too apt to take his concepts for 
data, his words for actual things' (Huxley 1970: 20). 
'I have always found,' Blake wrote rather bitterly, 
'that Angels have the vanity to speak of themselves as 
the only wise. This they do with a confident insolence 
sprouting from systematic reasoning.' systematic 
reasoning is something we could not, as a species or as 
individuals, possibly do without. But neither, if we 
are to remain sane, can we possibly do without direct 
perception, the more unsystematic the better, of the 
inner and outer worlds into which we have been born. 
This given reality is an infinite which passes all 
understanding and yet admits of being directly and in 
some sort totally apprehended. It is a transcendence 
belonging to another order than the human, and yet it 
may be present to us as a felt immanence, an 
experienced participation. To be enlightened is to be 
aware, always, of total reality in its immanent 
otherness ••. (62-3) 
Huxley talks of the variety of possible kinds of, at least, 
lower-intensity visionary responses. Some who participate 
discover a world of visionary beauty. To others again 
is revealed the glory, the infinite value and 
meaningfulness of naked existence, of the given, 
unconceptualized event. In the final stage of 
egolessness there is an 'obscure knowledge' that All is 
in all - that All is actually each. This is as near, I 
take it, as a finite mind can ever come to 'perceiving 
everything that is happening everywhere in the 
universe.' (22) 
Huxley's 'neurological' explanation (involving 'perception-
valves', and the like), as well as the special character of his 
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own 'experience', lead him to emphasize the radically new vision 
of physical reality the altered state can bring: 'visual 
impressions are greatly intensified and the eye recovers some of 
the perceptual innocence of childhood, when the sensum was not 
immediately and automatically subordinated to the concept' (21). 
He is moved to speculate that jewels, so prominent on icons and 
in paradisal art, are a kind of 'recollection' of the 
preternatural colours of transcendental awareness: 'precious 
stones are precious because they bear a faint resemblance to the 
glowing marvels seen with the inner eye of the visionary' (84). 
Stained-glass windows are a stimulus of the same order, having a 
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similar transcendental effect (87-8). The widespread use of 
luminous colours in church lighting suggests some recognition by 
religious authorities of the power of jewelled windows to induce 
an appropriately mystical frame of mind. 
In spite of his mention earlier of the first vision of 
childhood, Huxley's physiological explanation inhibits interest 
on his part in explanations of other kinds. He fails to inquire, 
for example, into a possible subjective mental source for these 
enhanced perceptions - such as regression to a prior, infantile 
mode of seeing. As we shall discover, there can be no final and 
satisfactory account of mysticism which excludes the part that 
infant perceptions can continue to play in adult mental life. 
Huxley's account is forceful, however, in its recognition 
that the 'horrific' others ide of this sensory paradise might 
equally be encountered, especially when the unprepared mind is 
overcome by the unbearable rawness of 'too much reality': 
The fear ... was of being overwhelmed, of 
disintegrating under pressure of reality greater than a 
mind, accustomed to living most of the time in a cosy 
world of symbols, could possibly bear. The literature 
of religious experience abounds in references to the 
pains and terrors overwhelming those who have come, too 
suddenly, face to face with some manifestation of the 
Mysterium tremendum .•.. Following Boehme and William 
Law, we may say that, by unregenerate souls, the divine 
Light at its full blaze can be apprehended only as a 
burning, purgatorial fire. An almost identical doctrine 
is to be found in The Tibetan Book of the Dead, where 
the departed soul is described as shrinking in agony 
from the Clear Light of the Void .•• in order to rush 
headlong in to the comforting darkness of selfhood 
(45) 
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Many weighty books have been and will continue to be written on 
Lacan's theory of psychoanalysis. Since this thesis is not about 
Lacan - although it makes use of some of his ideas - a 
comprehensive introduction to his work is beyond its scope. 
Nonetheless it will be necessary to acquaint the reader briefly 
with some terms and central concepts, and then to go on to say 
how they may be adapted to our present needs. 
Lacan's unique insight, as is generally conceded, was that 
all the areas of interest to psychoanalysis are bound up 
inextricably with questions of language: how it is acquired, how 
it functions in the creation of our world, what it is. Since the 
therapy psychoanalysis offers is that of the so-called 'talking 
cure' - it depends entirely on the dialogue between patient and 
analyst - its theory is clearly incomplete without an 
understanding of the psychological function of words. The 
brilliant linguist Roman Jakobson had already suspected that 
there were connections to be made between linguistics and 
Freudian theory19 (Jakobson 1988: 60), but it was Lacan who 
actually married psychoanalysis with the developing science of 
structural linguistics in his remarkable reinterpretation of 
Freud. So fundamental are both language and psychological 
development in shaping our world that this theory has 
implications far beyond its original range. 
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The place to begin is probably with the 'mirror stage'. 
According to Lacan, the moment when the infant gains an idea of 
its own independent existence is crucial. This comes about either 
through imitation, by identifying itself with some other child of 
similar age, or by a 'recognition' of itself in some reflecting 
surface. In each case, there is an identification between the 
subject and some image it takes as its own, as its 'self': 'The 
mirror stage is interesting in that it manifests the affective 
dynamism by which the subject originally identifies himself with 
the visual Gestalt of his own body: in relation to the still very 
profound lack of co-ordination of his own motility, it represents 
an ideal unity, a salutary imago ... ' (Lacan20 1966: 12;tr. 
Lemaire21 1977: 80). 
This union between the child and its image is of course 
illusory, imaginary in Lacan's terms. Before this point of the 
mirror stage there is only an undifferentiated reality, 
containing no true sense of separation between the infant and its 
mother's body: 'Experience of oneself in the earliest stage of 
childhood develops, in so far as it refers to one's similar, from 
a situation experienced as undifferentiated' (1966: 13; tr. 
Lemaire 1977: 79). 
The 'imaginary' mirror stage thus represents a middle, 
transition point between the Real order, where experience was 
unmediated by words, and entry into the Symbolic order, governed 
by language. Thus in the brief space of its first years or months 
the child passes through all three of Lacan's orders: Real, 
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Imaginary and Symbolic. In a sense, it parts company finally with 
none of them, although the last two will dominate its future 
world, to the exclusion of the Real. Its conscious life will be 
determined by its 'imaginary' identifications and by the ordering 
of its environment through the words it learns - from others, 
inevitably. 
Since language is a pre-existent cultural fact to which the 
child must gain access, it acts as a 'third person' of sorts in 
the child's world; Lacan calls this entity 'the Other'. To begin 
with, the father - who, Oedipally, intrudes between the infant 
and its possession of its mother - represents this 'external' 
totality, this Other. In a metaphorical sense, the world of words 
remains under the male sign, a reflection of the power of the 
father's 'Name'. 
Understanding that it must accept the father's rights, since 
it is powerless to do otherwise, is the child's first experience 
of 'law' and 'authority'. These forces are associated also with 
the ordering function of language which the child must come to 
terms with if it is to take up its new (and perhaps somewhat 
unwelcome) existence as a social being: 
In the Oedipus, the child moves from an immediate, non-
distanced relationship with its mother to a mediate 
relationship thanks to its insertions into the symbolic 
order of the Family ... In the Oedipus, the father 
plays the role of the symbolic Law which establishes 
the family triangle by actualizing in his person the 
prohibition of union with the mother. 
(Lemaire 1977: 7) 
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The realisation by the child that he bears his father's name is 
symbolic of his whole relation to society's world of language, 
which is always m,ediated through signs and accompanied by 
prohibitions. Hence Lacan's pun Le Nom-du-Pere/Non-du-Pere. Even 
objects, henceforth - like spoons, cups, rattles, balls ~ are not 
to be pure items of experience, part of the sensory variety of an 
unbroken whole, but must be labelled, placed in a prearranged 
order of use and meaning. It is in this sense that they fall 
under the sign of the phallus, under the father's domination 
(though of course by now the mother is participating in his 
function, too, offering it her support). 
As we have seen, this is a story of separations: from the 
womb, from the mother, from direct and immediate access to 
reality, both physical and emotional. All this is because of 
language, which incarnates the split; for in the sign the 
'signifier' is both distinguished from, and yet determines, what 
is 'signified' - a parallel situation to the mirror stage, where 
the reflected image takes precedence over an intangible reality: 
'We can think of the small child contemplating itself before the 
mirror as a kind of "signifier" ••• and of the image it sees in 
the mirror as a kind of "signified". The image the child sees is 
somehow the "meaning" of itself' (Eagleton22 1983: 166). 
It takes little imagination to appreciate the devastating 
emotional journey represented here. Indeed, 'splitting' (Spaltung 
in Freud's terms) becomes the main motif of the human mental 
world. After all, everything conscious, for this being whose 
whole development is division, begins with 
the trauma of the primordial moment when the body 
senses its split from the Real. This experience can 
neither be included in the Imaginary, the realm of 
illusory wholeness, nor can it be part of the symbolic, 
the domain which grants a conditional identity. The 
traumatic moment can thus return in psychosis as the 
experience of the 'fragmented body', unique for every 
subject, remainder and reminder of this fracture, 
appearing in art as images of grotesque dismemberment -
Lacan cites Bosch. (Wright23 1987: 113) 
Most potently, the subject's own 'self' is not a whole 
entity, but a bundle of innate divisions and contradictions -
however much he might wish to impose the imaginary 'unity' he 
discerns in his signifier, his mirror image. But this imaginary 
self is not really self-subsistent either, for, as part of the 
world of language, it is inseparably tied to 'the field of the 
other'. Hence, 'the subject of the statement', the 'I' we refer 
to when we talk, exists in entire and utter exile from the 'I' 
who speaks, 'the subject of the enunciation', about whom, 
naturally, nothing can be said. 
Lacan goes so far to liken this artificial formation, this 
supposedly unified ego, to a form of neurotic symptom. The ego, 
says Lacan, is itself 
structured like a symptom .... Inside the subject, it 
is nothing other than a privileged symptom. It is the 
human symptom par excellence. The ego is human being's 
mental illness. (Lacan24 197~: 22; tr. Felman 1987: 12) 
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According to Lacan's view of it, desire itself (as opposed 
to the mere 'demand' of, say, natural appetite for a specific 
attainable object) actually comes about directly because of the 
subject's divided state in language, arising from 'the split 
(Spaltung) which the subject undergoes by virtue of being a 
subject only in so far as he speaks' (Lacan 1977: 269). 
Demand always 'bears on something other than the 
satisfaction which it calls for', and each time the 
demand of the child is answered by the satisfaction of 
its needs so this 'something other' is relegated to the 
place of its original impossibility. Lacan terms this 
'desire'. It can be defined as the 'remainder' of the 
subject, something which is always left over, but which 
has no content as such. Desire functions much as the 
zero unit in the numerical chain - its place is both 
constitutive and empty. 
(Rose in Mitchell and Rose25 1982: 32) 
Thus desire itself is an effect of language. It comes into 
being because of an essential 'lack' that the sign represents: 
'the object that is longed for only comes into existence as an 
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object when it is lost to the baby or infant. Thus any 
satisfaction that might subsequently be attained will always 
contain this loss within it' (Mitchell in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 
6). But there is also a deeper lack, the yearning for a lost 
wholeness that was ended by coming into language at all. 
Desire persists as an effect of a primordial absence 
and it therefore indicates that, in this area, there is 
something fundamentally impossible about satisfaction 
itself. It is this process that, to Lacan, lies behind 
Freud's statement that 'We must reckon with the 
possibility that something in the nature of the sexual 
instinct itself is unfavourable to the realisation of 
complete satisfaction'. (Ibid.) 
Man remains a creature tormented by the idea of a lost unity. 
At the same time 'identity' and 'wholeness' remain 
precisely at the level of fantasy. Subjects in language 
persist in their belief that somewhere there is a point 
of certainty, of knowledge and of truth .•• The Other 
appears to hold the 'truth' of the subject and the 
power to make good its loss. But this is the ultimate 
fantasy. (Rose in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 32) 
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The sexual desires themselves participate in this fantasy, 'each 
sex coming to stand, mythically and exclusively, for that which 
could satisfy and complete the other' (1982: 33). 
Because he is lost in language, the goal man desires escapes 
from him eternally along a chain of signifiers which has no end: 
'signification always relates back to another signification' 
(Lacan 1975: 263); the meaning of words mostly turns out, 
metonymically, to be other words. This is only to be expected, 
since '[t]hings only signify within the symbolic order. The 
emergence of the symbol creates a new order of being in the 
relations between humans' and Reality: 'a symbolic order, from 
which the other orders, imaginary and real, take their place and 
are ordered' (Seminaire I, xix, 263; tr. in MacCannel126 1986: 
46) • 
Lacan sums up the subject's state as follows: 
the subject as such is uncertain because he is divided 
by the effects of language. Through the effects of 
speech, the subject always realizes himself more in the 
Other, but he is already pursuing there more than half 
of himself. He will simply find his desire ever more 
divided, pulverized, in the circumscribable metonymy of 
speech. (Lacan 1986: 188) 
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To an extent objects themselves as the 'objects' of desire 
are mere 'hallucinations' (167) of the pleasure principle; they 
are unreal also because we know objects not directly but only as 
picked out by words, as having their set (but not fixed) place in 
the differential order of meaning and desire. It is because 
everyth~ng he wants rests on language that man's desire is always 
'the desire of the Other' (158); though not even the totality of 
language itself could actually satisfy him. 
Object small ~ (as distinct from the large A of L'Autre 
[Other]) is Lacan's term for the thing we 'signify' that we think 
we want. Of course, the self is only one among such word-produced 
objects, 'a privileged object, which has emerged from some primal 
separation, from some self-mutilation induced by the very 
approach of the real, whose name in our algebra, is the objet a' 
(83) • 
This verbal 'uncertainty', this propensity of words to chase 
away from us into the field of meaning, is potentially of great 
use to the poet, however dispiriting it might be to the 
philospher. It is a special freedom which in a way, guarantees 
him his occupation; and, at the same time, sets him and his 
function over and against the normal uses of speech. Because of 
its workings, in the poem it is always the structures themselves 
which determine the exact meanings of the word; just as, on a 
larger scale, 
[t]he word is instituted in the structure of a semantic 
work, that of language. The word never has only one 
use. Every word always has a beyond, sustains several 
functions, envelops several meanings. Behind what 
discourse says, there is what it means (wants to say), 
and behind what it wants to say there is another 
meaning, and this process will never be exhausted. 
(I, xix, 267; tr. in MacCannell 1986: 47) 
In a way, this expansion of meaning infinitely into the 
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unsaid is the unconscious itself, a dimension of the structure of 
the Other: 'The discovery of the unconscious •.. is that the 
implications of meaning infinitely exceed the signs manipulated 
by the individual' (Lacan27 , Seminaire II, 1978; tr. in Felman 
1987: 77). Hence Lacan can say 'the unconscious is outside' 
(Lacan 1986: 123) and also, perhaps less happily, 'the 
unconscious is the discourse of the Other'. 
One might indeed see the unconscious as a kind of poet 
mangue, working in the non-existent 'gap' between words, carrying 
the sliding of language to its extremes of allowed possibility. 
But this cannot happen at random; the unconscious obeys its own 
rules of combination, has its own 'grammar' and rhetoric, 
dependent on condensation (metaphor) and displacement (metonymy). 
Hence Lacan can claim that the 'unconscious is structured like a 
language' (20), producing its own combinations 'quite as 
elaborate as at the level of the conscious' (24). 
The implications of this for criticism are summed up by 
Felman as follows: 'articulated knowledge is by definition what 
cannot exhaust its own self-knowledge' (1987: 77-8): '''It is 
obvious," says Lacan, "that in analytic discourse, what is at 
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stake is nothing other than what can be read; what can be read 
beyond what the subject has been incited to say'" (Felman 1987: 
21; reference from Le Seminaire XX, 1975: 29, Felman's 
translation). And yet there are rules for criticism, too: not all 
interpretations are possible, Lacan says; only those 'that must 
not be missed' (1986: 250). 
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It must be evident how applicable Lacan's model of psychic life 
is to any discussion of mysticism. For both Lacan and the mystic, 
objects as such belong to a partly illusory screen of 
appearances. Bearing only a contingent reality, they are not 
reality itself. Language, too, is seen as a closed system, unable 
to contain or communicate anything - any reality - outside its 
own system of differences. Both psychoanalyst and mystic are 
opposed to 'systematic' knowledge, whether of language or idea. 
Above all, for both figures the everyday self has no ultimate 
validity; for the mystic, indeed, it may be discarded and 
forgotten in the ultimate moment of cosmic consciousness. 
On the other hand, one probable point of difference between 
Lacan and the mystic lies in the use that may be made of such 
knowledge. It would not really be proper, to Lacan's way of 
thought, to speak of a 'higher' reality; especially one that 
might, in principle, be accessible in some other way than -
perhaps - through mystical experience. So long as we think or 
talk - or act or perceive - we are part of the system of signs: 
we must hear the irrepressible cries that arise from 
the best as well as the worst, attempting to bring them 
back to the beginning of the chase, with the words that 
truth has given us as viaticum: 'I speak,' adding; 
'There is no other speech but language.' The rest is 
drowned in their tumult. 
'Logomachia!' goes the strophe on one side. 'What 
are you doing with the preverbal, gesture and mime, 
tone, and tune of a song ... ? To which others no less 
animated give the antistrophe: 'Everything is language: 
language when my heart beats faster when I'm in a funk, 
and if my patient flinches at the throbbing of an 
aeroplane at its zenith it is a way of saying how she 
remembers the last bomb attack.' (1977: 124) 
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From every point of view there is no other reality, so long as we 
are using speech to talk about it. Hence the Real must be defined 
'as the impossible', Lacan underlines (1986: 167). 
And yet as the only available or promising 'place' to locate 
the mystical experience (and of course, by using these spatial 
terms we are already being metaphorical and hence, in this 
context, inaccurate; we are already bumping our heads against the 
limits of language) we are bound to investigate Lacan's concept 
of the Real. 
According to Benvenuto and Kennedy28 
The Real seems to include the domain of the 
inexpressible, of what cannot be symbolized, and to be 
the Order where the subject meets with death and 
inexpressible enjoyment .... It also seems to be 
connected to nature, as a 'brute external force' that 
has to be controlled 
(Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 166) 
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We see that 'the Real' is to Lacan essentially that domain 
which we know by inference to exist 'outside life', insofar as 
life is what is known and constructed through the medium of 
words. The Real is both 'the impossible' (Lacan 1986: 167) - and 
also, interestingly, the inevitable point of return: the 'real is 
that which always comes back to the same place - to the place 
where the subject in so far as he thinks .•• does not meet it' 
(49). since the Real (in spite of all we say) does exist, it will 
have its way: in the end, words will find themselves stumbling 
over it 'in the dark', so to speak - without ever effecting its 
appropriation. 
Hence the link between brute nature - that area physicists 
try to delimit and predict through their formulae - and death. 
Death marks the limit of life and is as inexpressible as is 
jouissance, some of whose character it is traditionally held to 
share. The Elizabethans, in seeing sexual ecstasy as akin to a 
dying, were simply acknowledging the irremediable elusiveness of 
both states, states that evade equally the powers of human 
thought and language. 
Lacan's former pupil Catherine Clement29 notes some 
additional ways in which the Real may be expressed: the Real 
'does not wait, and in particular does not wait for the 
subject, since it expects nothing from speech' (Ecrits 
1966: 388). It is 'a punctuation without a text,' pure 
act, raw behaviour, sudden and unfettered. 'It is 
identical with its existence, noise from which one can 
hear everything, and ready to demolish what the 
"reality principle" constructs under the name external 
world' (Ibid.) .... The Lancanian (sic) concept of the 
Real, then, partakes of both the Id's disconcerting and 
unpredictable powers - always ahead of its time - and 
the terrifying archaic images associated with the 
Mother. (Clement 1983: 169) 
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So, obviously and inevitably, there are many different ways 
of approaching the entity in question, and no single means of 
gaining a clear idea of it. Lacan, the interpreter of dreams, 
suggests a helpful analogy: that we could, if we wished, 'see the 
dream as the counterpart of the representation' (Lacan 1986: 60), 
as the equivalent of our waking word-bound perception (although 
we cannot of course wake from this 'waking' as we can from the 
dream). If so, then the 'real has to be sought beyond the dream -
in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us, behind the lack 
of representation of which there is only one representative'; 
i.e. its remainder, the image, the signifier. This hidden element 
of the Real is something like Freud's 'kernel of our being' (Kern 
unseres Wesens), the point 'where the dream reaches down into the 
unknown' (Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 176). 
The real may be represented by the accident, the noise, 
the small element of reality, which is evidence that we 
are not dreaming. But, on the other hand, this reality 
is not so small, for what wakes us is the other reality 
hidden behind the lack of that which takes the place of 
representation •.. (1986: 60) 
And yet Lacan's meaning still remains elusive, his 
expressions as delphic as ever. Is he alluding to Sleeping 
Beauty, woken only by desire? Or passing hints about the source 
of the Freudian 'total drive'? No doubt in this nearly 
unspeakable region ambivalent and 'tricky' speech is the only 
appropriate kind. 
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What we are justified in concluding, however, is that, 
phenomenologically speaking, Reality is neither purely mental or 
physical, psychological or natural, but something having the 
force of both; it is somewhere where these verbal oppositions no 
longer apply. 
Given all this information, what should we conclude? Is the 
Real then the site of the mystical experience? What Lacan himself 
would almost certainly tell us is that we cannot properly say. 
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Chapter 1: LACAN AND MYSTICISM. 
As it happens, in the final decade of his life Lacan turned in 
his seminars to matters bearing directly on the mystical 
experience. The first section of this chapter is to be devoted 
to a brief account of Lacan's twentieth seminar series, which 
he deliyered from 1972 to 1973. It was published in 1975 as 
Encore1 • I shall be concentrating especially on chapters 6 and 
7, entitled 'God and the Jouissance of T99 Woman' (note that 
the final 'The' [La] is printed with a slash, i.e. crossed 
out) and 'A Love Letter', respectively. These chapters have 
been translated by Jacqueline Rose2 (in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 
137-161), and I shall mainly be using her version of the text. 
In this late work Lacan turned to the topic of Woman's 
status in the symbolic world, exploring the way the feminine 
is recognised and figured by the language system. In the 
seminars of his last decade Lacan seems to be pushing 
psychoanalysis to its limits - to the limits of what may 
intelligibly be said about the human psyche. Thus his approach 
here is even more than usually provisional and experimental: 
an attempt - as if from a Pisgah mount - to sketch outlines of 
future directions of psychoanalytic thought. What is of 
special interest to our present purposes is that this project 
led Lacan to important statements about mysticism and the 
ultimate Reality of the mystics - which is, in his view, 
associated with the 'feminine' aspect, the non-existent 
beyond, of language. Perhaps most surprising of all these 
statements, to some eyes, is his announcement that the mystic 
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writings are 'neither idle gossip nor mere verbiage, in fact 
they are the best thing you can read - note right at the 
bottom of the page, Add the Ecrits of Jacques Lacan, which is 
of the same order' (1982: 147). 
The ironic and paradoxical language in which these 
seminars are couched has led to often very divergent 
interpretations of them - as, I am sure, was actually Lacan's 
intention. Many find themselves uncertain whether he is 
debunking the idea of a distinct and separate feminine 
identity, or acting in complicity with the proponents of such 
psycho-sexual 'essences'. The truth is that he is actually 
doing both; for after all his statements come from what in his 
view are the very limits of what can be said. And the right 
(though unsayable) attitude is that both perspectives are 
correct; which view we happen to uphold is determined by where 
we stand to view the question. 
If, for example, we choose to adopt the standpoint of 
language itself (which, in a sense, we must, for we are 
language), then to speak of a beyond is nonsense - and to 
associate this 'beyond' with femininity only compounds the 
absurdity. For, from the point of view of language - and hence 
of anyone, male or female, who speaks from a position 'inside' 
language - what cannot possibly be articulated cannot be 
conceived. In effect, it does not exist. 
Such an argument is effectively impugnable: it is 
entirely consistent and logically complete - provided that we 
take language as our starting-point and our only sure ground. 
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Yet, on the other hand, there are those who suspect that 
since language is human-created, it cannot possibly be suited 
to circumscribe the whole of reality, or adequately convey all 
the kinds of experience there are or possibly could be. Some 
confirmation of their view comes from such unexpected sources 
as quantum physics, which itself encounters a microworld which 
ordinary language and logic cannot adequately describe. 
The real difficulty for such persons arises when, acting 
on their suspicions, they rashly ignore Lacan's warnings and 
try to do the impossible, to see beyond the bounds of 
language. What they encounter there may not even be a 
'nothing', exactly. There may actually be 'something' there, a 
something which resembles the traditional domain of the 
mystics - which Lacan himself acknowledges. The problem is, 
they see what cannot be said - and they can tell us nothing 
precise about it, for it is by definition 'beyond all words'. 
Lacan admits that the difficulty we find ourselves in is 
not 'mere verbiage', or easily dismissible, as we might hope. 
Benvenuto and Kennedy account for this 'double' or equivocal 
position of his in Encore as follows: 
Lacan considered that the search for the origins of 
the subject, or what he ambiguously called the 
'limit experience of the non-existent' (what is not 
created by language), had led many analysts to jump 
off the tracks of language. In the search for the 
'pure feeling' which corresponded to the search for 
the thing-in-itself, they found themselves running 
deperately from one infantile phantom to another. In 
Lacan's view this desperate quest, which represented 
a turning away from what can be represented, could 
only come to a halt in front of the mysterious Real 
Order, the order where life meets only death and 
enjoyment. But the Real Order cannot be spoken 
about, for it does not belong to language. Even 
though he may speak, the subject is not allowed to 
know about his beginningsj he can only describe a 
chain of discourse around the Real which always 
slips away from it. All human knowledge according to 
Lacan is built on this 'ignorance', or what he 
described in partly philosophical terms as 'the 
original repression of the experience of not-being'. 
After birth the visible world dominates, and 
one can say that sight guarantees the existence of 
things over what cannot be seen. Thus the visibility 
of the phallus predominates over the black hole of 
the female genitals. The phallus would seem to 
represent the knowledge of the world, and the vagina 
another knowledge, or rather what Lacan called a 
'not-knowledge'. The phallic function includes the 
woman as a contingency, a part singled out within 
'the gates', or 'the bars' of the feminine side, the 
'dark side'. The place of the subject's origin (in 
the woman) is barred, or repressed. The woman 
functions as 'not-all' (pas-toute) .•. 
(Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 186) 
So Lacan's own recourse to ambivalent and oblique 
language in order to articulate the truth about our 
psychological situation, is something forced upon him by the 
limitations of words themselves, by the fact that he is 
obliged to straddle a paradox when discussing the mystical 
experience and its origins. (But when, in a sense, was he not 
in this position? Perhaps we have simply worked our way down 
to the most fundamental of paradoxes, that on which all the 
others rest.) 
Thus the awkwardness, the ambiguity, the paradoxicality, 
arise because he is attempting to address the nature of the 
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beyond of language from a standpoint still within its borders. 
And as a scientist, a researcher, the heir of Freud's 
rationalism, he is surely bound to adopt the necessary 
prejudices of the symbolic along with its perspective. As if 
to emphasize this necessity, he indeed sometimes slips into an 
almost chauvinistic tone when talking of the 'Woman', the 
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'feminine', whose ethos pervades this condition of being 
'beyond language'. (Read in the way I suggest, the Encore 
essays, with all their apparent chauvinism, actually become a 
remarkable and unique triumph of half-ironic style.) 
In the extract above, Benvenuto and Kennedy allow us to 
see why it is that the mystical experience should happen to be 
inscribed on the 'female' side. If the experience actually 
involves a regression to a time in everyone's private history 
when words are not yet the main agents in the sUbjective 
construction of reality, then this is also a time when the 
mother's influence is paramount: indeed at this stage the 
child - of either sex - cannot yet differentiate him/her self 
from the mother's being. To attach a 'female' character to the 
wordless 'not-knowledge' of the mystics is also appropriate in 
other ways: symbolically speaking, the 'absence' or 'black 
hole' of the female genitals contrasts with the perhaps even 
too-assertive 'presence' of the male phallus; while, on their 
side, words are constantly offering us a similar illusion of 
presence, a promise which they cannot actually fulfil. Again, 
since after the Oedipal event words are associated with the 
'Name of the Father', with 'male' law and authority, it seems 
entirely fitting that the pre-verbal realm should somehow be 
seen as a specifically 'female' domain. 
These connections may not be exclusively metaphorical or 
metonymic ones, in the event - though they are, of course, 
largely that. It may be that Lacan is actually tapping a 
profound source of influence on the way our culture 
perennially interprets ideas of 'masculinity' and 
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'femininity'. Perhaps the Jungian 'animus' and 'anima' have 
their true source in subliminal responses to these 
psychological relations. Into this area, however, Lacan 
refuses to be drawn. He remains indefatigably paradoxical in 
his treatment of such subjects. 
Despite his apparent adoption of the 'phallogocentric' 
point of view in Encore (and his seemingly cock-sure support 
for the supremacy of words) there is a hidden counter-meaning 
which arises - because, I think, at the very same time, his 
judgment, his intuition, rather wickedly and perversely 
encourage him to enroll himself on a different, perhaps even a 
superior side: the side of the woman, which does not, properly 
speaking, exist - or, at least, 'not-all' of it does. 'On the 
whole one takes up this side by choice - women being free to 
do so if they so choose' (143): for, as Virginia Woolf also 
maintained nearly fifty years earlier, biological gender has 
nothing to do with psychological 'sexual' temperament; it 
cannot predetermine the gender divisions of the psyche: 
when any speaking being whatever lines up under the 
banner of women it is by being constituted as not 
all that they are placed within the phallic 
function. It is this that defines the •.. the 
what? - the woman precisely, except that The woman 
can only be written with The crossed through. There 
is no such thing as The woman ... of her essence, 
she is not all. (144) 
A very good example of a male who made the 'feminine' 
identification, in Lacan's view, is st. John of the Cross. His 
example is also useful for Lacan in so far as it adumbrates 
and encapsulates many elements of what he intends to discuss 
in these Encore seminars: 
The mystical ... is something serious, which a few 
people teach us about, and most often women or 
highly gifted people like Saint John of the Cross -
since, when you are male, you •.. can also put 
yourself on the side of not-all. There are men who 
are just as good as women. It does happen. And who 
therefore feel just as good. Despite, I won't say 
their phallus, despite what encumbers them on that 
score, they get the idea, they sense that there must 
be a jouissance which goes beyond. That is what we 
call a mystic. (147) 
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Lacan raises discussion of the concept of the feminine orgasm 
vastly above the rather unfortunate level at which Freud left 
it - though, of course, Lacan does not want us to suppose that 
he is literally or exclusively discussing women's bodily 
sensations: indeed, most of what he says is meant 
symbolically. Much of the time, he is rather impishly playing, 
for his own symbolic purposes, with popular ideas of the 
different quality or duration of the female orgasm. On the 
other hand, perhaps he really does wish to imply that there is 
a separate, a 'masculine' or a 'feminine', way of being in 
orgasm. What might differ here would not be precisely the 
sensations involved, but the attitudes and expectations that 
precede them. The 'feminine' way of experiencing orgasm, then, 
might relate it not to power or domination but to a form of 
mystical transcendence. 
Whatever the context, for him the true feminine ecstasy 
is that which entirely escapes the domain of the phallus, 
associated symbolically with the signifier, with language, and 
hence with the Other and the domination of Culture. It is, 
potentially, a different realm of being: an impermissible 
supplement to the symbolic order; 'a supplementary jouissance 
(144)', the nature of which is radically Other to the very 
nature of speech. 
There is a jouissance, since we are dealing with 
jouissance, a jouissance of the body which is, if 
the expression be allowed, beyond the phallus. That 
would be pretty good and it would give a different 
substance to the WLM [Women's Liberation Movement]. 
A jouissance beyond the phallus ..•• (145) 
This unique mode of experience belongs to a 'her', then, 
which is not precisely identifiable with all the female sex: 
this 'her', after all, is a '''her'' which does not exist and 
which signifies nothing' (145). Indeed, strictly speaking, 
'she' knows nothing - and certainly can say nothing - about 
'it'; and then, it 'does not happen to all of them' (Ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the psychological feminine only has meaning at 
all in relation to this jouissance, this ecstasy beyond all 
speaking: 
There is woman only as excluded by the nature of 
things which is the nature of words, and it has to 
be said that if there is one thing they themselves 
are complaining about enough at the moment, it is 
well and truly that - only they don't know what they 
are saying, which is all the difference between them 
and me. (144) 
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Lacan's jibe is as multilayered as ever. He 'knows what he is 
talking about' as representative of the phallus and language, 
which women don't; and yet 'all the difference' between the 
woman's position and his own is simply that he 'knows' (even 
if he can't exactly say) where the 'feminine' stands in 
relation to discourse. As it happens, just while he is 
realising the shortcomings of the world of words and of 
material culture, and the corresponding importance of the 
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'feminine' beyond it, women themselves are clamouring for a 
larger stake in the power-relations of the formerly masculine 
state. wryly he implies that, aside from his 'masculine' aim 
of advancing conceptual knowledge by specifying the feminine 
domain, he places himself on the Woman's side - whatever 
actual women may be doing or desiring. 
The difficulties of expression uncovered here are after 
all nothing new in Lacan. It is clear we are coming close to 
the source of the mi-dire, the 'half-speak' he has used 
throughout his career, partly in imitation of the writings of 
the female paranoiacs whom he studied at its start: Marcelle, 
Aimee, and the notorious Papin sisters. Catherine Clement 
draws together the two phases - clinician and lecturer - of 
Lacan's history according to just this theme: 
From the mystic to the madman is but a stone's throw 
..• Thus it was logical that Lacan should have begun 
this thinking with insane women - and the logic of 
that choice became more and more evident with each 
new page that he wrote and each new word that he 
uttered. He never stopped thinking about women: 
Hadewijch of Antwerp followed Marcelle, Saint 
Theresa followed the Papin sisters - always the 
women were the same. Whether locked up in hospitals 
where Lacan discovered them or sanctified by a 
tradition that idealized them even as it 
misunderstood them, 'inspired' women inspired Lacan 
throughout his long life. This was one of his 
principal lives: the most enigmatic, most difficult, 
and most recalcitrant of all, just like female 
ecstasy (jouissance), with which Lacan, in declaring 
himself to be a mystic, sought to identify himself 
••• The mystics who aroused Lacan's interest [at 
first] were of a quite different sort [from the 
Beguines or Bernadette of Lisieux]. Their raptures 
were criminal; their pleasures took the form of 
actions. Aimee and the Papin sisters were insane and 
they were mystics, but they were also criminals. 
(Clement 1983: 66-7) 
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What the extract above clarifies for us is the nature of 
an essential difference between Lacan's approach and Freud's; 
this difference seems to lie in a certain ambiguity in Lacan's 
professed respect for rationality. Profound conceptual thinker 
and clinical doctor that he was, there was an anarchic strain 
in his dealings with authority and order that is not found in 
Freud, who is entirely on the side of the civilising superego. 
This temperamental gulf is discernable in the qualitative 
differences in their styles. According to Clement, Lacan -
this man 'who searched for the correct distance' - was 
actually obsessed 'by the love of madness throughout his life' 
(78); and though he was a kind of mystic as well as a healer, 
'Mysticism is incompatible with maintaining the correct 
distance'. 
It is women especially who are popularly associated with 
the inability to 'maintain the correct distance'; and Lacan's 
identification with the Woman is carried into his mi-dire, the 
subversion of his own language. This necessarily involves the 
relation of his speech to truth, through the knowledge that 
there is more to truth than can be spoken. Medire, upon which 
mid ire puns, is after all the French word for 'slander' (35): 
'I tell the truth - not the whole truth.' When the 
truth is conceived 'whole,' it cannnot be anything 
but the complement of the man. But the truth is not 
'the whole truth,' it eludes the grasp of man, his 
culture, and his language. And since any privation 
dialectically entails a 'surplus,' since to assert 
without negation and to assert by means of a double 
negative are not the same thing, if women [sic] is 
not 'the whole truth' she will enjoy a privilege 
that men lack. To tell the truth, she will enjoy -
simply that. For the 'surplus,' which Lacan says is 
a supplement rather than a complement, is female 
orgasm (jouissance). (Clement 1983: 63) 
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But clearly this jouissance - though it is 'of the body' - is 
not a matter of the sexual organs. It is, however, sexual in 
the sense that everything that relates to the human identity 
has a sexual origin, in the primal relation of the infant to 
its mother or father. In this context (it needs, finally, to 
be said) 'sexual' simply refers to a desire involving, 
potentially, the whole being. And in the mystical ecstasy the 
whole being of the mystic is absorbed and transformed; the 
ordinary 'self' is seen for the small thing it is and left 
behind. 
Hence Lacan is correct in identifying this special kind 
of ecstasy as sexual, in essence: a plus-de-jouir (meaning, 
significantly, both 'surplus joy' and 'no more enjoyment': for 
in a sense it is non-existent). Though mysticism and sexuality 
seem far apart, the cases of the mystic women Hadewijch of 
Antwerp or Saint Theresa show many signs of the connection: 
As regards the Hadewijch in question, it is the same 
as for Saint Theresa - you only have to go and look 
at Bernini's statue in Rome to understand 
immediately that she's coming, there is no doubt 
about it. And what is her jouissance, her coming 
from? It is clear that the essential testimony of 
the mystics is that they are experiencing it but 
know nothing about it. (1982: 147) 
Lacan omits to discuss certain other features of 
Bernini's sculpture, the 'Ecstasy of st T[h]eresa' - such as, 
for example, the piercing dart being administered by an oddly 
smiling - even smirking - pre-adolescent cherub. Yet such 
elements are perhaps just as relevant to our understanding of 
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the work. For it is in the emblem of returning childhood - the 
amoral pre-Oedipal realm before knowledge of good and evil -
that we may find hints of the source of Teresa's heavenly 
transport. (Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the 
infant cherubs in art always function with this significance: 
they are primal messengers, psychopomps, from 'other' realms 
of being, which also exist outside [before] speech.) So this 
is, we may say, where Theresa comes from, in every sense. 
In view of this meaning (though Lacan avoids its precise 
articulation), to talk of mystical spirituality simply as 
sexual 'sublimation' would be a vast over-reduction: 
What was tried at the end of the last century, at 
the time of Freud, by all kinds of worthy people in 
the circle of Charcot and the rest, was an attempt 
to reduce the mystical to questions of fucking. If 
you look carefully, that is not what it is all 
about. Might not this jouissance which one 
experiences and knows nothing of, be that which puts 
us on the path of ex-istence? And why not interpret 
one face of the Other, the God Face, as supported by 
feminine jouissance? (1982: 147) 
·The Heideggerian-sounding term 'ex-istence' seems at once 
to imply both our coming into being as 'selves' from a prior 
undifferentiated pleroma, as well as the contrary possibility 
of 'ex-iting' from this present plane of supposed reality in 
the manner of the mystics. In other words, it betrays all the 
inevitable paradoxicality characterising Lacan's broad stance. 
Catherine Clement correctly underlines that Lacan 
properly belongs among that auspicious list of thinkers 'for 
whom mysticism and religion have nothing to do with each 
other' (1983: 66). The most Lacan will admit about God's 
existence is contained in his announcement that 'God is 
unconscious' (Lacan 1986: 59). However, we must note that in 
stating this he is self-consciously placing himself in 
opposition to Nietzsche's 'myth of the God is dead - which, 
personally, I feel much less sure about, as a myth of course, 
than most contemporary intellectuals, which is in no sense a 
declaration of theism, nor of faith in the resurrection' 
(1986: 27). Indeed, Lacan sees considerable affinity between 
psychoanalysis and 'the religious register': 
there is no doubt some affinity between the research 
that seeks and the religious register. In the 
religious register, the phrase is often used - You 
would not seek me if you had not already found me 
[sic]. The already found is already behind, but 
stricken by something like oblivion. Is it not, 
then, a complaisant, endless search that is then 
opened up? (1986: 7) 
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Here again we find the suggestion that it is into the deep 
past, rather than into an unknown future, that we must look in 
order to appreciate the force and power of religious leanings. 
That God is unconscious in Lacan's reckoning, implies no 
loss of power on His part - rather the reverse, in fact. If 
the unconscious is 'the discourse of the Other', then, in a 
sense, God is the Other, or, at least, an aspect of the Other. 
In this guise he 'lays down the law', just as the Other does: 
'That the symbolic is the support of that which was made into 
God, is beyond doubt' (1982: 154). 
But God's being is not entirely exhausted by this 
formulation - especially if one takes the desire of mystics 
into account. It is clearly not this God they are relating to, 
the God who determines language; hence the paradox: 'one can 
see that while this may not make for two Gods, nor does it 
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make for one alone' (1982: 147). It is clear that this other 
mystical God-face - whose exact location remains unexplained -
is closer to the Aristotelian 'unmoved mover' than it is to 
the judgmental God of the Old Testament: 
it becomes clear that the supreme Being, which is 
manifestly mythical in Aristotle, the immobile 
sphere from which originate all movements, whether 
ch~nges, engenderings, movements, translations or 
whatever, is situated in the place, the opaque place 
of the jouissance of the Other - that Other which, 
if she existed, the woman might be. It is in so far 
as her jouissance is radically Other that the woman 
has a relation to God ... (153) 
I shall have to leave detailed discussion of the existence of 
these not-quite-two Gods to my chapters on 'Occult Fiction' 
(Chs. 8 and 9), where their joint bearings and ramifications 
should become plain. Suffice it to say that they appear there 
in a very different character, whose natures are prefigured in 
Lacan's mysterious statements of 1964 upon the dark Other: 
the offering to obscure gods of an object of 
sacrifice is something to which few subjects can 
resist succumbing, as if under some monstrous spell. 
Ignorance, indifference, an averting of the eyes may 
explain beneath what veil this mystery still remains 
hidden. But for whoever is capable of turning a 
courageous gaze towards this phenomenon - and, once 
again, there are certainly few who do not succumb to 
the fascination of the sacrifice in itself - the 
sacrifice signifies that, in the object of our 
desires, we try to find evidence for the presence of 
the desire of this Other that I call here the dark 
God. (1986: 275) 
Whatever may be said of battles among the gods, it is 
certain that in our own experience we find two principles at 
war when it comes to this question of the jouissancei indeed, 
two kinds of jouissance whose opposition might surprise us. We 
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find that phallic enjoyment attempts to circumscribe and 
exclude the alien feminine ecstasy, at its very heart. 
The difference between these varieties of bliss is well 
characterised by Jacqueline Rose: 'In relation to the earlier 
texts we could say that woman no longer masquerades, she 
defaults: "the jouissance of the woman does not go without 
saying, that is, without the saying of truth", whereas for the 
man "his jouissance suffices which is precisely why he 
understands nothing'" (Reference from Seminar XXI, vii: 16; 
Rose in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 53). This 'defaulting' from 
the symbolic is something that male enjoyment will hardly 
tolerate; and, after all, it is the phallus that signifies. 
Nonetheless, in spite of all its self-importance, Lacan 
is hardly complimentary with regard to the pleasure of this 
phallus which upholds the signifying function. Indeed, he 
actually has this to say: 'phallic jouissance. What is it? -
other than this, sufficiently stressed by the importance of 
masturbation in our practice, the jouissance of the idiot' 
(1982: 152). 
We see how the phallus and its representatives, to whom 
authority, precedent, and the maintenance of law are 
paramount, will do all in their power to extirpate this 
enjoyment which should not exist. That they will excommunicate 
that which puts all their structures in question, goes without 
saying. Benvenuto and Kennedy outline the situation thus: 
Lacan explains the woman's enjoyment as having a 
something extra, supplementary, 'encore! '. She has a 
surplus of enjoyment which cannot be integrated into 
language, unless it is placed under a prohibition, 
such as the law of castration .•.. The surplus of 
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enjoyment left over by language becomes the 
unconfessable crime which is pursued by the law of 
the father, who is the upholder of the phallus as 
legislative power. The law looks for the truth, but 
only to put it behind bars, to keep truth on the 
run, from one signifier to another; the truth 
retreats and re-appears like a mirror-image, a 
semblant, it moves in and out like waves lapping on 
the shore, still it goes on, encore ..• disguised, 
mute, fading away, ungraspable. 
(Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 190-1) 
The 'bars' mentioned are of course the typographical bars 
dividing signifier from signified. In its attempts to 'hold 
down' the sliding of the signified beneath it, the signifier 
sees its greatest threat in a jouissance which seeks to escape 
its limits entirely. 'The linguistic bar between signifier and 
signified now comes to take on a new meaning - the subject is 
barred to jouissance' (Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 180). 
Because 'accomplished discourse, incarnation of absolute 
knowledge, is the instrument of power, the sceptre and the 
property of those who know' (Lacan Seminar 113 ; tr. MacCannel14 
1986: 7), in its guise as power, the control of the signifier 
is - albeit unconsciously - ranged against this intruder, this 
'feminine' experience of being which defies its absolute rule 
and authority. 
This state of affairs is compounded by the fact that 
'[t]here is, as Lacan rightly pointed out, a disquieting 
ignorance about feminine sexuality, almost as if such 
ignorance were something inherent in language itself' (1986: 
189): women, even women analysts, do not seem readily capable 
of analysing what constitutes their 'difference'. Lacan 
suggests that this is because that difference is centred in 
what escapes language altogether. 
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Thus from the start there seems something dangerous about 
female jouissance, this form of enjoyment which inherently 
defies linguistic expression. What is especially interesting 
in this is that it is pleasure itself - including the male 
variety of jouissance - which is set against its extraordinary 
counterpart. We are speaking here of the Pleasure Principle of 
Freud, that which goes to sustain the Ego - which is itself 
nothing but the creation of its own pleasures. And, of course, 
mystical jouissance is threatening to the self and its 
existence: 'For it is pleasure that sets the limits on 
jouissance, pleasure as that which binds incoherent life 
together, until another, unchallengeable prohibition arises': 
the law of the Father, which channels pleasure into socially 
appropiate forms (Lacan 1977: 319). 
Pleasure, for Lacan, is bound to desire as a defence 
against Jouissance, and is a prohibition against 
going beyond a certain limit of jouissance. 
Jouissance, like death, represents something whose 
limits cannot be overcome. In Lacan's thought the 
'other' of life, the negativity to be overcome, non-
being (in Freudian terms the death drive) 
paradoxically becomes the centre of life. 
(Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 179) 
It may be because it is innately 'unlimited', without 
bounds, that jouissance poses a threat to the borders and 
boundaries of the rational conceptual world. Its ultimate 
limits are unbreachable only because they cannot be 
discovered. In this, once again, it notably resembles the 
state of death. 
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It is because of the wide disparity between the two kinds 
of enjoyment that Lacan makes the astonishing declaration that 
there is no sexual relation. 
After all, for the two varieties of jouissance to 
interrelate there would have to be a crossing over the line of 
language into its beyond, which is impossible. Again, there 
is no sexual relation because, owing to the dominance of the 
phallic signifier in our everyday lives, in sex it is the 
clothes, the signifiers, that relate, not the people. The 
situation - where people relate sexually to images, not the 
humans behind them - is like the story of picasso's parrot, 
who bonded with its master's clothes: 
. , Pro-menade: Clothes - that prom1ses la menade; take 
them off and you have the menade [Bacchante]. To 
enjoy the body when it has no clothes on leaves 
intact the question of what makes the One, i.e. the 
question of identification. All love is like the 
parakeet, who identified with picasso's clothing. 
(XX, Encore,. i, 12; tr. in MacCannel1 51-2) 
As this extract indicates, the question of the sexual 
relation brings into prominence the problem of the 'One'. What 
real meaning can 'one' have in this relationless context? 
certainly, the appeal of the woman - 'as the object which 
envelopes an absence, the lack of the phallus - unchains the 
desire to be One again. But, as Lacan understood it, sexual 
intercourse does not work for the lovers of One' (Benvenuto 
and Kennedy 1986: 187). (We shall have to return to this 
important problem of the One in the following section.) 
As Lacan's 'promenade' statement indicates, woman is not 
man's complement, but his supplement - and that is very 
different. Beneath the outward signifiers of our culture 
(indeed, few items could better represent the relations of 
individual and Other than our clothes, those products of the 
external dictates of fashion and display which still we call 
our own) lies not our individual embodied self, but only the 
unpredictable and chaotic frenzy of the maenad: the infinite 
and unknowable feminine bacchante, whose dance denies all 
individuation. 
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'Lacan has discovered that [what we ordinarily talk of 
as] sexuality exists only at the level of representation 
Lacan writes that we can never know the body except as a form, 
or figure' (MacCannell 1986: 52). In other words, the body -
at least whenever we think about it - is itself only known to 
us as a representation - not, as we thought, something 
continuous with our very self. 
Yet the very selves we mean when we speak of ourselves or 
others have very little more than the status of clothes - they 
too are representations, signifiers, part of the world of 
language which is not that of the Real. Beneath this level of 
words lies only the Lust-Ich: he who speaks, but about whom 
nothing can really be known (the enunciating subject); and, of 
course, the hidden side of his desire. In his statement above, 
Lacan gives us every reason to believe that this desire 
(impossible desire before any 'object') should itself be 
characterised as feminine, as having the femininity of the 
maenad. 
The 'absence' that characterises the true sexual 
relation, then, is encountered in analytic practice only as 'a 
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resistance, the silence which represents the impossibility of 
knowing or speaking' (Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986: 184): 'The 
analytic discourse keeps bumping into an empty space, the area 
excluded by language'(Ibid.). 
This feminine 'difference' that Lacan locates has 
inspired some of his female pupils - such as Michelle 
Montrelay5, Luce Irigaray6 and, to an extent, Julia Kristeva7 
(insofar as she wishes for a 'regressive extinction of 
symbolic capabilities' [Kristeva 1980: 270J) - to valorize the 
role of the pre-Oedipal mother in this regard, as emblem of 
this radically 'different' existence: 
The objective is to retrieve the woman from the 
dominance of the phallic term and from language at 
one and the same time. What this means is that 
femininity is assigned to a point of origin prior to 
the mark of symbolic difference and the law. The 
privileged relationship of women to that origin 
gives them access to an archaic form of expressivity 
outside the circuit of linguistic exchange. This 
point of origin is in the maternal body, an 
undifferentiated space, and yet one in which the 
girl child recognises herself. The girl then has to 
suppress or devalue that fullness of recognition in 
order to line up within the order of the phallic 
term .... Women are returned, therefore, in the 
account and to each other - against the phallic term 
but also against the loss of origin which Lacan's 
account is seen to imply. It is therefore a refusal 
of division which gives the woman access to a 
different strata [sicJ of language, where words and 
things are not differentiated, and the real of the 
maternal body threatens or holds off woman's access 
to prohibition and the law. 
(Rose in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 54-5) 
On the whole, Lacan himself was unhappy about this 
development among some of his female followers; his reasons 
for unease have, I think, been misunderstood. To some extent 
Encore itself was a reply to Irigaray, who was actually 
expelled from the movement in 1973. Jacqueline Rose accounts 
for the disagreement as follows: 
For Lacan, as we have seen, there is no pre-
discursive reality ('How return, other than by means 
of a special discourse, to a pre-discursive 
reality?', Seminar XX: 33), no place prior to the 
law which is available and can be retrieved. And 
there is no feminine outside language ..•• 'there is 
nothing in the unconscious which accords with the 
body'. (Seminar 21 Jan. [1982: 165J; Rose in 
Mitchell and Rose 1982: 55) 
Perhaps the problem here is simply that Montrelay and 
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Irigary have seen only one side of the question, Rose another. 
For the truth is that the real situation is irremediably 
paradoxical (as I have tried to emphasize in my own account 
above). What Lacan objects to in the efforts of his feminist 
pupils is that their accounts lose touch with this inherent 
paradoxicality. They seem to suggest that the human condition 
in language might be other than it is, which is a failed hope. 
The only 'way through', utterly 'beyond all words', is the 
jouissance of the mystic. 
And yet it is still open to us to point out that this 
paradoxicality goes further than is imagined. Language itself 
is, after all, itself an utterly paradoxical construct: it is 
the one definitive attempt to arrive at a 'something' created 
upon nothing - this is the ultimate implication of all Lacan 
has to say on this score. And it is too much to hope that it 
would retain no traces within itself of the 'nothing' that is 
its origin, even if only as a 'lining' - which is the Lacanian 
term Kristeva frequently uses in this regard. 
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For there is a law of Reality which is imposed upon 
language: that, within the totality of langue, there are no 
absolute 'differences', but only differance, as Derrida has 
it. Its elements, its signifieds, concrete objects, only give 
the illusion of being truly sUbstantive entities, in so far as 
they may be spoken of. In fact they are the products of a 
process of binary division within the core of meaning, based 
upon differential contrasts, not upon absolute separation: 
this has been the continuing burden of semantics based this 
century upon the discoveries of Saussure. Which means that 
language may have its 'death drive', too: that it may betray 
its desire to return to its own elastic origins, to the 
'nothing' (which is everything) out of which it has been 
constituted. 
The contention of this thesis is that, indeed, literature 
and its brand of language are special arenas where precisely 
this drama unfolds itself: the drama of origins. What one 
wants to say is that it is precisely the form, the generic 
factors, the artifice, the figured tropes of art - all that is 
'unreal' within the artist's arsenal of craft - that serve the 
unconscious end of 'displacing' the reality we know; enough, 
at least, to return to us some measure of our aboriginal 
freedom. 
This might occur by reawakening in us 'one of the stages 
in the constitution of the subject': a stage which is 
fleetingly in place only at the very outset of the acquisition 
of language. During this stage the sign itself can best be 
represented by a signifier without content, a fraction whose 
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denominator is zero; which suggests it has an infinite value. 
While such a temporary but privileged state of affairs lasts, 
the effect is 'the infinitization of the value of the subject, 
not open to all meanings, but abolishing them all' (Lacan 
1986: 252): 'What, in effect, grounds, in the meaning and 
radical non-meaning of the subject, the function of freedom, 
is strictly speaking this signifier that kills all meanings'. 
Freedom itself, Lacan implies - including the freedom over 
which wars are fought - is in origin nothing but a continuing 
recollection of this privileged condition, before the pre-
determinations of language and culture recast the subject in 
their shape. 
What literature returns us to, then, is a special 
dispensation of the child, one Lacan also identified in his 
reconsideration of one of Balint's cases: 'He speaks of how a 
child's word is often considered oracular, may even be 
idolised, but no matter how seriously it is taken, no child is 
ever considered bound by it' (Seminar I, xviii, 255; tr. 
MacCannel1 1986: 49). 
'A child's word, given, Lacan writes, 'before' entering 
the world of work, is not his bond'; the situation is 'instead 
that of the child as not engaged by his word, unlike the 
adult, who is 'enslaved' (Lacan's term) by it' (Ibid.). If 
Lacan is to be believed, the 'fictional' dimension of all art 
is a gift to us from this (just) pre-linguistic state of 
freedom, a condition of childhood which it celebrates. But 
'not to be enslaved' by the word is also, of course, a 
mystical attribute. 
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Theory is empty without evidence; and, as I say, no 
amount of evidence could finally establish that a primary 
quality of art would be its propensity to play dangerously 
about those levels where the world's appearances and their 
symbols are made to undermine their own nature and signifying 
function, in service of some, or one, deeper truth about 
reality. What can be demonstrated, however, is the wide 
currency of themes and artistic techniques which have 
precisely this aim in view; and this is what my subsequent 
chapters, taken together, will endeavour to perform. What I 
want to show is that a greater cross-section of literary art 
than might be expected chooses to align itself with Hadewijch 
and st Theresa, in terms of its ultimate aims; that there is, 
or can be, a mystical dimension to literature and its 
language, that inheres in its very nature and practice. A 
dimension that is - for those sensitive to its necessities 
(and perhaps it has only been adherents of the realist school, 
and their debased followers down to the soap operas and TV 
jingles, who have been less than sensitive in this regard) -
available ready at hand in the materials with which they have 
chosen to work • 
Though what goes 'beyond' is never the language itself, 
the 'beyond dimension' is, I believe, essential nonetheless to 
the functioning of this art as literature. All this leaves 
open, of course, the question of the 'where' of this beyond. 
Since the moment that Lacan began to interrogate, as the 
possible site of the unconscious, the 'nothing' which is all 
that divides the etre-pour-soi and the etre-en-soi in Sartre's 
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philosophy, analysis has had a credible tool with which to 
investigate this question. This 'nothing' and 'noplace' is 
also the Wo es war of Freud's slogan (1986: 45). Again, it is 
also very like the Ungrund of Jacob Boehme8 : 'For Boehme this 
Void, this dark abyss, is not sterile and passive but is 
active and fertile, possessed by a motivating energy and 
Desire (Trieb) , (Waterfield9 1989: 27). 
Therefore Christ saith, Unless you be converted and 
become as children. you cannot see the kingdom of 
God. Also, you must be born again (that is, we must 
wholly disclaim and depart from our own reason, and 
come again into resignation and self-denial into the 
bosom of our mother, and give over all disputings, 
and, as it were, stupify or mortify our reason), 
that the spirit of the mother, viz. of the eternal 
Word of God, may get a form in us, and blow up or 
enkindle the divine life in us, that so we may find 
ourselves in the spirit of the mother in the 
cradle - if we desire to be taught and driven by 
God. (Boehme 1989: 72) 
And in spite of Lacan's many dicta warning against too 
much interest in any pre-linguistic region of experience, 
there are others which have a different effect: 'the subject 
is there to rediscover where it was - I anticipate ~ the real 
•.. I use, quite intentionally, the formula - The gods belong 
to the field of the real' (Lacan 1986: 45). 
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This section has to do with the problem of One. The question 
of the deeper meaning of this category is very wide-ranging, 
and arises whether we are talking of the first numeral, or 
about the 'oneness' two human beings ought to feel in a sexual 
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relationship - or even if we mean the One of the mystics. 
'This One has resounded endlessly across the centuries,' notes 
Lacan. 'Need I bother to evoke here the neo-platonists?' 
(Lacan in Mitchell and Rose 1986: 139). 
It is probably this last example - the one that Lacan 
hardly bothers to evoke - that in fact most concerns him in 
his dis_cussion. For the Platonic and neo-Platonic One is 
another name for the Absolute of metaphysics: the ultimate 
Reality that underlies appearances, according to many systems, 
or the final category from which all others derive. For Lacan, 
all such profound concepts are best approached psychologically 
(though this is not, in the last analysis, to limit them). 
Since he adopts this psychological perspective, Lacan feels 
quite happy in slipping undetectably from one manifestation of 
One to another; indeed, at times he is clearly discussing them 
all at once. For the purposes of argument he is apparently 
willing to accept the Platonic idea that the category remains 
essentially similar in whatever context it appears - even if 
it turns out to be, in all these contexts, an illusion. We are 
clear, at any rate, where our investigation should begin: 'it 
is on the level of language that we must interrogate this One' 
(Ibid.). 
In this section I find myself obliged to argue, partly on 
the basis of the artistic evidence of future chapters, for two 
emendations to Lacan's theory; or rather, I ask that we should 
choose to understand one or two things he says in our own 
individual way. The practical advantage of these emendations 
is that they simplify the placement in the theory of a good 
deal of the material to come. 
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In preferring the intuitions of art (admittedly, as ~ 
'read' them) to those of Lacan himself, I am encouraged by 
Lacan's own advice'o to psychoanalysts 'to remember with Freud 
that on his subject the artist always precedes him, and that 
he has no business acting the psychologist where the artist 
blazes the trail for him' (Lacan -1965; tr. Durand" 1983: 
860) • 
The two points I wish to make may be themselves expressed 
in Lacan-like dicta. Firstly, where Lacan was given to insist 
that there is 'no other of the Other' (Mitchell and Rose 1982: 
151), I wish to agree but to add that 'there is, however, a 
One of the Other'. This maxim, whose bad grammar is - I hasten 
to say - one of its advantages, goes directly against some of 
his pronouncements. 
The second point concerns the manner in which the mind's 
past influences its present. A basic tenet of Freudianism is 
that the 'deep' past - including the preverbal past -
continues to participate in the mind's present acts, through 
the unconscious. For Lacan, however, the central events of 
psychic life are those that accompany and succeed our coming 
into language. Language is thus both cause and cure of 
everything that takes place in the mind's life. Trauma, on 
this basis, is simply what causes an apparent gap in what 
should be the unbroken narrative of the subject's life. The 
unconscious, indeed, is really only that part of the story, 
including what has gone into its construction, that misses 
direct articulation in the apparent 'text'. 
If this is so, we are led to conclude either that the 
preverbal past plays no part in the text at all except in so 
far as it has 'set up' the conditions of the present, or 
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else - as I prefer - that our preverbal history continues to 
take part at a structural level. Of course as we know any 
trauma affects the way the unconscious acts: it affects us 
through 'form' as much as through 'content'. The difference is 
that the 'deep past' contributes to the whole character of the 
unconscious. I am not talking here about biology or instincts, 
but about history turned into activity, working through the 
unconscious. 
My contention is that this happens from the beginning, a 
point which is by no means clearly stated in Lacan, though it 
is hardly to be missed in Freud. In strict theory Lacan was 
inclined to deny a direct equivalence between the form the 
unconscious takes and its history - at least after the Oedipus 
event (the status of its prehistory up to and including the 
event is rather less clear). He says: 'If knowledge is so 
often, in theoretical writings, related to something similar 
to the relation between ontogenesis and phylogenesis - it is 
as the result of a confusion ••• psycho-analysis .•• does not 
centre psychological ontogenesis on supposed stages' (1986: 
63) • 
What Lacan seems to be criticising here are notions of 
psychological development that privilege something similar to 
the Freudian oral or anal stages, and which maintain that 
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these stages continue to affect normal adult behaviour in some 
subliminal way. For Lacan at this point, the Oedipus event is 
the primary mechanism; otherwise, the early history of 
individuals can effect no permananent or inevitable 
modifications to the form the unconscious adopts. To think of 
things in this way would be to make psychological events too 
much like a sort of biological or organic 'program'; whereas 
Lacan wants to maintain that the unconscious is a feature of 
language itself. 
There are other of his statements, however, which can be 
read as suggesting convertibility of a sort between psychology 
and history: cf. 'The unconscious is that chapter of my 
history which is marked by a blank ..• : it is the censored 
chapter' [Lacan 1977: 50]). Of course, one can still argue 
that - despite its own very notable blank in our memories - in 
the time before the Oedipal event nothing was being written, 
since there were no words; hence the pre-Oedipal can count 
only as the text's margin, its endpapers. Nonetheless, there 
seems something unsatisfactory and arbitrary about this 
starting-point which is not the beginning. What kind of life 
was it then, before we spoke? 
At any rate, we see how Lacan's argument against taking 
the view that the unconscious is a form of 'active memory', 
and hence there from the beginning, rests on the great 
importance of language, which is acquired, not given. He would 
insist that the unconscious is not only structured like a 
language, but its existence presupposes language. The 
unconscious, properly speaking, is only forced into being by 
speech. 
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One may perfectly agree with this point, and yet still 
retain the suspicion that though individual prehistory takes 
up its meaning as an aspect of the 'unconscious' only with the 
arrival of language - and is irreversibly transformed by that 
arrival - it is still not displaced by this event. 
On this basis, I wish to hazard the notion that, in the 
case of the unconscious, form does largely follow history, or, 
rather, that 'ontogeny is phylogeny'. If this principle is 
even partially accepted, then the corollary is that all of the 
universal subject's prehistory needs to be taken into account, 
without prejudice with respect to time. Simply put, this means 
that we need to follow the trails of the mind's past back even 
as far as the embryo. The birth-event itself is not a 
defensible beginning. 
One understands all the reluctance on this score, of 
course: it is to introduce onto a fraught scene what seems 
just another irresolvable mystery: what is awareness? When can 
one say it has begun? Yet this problem - of dealing with the 
unstatable - has not prevented theorists from dividing up the 
hardly less problematic region of the pre-Oedipal among 
themselves, on the basis of inferences they draw from its 
effects; indeed, the major differences within psychoanalysis 
seem often to rest on conflicting interpretations of just this 
ground. 
To return, however, to the first of my issues: the One. 
The question of the One did, of course, absorb Lacan's 
attention deeply in the last decade of his life; and rightly 
so, for a great deal depends upon it. As he himself put it: 
'instead of one signifier we need to interrogate, we should 
interrogate the signifier One' (Seminar XX: 23; in Mitchell 
and Rose 1982: 47). 
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A central way in which the One is essential to our world 
of variety is that there can be no meaning without it, for all 
the importance of the Other. We must be influenced by at least 
the illusion of unity or possible unities to pick out concrete 
objects and individual persons, and to treat them as if they 
were coherent entities. Though meaning may be organised within 
the field of the symbolic (and hence the Other, which grades 
and sorts the symbolic objects of our world), it depends upon 
the function of the imaginary - for, above all, the imaginary 
imagines One, just as the child imagines an identity between 
itself and its reflected image. More plainly, it is only 
through the medium of a gestalt that meaning - meaning of any 
kind - comes to us; for 'good form and meaning are akin' 
(1975; in Mitchell and Rose: 163). 
Lacan pictures the 'consistency presupposed to the 
symbolic' in the quest for meaning as 'naturally configured' 
by the circle: the deceptive symbol of the complete and the 
centred. The mythical subject who finds the face of his 
persecutor among the random dots and blotches of the Rorschach 
test is thus a representative figure: what he discovers there 
is a relation; hence, wholeness. But though this face is 
'meaning', its meaning is still paranoid, merely personal, a 
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sign. For signification to occur, on the other hand, the sign 
must come within the field of the Other, its codes and rules. 
Not least among the closely related matters that are 
implicated here is that of form in art; for if, like the split 
subject, this supposed unity of the form is merely illusory -
something we talk ourselves into accepting - then a radical 
reinterpretation is called for. Robert Con Davis12 puts such a 
case unequivocally, by linking the narrator of fiction - and, 
consequently, the story he tells - with the 'split subject' of 
Lacanian theory: 'since the subject (narration) is marked by 
this irrevocable split, what we are accustomed to calling 
unity and wholeness in form and seeing as concepts centrally 
important to narration and interpretation are unceremoniously 
ousted' (Davis 1983: 857). 
He means that the work of art, as product of the split 
subject, must inevitably reflect its incompleteness (for, in a 
sense, it is itself a subject, just as a signifier is subject 
for another signifier, in Lacan's view [1986: 198]). Again, if 
the work is produced in language, it is seamed through and 
through with the 'lack' which the phallic signifier does no 
more than commemorate: hence language and wholeness are 
intrinsically at odds. This, as we know, is the starting 
presumption of deconstructive criticism (and Lacan clearly 
considered that Deconstruction simply built upon his own 
intellectual foundation [MacCannell 1986: 14-15]; certainly, 
he invented the term, employing it in some of his titles - for 
example, 'The Deconstruction of the Drives' [(1964) 1986: Ch. 
13]). 
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However, all this is not enough for us simply to dispense 
with the idea of form-as-unity outright; there is a something 
left, and this something needs interrogation. Robert Con Davis 
does admit that 'these concepts do not just vanish; we still 
have some reason to speak of wholeness and unity'. He goes on 
to insist, however, that such concepts are to be relegated 'to 
the status of being (in Jacques-Alain Miller's term) a mere 
"suturing" over of the fundamental split with the various 
commitments (threads) of ideology, the inevitable ideological 
bias that we bring to anyone approach to the subject in a 
narration in hopes of promoting a view of meaningful 
significance and wholeness' (1983: 857). 
As with most criticism of ideology, this example lays 
itself open to a predictable tu quoque. The possibility that 
antagonism to the One as artistic 'form' might itself be 
ideologically motivated could just as readily be assumed -
especially if this One is seen primarily as an expression of 
humanist individualism, for example. Both Marxism and 
structuralism1 do, after all, share ground in their opposition 
to humanism - though for very divergent reasons. 
And there is a certain input from Modernism too. As 
Fredric Jameson13 notes: 'To a certain degree, the theoretical 
problem of the status of the subject in narrative analysis is 
itself a reflection of the historical attempt of modernistic 
1 cf. Levi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1978): 'I never had, and still do not have, the perception 
of feeling my personal identity. I appear to myself as the place 
where something is going on, but there is no "I", no "me". Each 
of us is a kind of cross-roads where things happen' (4-5; Quoted 
in MacCannel1 1986: 16). 
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practice to eliminate the old-fashioned subject from the 
literary text' (Jameson 1977: 381-2). Hence, and without 
denying that - for example - ideology has a totalising aim, it 
is still open to us to propose that this question of wholeness 
cannot adequately be left on the ideological level, as the 
quote from Miller above perhaps invites. 
The question is, can we really do without the One? Lacan 
insisted, we must remember, not that the One had been 
annihilated, but that 'There is something of One' (in Mitchell 
and Rose 1982: 138). He goes on to affirm that 'This There is 
something of One is not simple - to say the least'. Indeed, it 
is all the more serious as opposition to the One goes against 
the meaning of Eros in Freud, defined as 'the gradual tendency 
to make one out of a vast multitude' (ibid.). 
Lacan's slogan above has all his usual ambivalence. There 
cannot, of course, be 'something' of One: One stands alone 
against the many. To divide it up is to introduce the many 
into the heart of the One, which is conceptually awkward, to 
say the least. The dictum thus stands to warn us against 
assuming, in our innocence, the unproblematic authority of the 
One. 
It is certainly true that Lacan's primary position is to 
deny the validity of any self-existent One. He feels it is his 
responsibility as a scientist and as a teacher to encourage us 
to take an Aristotelian, not a Platonic position on the One: 
we are enjoined to see such categories only as already 
inscribed within speech and bound by its inadequacies and 
limitations. They are in no sense - or, at least, no clearly 
statable sense - transcendental Platonic categories, but 
simply features of language, part of an illusory but 
inevitable reality: 'for everything concerning the speaking 
being, reality is of one order, that is to say, fantasmatic' 
(Lacan 1972-3; in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 159). 
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But then, as Lacan's own discourse goes to show, not 
everything true is clearly statable. Indeed, as his 'Preface' 
to the English edition of The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
psychoanalysis decrees, in wildean fashion: 'There is no truth 
that, in passing through awareness, does not lie. But one runs 
after it all the same' (Lacan 1986: vii). 
Lacan's whole mode of presentation - with all its 
paradoxes - defines his position in relation to this question 
of the One. His own style both promotes our desire to 
establish the gestalt of his meaning and at once undermines 
it: 'Lacan's language is not -it cannot be - simply "one"', as 
Ronald Schleifer14 puts it (Schleifer 1983: 874). Lacan's 
scepticism is, however, twofold; he both illustrates his 
disbelief in the One - and, correspondingly, in any concept of 
a 'system' - and at the same time offers us a speech which 
threatens alarmingly to escape the Other on every hand. Where 
else, we may well ask, but into the One? 
Indeed, in language, the complete truth is impossible, 
because language cannot contain it. But then, 'impossible' is 
precisely the definition of the Real (167)! And as Lacan 
plainly states in the same work, the Real is, indeed, real, in 
spite of its (linguistic) impossibility: 'There can be 
absolutely no doubt that there is a real' (1986: l86). 
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Since it lies outside speech, we can say nothing clearly 
about the Real. But there may still be enough evidence to 
persuade us that this One we have spoken of has another kind 
of existence in the Real. Indeed, in a paradoxical way, Lacan 
needles us into taking this route - while telling us all along 
that it is 'impossible', a cul-de-sac, washing his hands of 
us. 
In Lacan's defence, it must be said that his terms 
encourage us to look beyond easy solutions to this problem of 
the origin of the One. We might for instance suppose that the 
idea of 'one' - anyone - comes into being with the infant's 
perception of the separate existence of objects, which is only 
fully brought home to him when such things present themselves 
to be named: when they become part of language. His 
identification of himself as a 'one', one with his image, is 
really to adopt, to confer on himself, the apparent singleness 
of the signifier. And of course, this is only an imaginary 
unity. 
Surprisingly, Lacan is categorical in denying us this 
avenue: 'the One of meaning is not to be confused with what 
makes the One of the signifier' (1982 b [ 1975]: 164). The urge 
towards unity that encourages us to create form, to perceive 
the gestalt, is not, apparently, derived a posteriori from the 
unity of the signifier. Indeed, since the signifier is not, 
properly speaking, a 'one' at all, but something which depends 
for its very existence on a differential relation to a chain 
of other signifiers, 'there would never be any conjunction, 
any coupling, of One and g' (ibid.). 
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Nor can we reverse things and derive the origin of the 
idea of 'one' from the subject's sense of self, either, for 
that sense of self is in turn derivative; it does depend upon 
the illusory One of the signifier: 'The One of meaning hardly 
comes into it - it [the subject] is merely the effect of the 
One of the signifier, which in fact only works by being 
available to designate any signified' (165). 
These statements were made in Lacan's Seminar of 21 
January 197515 , which makes them somewhat late. There is 
perhaps some change discernable here from Lacan's position 
eleven years earlier, where the concept of unity is related 
more closely to the arrival of the subject as a 'signifier' 
himself in the signifying system. However, we should not judge 
this matter too hastily; indeed, the ambivalence of Lacan's 
1964 phraseology prohibits hurried judgments. We see that the 
subject distinguishes himself not as 'one' alone, but as one 
one, which is a different matter. 
The subject himself is marked off by the single 
stroke, and first he marks himself as ... the first 
of the signifiers. When this signifier, this one, is 
established - the reckoning is one one. It is at the 
level, not of the one, but of the one one, at the 
level of the reckoning, that the subject has to 
situate himself as such. In this respect, the two 
ones are already distinguished. Thus is marked the 
first split that makes the subject as such 
distinguish himself from the sign in relation to 
which, at first, he has been able to constitute 
himself as subject. (Lacan 1986: 141) 
The two 'ones' referred to here are first of all the subject 
of the statement and the subject of enunciation: the Real-Ich 
who precedes language and the subject as caught up forever in 
the toils of language. But as soon as you have one one, it 
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implies another, and the Other; and, perhaps, at an earlier 
stage, a One from whom the initial one distinguishes himself 
as the one who counts - who can count, since he is really at 
least second to arrive. 
This matter of the One is certainly not simple, just as 
Lacan predicted. In 1976 Lacan returned to the idea that the 
form of art and the unified world-view that the subject tries 
vainly to make out of his experience are both derived from his 
initial impression of his body as 'one'. Such vacillations 
render it dangerous to talk of any decisive change of 
viewpoint in this regard. The examples do however provide 
clear testimony of the incomplete nature of this kind of form: 
In order to give oneself an image of what is called 
the world, man conceives it as •.• unity of pure 
form, which represents for him the body. It is from 
the surface of the body that man took the idea of a 
privileged form. And his first apprehension of the 
world was the apprehension of his 'semblable'. Then 
this body, he saw it, he abstracted it, made a 
sphere out of it: good form. (Lacan in Scilicet 6/7, 
1976: 54; tr. by MacCannel1 1986: 52) 
And yet, at the same time, this body is not the source of 
the One. It can only provide the intermediate origin for One's 
stand-ins, its counterfeit equivalents. 
I want to bring all the threads of my argument together 
by suggesting that the content of the One is actually given by 
a condition which is established in the womb itself. Behind 
the Real-Ich - and, ultimately, the subject of speech (as well 
as the subject's body) stands the undeniable unity of the 
subject and his world which was the experience of the foetus 
in the womb. This unity - I wish to assert - continues to work 
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at a structural level of the unconscious upon everything else 
the subject later encounters and assimilates - including his 
idea of himself. 
It is only from the perspective of the symbolic that this 
primal One - for that is what it is - can be called 
'imaginary'. There is another perspective - that of the embryo 
- which would make it the primary constituent of the Real. 
What this means is that the 'imaginary' unifications of 
the subject with his/her external mother and later with the 
mirror-image which precede the onset of the 'symbolic' are 
already an anamnesis, a return of the forgotten •.. though 
what was needed was not forgotten until the moment it was 
needed. In other words, 'forgetting' itself only begins to 
have meaning under pressure from the proximity of language. 
Before this, one needs to posit a certain continuity between 
the subject of the enunciation, the Real-Ich, and the One of 
the womb - a continuity which enters into everything with 
which the primal being has to do, both then and later. 
If we imagine the proto-subject existing, initially, 
within the Real - and we acknowledge this as a psychological 
event through and through - then any subsequent 'information' 
the subject encounters must be transcribed by him as a 
division in this Real. At first the character of these 
transcriptions derives largely from himself: this is the 
'Imaginary'. As Lacan specifies, it is at this stage that the 
major effort of division is accomplished: between subject and 
object, self and outside-self (earlier divisions, if they 
exist, are probably best expressed as good and bad self, Lust-
Ich and Unlusti and this seems to involve not a single split 
being but a split into two separate entities). 
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Later, family and society take a handj hereafter, all 
symbolic values come from the other. But the Other can only 
write on the subject's page by adding further divisions to 
that subject's own internalised settlement of the Reali and 
these proferred divisions, borderlines, are paramount: the 
subject only mimics them, accepts their domination. For this 
reason, the unconscious is more appropriately placed 'outside' 
(1986: 123) than within, as Lacan specifies. It operates upon 
the domain of the usurped Real, and under the influence of 
language; which is not primarily the subject's but is his 
cultural inheritance. This is to say he falls under the 
domination of the Name-of-the-Father, external authority, the 
'law': the Other, which is what his real has become. 
But each new signifier is found at a price: it introduces 
a 'lack' into the Real of which the subject once thought he 
had possession. The so-called 'reality principle' (society's 
reality, not the Real) demands this 'sacrifice': a demand 
which comes from the Other, invading and diminishing his 
primary narcissism. It is in this nexus that the castration 
complex takes on such meaning as it has, and is given 
structure by the Oedipus. The Mother whom the child gives up, 
sacrifices, is in one aspect the representative of his primal 
self, and all it now signifies. She is what is given up in 
favour of a social existence. As Lacan himself explains: the 
castration complex is 
the only indication of that jouissance which in its 
infinitude entails the mark of its prohibition, and 
which in order to constitute this mark, implies a 
sacrifice: that which is made in one and the same 
act with the choice of its symbol, the phallus. 
(1977: 319; incorporating Benvenuto and Kennedy's 
emendations [1986: 180]). 
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No wonder that we can say that the unconscious indicates 
its presence in the 'gap', the 'cut', the 'rim' between 
conceptual boundaries. It is at these edges of uncertainty 
that the forces of the unconscious - condensation, 
displacement, metamorphosis, the partial drives - make 
themselves felt, as remnants, ultimately. of the One: remnants 
whose complete subjugation is in question. This is one way in 
which we may justifiably believe that there is still 
'something of One'. 
One understands what influences Lacan to start with birth 
and to neglect the place of the womb - not only for its 
inherent difficulty, but also because it might tend to 
underpin the subject's claims to unity, identity - to be a 
One. In this regard, the developing subject can certainly 
appeal to precedent, at least - a precedent which is not 
entirely in the Imaginary, either. Unfortunately, this appeal 
gets him nowhere when it comes to his life in language: there 
his status remains split, as Lacan describes. Fundamentally, 
then, the structure Lacan articulates is not seriously 
threatened by inclusion of the embryonic consciousness. 
His later meditations on this subject of the One do show, 
I think, how the problem becomes a kind of conceptual thorn, 
neither ejected nor entirely engulfed by his theory. Finally, 
the problem of the One is placed on the woman's side - which 
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is appropriate, since most of the experience of the infans is 
under her sign, under her direction: 'God knows where it leads 
you to believe there is One,' he expostulates: 'it can even 
lead you so far as to believe there is The [i.e. La], a belief 
• • b • that 1S fallac10us' (1982: 170). In other words, ne1ther One, 
God, nor the Woman can be shown to exist (though they are 
related): an ironic statement we may take as we will. 
In the following analysis we see how Lacan is an~ious to 
situate what is still essentially the One as an unrecognised 
feature of the Other - as belonging to the same field. Except 
that now it is an Other specifically related to the Woman: 
By her being in the sexual relation radically Other, 
in relation to what can be said of the unconscious, 
the woman is that which relates to this Other .... 
The woman relates to the signifier of this Other, in 
so far as, being Other, it can only remain always 
Other. I can only presume here that you will think 
back to my statement that there is no Other of the 
Other. As the place where everything of the 
signifier which can be articulated comes to be 
signified, the Other is, in its very foundation, 
radically the Other .... How can we conceive that 
the Other might, somewhere, be that to which one 
half - since that is roughly the biological 
proportion - one half of speaking beings relates. 
(Lacan 1972-3; in Mitchell and Rose 1982: 151-2) 
What Lacan is saying here is that Woman is to be seen as the 
supplement of the psychological Man, who in his phallic 
presumption believes (150) that he is 'all' (and in a sense he 
is: all of the symbolic). In some respects she shares the same 
phallic world as he does; but her psychic self has a 'doubled' 
character. Hence, in her character of 'not-all', she relates 
to the ~her directly - to the Other in its guise as All: i.e. 
to the signifier (the slashed 0) of the undifferentiated all, 
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the all including the subject2 • This capacity to repudiate the 
symbolic means that, in this aspect of her true nature, 
'Nothing can be said of the woman' (152). Her sign is her 
feminine definite article, crossed through and hence expelled 
from language. 
By this move - by relating the woman to the radical other 
- the problem of the One is placed on the woman's side - which 
is appropriate enough. But it also allows Lacan to abandon the 
quest for the One; the 'radical Other' is as far as he is 
prepared to go in search of it, for it marks the outmost 
bounds of what still counts as language. Provided, then, that 
we remember that Lacan's formulation, too, is not-all, that 
there is more to be said, none of it need be discarded. 
This more that needs to be said can be summed up in 
another neo-Lacanian slogan. Where Lacan pronounces that 
'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (1986: 158), we need 
to add 'and the desire of the Other is for the Real'. 
So another way that the One appears is as the ground of 
the Other - for, after all, it is on the field of the Real 
that the Other is transcribed. Because of its origins, this 
Real must inevitably continue to be felt, to a degree, as one, 
whatever commonsense informs us. It continues to be one, since 
2 Catherine Clement's definition of this particular 
signifier is vivid and simple. In her account, the barred 0 
'stands for the completely crazy idea that you might be able to 
get rid of the Other, cut the moorings, and do whatever you 
please. And to say whatever you please as well. But to think you 
can really do it is an illusion. The slashed 0 doesn't work: it's 
an unattainable limit. But all the same it would be some pleasure 
to be able to say and do everything all at the same time' 
(Clement 1983: 25). 
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its very nature, as a 'known', derives from its division. And 
it is to this other in the guise of One, the radical ~ther, 
that the feminine principle relates - as Lacan has it above. 
This way of telling the story has certain advantages: it 
retains the notion of addition as division which is the 
essence of 'differential' semantics since Saussure. (In this 
sense a language is always complete, nomatter how many or how 
few words it contains [cf. Benveniste16 1971: 36-7, 48].) 
This is, as I have said, in spite of it being an 
interpretation Lacan himself opposed: 
Discontinuity, then is the essential form in which 
the unconscious first appears to us as a 
phenomenon - discontinuity, in which something is 
manifested as a vacillation. Now, if this 
discontinuity has this absolute, inaugural 
character, in the development of Freud's discovery, 
must we place it - as was later the tendency with 
analysts - against the background of a totality? 
Is the one anterior to discontinuity? I do not 
think so, and everything that I have taught in 
recent years has tended to exclude this need for a 
closed one - a mirage to which is attached the 
reference to the enveloping psyche, a sort of double 
of the organism in which this false unity is thought 
to reside. You will grant me that the one that is 
introduced by the experience of the unconscious is 
the one of the split, of the stroke, of the rupture. 
(Lacan 1986 [1964]: 25-6) 
My argument all along has been that we may willingly 
grant Lacan his conclusion, without admitting that it 
necessitates our accepting his supplementary inference about 
origins. Perhaps we could seize from the unaccustomed 
diffidence of these paragraphs the implication of a certain 
latitude in these regions. Indeed, if I believe - as I do -
that the psychoanalytic model outlined here is justly and 
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fairly applicable to the mystics, such as Boehme - or, indeed, 
to Plotinus, who builds the first towering theoretical edifice 
of mysticism squarely upon the One - then I am virtually 
obliged to make the choices I have. I take it that Lacan's own 
interest in this very area in later life shows that my taking 
up this line of inquiry, at least, is not wildly far from the 
mark. What is centrally valuable about Lacan's testimony is 
that it indicates how the Reality of the mystics and the Real 
of psychoanalysis may find valuable common ground: a 
circumstance which confirms them both. 
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As Lacan's pupil Catherine Clement puts it: 'the mother is 
first of all the image of the All. The 'good' All, the perfect 
All, nostalgic, integrating: the circle rejoined, the 
Magdeburg sphere, the ball, the complete organism, the mandala 
... the atom, the glass bubble, the earth ... ' (Clement 1983: 
84) • 
Yet, we say, only in relation to a 'prior' unity - a 
unity before the mother, does 'lack' have real force - which 
it must, to constitute the primal drive. It is not enough to 
locate this desire in the Imaginary alone; how then would it 
display such power? After all, man's totality is implicated 
there. 
What we need to say is that ultimately, every object of 
man's desire is a placebo; what he truly craves is just one 
thing: to be just one thing, himself and his world. What he 
desires, in other words, is his origin in the Real. 
And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a 
that can be enumerated are the representatives, the 
equivalents. The objets a are merely its 
representatives, its figures. The breast - as 
equivocal, as an element characteristic of the 
mammiferous organization, the placenta for example -
certainly represents that part of himself that the 
individual loses at birth, and which may serve to 
symbolize the more profound lost object. I could 
make the same kind of reference for all the other 
objects. (Lacan 1986: 198) 
81 
Thus the Freudian picture begins, according to Lacan, 'by 
positing a universe of desire' (1978 17 : 260) for which there is 
no corresponding object, as there might be naturally in the 
classical perspective. For Freud, 'Desire is the relation of a 
being to a lack', no more. Hence the 'libido is the name of 
what animates the fundamental conflict at the heart of human 
action': precisely that - since he is a developmental being -
man's desire is always for an object that is past: 'no object 
will ever again be it'. Thus man's tragedy and his comedy 
consists in the fact that 'Desire, a function central to the 
whole of human experience, is the desire of nothing namable' 
(Lacan 1978: 260-2; tr. Shoshana Felman18 1983: 1038). 
However, what the subject most desires is also what he 
most fears. Lacan insists that 'the reader should recognize in 
the metaphor of the return to the inanimate (which Freud 
aplies to every living body)' a desire to return to 'that 
margin beyond life that language gives to the human being by 
virtue of the fact that he speaks' (1977: 301). The fact that 
this drive, taken to its ultimate conclusion, would demand the 
death of his ego, thus taints it not only with fascination, 
but also with revulsion and awe - which is just as well 
perhaps for human reproduction and the maintenance of the 
ordinary processes of social life: luckily, we content 
ourselves with lesser goals. 
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If the true satisfaction of desire and immersion in the 
immortality of life can only be accomplished at the cost of 
his self, the ordinary man may settle, then, for the partial 
goals whose achievement can never bring ultimate contentment. 
outside his knowledge, however, all his more immediate desires 
- the partial drives themselves - share the character of the 
total drive. His being a sexed being implies inevitably a loss 
of totality; but in desiring his completion he opens himself 
up to death: 'the drive, the partial drive, is profoundly a 
death drive and represents in itself the portion of death in 
the sexed living being' (205). 
Even more so is it true that the language which 'fills 
in' for man's desire embodies death, for the 'symbol manifests 
itself first of all as the murder of the thing' (Lacan 1977: 
104): 'so when we wish to attain in the subject what was 
before the serial articulations of speech, and what is 
primordial to the birth of symbols, we find it in death, from 
which his existence takes on all the meaning it has' (105). 
We see how the picture Lacan offers humankind is in the 
end hardly optimistic. Man is faced with something of a 
Heideggerian choice: to lose himself in his inevitable role 
within the inauthentic world of words, events, and objects 
that constitutes social reality - or to face firmly the fact 
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that all roads lead to death (at least, of the ego), and that 
this personal Gotterdammerung, this end in annihilation, is 
where his deepest desires are inescapably leading him. 
That the situation in which humankind finds itself is 
fraught with such paradoxes is understood by the philospher 
and speculative novelist Olaf Stapledon - to take an example 
from minor literature19 • The fact that Stapledon - writing in 
the 1930s - lived into the Freudian era may, of course, be 
thought to limit his independent evidentiary value. 
Nonetheless, his modern consciousness produces a plain 
statement on these tricky matters. 
His narrator is a lofty Neptunian 'man' from the distant 
future who as a research project monitors the earthly mind of 
a selected twentieth-century ancestor from the moment of birth 
itself. As it turns out, the comparative clumsiness of this 
child's delivery 
caused no unusual damage to his mind, nothing but 
the common yearning toward a warmer, cosier, less 
noxious world, which, in so many of you, favours 
legends of a golden age in the past, or of a golden 
heaven in the future ... In after years ... he was 
ever to seek in the harshness of fate for the breath 
of a new life. Even though, in all his ages, he 
yearned to creep back into the warm close peace of 
the womb, he craved also to absorb into his blood 
the atmosphere of a wider world. 
(Stapledon 1978 [1932]: 68) 
Stapledon's hero is thus a truly representative figure, 
representative of the exiled and divided fate of us all. 
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The implications of all this for literary art will have to 
wait, very largely, for their appearances in future chapters; 
where inevitably they will turn up differently according to 
each of my separate sets of subject-matter. 
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I have said already that I am certain that a 
psychoanalytically understood mysticism has a very large field 
of application in poetry; larger even than one might conclude 
from Julia Kristeva's pioneering work Desire in Poetry 
(Kristeva: 1980), where she aligns both the rhythmic effects 
of verse and the typographical and formal fragmentation of 
some modernist poetry with what is effectively a counter-
surgence of form against the domination of sense and of the 
authoritarian phallic word. She sees this taking place in 
poems as an enactment of return: of return to a pre-verbal 
reality associated with the maternal body. All one would need 
to add to this analysis, as far as it goes, would be some 
comments on its mystical connections; for in Kristeva the 
subversive elements of poetic form are seen as primarily 
political in force. 
However, since my first chapters will be devoted to 
poetry - and fiction, in consequence, will have to wait its 
turn - perhaps there is room here for a few preliminary notes 
on applications to narrative, to 'that very truthful 
fictitious structure' (Lacan 1966: 449; tr. in Felman 1983: 
1044) which may be either that of the story or the analytic 
confession. The view of narrative which, according to 
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Elizabeth Wright, Lacan advances is one laden with 
opportunites for unheimlich returns, recurrences, and primal 
significances, as the patterns of fiction replace and submerge 
our everyday realities. What the form of such work must 
revisit again and again to make itself whole, a One, is the 
trauma of an origin which prevents it being so. As Joel 
Fineman20 puts it: 'where there is a structure there is already 
piety and nostalgia for the lost origin through which 
structure is thought' (Fineman 1981: 44; quoted in Felman 
1983: 875). 
For Lacan, narrative is the attempt to catch up 
retrospectively on this traumatic separation, to 
tell this happening again and again, to re-count it: 
the narrative of the subject caught in the net of 
signifiers, the story of The Purloined Letter, the 
story of the repetition compulsion. 
(Wright 1987: 113) 
But what interests me most, and what I feel implicates 
the whole theoretical question of fiction and its status, is 
the kind of presence within itself which the text invites the 
reader to take up. In a sense (and for the novel perhaps in 
even greater degree than the short story) the call of the 
narrative to the reader is no less than to be 'born again' 
under the new terms it makes available to him. Earlier, with 
reference to Lacan's comments on one of Balint's cases, we 
encountered the truth that the child's word is not always his 
bond. Essentially, the fictional text extends the offer of 
this childish irresponsibility anew to the reader, who is 
enouraged to give up the burden of his ego in a way which 
formally parallels, and is not utterly unrelated in feeling 
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to, the spiritual immersion of the mystic. I am certain that 
this freedom, which is regressive in so far as it recalls an 
original time of freedom before the law, accounts for much of 
the fascination of reading as activity, however much the world 
of the work may fall short of a uterine paradise. 
If the reality principle is represented there, as it 
certainly will be, we should not be deceived into believing 
its presence to be paramount and determining, but only 
necessary - as much a tactic as a source of truth. For it is 
an unavoidable legacy of language that the unattainable form 
can only be adumbrated, finally, through conflict. Other 
'realities' - like those of fictional worlds - will inevitably 
obey the rules under which all realities, to be realities, 
must fall. So it is not in escaping reality - we only escape 
this reality, after all - but in the fact of a displacement of 
self that this moment of freedom is allowed us. 
When Jane Eyre says 'Reader, I married him' it is - in so 
far as the fiction works - always the same reader to whom she 
speaks: a reader liberated by the fictional disposition from 
the responsiblilites of his or her daily personality. 
Liberation of self from language by a skilful uprooting of 
language is, I feel, more or less what literary imagination 
means. 
In Virginia Woolf's last work Between the Acts21 - where 
the title alone invites us to explore the intervening space 
'between' the physical activities of life through the 
indulgences of art - part of the novel's text is that of Miss 
La Trobe's open-air village pageant: a play-within-a-novel. A 
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heterogeneous audience of local characters, overdressed 
ladies, town officials and the dutiful vicar sit receptively 
before La Trobe's eccentric and impossible verse-drama. 
uncritical and aesthetically undeveloped as they are, they are 
all the more profoundly worked on by this less than 
exceptional play - because in these simplified circumstances 
it is Art alone which is doing the work. When they gather in 
the interval, the audience 
felt - how could one put it - a little not quite 
here or there. As if the play had jerked the ball 
out of the cup; as if what I call myself were still 
floating unattached, and didn't settle. Not quite 
themselves, they felt. (1965 [1941]: 175) 
'Our part ••. is to be the audience' one of the characters 
realises (73). But of course, in these circumstances, precise 
placing is uncertain. At last audience and artist confront 
each other, in the persons of Mrs swithin and Miss La Trobe: 
Their eyes met in a common effort to bring a common 
meaning to birth. They failed; and Mrs Swithin, 
laying hold desperately of a fraction of her 
meaning, said: 'What a small part I've had to play! 
But you've made me feel I could have been ..• 
Cleopatra!' ...• 
'I might have been -
repeated. 'You've stirred 
she meant. 
Cleopatra,' Miss La Trobe 
in me my unacted part', 
(175) 
As the play's text intones for us: 'protect and preserve us 
from words the defilers, from words the impure! What need have 
we of words to remind us? Must I be Thomas, you Jane?' (222). 
In this situation where there are only roles, and no lesser 
realities, the role of critic is effectively given to the 
parson, who sums up at the end - inevitably, in terms of his 
own perceptions: 
To me at least it was indicated that we are members 
one of another. Each is part of the whole ..• We act 
different parts; but are the same. That I leave to 
you. (37) 
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As the audience files away, they are accompanied by the noise 
of a gramophone, singing 'Dispersed are we'. Gradually, the 
clockwork turntable grinds to a halt. Symbolically speaking, 
what finally obstructs its progress is the problem of the One: 
The gramophone gurgled Unity - Dispersity. It 
gurgled Un ... dis and ceased. (235) 
What the audience must return home to recover from is their 
exposure to the subtle anonymities of art. 
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PART TWO: THE ROMANTIC SUBLIME 
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Chapter 2: Compulsive Repetition and the 'Ancient Mariner': 
Coleridge's Romantic 'Uncanny'. 
The mature writer, whether a failure or not (though 
perhaps never losing sight of the two alternatives), 
never stops harking back to symbolization 
mechanisms, within language itself, in order to find 
in a process of eternal return, and not in the 
object that it names or reproduces, the hollowing 
out of anguish in the face of nothing. 
(Kristeva' 1982: 43) 
My main aim in the following three chapters is to examine the 
close connection between the Romantic 'sublime' and the 
mystical experience. In order to do so I shall be looking from 
a theoretical perspective at works and statements by Coleridge 
and Wordsworth, beginning with the 'Ancient Mariner' (PW: 186-
209; hence AM)2 and with Coleridge's idea of the 
'supernatural'. Underlying my investigations is my wish to 
show that for these two men the central purpose of poetry was 
to induce an experience akin to the mystical in the reader. 
This they believed could be managed through the manipulation 
of functions of words that were commonly left latent or 
neglected in ordinary speech. Ultimately, evocation of 
feelings that drew close to the mystical experience really 
called for a progressive technique of undermining the verbal 
certainly of undermining its merely utilitarian and everyday 
communicative role, which was all that language could mean for 
the majority of speakers. 
Hence Coleridge's attack in Biographia Literaria3 (BL: Ch. 
XVII) on Wordsworth's early views of poetic diction. For 
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Coleridge, the one thing the language of poetry could not 
resemble, by definition, was 'the real language of men'. It is 
not, however, that an elevated diction on eighteenth-century 
models was desired, either; though the Pre-Romantics often 
made sublime events and experiences the subject-matter of 
their verse, Coleridge and Wordsworth together managed to find 
or borrow poetic techniques and forms that blended with their 
subjects to make the poem itself a potentially sublime 
encounter. What they insisted on was the ideal of unity; of 
the subordination of the elements of the poem to the intensity 
of this central poetic aim. Both poets held to the belief that 
there was nothing super-refined or hyper-cultivated about 
sublimity; that it was in fact a recognition of the deepest 
and most fundamental laws of universal human nature. They were 
certain, then, that this mystical sublimity was profoundly 
'simple', however much the fevered world's 'fretful stir 
unprofitable' or the obsession with 'getting and spending' 
caused it to be overlooked. Mankind's renewed authenticity 
depended on it making contact once again with this elemental 
source, where poetry had the means to lead it. 
A great deal here depends on the opening stages of a 
poem, on the inital stanzas or verse-paragraphs. The task of 
the poem's beginning is to draw the reader into its separate 
world, where language works in a different way; and to 
heighten the reader's receptivity and force his/her 
concentration to a pitch where language and mood resonate 
together. I shall take the example of 'Frost at Midnight': 
The Frost performs its secret ministry 
Unhelped by any wind. The owlet's cry 
Came loud - and hark, again! loud as before. 
The inmates of my cottage, all at rest, 
Have left me to that solitude, which suits 
Abstruser musings: save that at my side 
My cradled infant slumbers peacefully. 
'Tis calm indeed! so calm, that it disturbs 
And vexes meditation with its strange 
And extreme silentness. Sea, hill, and wood, 
This populous village! Sea, and hill, and wood, 
with all the numberless goings-on of life, 
Inaudible as dreams! 
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Appropriately, for what is at one level a meditation on the 
poetic value of childhood perceptions, the poet is isolated 
with his sleeping child. It is as if he must vocalise what the 
infant cannot: as an adult who must debase the unconscious 
baby's pre-verbal life by his articulations, he is hardly more 
than one of its inaudible dreams. The 'shock' of the final 
image issues from paradox: to declare dreams inaudible is 
actually to suggest they might, conceivably, be heard - an 
implicit hint of the impossible, that undermines the mere 
communicative value of the phrase. 
Coleridge, who would later define the poetic essence as 
'the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant 
qualities' (BL: 174), builds this introductory segment upon 
paradoxes, statements which inherently undermine each other. 
This paradoxicality may work to intensify our sense of the 
opposite meaning to what is expressed; or, finally, to subvert 
verbal communication altogether. Increasingly, language as 
such is dissolved in mood, a mood specified by the key words: 
'rest', 'solitude', 'slumber', 'calm', 'silentness', 'dreams'. 
Hence, the tension between adult and infant is not the 
only opposition at work here. Details of the isolated setting 
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are one by one invoked only to eliminate their intrusion and 
to diminish their force; the 'external' is suppressed simply 
by naming it in such a context. That we have to listen hard to 
hear the 'owlet's' vulnerable repeated cry only increases our 
sense of the dominating silence, for example. This 'strange 
and extreme silentness' is such that its very calmness, 
seeking for invasion and finding none, disturbs itself by its 
own profundity. 
Obviously enough, such quietude is both a physical 
situation and an inward state: what we encounter here are 
effectively 'minimal circumstances of being', which each tiny 
intrusion from outside only helps to establish. In such a 
quiescence of consciousness an invisible effect like the 
'secret' working of the frost, itself subduing a world to 
unity, is raised to the status of sacred ritual, a serving 
'ministry' - one which is, in reality, bringing the 
paradoxical balm of death and cold. Isolation is so pervasive 
here, the frost evades even the intangible importunities of 
the wind. 
Outside realities are mentioned, even celebrated, only to 
be blurred in the process. The building up of successive lines 
to evoke 'the numberless goings-on of life' in line 12 is 
negated by the sentence's deferred conclusion, 'Inaudible as 
dreams! '. 'Sea, hill, and wood' are smoothed and unified into 
'Sea, and hill, and wood' in line 11, losing the edges of 
their separate identities along the way. 'Numberless' is 
itself a paradox: to be 'without number' is to be both 
'numerous' and 'unidentifiable' at once. 
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The pupose here is something like a 'melting-together' of 
the individual words, a chemical 'reduction' of plain sense. 
Most potent of all these poetic strategies is the use of 
verbal music, especially assonance and internal rhyme. The 
appeal to the raw energy of sound itself effects a kind of 
dissolution of the words into their primal elements, taking 
them closer to the pre-verbal, the pre-conceptual. The self-
communion the poet indulges in this 'solityde, which suits 
Abstryser musings' is not yet a meditation that can be 
expressed in words. It is rather an inward listening, a 
special sub-verbal altertness to 'nature' within and without, 
but where we also see external nature gradually giving way 
before the nature within. What we are offered, in other words, 
is a preparation for mystic experience. 
In the case of 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' the 
reader's entry into the poem is abrupt, not gradual. Like the 
wedding-guest, the reader is accosted on the threshold of the 
narrative, by an act which happens prior to the opening line: 
'It is an ancient Mariner •••. , The almost literally hypnotic 
power of the lines of 'Frost at Midnight' finds its equivalent 
here in the compulsive spell the mariner's narrative exerts 
upon its listener within the poem. Coleridge can afford to 
direct this power upon the wedding-guest, rather than upon his 
own readers, because he is relying on the ancient and familiar 
appeal of the ballad-form to do his work for him. The ballad's 
own headlong narrative momentum carries the reader insistently 
along. 
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The technique may be different to that of 'Frost at 
Midnight', but it works towards similar ends. It is generally 
assumed that coleridge uses the ballad-form because of its 
antiquity and its association with the anonymous voice of the 
common people down the generations. But this return to the 
oral origins of verse has a deeper motive, connected with what 
Julia Kristeva means when she defines poetic language as 'an 
attempt to symbolize the "beginning'" (1982: 61). It is also 
of a piece with a more personal and symbolic 'return to 
origins', which is another of the subjects of the poem. It is 
no accident, for example, that the scene of the launching of 
the mariner's vessel appeals to the child-like in us through 
its clockwork motions, its primitive perspective, and its 
bright primary colouring, as in a child's picture: 
The ship was cheered, the 
Merrily did we drop 
Below the kirk, below the 
Below the lighthouse top. 
The Sun came up upon the 
out of the sea came he! 
And he shone bright, and 
went down into the sea. 
harbour cleared 
hill, 
left, 
on the right 
(AM: 11. 21-8) 
The double sense of 'cheer' informs this 'cheerful' picture of 
the voyage's beginning, in which all is miniaturized except 
the elements, and where the human presence, contained in the 
simple 'we', seems to have no control over events. All 
responsibility for the boat's progress seems to rest with the 
larger forces of wind and sea. But this happy irresponsibility 
is not to last. 
2 
Forthwith this frame of mine was wrenched 
With a woeful agony, 
Which forced me to begin my tale; 
And then it left me free. 
since then, at an uncertain hour, 
That agony returns: 
And till my ghostly tale is told, 
This heart within me burns. 
I pass, like night, from land to land; 
I have strange power of speech; 
That moment that his face I see, 
I know the man that must hear me: 
To him my tale I teach. (AM: 11. 578-590) 
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The lines above are not offered as a description of the trials 
of those who compose theoretic essays on romantic poetry. They 
do, however, provide a point of entry to a fascinating task: 
the speculative re-composition - in our own terms, and from, 
inevitably, our later perspective - of some of the matter of a 
'lost' essay by Coleridge: the promised but never-completed 
treatise on the supernatural which he alluded to several times 
in the course of his literary career. The most prominent 
notice he gave of it is especially strategically placed. It 
ends the first book of Biographia Literaria and follows 
immediately upon the most famous lines of prose he ever wrote: 
the culminating definitions of Fancy and Imagination which 
close chapter XIII. The context seems thus to link the 
'supernatural' directly with the romantic vision of the 
creative Imagination. 
whatever more than this I shall think it 
fit to declare concerning the powers and 
privileges of the imagination in the 
present work will be found in the critical 
essay on the uses of the supernatural in 
poetry and the principles that regulate 
its introduction: which the reader will 
find prefixed to the poem of The Ancient 
Mariner. (BL: 167) 
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The project mentioned might consequently seem of the highest 
importance to the poet, equal in importance only to the 
separate metaphysical Biographia, for which it was intended to 
form a companion-piece. From both of these enterprises 
Coleridge was characteristically distracted, as we know, and 
they were never undertaken. 
The real reasons for his dereliction of both tasks must 
have been something more than his legendary procrastination, a 
failing for which he constantly upbraided himself. No doubt he 
could visualise the final forms required with sufficient 
clarity to realize or at least half-realise that he could get 
little help in attaining them from the critical theory, 
philosophy, psychology and science of his own day. He would 
still be left with almost insurmountable problems of logical 
connection. These difficulties not even optimism, or a clear 
sense of the goal, or an intuitive feel that there was a path 
to be followed, would have been able to minimise. 
As far as the projected metaphysical treatise was 
concerned, the alternative to abandoning it would have been to 
offer a slavish imitation of Schelling, the German philosopher 
to whose ideas the Biographia was already too heavily 
indebted. Such a course of (perhaps only partially 
acknowledged) imitation would have left Coleridge too exposed, 
in view of all the claims and promises he had made. It is easy 
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enough to see the way in which he may have been the victim of 
his own publicity: in Coleridge's complex mind, it seems, to 
create too strong an expectation of the fulfilment of some 
task was actually to encourage himself to defect from it. 
In the case at least of the essay on the supernatural, we 
are perhaps in a slightly more favourable position than he 
was. For a start, we are the heirs of all those post-romantic 
thinkers who have elaborated the theory of symbolism since his 
time, often building on the efforts of Coleridge and his 
European contemporaries of two centuries ago. 
As is sometimes acknowledged, the romantic interpretation 
of the symbol and of symbolism - of which Coleridge is at 
least the most articulate English exponent - gave rise to two 
developing traditions. The first led through the literary 
symbolistes of France to a modern conception of the 
functioning of the image in poetry, drama and the novel; the 
second produced the conception of the dream-symbol, and of the 
symbolic act as symptom, which underlies twentieth-century 
psychoanalytic practice. Our advantage is that some of the 
late fruits of these processes Coleridge helped to initiate 
may perhaps supply the necessary matter that he lacked, or, at 
least, may sUbstitute for it in bolstering his theory. 
Familiar as it is, Coleridge's remarkable new vision of 
the symbol deserves recapitulation here. Its best-known, 
though somewhat cryptic, definition runs 
a symbol is characterised by a translucence of the 
Special in the Individual or of the General in the 
Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above 
all by the translucence of the Eternal through and 
in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality 
which it renders intelligiblej and while it 
enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part 
in that Unity, of which it is the representative. 
(Coleridge4 1972: 30) 
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This admittedly somewhat grandiose account of symbolism has 
in the last decades become newly controversial, in view of the 
exception taken to it by Paul de Man, among others, on the 
grounds that it posits a naive referentiality of meaning, by 
suggesting that the sign is inseparable from - in the sense of 
'transparent to' - what it designates. This objection is in my 
opinion based on a misunderstanding, as I think both the 
context and practical applications of the passage reveal. 
The symbol is inseparable from its meaning, in 
Coleridge's presentation of it, precisely because it does not 
'stand for' something apart from itself and its function in 
its context, as would be the case in allegory. The image 
chosen - let us sayan albatross - comes to represent far less 
its dictionary signification - a type of bird - than it does 
an almost inexpressible focus of energies, a complex of 
associations, meanings and feelings given to it by its 
function within the totality which encases it. The image 
becomes, in a sense, an adumbration and expression of the 
whole 'little universe' of the poem, and is only ever 
imperfectly divisible from it, if at all. It is able to 
operate in this supralinguistic way because the elements of 
the poem serve progressively to emancipate it from its mundane 
signifying role, from its normal purpose in the everyday 'time 
and space' of common discourse. 
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Thus, understanding of a particular poetic symbol, 
properly so-called, is not likely to be exhausted by any 
single thread of interpretation that may be, however 
appositely, drawn out from it. As a condensation of semantic 
energies, it may support a wide range of meanings, without 
being any of these exclusively. Such meanings may range from 
the most particular to the most abstract, from the most 
'especial' to the most 'general', and still be entirely 
reflective of the poem. To conflate an antinomy set up by 
Roland Barthes, the poem may thus be both 'text' and 'work'i 
but it is restricted from being any text because it is a work. 
This situation, where an apparently arbitrary image gains 
a new range of meanings through its relation to some hidden 
supportive complex, is just that found in psychoanalysis, 
where pictorial and verbal elements from dreams and fantasies 
furnish unexpected significances for the process of therapy. 
The totality in this case is the entire unconscious life of 
the dreamer, to whom the un interpreted image may often appear 
to possess an almost occult or chthonic power, until its 
emotional sources are laid bare. 
That Coleridge effectually anticipated this psychological 
use of his concept of symbolism is indicated by such comments 
as the following from a letter of 1816. What is notable is 
that he identifies this special potential of the 'symbol as 
sign' with its power of suspending reference, or of rendering 
reference uncertain: 'The truth is that images and thoughts 
possess a power in, and of themselves, independent of that act 
of the judgment or understanding by which we affirm or deny 
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the existence of a reality correspondent to them. Such is the 
ordinary state of the mind in dreams' (Raines 1950: 216). 
For an observer in certain special states of mind, 
sometimes even external things could seem to desert their 
usual functions and take on the strange quality that such 
dispossession of everyday meaning brings. But under such -
very n~arly mystical - circumstances they do not signify 
nothing, but begin to draw instead upon deep inner sources of 
signification, that defy precise transcription: 
In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, 
as of yonder moon dim-glimmering through the dewy 
window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were 
asking for, a symbolical language for something 
within me that already and forever exists, than 
observing something new. Even when that latter is 
the case, yet still I have always an obscure feeling 
as if that new phenomenon were the dim awakening of 
a forgotten or hidden truth of my inner nature. It 
is still interesting as a word - a symbol. It is 
logos the Creator, and the Evolver! 
(in E.H. Coleridge6 1895: 36) 
Though the interpretation of the symbols of dream and 
fantasy in the psychoanalytic session could be considered a 
somewhat restricted instance of what Coleridge meant, there is 
interest in the fact that Freud, round about 1919, made a 
notable repayment of the debt psychoanalysis owed to 
literature. The current of his thoughts turned in the 
direction of literary and aesthetic concerns on this occasion 
to help explain just those powerful but elusive feelings of 
overwhelming strangeness that can accompany the re-emergence 
of unconscious matter in symbolic form. 
His immediate object of interest in his essay on 'The 
uncanny,7 was the fantastic novella by E.T.A. Hoffmann called, 
in translation, The Sandman. He wished to propose a 
psychoanalytic justification for the macabre visions of 
disembodied eyes and of the animated female doll, Coppelia, 
which the piece contains. But these incidental facts need 
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concern us less than the general comments on the nature of the 
'uncanny' or 'unheimlich' which make up the body of his essay. 
It can be no coincidence that Freud was deeply occupied with 
two other important concepts in this and other writings at the 
time; his thoughts on the uncanny seem a by-product of his 
elaboration jointly of the the repetition-compulsion and of 
the death-wish, both of which were made central in his Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, also then in process of composition. 
The connection between these three psychological, 
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entities, the 'uncanny' response, the repetition compulsion, 
and the death wish, helps to throw some not always oblique 
light on the romantic supernatural of Coleridge, and 
consequently upon The Ancient Mariner. But to explore this I 
shall have to begin by following Freud's initial steps through 
'The Uncanny', in particular his efforts to define the rather 
difficult-to-translate German word unheimlich in a way which 
reveals the connection between the sense of eeriness, in 
literature and in life, and mental processes only partly 
within our conscious reach. 
It is perhaps in itself significant that Freud begins 
with a long compilation of examples and quotations from German 
and other dictionaries, illustrating the wide variety of 
different usages attaching to the word unheimlich. His list 
runs to several pages of text; so uneasy and shifty is this 
105 
term, as if taking some taint of its own from the 'uncanny' 
world, that it turns finally into its opposite: the same 
sense, we learn, may in some contexts be conveyed by the term 
heimlich, its apparent contrary (XVII: 226). In this pervasive 
state of verbal unease, it seems hardly surprising that the 
psychologist E. Jentsch had in 1906 defined the 'essential 
factor' in uncanniness as 'intellectual uncertainty'. Freud, 
however, after considering this suggestion sets it aside as 
'incomplete' (221), as staying somewhat too anxiously close to 
the merely etymological sense of 'unhomely' or 'unfamiliar'. 
Before we follow Freud's example, it is worth mentioning 
that Jentsch's account has at least the merit of placing the 
emphasis not on the special subject-matter concerned, but on 
the sUbjective disorientation produced by it: on the abysmal 
sense of losing one's way amid failing certainties; and it 
would be wise not to abandon the suggestion entirely, but to 
allow it as a contribution in what follows. 
Freud is clearly more impressed by the definition from 
Schelling (the very Schelling whose 'dynamical philosophy' 
lies so extensively behind the metaphysics of the Biographia) 
which appears among the lexicogaphical material: '''Unheimlich'' 
is the name for everything that ought to have remained 
secret and hidden but has come to light' (XVII: 224). 
Freud picks this idea out for special notice on the page 
following, indicating how amid the more humdrum and 
predictable instances, 'Schelling says something which throws 
quite a new light on the concept •.• for which we were 
certainly not prepared' (XVII: 225). In fact, Schelling's 
suggestion is the thread Freud follows. In the analysis of 
Hoffmann's stories he highlights the appearance of the 
'double' or doppelganger in many of them, and cites this 
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typical 'doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self' 
(234) in the fantasy tale as no more than a special instance 
of that mysterious phenomenon of apparently unaccountable 
'repetition', which begins now to be mentioned in the text. 
Yet such multiple repetitions themselves repeat the past; as a 
form of regression to the 'primary narcissism' of childhood, 
when self and other were imperfectly distinguished: 'when the 
ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external 
world and from other people' (236). 
When all is said and done, the quality of 
uncanniness can only come from the fact of the 
'double' being a creation dating back to a very 
early mental stange, long since surmounted - a 
stage, incidentally, at which it wore a more 
friendly aspect. the 'double' has become a thing of 
terror, just as, after the collapse of their 
religion, the gods turned into demons. 
(XVII: 236) 
Thus the primary, pre-linguistic world of earliest 
consciousness, unified to the point where distinctions even of 
self and other blur and disappear, may reappear for the adult 
mind in two utterly contradictory lights: as the epitome of 
all that is comforting and paradisal, as it perhaps once was; 
or, alternatively, as a source of horror and imminent self-
collapse, and as a threat to the rational adult being. In its 
appealing aspect it is, according to Rosemary Jackson, a 
goal which lies behind all fantastic art, to a 
greater or lesser degree, the arrival at a point of 
absolute unity of self and other, subject and 
object, at a zero point of entropy. Jacques Lacan 
has identified the longing for this unity as the 
profoundest desire of the subject, referrring to it 
as 'an eternal and irreducible human desire ... an 
eternal desire for the nonrelationship of zero, 
where identity is meaningless'. (Jacksons 1981: 76-
7) 
Such was the condition of the prelinguistic world of 
common experience, as both Freud (cf. XXI: 64ff.) and Lacan 
would have it. There is an obvious connection between 'the 
double' and the sense of doubling that attends the Lacanian 
'mirror stage', the phase of development which acts as a 
portal between 'that' world and the growth of our social, 
rational selves (cf. Jackson 1981: 114). 
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To Freud, however, it is the negative, not the paradisal, 
aspect of such 'recollections of early childhood' which stands 
uppermost. In the less relative world of the infant, too, the 
paradise of early existence may instantly change to hell, 
without bridge or intervention; so, according to Freud, an 
inexplicable state of repetition may tap us into the 
terrifying, not the holy, recollection of an earlier life. 
Thus repetition may in some circumstances of life itself 
'arouse an uncanny feeling, which, further recalls the sense 
of helplessness experienced in some earlier states' (XVII: 
237). He gives as example his own reminiscence of being lost 
in a strange town, and inadvertently returning time and again 
to the same street, from which he was intent on finding his 
way. Though Freud does not make it explicit, what is uncanny 
about this instance of repetition is its forcing of an 
unwanted unification upon its victim's disorientated mind: 
that the regressive state of unity comes unwarranted and 
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unbidden, giving rise to primal panic and the 'helpless' 
condition he describes, in which all effort of will and self-
assertion seems annihilated by uncontrollable circumstance. 
The repetitious street begins, no doubt, to wear an air of 
almost deliberate malice, adding to our troubles the 
unwarranted dislocation of consciousness into external 
circumstances. That this last effect is the experience of 
Coleridge's mariner we need hardly be reminded. 
In the case of the mariner, the inherent unity of the 
'One Life' which governs the cosmos, with the innate 
interdependence of consciousness and world, of subject and 
object, are positive values he is eventually brought through 
experience to recognise, having initially disregarded them in 
the albatross's murder. However, Freud's personal attitude to 
the psychological equivalent of this primal unity is far from 
accepting, though he recognizes its important influence among 
the usual contents of uncanny experience: 
Our analysis of instances of the uncanny has led us 
back to the old, animistic conception of the 
universe. This was characterized by the idea that 
the world was peopled with the spirits of human 
beings; by the subject's narcissistic overvaluation 
of his own mental processes; by the belief in the 
omnipotence of thoughts and the technique of magic 
based on that belief; by the attribution to various 
outside persons and things of carefully graded 
magical powers, or 'mana' ••• It seems as if each 
one of us has been through a phase of individual 
development corresponding to this animistic stage in 
primitive man, that none of us has passed through it 
without preserving certain residues and traces of it 
which are still capable of manifesting themselves, 
and that everything that now strikes us as 'uncanny' 
fulfils the condition of touching those residues of 
animistic activity within us and bringing them to 
expression. (XVII: 240-1) 
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Although the anthropological value of Freud's insights 
would now be heavily questioned, the picture he paints of 
narcissism itself gains colour from these images. Freud's 
desire to equate the early stages of personal development with 
the primitive history of Man has a bearing on Coleridge's 
poem: it may be that the 'ancientness' of our mariner is 
partly emblematic of the poem's symbolic reference to the 
initial embarkation of the 'self' upon the waters of life. We 
perhaps begin to understand something about the Ancient 
Mariner's story which must have disquieted most readers in 
some degree: the lack of balance or justice in his fate as 
compared with what happens to his shipmates. Fickle they may 
be, but they are not after all responsible for the death of 
the bird, as he is; and yet he survives while they perish, and 
their bodies become the lifeless animated tools of 'angelic 
spirits'. They suffer, in other words, the reverse fate to 
that of Dr. Coppe1ius's doll; and such humiliation seems a 
retribution in excess of that exacted from the deed's real 
perpetrator. But the cause of the situation is that their 
whole condition, and that of the other characters, is entirely 
secondary to and dependent upon the mariner's welfare, even to 
life or death: it is his 'ego' and hence his fate which is of 
exclusive narcissistic dominance in the narrative. For this 
reason even the wedding-guest cannot evade him. So, for this 
almost overbearing centrality of the Mariner's own ego in his 
story, Freud's 'primary narcissism' does offer some 
explanation. 
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It does begin to seem as if the precise feeling of 
uncanniness as such is not to be located in the contents of 
our early awareness of things, which seem in themselves 
frequently either neutral or positive, or conceivably so. The 
eeriness and unease must rather reside elsewhere, and be 
projected onto those things, thus colouring them. If these 
early memories are not simply forgotten, but repressed by our 
'grownup' consciousness, then it must have some vested 
interest in their non-appearance, which it may find 
threatening to the rational ordering of its daily life and 
sense of self-preservation. Hence it is not the memories, but 
their re-appearance, their repetition, which is the source of 
anxiety. So, in essence, runs Freud's explanation. 
if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, 
we can understand why linguistic usage has extended 
das Heimliche ['homely'] into its opposite, das 
Unheimliche (cf. 226)i for this uncanny is in 
reality nothing new or alien, but something which is 
familiar and old-established in the mind and which 
has become alienated from it only through the 
process of repression. (XVII: 241) 
Hence the links with the 'hidden' and brought 'to light' of 
Schelling's definition. As Freud neatly points out, in 
unheimlich 'the prefix "un" is the token of repression'. Thus 
'everything that is uncanny ••. is something which is secretly 
familiar' and 'has undergone repression and then returned from 
it' (245). 
It may be possible to put it differently and to locate 
the sense of supernatural eeriness in something more benign: a 
widening of consciousness to encompass new realities and new 
ways of seeing - which are really old ways of seeing which our 
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rational consciousness had by its very development foreclosed 
from us. The dizziness and strangeness of the experience are 
the natural response to this necessary re-orientation of all 
our familiar conceptions to accommodate the new realities. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the 'symbolic' mode of 
communication with ourselves (in Coleridge's sense) is not a 
more sophisticated, but a more primitive model of thought, the 
elements of which are imagisitic, shifting, metamorphosing, 
all-embracing, imprecise - like the ingredients of dreams. 
That the romantic use of symbolism may itself be enough to 
raise 'uncanny' feelings in the mind, Coleridge's somewhat 
grandiose account of it in the Lay Sermons seems to promise. 
Freud, however, was never able to sympathise with those 
who saw a positive value in the condition of 'primary 
narcissism', with which 'symbolism' in Coleridge's sense 
appears to connect. Though he understood his friend Romain 
Rolland's account of the fundamental 'religious emotions' to 
refer to this earlier state of being, as 'a feeling of an 
indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a 
whole' (XXI9 : 65), he sees in this fact even less reason for 
attraction to the condition. In this he is not at one with 
Rolland, whose memorable description of the feeling, as 
recounted by Freud, is markedly positive: the emotion 
concerned 'he may suppose is present in millions of people. It 
is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of 
"eternity", a feeling of something limitless, unbounded - as 
it were, "oceanic'" (XXI: 64). We are reminded of the most 
important characteristic Coleridge attaches to the symbol: 
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'the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal.' 
If it is with language that the fine distinctions of time and 
place are enabled to enter our consciousness, there may still 
be uses of language which partially reflect a more holistic 
prior condition, a condition not entirely in space and time, 
as we later come to differentiate these terms. As Jacques 
Lacan puts it, 'what happens' in the unconscious 'is 
inaccessible to contradiction, to spatio-temporal location and 
also to the function of time' (Lacan'o 1986: 31); and, insofar 
as the oceanic condition is an unconscious stratum still 
present within us, it has the same right to these 
descriptions. If 'indestructible desire escapes from time' 
(Lacan, 32), may this not also be the partial and relative 
effect of such a 'symbolic' form of words as contains its own 
death-wish, so to speak, and which seeks to reflect as closely 
as possible those 'unconscious desires' that spell its 
undoing?' 
, It should be noted that Lacan insists that 'Freud's 
unconscious is not at all the romantic unconsious of imaginative 
creation' (Lacan 1986: 24); we are partially justified in 
understanding as much of Laca·n' s own different 'unconscious'. For 
him (at least in 1986), as for Freud, the 'oceanic aspiration' 
is a 'phantasy', and 'illusion' (31); it gains reality only in 
terms of the 'split' or 'gap', the surprise, by which the 
unconscious opens up a hiatus in our speech and daily life, and 
so renders them contingent: 'What is ontic in the function of the 
unconscious is the split through which that something, whose 
adventure in our field seems so short, is for a moment brought 
into the light of day' (31). Thus Lacan's unconscious can only 
properly be located in terms of negatives: 'Ontically, then, the 
unconscious is the elusive' (32); it is what in our psychology 
challenges the ordinary assumptions we hold about Being 
(including its subordinate categories of Time and Space). The 
unconscious's further existence as any kind of unitary entity is 
problematic indeed. 
3 
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In the case of the Ancient Mariner, his embarkation and sea-
voyage into new realities are certainly clarified for us if we 
take account of their 'oceanic' dimension. Indeed, the 
Mariner's voyage could be interpreted as a parable of the 
ego's painful discovery of the reality principle, in that the 
cosmic results of his mistreatment of the albatross impress 
upon him his relative subordination to the universe's more 
powerful ego, where once he supposed his own omnipotent and 
omnipresent. In the albatross he thus comes to some awareness 
of the demands of 'other', an 'other' still partially 
conceived of as a division in, and hence a projection of, the 
self. Insofar then, as it imitates the formation of the super-
ego the poem becomes a universal parable of the arrival of 
guilt. 
Though reductive in the traditional 'Freudian-school' 
manner, it is tempting to suggest an identification between 
the albatross and the poet's father, whom, as a child of 
eight, he must have believed he had 'killed' through his own 
celebrated naughtiness. The exile to 'Christ's Hospital' must, 
as 'Frost at Midnight' hints, have seemed an imprisonment and 
penance for this self-convicted Oedipal deed. From here began, 
perhaps, a pattern of 'compulsive repetition' - of need, 
transgression, self-punishment and self-reproach - which was 
to last Coleridge throughout his life. 2 [11] 
2 David Beres in 1952 suggested a link between the albatross 
and perhaps more interestingly the water-snakes, and 
Coleridge's recollection of a 'phallic mother'. His paper was 
called 'A dream, a vision, and a poem' and is referred to and 
discussed by D.W. Harding in 'The Theme of "The Ancient 
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But even if accepted this would be merely to scratch the 
surface of the range of meanings of the work, and would offer 
us only a little information about the functioning of the poem 
as an emotional event for the reader, which is our primary 
concern. 
There is no doubt that the Mariner's world is 
'oceanically' unified. Its 'One Life' shows itself not only in 
the Coppelia-like vivification of all its elements (sea, ship, 
winds, currents, and celestial objects all seem actively 
involved in the Mariner's fate) but also in the unifying 
poetic form of the ballad itself, and in the evidence of the 
poet's own mind which is everywhere present: the animation 
provided in the similes, other images and figures of speech 
contribute, even more than could be considered 'usual' in a 
poem, to a sense of a newly-living whole. 'O! the one Life 
within us and abroad,/ Which meets all motions and becomes its 
soul,/ A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,/ Rhythm 
in all thought ..• ' wrote Coleridge in 1828, six years before 
his death. The synaesthesia of these expressions reveals -
still more than the union of poetic self with an equally 
created world of perception, or of subject and object in the 
poem - that malleable 'shiftiness' of language, and, 
correspondingly, of the supposedly real entities of 
experience, which prepares the way to make unification 
possible. 
This controversial unity of the poem which both Coleridge 
and Wordsworth believed in is seen by them in a quasi-
Mariner"'in Coburn (1967: 57-64). 
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metaphysical light. Uncomfortable as this may be to recognise 
in our more sceptical times, for both poets the unifications 
of the poem imitate in some dim, reflected way the absolute 
unity of the cosmos at large. This unity includes not only 
physical nature but mind, too, in their view. As Coleridge 
could happily assert in one of his letters: 'what the Globe is 
in Geography, miniaturing in order to manifest the Truth, such 
is a Poem to that Image of God, which we were created unto, 
and which still seeks that Unity, or Revelation of the One in 
and by the Many '(1956: 545)12. The child's mind was 
recognized as both emblem and origin of that vision which 
could perceive the unities upon which both revelation and 
poetic form and vision depend: 'Blest the Infant Babe,' writes 
Wordsworth13 (Wordsworth 1954: Prelude II, 11. 229ff), 
indicating that his intention is not unlike that of Freud: '( 
For with my best conjecture I would trace/ Our Being's earthly 
progress ..•• ).' In specifically Lacanian terms, we could say 
that the poem is invoved in a partial process of attempted 
approximation to the undifferentiated Real. 
For Wordsworth the contentment and security of 
Childhood's primary narcisssism, where the infant does not yet 
distinguish him or herself from mother and hence world, is not 
only a vital determining experience; it is also a supremely 
positive and profound one, capable of 'irradiating and 
exalting' (cf. Prelude II, 11. 234-241) the external universe 
by imbuing it with one of humankind's deepest and most all-
embracing emotions. Coleridge, in his Mariner, is far more 
acutely conscious than Wordsworth, and at an earlier stage in 
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their joint development than he, that the gates of Eden do 
close, and that the cost of being an outcast from this primal 
world may be considerable - all the more to the degree one is 
empowered to 'recollect' it. 
And yet even for Coleridge the sublime, as a state of 
elevated consciousness which promises the reader (or listener 
or viewer) the absorption into a higher mode of being and 
feeling in which the trappings of self may be temporarily 
discarded, comes to stand as the primary achievement and 
purpose of the poetic text. As in his table talk Coleridge 
once placed this quality in poetry - in contrast to the mere 
'majestic' or the 'picturesque' - as the ultimate but almost 
unachievable stage of response: 'Where neither whole nor 
parts, but unity, as boundless and endless allness - the 
sublime' (Coleridge'4 1917: 443). 
It is clear, then, that there must be a relation hetween 
the poetic sublime and the romantic uncanny, since the terms 
which most concern them appear so to overlap. Interestingly, 
Coleridge seems to put his main emphasis on the supernatural 
rather than the sublime. This may be because he is concerned 
with a wider range of possible responses emanating from the 
primal source - including primal teror and unease, as the 
mariner's fate attests. 
Coleridge is certainly (perhaps even unfortunately) 
prophetic in The Ancient Mariner, with regard to the future 
course of romanticism. For this work touches not only on the 
sublime and the uncanny, but - as we shall see - incorporates 
the repetition compulsion, too; more ominously - in the dire 
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consequences for the mariner's comrades, and in the Death-in-
Life the mariner himself undergoes - we may discern the 
lineaments of the death wish also. 
Alas! (thought I, and my heart beat loud) 
How fast she nears and nears! 
Are those her sails that glance in the Sun, 
Like restless gossameres? 
Are those her ribs through which the Sun 
Did peer, as through a grate? 
And is that Woman all her crew? 
Is that a DEATH? and are there two? 
Is DEATH that woman's mate? 
Her lips were red, her looks were free, 
Her locks were yellow as gold: 
Her skin was as white as leprosy, 
The Night-mare LIFE-IN-DEATH was she, 
Who thicks man's blood with cold. 
The naked hulk alongside came, 
And the twain were casting dice; 
'The game is done! I've won! I've 
Quoth she, and whistles thrice. 
won! 
(AM: 11. 181-198) 
The italics and capitalisations deserve attention here: what 
is fascinating is that the 'Night-mare LIFE-IN-DEATH' is 
presented as specifically and emphatically female. It is her 
triumph that the mariner is condemned not to extinction but to 
a 'living death', in which he suffers the compulsion to repeat 
the essence of his traumatic tale. 
What this seems to imply for the mariner-as-poet is that 
he is never entirely free of the grasp of the pre-verbal 
maternal entity which incorporates in its meaning the 'death 
of the self'; in his mixed desire and dread of this red-
lipped, golden-haired entity he is forever moved both to 
regret her passing and to fear her power: a state of 
irresolvable tension which dooms him forever to return to the 
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subject in his multiplied symptomatic narratives, but which he 
cannot finally exorcise. 
For Wordsworth the mystical is never other than 
benevolent, or else salutary in the fear it inspires; 
Coleridge seems aware that there is something potentially 
darker and more genuinely terrifying in the engulfing 
sublimity the poem both hides and reveals. 
The death wish is in any case an ambivalent entity: it 
may imply nothing more harmful than the paradoxical desire of 
self for 'dissolution into the organic' or into the primal 
unity. This is, it seems to me, where Lacan most recognizes 
its functioning: as an effect of the frustrated desire for the 
Other. But that it may have more sinister implications too is 
revealed by the second and later generations of romantics, 
where the death wish begins to dominate, and does, I think, 
initiate the romantic decline; for example, its Keatsian need 
to cease upon the midnight with no pain; its belles dames, who 
represent the masochistic submission to the mother (or at 
least to the feminine) who seeks to overwhelm and re-absorb 
the emergent self. The 'romantic agony' in all its 
manifestations begins to give increasing prominence to these 
destructive drives, to an extent which ordinary everyday 
rationality would eventually cease to tolerate. 
The 'supernatural', then, is more comprehensive than the 
'sublime' (at least as Wordsworth conceived it); it adds to 
the Wordsworthian sublime more extensive possibilities of 
terror and awe as well as exaltation (though, to be fair, 
Wordsworth has these, too). But all these are still by-
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products of the process of alerting us to a 'different' world, 
one that surrounds and contains our own limited, familarized, 
post-lingui~tic consciousness, and thereby exposing us to the 
relativity of what we had thought all-inclusive. It tells us 
that a super-normal reality extends beyond our own - at least 
linguistically speaking; and that it is one of the functions 
of our metamorphic poetic devices to make that 'other' reality 
partly visible to us through the poem. 
As Coleridge himself described the first effects upon him 
of his encounter with Wordsworth's poetry, before he had ever 
met the man, it is clear that what deeply impressed him was 
the poet's power to make vision new. He saw this especially in 
the poetry's dialectical mixture of accurate observation and 
'the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed; 
and above all the original gift of spreading the tone, the 
atmosphere and with it the depth and height of the ideal 
world, around forms, incidents and situations of which, for 
the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried 
up the sparkle and the dewdrops' (BL: 48-9). 
We remember the joint plan of campaign for the Lyrical 
Ballads: the poets were inspired by the symbol of a moonlit or 
sunset landscape to the idea that the 'imaginative' and the 
'actual' might be combined without sacrificing either. Hence 
two sorts of poems were planned, each sort to be the 
responsibility of one only of the two poets: 'it was agreed 
that my endeavours,' recalls Coleridge 'should be directed to 
characters or persons supernatural, or at least romantic' (BL: 
168). We see how closely these two terms are linked in 
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coleridge's mind: here the 'romantic' appears as merely a 
modified or more edifying version of the stronger alternative. 
Mr Wordsworth, on the other hand, was to propose to 
himself as his object to give the charm of novelty 
to things of every day, and to excite a feeling 
analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the 
mind's attention from the lethargy and custom and 
directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of 
the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but 
for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity 
and selfish solicitude, we have eyes yet see not, 
ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor 
understand. (BL: 169; my emphasis) 
These are somewhat more moderate claims than those I want to 
make or have been making; or which Coleridge seemed to imply 
in his final words on the Imagination a chapter but also a 
volume ago. But what is recoverable from both contexts is the 
sense of a renewal of vision which Imagination may bring 
about, which may make the natural world appear to us as 
suddenly 'uncanny'. (We remember that Coleridge wished to 
distinguish between the supernatural proper and its close kin 
the preternatural, and planned to prefix an essay on this 
second form to 'Christabel' if and when it were separately 
published; it was possibly the uncanny in its more 
Wordsworthian variant, as the radically unexpected, that he 
had here most in mind.) 
In the previous chapter Coleridge had claimed the 
following about the operations of the creative Imagination: 
'It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or 
where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all 
events, it struggles to ideaalize and to unify. It is 
essentialy vital, even as all objects (as objects) are 
essentially fixed and dead' (BL, 167). 
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Is there not sufficient here, then, to reveal to us the 
meaning of the romantic supernatural, as Coleridge intends it? 
It consists in, as Schelling suggested, a 'bringing to light' 
of that which is 'secret and hidden'. What is most 
characteristically hidden from our everyday vision is the 
innate unity and subjectivity of the world of apparently 
discrete things we suppose external to our perception. This 
revelation - which is as much an inward communing with 
something we know but have forgotten - we may be surprised 
into, by a poem, in two ways: by a dissolving and diffusing of 
our ordinary linguistic expectations; or, in contrast, by a 
more-than-expected unification of sound, connotation, emotion 
and image, to create the effect of a new composite entity. All 
this is largely managed by making words themselves function in 
new and renovating ways. 
It may be objected that what has been suggested may still 
be applied as much to the sublime as to the uncanny, and yet 
in neither case characterizes them specifically. Terror may 
also be part of the sublime, as Burke had revealed long before 
Coleridge's time ('whatever is in any sort terrible, or is 
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in manner 
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime' [Burke15 1969: 
35]). Although the two are linked, it must in the last 
analysis be differences of content that reveal the precise 
distinction between them. In the case of the sublime, what 
seems most to impress us are extremes of dimensionality or 
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scale: of power, strength, height, depth, vastness, intensity, 
perfection or all-embracingness. To continue with Burke: 'In 
this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that 
it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on 
that object which employs it ..• hardly anything can strike 
the mind with its greatness, which does not make some sort of 
approach towards infinity' (1969: 49, 54). What Burke 
describes is the overwhelming of the reason and its capacities 
by the employment of some means which, even on early 
interpretations, are seen as suggesting extreme 'dimensions of 
the mind': human qualities of nobility, profundity or 
awesomeness, perhaps. 
The supernatural or uncanny emerges thus as a 
subdepartment of the sublime, where our sense of awe and 
veneration is actually overtaken by the elements of fear, 
unease, and half-pleasurable terror, all leading towards the 
temporary 'death of self'. It is then only a question of a 
different emphasis that distinguishes supernatural from 
sublime: as Freud reveals, what is at stake in the 
supernatural or uncanny are not mountains or chasms but the 
overawingly personal abysses into which we stare, when we 
recognise the alien at heart of the human. It is that utterly 
elusive sense of self-recognition that is most awful, that 
inexplicable conviction of our own deep implication in what he 
means that the spectre brings with him, like a reflection in a 
mirror that is also not our own. In a wider but no less potent 
way the spectral includes the return of common yet forgotten 
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psychological matter, which the features of the tale or poem -
or perhaps the whole poem - serve to evoke. 
Julia Kristeva seems close to these matters when she 
finds the ,origin of all poetic activity in human emotions of 
fear: fear of the deep preverbal nothingness that underlies 
our language, about which we must compulsively keep talking: 
any practice of speech, inasmuch as it involves 
writing, is a language of fear. I mean a language of 
want as such, the want that positions sign, subject, 
and object ••• a language of want, of the fear that 
edges up to it and runs along its edges. The one who 
tries to utter this 'not yet a place', this no-
grounds, can obviously only do so backwards, 
starting from an over-mastery of the linguistic and 
rhetorical code. But in the last analysis he refers 
to fear - a terrifying, abject referent ... the 
writer is permanently confronted with such a 
language. The writer is a phobic who succeeds in 
metaphorizing in order to keep from being frightened 
to death; instead he comes to life again in signs. 
(Kristeva 1982: 38) 
4 
Which brings us to the repetition compulsion. Here Freud is 
surely right in placing less emphasis upon the specific 
contents of the experience than upon the force of disturbance 
itself, and upon the particular character of the 
disorientation it compels upon our everyday perceptions and 
presuppositions. 
Neil Hertz16 puts it this way: 'The feeling of the uncanny 
would seem to be generated by being-reminded-of-the-repetition 
compulsion, not by being-reminded-of-whatever-it-is-that-is-
repeated. It is the becoming aware of the process that is felt 
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as eerie' (Hertz 1979: 301). In other words, it is being 
tumbled willy-nilly into a situation of unexpected return -
with its implications of timelessness in the very fact of 
recurrence, a parallel return on both behavioural and 
psychological levels - that is particularly vertiginous for 
the everyday rational and linguistic ordering of our lives. 
Freud puts the matter perhaps most directly in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle: 
It may be presumed that when people unfamiliar with 
analysis feel an obscure fear - a dread of rousing 
something that, so they feel, is better left 
sleeping - what they are afraid of is the emergence 
of this compulsion with its hint of possession by 
some daemonic power. (XVII: 36). 
Though the work mentioned above provides the central 
occasion upon which Freud links - still perhaps somewhat 
loosely - the death wish and the compulsion to repeat, it is 
in 'The Uncanny' that this further element of uncanniness is 
drawn into the ambit of the other two: 
For it is possible to recognize the dominance in the 
unconscious mind of a 'compulsion to repeat' 
proceeding from the instinctual impulses and 
probably inherent in the very nature of the 
instincts - a compulsion powerful enough to overrule 
the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects 
of the mind their daemonic character, and still very 
clearly expresed in the impulses of small children; 
a compulsion, too, which is responsible for a part 
of the course taken by the analyses of neurotic 
patients. All these considerations prepare us for 
the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner 
'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny. 
(XVII: 238) 
Though Freud clearly wishes us to link the compulsion 
which produces the repetition of the neurotic symptom with the 
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sense of irrational 'uncanniness' which so frequently attends 
its 'inexplicable' return, we may feel some dissatisfaction at 
not being offered a clear account of the mechanism concerned. 
Why repeat? We still do not seem to possess an explanation for 
the particular character of the process itself. His comment to 
the effect that the instincts - of whatever character -
involve the repetition of behaviour, is only a sally in this 
direction. There is a world of difference between innate 
genetic behaviour patterns and neurotic symptoms. 
However, the descriptions17 he offers of such recurrent 
gestures or actions are vivid enough: 
There are people in whose lives the same reactions 
are perpetually being repeated uncorrected, to their 
own detriment, or others who seem to be pursued by a 
relentless fate, though a closer investigation 
teaches us that they are unwittingly bringing this 
fate on themselves. In such cases we attribute a 
'daemonic' character to the compulsion to repeat. 
(Freud 1973: 140) 
That this offers us an adequate account, not only of the 
situation of the Mariner subsequent to his voyage and return, 
but applies too to the addictive personality of his guilt-
tormented creator, is evident enough. Yet the Mariner's tale 
is sufficiently early in Coleridge's career to have been 
'uncannily' prophetic, as the poet himself seems to have 
recognized for the first time upon his trip to Malta in 1804. 
In a special way here, the 'timeless' character of the 
symbol might seem to have been vindicated. coleridge once 
spoke of the way dreams may be thought 'supernatural 
visitations', seeming by their prophetic power to possess a 
'character of divination. For •.. who shall determine, to what 
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extent this reproductive imagination, unsophisticated by the 
will, and undistracted by intrusions from the senses, mayor 
may not be concentred and sublimed into foresight and 
presentiment?' (LS: 80-1). Foresight or insight, the dream-
like fantasy of the mariner seems to have had emblematic 
status for Coleridge's life, as has often been noted. 
with regard to the mechanism of the repetition 
compulsion, we are obliged, I think, to adopt the Lacanian 
recourse of seeing in it a special relation to absence; it 
thus becomes a type of signifier, created out of presence and 
absence at once, as is so much else in our linguistic and 
symbolic world, if in a less overt way. Signifier or symbol, 
the repetitive gesture is surely an attempt to staunch a gap, 
to foreclose upon an absence, through a device the futility of 
which must be evident even to the luckless obsessive himself. 
Yet he is helpless, compelled by powers that are larger than 
his sense of self or of reality, for the origin of the 'gap', 
the trauma, is frequently to be found in an area of his past 
which precedes the full formation of these senses. 
One is probably not far from the mark in seeing the 
entire power of the Other - as object of desire - temporarily 
dislocated into the neurotic symptom, the vain attempt to re-
unify a fundamental level of experience divided by the 
traumatic or the repressed ••• as the unitary consciousness of 
primary narcissism is split into self and other, wounded by 
the need to speak. The Mariner must speak and continue 
speaking, like the poet, but such speech will not bring the 
promised surcease from the 'uncanny' source that prompts it, 
as even he knows. 
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Such an account may seem inflated until we consider 
examples within the experience of us all, for the 'compulsion 
to repeat' afflicts most of us through the regressive 
obsessionality of what is popularly called being 'in love'. 
The excruciating incapacity for being deterred from her object 
which afflicts the besotted Helena in A Midsummer Night's 
Dream is an example of this compulsion which has an 'uncanny' 
hold on her willi or the point when Lear, in a moment of dire 
black comedy, can see in the pitiful blind Gloucester only a 
'Goneril with a white beard'. Both are evidences of the 
compulsion to make whole by speech or act what resolutely 
refuses to be healed . 
. The idea that neurotic repetition is a kind of speech 
might prompt us to certain insights about the nature and 
function of repetition as a figurative device or rhetorical 
trope - at least, perhaps, in some romantic verse. Neil Hertz 
raises the question in the reverse direction when he asks 
whether the symptomatic gestures or 'visible signs of desire 
are "like" figures of speech?' (Hertz: 300). What we, in turn, 
wish to enquire is whether repetition and other figures may 
not sometimes function as 'symbols' in Coleridge's sense, or 
as apparently contentless and hence simply formal equivalents 
of such symbols. His mention of the 'referenceless' character 
of the symbols of dreams, quoted earlier in this essay, could 
perhaps open the way for such an understanding. 
Repetition may, of course, appear in many forms. It is 
customarily understood as a device for emphasis, and often 
is - but perhaps not always or exclusively. Here we may 
include not only the repetition of words, phrases, lines, 
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refrains and choral stanzas, and the same symbol appearing in 
different guises, but the formal inward repetitions that 
constitute rhyme and rhythm. What we mostly see is a complex 
play with our expectations: a texture of real presences and of 
presences implied or accentuated by absence, operating both on 
the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. It begins, indeed, to 
look as if verse is built up largely as a structure of 
repetitions and their absences. Consider 
or 
water, water, every where, 
And all the boards did shrink; 
Water, water, every where, 
Nor any drop to drink. (AM: 11. 119-122) 
Alone, alone, all, all alone, 
Alone on a wide wide sea! 
And never a saint took pity on 
My soul in agony. (AM: 11. 232-235) 
in contrast with 
o happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gushed from my heart, 
And I blessed them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
And I blessed them unaware. (AM: 11. 282-287) 
In the following case the repetitions not only dramatise the 
unalleviated endless agony and then the jabbering excitement 
of mariner and crew, they also enact the vain stabbing 
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attempts to pin down an elusive - ultimately uncanny - reality 
with words: 
There passed a weary time. Each throat 
Was parched, and glazed each eye. 
A weary timel a weary timel 
How glazed each weary eye, 
When looking westward, I beheld 
A something in the sky. 
At first it seemed a little speck 
And then it seemed a mist; 
It moved and moved, and took at last 
A certain shape, I wist. 
A speck, a mist, a shape, I wist! 
And still it neared and neared: 
As if it dodged a water-sprite, 
It plunged and tacked and veered. (AM: 11. 143-156) 
The coleridgean explanation of all this would surely be 
its linking of 'sameness with difference' in the poem; of 'a 
more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order'; 
as part of the way a poet 'diffuses a tone and spirit of unity 
that blends and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that 
synthetic and magical power to which we have exclusively 
appropriated the name of imagination' (BL: 174; my emphasis). 
Coleridge of course traces metre originally to 'the balance in 
the mind which strives to hold in check the workings of 
passion' (BL: 206). And, 'as intimately connected with this, 
if not the same argument in a more general form, I adduce the 
high spiritual instinct of the human being impelling us to 
seek unity by harmonious adjustment, and thus establishing the 
principle that all the parts of an organized whole must be 
assimilated to the more important and essential parts' (BL: 
211) • 
130 
What this amounts to is that language, figures of speech, 
and metre all share the same function - precisely that of 
distinguishing the poem from the language of 'real men'. The 
ultimate and essential fact is: 'I write in metre because I am 
about to use a language different from that of prose' (209); 
'in every import of the word essential which would not here 
involVe a mere truism, there may be, is and ought to be, an 
essential difference between the language of prose and of 
metrical composition' (212). 
The difference between the figure of speech or trope and 
the customary patterns of ordinary unaccentuated prose is in 
itself one of its most important rhetorical effects. That 
difference acts as a challenge to our adult, rational, prose-
centred existence, in Coleridge's view. The fact that the 
forms of poetry involve the recurrent more than the forms of 
prose, by itself constitutes a device to open up semantic 
uncertainty, to disspel stuffiness, to alert us to what is 
threadbare about our ways of seeing. 
It is thus rhetorical in a special sense somewhat like 
that outlined by Paul de Man in his 'Semiology and Rhetoric,18. 
De Man sees, for example, the ordinary question become 
rhetorical 
not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning 
and, on the other hand, a figural meaning, but when 
it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other 
linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that 
can be entirely contradictory) prevails. Rhetoric 
radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous 
possibilites of referential aberration. And although 
it would perhaps be somewhat remote from common 
usage, I would not hesitate to equate the 
rhetorical, figural potentiality of language with 
literature itself. (De Man 1979: 129-30) 
As is well-known, as a definition of literature this 
formula becomes problematic when confronted with the essay, 
the biography, the treatise, and even the novel. But it may 
have something to say about the common, formal aspect of 
Romantic poetry. 
5 
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The semantic splitting de Man talks of need not be followed as 
far as direct contradiction. Yet, as we have already seen, a 
poem like The Ancient Mariner cannot be made to signify in the 
way we suppose normal with our ordinary prose or speech 
communications. We and many others have teased out from the 
poem already a mumber of readings, all of which have equal 
right to our attentionj there is no reason to believe they are 
exhaustive. Such polysemy extends to the very frame of the 
mariner's tale, which seems designed to spread the 
possibilities of its signification. As Frances Ferguson'9 
notes, both the epigraph and the prose gloss actually serve to 
divide the ground from which we approach the work, for their 
separate registers and frames of reference frequently 
disagree: 'while the persona of the Gloss is that of a 
seventeenth-century editor who lays claim to sorting out the 
medieval tale, the author of the epigraph, his contemporary, 
merely provides us with a record of his lack of certainty' 
(Ferguson 1987: 258). In the course of the narrative, as has 
often been noted, the gloss and the verses sometimes actually 
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exchange functions: the gloss becomes more metaphorical or 
'supernatural', the corresponding verses more literal and 
prosaic. The effect of the supernatural tale so presented is 
constantly to undermine our reading certainties to special and 
particular endsi and such - or so I have been arguing - is 
what the term 'supernatural' in this context should lead us to 
expect. 
By way of illustration, let us list some of those 
'readings' we have had cause to suggest or allude to or imply 
in the course of this study. There is the poem as emblem and 
prophecy of the poet's personal life, with his constant murder 
of his 'better self' within and consequent self-punishmentj 
there is the parable of his own problematic early psychic 
experiencej there is the universal myth of early consciousness 
and selfhood afloat on the sea of life and encountering 
reality, with the interplay of conscious and unconscious 
forces that govern our world unbeknown to us, conditioning our 
livesj there is the unresolved conflict or conflation of the 
Mariner's hope for Christian solace and an animistically-
conceived universe, itself with powers of life and 
retribution. Never to be disregarded, there is Robert Penn 
Warren's metaphysical 'One Life,2o interpretation of the 
nineteen-forties, seeing a cosmic interdependence of living 
things which the mariner disturbs by one thoughtless act of 
circumscribed desecration, akin to the independent operations 
of irresponsible rationality. Most important for our purposes, 
there is the 'allegory' of poetic creativity and the poet's 
relation to his own unconscious sources of inspiration, which 
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he must learn to accept and bless, even though they may be 
apparently alien, the equivalent of water-snakes and a 
'thousand thousand slimy things' that 'crawl with legs/ Upon 
the slimy sea' (AM: 11. 125-6). Only by such acceptance of 
what is within himself may he hope to turn his avenging demons 
into 'angelic spirits'. Even so, he is a forever tainted 
being, who - although (in the words of 'Kubla Khan') he has 
fed on 'honey-dew ..• And drunk the milk of Paradise' - is 
compelled by that knowledge which is within him to the endless 
varied repetitions of its inward matter in poetic form, each 
variation of which offers only temporary surcease of his 
desire for the Real he is denied, by the fact of his 
adulthood. 
The 'holy dread' the wedding-guest feels for the uncanny 
mariner may be accounted for by his own self-recognition in 
the figure: after all, he becomes a 'sadder and a wiser man' 
through this inevitable acquaintance. There can be little 
doubt that the mariner and the wedding-guest are projections 
of one and the same consciousness, as is customary in dreams. 
It is the wedding-guest, as 'hostage' to the everyday world of 
the wedding-feast (upon which he ultimately turns his back) 
who is constrained to listen to this compulsive repetition of 
the voice of his own deepest being, 'like a three years' 
child' (AM: 11. 15). The wedding-feast awaits him, its 
festivity and gaiety echo as a sounding backdrop almost within 
his reach: but this expression of adult procreative sexuality 
and future parental reponsibility would mean, by his accepting 
a more everyday form of 'fertility', a final closing of the 
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doors upon the child within - whose torments, terrors, and 
transcendent vision are the source of the uncanny power which 
animates his creative will ... or, at least, that of the 
mariner, or else the poet. 
What the Mariner repeats, of course, is the poem we hear 
for the first time, yet which is repeated each time a reader 
reads it. After which the repetition compulsion, it appears, 
gives rise to the interpretation compulsion: that attempt to 
domesticate a text or trauma by repeating it over in one's own 
voice; just as the poem is an effort to 'repeat' its source of 
inward meaning in its own colours (we see signs of this, for 
example, in the mariner's 'Christianizing' of his own text). 
That neither compulsion can, in the nature of things, be 
successful in its initial purpose, will not bring the process 
to an end; for we are compelled to continue, to fill the 
widening gaps in being. It is perhaps only that we inevitably 
introduce our own particular brand of 'sameness with 
difference', and so produce what we did not think to, which 
gives independent value to our efforts. 
I have left out of my list of interpretations, of course, 
the wild notion that the Ancient Mariner is a literary ballad, 
in imitation of common and archaic oral forms, about a sea-
dog who endures an inconveniently disturbed voyage. But I 
think I have said enough to illustrate the capacity of the 
'symbol' (whether linguistic feature or complete work) to 
confound our ordinary semantic expectations. Our 
interpretations range from the Especial to the General to the 
Universal, yet the end is not in sight, simply because - as is 
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not the case with allegory - our references cannot be what 
the symbol is. It is its capacity for interpreting us which is 
the most uncanny thing about it. Yet the romantics were not 
inclined to savour vertiginous linguistic abysses for their 
own sake. For them the defeat by poetry of our ordinary 
referential language was no more than a prelude to a wider and 
more inclusive vision. Poetry, by its simple existence, was 
also that form best equipped to provide the most comprehensive 
vision possible to linguistic man, yet still remain within the 
fold of language: hence its 'uncanny' irreducibility, its 
range of potential reference. As Coleridge 'repeated' in his 
epigraph from Burnet: 'I can easily believe that there are 
more invisible than visible Beings in the Universe.' The same 
is true of meanings. 
I close with a translation of the epigraph itself, in 
this case only slightly abridged to highlight a meaning or 
range of meanings which, it may be, were not as apparent to 
the reader before this essay. As I have already confessed, 
there is no reason to suppose they are exhaustive. 
I believe easily that there are more invisible than 
visible beings in the universe ... The human mind 
has always circled about the knowledge of these 
things but has never reached it. still it is 
undeniably desirable to contemplate in the mind, as 
it were in a picture, the image of a greater and 
better world: lest the mind, accustomed to the small 
details of daily life, becomes contracted and sinks 
entirely into trivial thoughts 
(Scheider21 1972: 634-5). 
This 'invisible' and more extensive world, paradisal and 
horrific, is that which lies beyond the compass of our words. 
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That there is an affinity between Romantic studies and 
Deconstruction is a commonplace of the smalltalk of 
contemporary criticism: it has been much noticed that many of 
the most famous American Deconstructionists are or were also 
Romantic scholars. However,there seems no very great clarity 
on exactly what that affinity consists in. For example, in his 
book Deconstruction: Theory and practice' Christopher Norris 
appears to suggest that the relation is primarily a negative 
one: it is distinguished, so to speak, by the contrast it 
provides. 
Romanticism holds out the utopian idea of a merging 
between mind and object, a state of awareness so 
finely attuned to experience that all such 
distinctions drop away and the knower is at one with 
the known. Wordsworth's poetry was a constant search 
for these privileged moments or 'spots of time', 
while Coleridge pursued a similar theme through the 
toils of idealist metaphysics. The inherent pathos 
of this attempt - the fact that the mind can never 
achieve such perfect communion - is often manifest 
in Hartman's more chastened [i.e. later. 
Deconstructionist] style ... For Hartman this is the 
impasse encountered by all Romantic and post-
Romantic thought. The 'unmediated vision' lies 
beyond reach of language, because language brings 
along with it a mediating structure of awareness 
which can never coincide with its object in a pure, 
self-authenticating knowledge. This was the burden 
of Hartman's criticism long before he met with its 
powerful formulation in the texts of Derrida. 
(Norris 1982: 94-5) 
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Norris has the gift of being lucid in areas where 
lucidity is not always taken as a virtue; nonetheless, perhaps 
certain sacrifices of sense have been made for the sake of 
such clarity. The problem here is a problem of language: a 
question of what meanings different speakers attach to words 
in common use when they appear in a slightly uncommon context. 
The problem words in this case are 'subject' and 
'object'. I believe a misunderstanding is risked - or, 
perhaps, an ambiguity is left unclarified - in the extract 
above, over the senses such words had for the Romantics whom 
Norris mentions. Norris attributes the same misunderstanding 
to Geoffrey Hartman. We will have to investigate a little to 
decide if the association of Hartman with the spirit of the 
Norris paragraph is indeed entirely valid. 
For the moment, I wish to make three assertions which 
contradict the broad sense of what Norris is saying. Firstly, 
I intend to show that Wordsworth and Coleridge were themselves 
fully aware - just as aware as Hartman - of the 'mediating 
structure of awareness' implicit in language; secondly, that 
they were in no way deceived into supposing that 'perfect 
communion' with external objects in nature - the sort of 
objects language might be supposed, naively, to designate -
was at all possible; and thirdly, I would go so far as to find 
in scepticism about the 'self-authenticating' correspondence 
of general concepts or percepts with real external entities a 
major (perhaps the major) defining characteristic of 
Romanticism itself. In other words, it is possible to see 
Romantics like Wordsworth and Coleridge not as the polar 
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opposites of Deconstruction, but in many ways its forerunners. 
This essay, then, argues for the considerable modernity of 
these poets' theoretical discourse, at least in this regard. 
The real problem with the terminology of 'subject' and 
'object' comes, I believe, in the form of a confusion between 
two different philosophical uses of these terms. (Lacan 
recognises something like these differences in his distinction 
between 'object small g' and Ie grand Autre ['object large A', 
we might usefully term it]). Modern commentators sometimes 
fail to appreciate that the Subject and Object Romantic poets 
and philosophers were concerned with were not generally to be 
identified, in a straightforward fashion, with one particular 
historic observer in the contemplation of one isolated 
individual object. In the case of the 'subject', the Romantics 
accepted that any individual consciousness bore a synecdoche-
like relation to the universal Subject of perception: the 
individual was always the representative of such a Subject, 
but was not for all purposes identical with it. This 
correspondence of subject with Subject is implicit in the 
German idealists Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (cf. Eagleton2 
1990: Chs 4 and 5). Since it asserted an irreducible 
equivalence at the deepest level of one subject with another, 
it seemed for the Romantics at the same time both one of the 
major mysteries, and yet also a near-unquestionable inference 
from the needs of both reason and experience. All the 
contemporary discourse on 'human rights', for example, depends 
upon its recognition. 
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However, Romantics were under no illusions that the same 
sort of identification with the general was possible for any 
particular object that might come within an observer's field 
of notice. On the whole, they saw the link between actual 
objects and the idea of Object itself as formal and conceptual 
only, not hiding an essential reality. 
Admittedly, Romantic assertions were sometimes ambiguous 
enough to excuse our confusion on the matter; nonetheless, 
when Romantics spoke of the identification of subject and 
object in such privileged moments as Wordsworth's 'spots of 
time', what they had in mind was the absorption of the 
observer into the total field of consciousness, not the union 
of one poet with one peak. 
When Wordsworth gives instances of what has appropriately 
been dubbed by others 'cosmic consciousness', the experience 
is usually in practice admittedly only partial, a 'leading' 
rather than a full admission into oneness with totality. 
Again, undoubtedly, the mystic experience is habitually 
occasioned by some particular occurrence in the natural 
world - the looming of a mountain, a roaring wind - but is not 
to be identified with the occurrence. Indeed, there is a kind 
of paradox in the fact that such contingent things may have 
such momentous results. Individual objects may thus stimulate 
a 'spot of time' but they have only incidental relation to the 
happening in itself: that happening lies beyond the province 
of particular perceptions, and, by a similar token, beyond the 
province of what language might be thought to refer to. In 
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fact, the very essence of the event lies in the defeat of all 
perceptual or conceptual systems. 
This argument will have to wait for its further 
elaboration and sUbstantiation later in this essay. For the 
moment, I wish to return to the question of whether it is 
against Norris, or against Norris and Hartman, that the 
argument is directed; of whether or not Geoffrey Hartman would 
subscribe, in the unequivocal way Norris's tone suggests, to 
the interpretation of Romantic attitudes he offers 
us above. 
I am able to decide this matter, if at all, only in terms 
of particular instances. Consequently I have chosen as 
specimen cases two widely separated writings by Hartman, both 
on Wordsworth. The first, published in 1964 - before his 
encounter with Derrida and Deconstruction - is his seminal 
work Wordsworth's Poetry 1787-18143 • The other, for the purpose 
of comparison, is his essay 'Words, Wish, Worth: Wordsworth', 
which appeared in the collection Deconstruction and Criticism4 
in 1979. 
In Wordsworth's Poetry Hartman defines Imagination as 
'consciousness of self raised to apocalyptic pitch' (his 
emphasis). In the original context, he arrives at this 
definition through a consideration of 'The Solitary Reaper' 
and the paean on Imagination from the crossing of the Alps 
episode (1850 Prelude VI: 11. 592 ff.). 
In the Preface to the same volume, he glosses 
'apocalyptic' variously. Of the senses offered, that which 
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most concerns us here is 'any strong desire to cast out nature 
and to achieve an unmediated contact with the principle of 
things' (1964: xxii). 
On the face of it, this formulation sounds supportive of 
Norris's view of matters; but we should treat it carefully. 
Not only does it speak - surprisingly, it may be, in a 
Wordsworth ian context - of 'casting out nature': an 
uncapitalised nature which can only mean the collective 
appearances of objects, not the reality they represent. 
Secondly, it invokes 'the principle of things', not the 
essence of things. Wordsworth certainly in his visionary 
moments seeks contact with what could be called the principle 
behind nature (if these metaphors of 'behindness' serve at 
all); but that is not remotely the same as saying that he 
desired direct contact with the entities normally designated 
in speech, while by-passing the linguistic process. 
Hartman's inclusion of the word 'unmediated' does, it is 
true, hint at the second sense as well as the first. However, 
in the context in Hartman's work the first sense is the 
stronger. On the other hand Norris - if this is one of his 
sources - could well suppose the second sense to be meant. 
Hartman himself should be left the last word, when it 
comes to interpreting the earlier Hartman in the light of the 
later, or attempting to judge if a later sense was lurking in 
the earlier formulation. In his 1971 'Retrospect' to the 
volume, he himself attempts to restate his themes 'in terms 
which reflect what has interested me since the completion of 
this study' (xiii). 
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Despite the updating of terms, Hartman still emphasizes 
that Wordsworth takes particular natural things as a point of 
departure for direct visionary contact with what they 
represent - Nature as a generalized, not a particular entity. 
The poet's sense of place, for example, can lead him onwards 
to what is placelessi as, we might add, the designating word 
can, at least in poetry, lead to what is undesignated. But 
there is no claim that Wordsworth believed in privileged 
contact of a direct kind with either place or object. 
To this vision, as Hartman presents it, the place - or 
thing - made sacred by 'second sight' appears as an omphalos, 
a world-centre. It communicates with that which is all but 
itself. And it is that mysterious 'all' which is, we might 
add, the real object of the poet's visionary interest. 
Hartman has an subsidiary thesis to add to this. He sees 
Wordsworth as experiencing conflicting pulls - towards the 
visionary totality, Nature, on the one hand, and towards 
natural objects of sense on the other - and holds that it was 
the 'humanized' Wordsworth who won out in the end. To 
transpose this into Lacanian and linguistic terms: Wordsworth 
eventually abandons the Real for the Symbolici he gives up the 
search for an extralinguisitic dimension and resigns himself 
to language. 
On the face of it, this programme is close enough to 
orthodox interpretations; it can be well supported from the 
poetry. Though in presenting such 'self-humanizing' as an 
aim - as a motive in dialectical conflict with its opposite, 
the supernaturalizing death-wish - some liberties are taken 
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with the evidence, to my mind. In fact, in the poetry 
Wordsworth presents the 'humanizing' as forced upon him; not 
consciously or even unconsciously sought. As we all know, the 
'Immortality Ode' laments a loss of vision imposed by age and 
'forgetting'; in the 'Elegiac stanzas' it is a 'deep distress' 
(his brother's death) that 'hath humanized my Soul'. 
(No doubt one might maintain that this multiplication of 
responsibility for the change argues, if not some 
disingenuousness, at least a lack of self-knowledge on 
Wordsworth's part. But it in no way establishes that he 
actively sought the extinction of his powers. Insofar as the 
evidence is consistent, it is consistent for the opposite 
view.) 
While resting on the antithetical nature of Wordsworth's 
supposed internal conflict (which a lingering 'Coleridgean 
metaphysical hangover' [xvii] helped to prolong) Hartman 
admits that 'what I saw mainly was the SOlipsism inherent in a 
great imagination, the despair tracking apocalyptic hope' 
(ibid.). This certainly seems to suggest a pessimistic 
attitude on Hartman's part towards the poet's apocalyptic 
ambitions, towards his desire to overcome the limitations of 
the cartesian subject. 
It will be part of the argument of this essay that 
sympathy with this supposed predicament of Wordsworth's is 
misplaced. Antithesis is not necessarily conflict; and I 
believe that Wordsworth felt the force of antithesis, but not 
what could be called conflict ••. at least until late, until 
concern over the loss of his powers. As with the leech-
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gatherer of 'Resolution and Independence', who is both homely 
and 'supernatural', Wordsworth was prepared to contemplate a 
combination of extremes without conflict - a 'balance or 
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities' (BL: 
174) - precisely because Coleridge in his own theories of 
perception (and, by inference, of language) had provided in 
advance a theoretical framework which gave them an exact and 
approved place. Then again, even the 'Elegiac stanzas', where 
the 'humanization' is at last declared, is redolent with 
thoroughly metaphysical influence, Coleridgean or otherwise: 
which means that unfortunate 'metaphysical hangovers' cannot 
be entirely blamed. 
This subsidiary issue aside, it will be evident that 
Hartman's statements about things and places - especially the 
doctrine of the omphalos - could readily be interpreted in 
linguistic terms, revealing Wordsworth's conflict with debased 
words as much as things. In his 1971 re-consideration of 
Wordsworth's Poetry Hartman allows that he often did come 
close there 'to a theory linking verbal figures and structures 
of con~ciousness', but managed 'to evade my own insight' 
(vii). He feels now that the poems which display an intensive 
centering on the omphalos really subtly reveal that what the 
chosen locus hides is a decentred reality: 'The center they 
converge on is an absence; the darkness they illumine has no 
heart' (xviii). Such statements, while again pessimistic in 
tone, nonetheless do not support the precise interpretation of 
matters Norris offers us. It is Wordsworth's mystical 
pretensions as such that Hartman seems to see as endangering; 
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in so far as the last quotation is a comment on the 
deficiencies of a linguistically-centred approach to reality, 
Wordsworth would entirely agree with Hartman - but his tone 
would, for good reasons, be different. 
These terms, or the sense in which Hartman then used such 
terms ('omphalos', 'unmediated'), having been a little 
clarified, we can move some fifteen years on from Wordsworth's 
Poetry to the essay published in Deconstruction and criticism, 
with an eye to noting how far the linguistic adaptation has 
progressed: to what degree the basic concepts of the earlier 
work have survived their translation to a Deconstructionist 
setting. (Though I think we should bear in mind Hartman's 
important avowal, in his own Preface to the later 
collection,that he and Bloom are only 'barely 
deconstructionists'. He there distinguishes these 'barely 
deconstructionists' from the 'boa-deconstructors' featured 
elsewhere in the volume: Derrida, de Man, Hillis Miller 
[Hartman 1979: ix).) 
His own essay takes a poem of 1816, 'A little onward 
(Wordsworth5 1947: 92-94), as its point of departure. We see 
that the older terminology is still current: 'What is "a 
little further on'" Hartman asks, if not an 'omphalos' or 
other 'sacred place' (Hartman 1979: 179)? Again, Wordsworth's 
use of an opening quotation from Milton, and his preparedness 
to draw upon the Classics (but from a source which integrates 
them, in some apparently primal way, with Christianity), are 
taken to 'represent the felt though repressed power of pre-
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Christian literature: a power which, like Imagination, points 
to the possibility of unmediated vision' (181). 
While giving full weight to the elegance and power of 
Hartman's argument here, I must confess that in the poem 
quoted, which offers so many almost uncomfortable 
reminiscences of the 'great decade', the appeal to nuns and 
Holy Writ in its coda sounds to me more disappointingly 
bathetic than 're-integrative'. It is as if the poet has taken 
pains to shrive himself with a dab of holy water for the pagan 
and pantheistic enthusiasms he all but tempts daughter Dora a 
little onward to enjoy1. 
Hartman sees Wordsworth as fusing the various literary 
sources in an attempt to 'reach beyond religious or temporal 
mediation' to 'a point of origin essentially unmediated' 
(183). It is clear that Hartman's concept of 'mediation' still 
conveys no less than it did in 1964, even if it now being used 
for different, pancretist, ends. 
As anticipated, the concept of mediation is elaborated to 
include verbal text as well as natural object. That is why 
Wordsworth's prefatory Milton quotation so fascinates Hartman. 
Immediate and mediate are now analogous to raw primal sound 
1 Indeed, in the 1840 comment on 'Ode tQLycoril:?' which 
Hartman includes to sUbstantiate his interpretation, Wordsworth 
to me actually sounds peevish and defensive, rather than the 
architect of a Grand Unified Theory, as Hartman would, I think, 
have it: 'Surely one who has written so much in verse as I have 
done may be allowed to retrace his steps in the regions of fancy 
which delighted him in his boyhood, when he first became 
acquainted with the Greek and Roman poets Classical 
literature affected me by its own beauty. But the truths of 
scripture having been entrusted to the dead languages ••• an 
importance and a sanctity were at that [i.e. Milton's] period 
attached to classical literature ••• that can never be revived' 
(1979: 182). 
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and articulate meaning, respectively; like phone and 
antiphonal response, it is suggested. Indeed nature itself now 
becomes text: 'The visitings of imaginative [visionary] power 
in Wordsworth put quotation marks even around nature' (185). 
Nature (small 'nt) and words are identifiable, and these 
together are part of what Wordsworth wishes to step beyond, 
'as a Jonah evading the divine Word'. What is at issue in this 
attempt to speak the speechless is 'Wordsworth's knowledge 
that the imagination may not be on the side of nature' (185). 
Thus, as anticipated, 'Words, Wish, Worth ..• ' takes 
shape as a modernisation - post-semiotic, peri-Derridean - of 
the thesis of Wordsworth's Poetry. Though the occasion chosen, 
the poem 'A little onward •.. ', may also be a little 
unserviceable, its provisional title is at least symbolic of 
the new steps it represents. And yet it was only a little 
onward that Hartman needed to go to see his original exercise 
as part of a new critical enterprise. 
What I think we have now ascertained is that in neither 
critical text we have considered, for all his expected 
pessimism about referentiality, does Hartman suppose that the 
visionary moment in Wordsworth is an attempt to overcome the 
proper separation between sign and signifier, to attain direct 
communication with the objects of language, seen as somehow 
existing independently of language. On the contrary, Hartman 
argues, I think correctly, that such moments should be seen as 
an attempt to defeat language altogether. But the objects or 
object then sought are not the objects of language. 
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We still have an important objective to attain: if 
Wordsworth and Coleridge did not entertain naive notions of 
the functions of language, then what notion of the relations 
between word and world did they hold, and how is it free of 
that naivety? How is it possible to show that Norris's 
picture of the Romantics as the arch-representatives of those 
who espouse a deludedly referential view of language, and, 
still more, of those who believe that the constraints of 
language may be overcome and its objects 'really' grasped, is 
in fact the absolute contrary of the truth about them? 
Although we have exonerated Geoffrey Hartman of 
complicity with Norris's opinions, Norris may well be right 
about other Deconstructionists: this possibility will be 
pursued further in the next chapter. For the present, I wish 
merely to adopt another suggestion of Hartman's from the 
'Words, Wish, Worth: Wordsworth' essay, where he points to 
the existence of a theological and a countertheological wing 
in post-structuralist thought and criticism (1979: 206). The 
difference between these two wings is approximately analogous 
to the differences in approach between Jacques Lacan and 
Jacques Derrida. What I hope to show in the course of this 
essay is that, by reason of a whole range of internal 
affinities, the theological approach to Wordsworth and his 
work - with Lacan as the principal luminary - is the most 
appropriate and productive one. It is as if Lacan's psychology 
permits a complete further level of excavation: an eleventh 
Troy hidden under the archaeologist's rubble, supportive of 
all the rest. 
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That the unconscious is structured like a language is, 
perhaps, Lacan's most famous insight. There are, however, 
diverse interpretations of this pronouncement. To my mind, 
Lacan states that the kinds of relationship that differentiate 
and unite the elements of language are structurally the same 
as the relations that unite and define the unconscious 
contents of our minds. Images, 'objects', symbols, words: all 
these, whether consciously or unconsciously active, contrive 
to make sense or nonsense together by the same sorts of rules 
of connection and association. It is the tendency to unite, to 
forge linkages and contrasts, which is the important thing: 
and this operates by similar processes in both cases. In the 
case of the unconscious however, we may suppose, the 
restraints are looser and the possibilities less limited and 
predictable. 
If we will, we could see Lacan's picture of the 
unconscious as a constantly ramifying network, a vastly 
proliferating system of links and differences, bringing into 
relationship whatever will be so conjoined. Yet all this is 
not precisely separable from our ordinary discourse, and 
intrudes into it. This webwork of useen affiliations, this 
complex of links and associations - the 'unconscious' of our 
language itself - is brought into play to some extent in every 
sentence we employ. 
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Small wonder that our unconscious makes use of regulated 
and unregulated connections at need in such circumstances as 
dreams, forging sometimes convoluted symbolisms in response to 
our psychological promptings and demands. In these 
circumstances, Lacan would say, we especially witness the 
shifting of the signified beneath the signifier (always for 
him, in any case, an unstable conjunction). This reference to 
dreams is not without its relevance to the poet, who, in 
casting his metaphors and similes, is also making use of 
unregulated or at least unexpected conjunctions between words 
and hence 'things'. 
Wordsworth, for one, was fully aware that language has 
its own unconscious: 
Visionary power 
Attends the motions of the viewless winds, 
Embodied in the mystery of words: 
There, darkness makes abode, and all the host 
Of shadowy things work endless changes .... 
(1850 Prelude VI: 11. 595-599) 
What Wordsworth means, the legitimate semantic 'catch' 
his words draw in, includes the following. Nature, blind and 
apparently bereft of consciousness as she may appear, becomes 
something more than herself when embodied in words, when names 
are ceremoniously or unceremoniously given to her parts. This 
is because a word, as a human construct applied to reality, 
joins in one, so to speak, the human subject and the thing 
described: subject and object, speaker and nature, meet in the 
spoken or written symbol. 
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If this is indeed what Wordsworth is claiming, then such 
a claim would seem to justify Norris's worst apprehensions. 
But as I shall bring evidence to show later, and as is in any 
case more or less apparent from the extended passage, this 
claim does not really involve a belief that something external 
to language is being 'captured' by the linguistic symbol. 
Indeed, Wordsworth is actually saying precisely the opposite: 
that the word is not the 'thing' itself; that it is thoroughly 
imbued with a human dimension, being a human construct. Though 
it seems to - in a sense, does - draw upon a part of nature 
for its reference, 'wind' as a named thing is itself a human 
creation. So the investiture of the physical with the human is 
only approximate truth: there never was, strictly speaking, 
any independently existing physical 'thing' before it was 
picked out, later recognized, and so in some sense 'named' by 
human agency. 
Thus the so-called physical object, in this case the 
wind, in its verbal guise becomes part of a complex webwork of 
memory and association: it is at once linked with the 
subconscious of the language, 'darkness' and all its host of 
'shadowy things'. (The subconscious of the language becomes in 
practice the linguistic subconscious of the utterer or hearer, 
of the poet or reader; but who is to say where public or 
private begins or ends? We are all, in a sense, 'situated' in 
a language which speaks through us.) 
Again, the supposed natural things are further 
transformed by their relocation into a creative linguistic 
structure. They become more than themselves when rehoused in 
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the different mansion of the poem. This is partly because, 
once isolated within the poem, they become enmeshed in its 
complex of verbal interactions - or, at the very least, in 
those interactions which are particularly highlighted within 
the frame; it is also partly because in this new context, with 
their human element exposed, they become symbolic of the sort 
of union of the human subject and Nature 'at large', Nature as 
a perceptual totality, that characterizes the moment of mystic 
or visionary union. Though this likeness between words in a 
poem and the unifications of cosmic consciousness is in itself 
no more than a kind of analogy, it may contribute to making 
the effect of the whole poem something closer to the mystical 
experience as such; or so Wordsworth believes. 
This potentiality is owing to the way in which the 
organic unity of the poem (pace Coleridge; more, later, about 
this as a controversial term) is very like a small alternative 
Nature: a microcosmic reflection in essence of the unbroken, 
undivided whole that is these things' original home - as it 
appears, at any rate, to the state of cosmic consciousness. 
The universe itself, to this view, taken as one, is repeated 
in little in the poem. 
The universe, to these poets' minds, can legitimately be 
taken as 'One' because human conceptual boundaries alone 
impose divisions upon it: the intellect which 'murders to 
dissect' appropriates the world by its insistence upon its 
links and differences, as if these were realities. If the 
mental processes of analysis, classification, and subsequent 
reassociation are quintessentially human in character, then we 
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are entitled to suspect that Reality repudiates such 
distinctions. If our linguistic signs seem to presuppose a 
world of independent particulars, then reflection on the 
arbitrary character of signs suggests that there is no 
correspondingly discontinuous reality beneath, but - in all 
likelihood - a single plenum. Schelling's philosophy supports 
such a view: for Schelling, too, subject and object are 
aspects of a pre-existent unified ground of which we are 
usually unconscious; only in the work of art can we gain some 
intuitive intimation of what that ultimate reality might be 
like (cf. Eagleton 1990: 133-6). Schelling was, of course, a 
primary influence upon Coleridge. 
Such affirmations naturally go beyond even the most 
sympathetic of Deconstructionist positions. For 
Deconstruction, only dreadful abysm and aporia follow upon our 
realisation of the failure of signs: a sense of vertigo and 
loss, and abrupt and sorry return to the prison-house of 
language. For Romanticism, on the other hand, the collapse of 
signification can bring the revelation of a strange, alien, 
and yet more unified mode of being beyond our own. The full 
consequences of this for my argument will have to wait, 
though, for my following chapter. 
Wordsworth's Prelude passage continues as follows: 
•.• - there, 
As in a mansion like their proper home, 
Even forms and substances are circumfused 
By that transparent veil with light divine, 
And, through the turnings intricate of verse, 
Present themselves as objects recognised, 
In flashes, and with glory not their own. 
(VI: 11. 599-605) 
156 
The 'transparent veil' is that woven from 'the mystery of 
words': but 'light divine' shines in and around it. This 
paradoxical light both preserves differences and melts them 
together. What the veil is transparent to is not (as Norris 
supposes) the reality of discrete entities our language leads 
us to expect, but an increasingly undifferentiated and 
harmonious experience of cosmic wholeness. The panoply of 
hidden unconscious connections works alchemically upon the 
language, reinforced by the poem's special unifying devices 
such as rhyme, rhythm, assonance and alliteration. What the 
poem echoes in its own admittedly limited way is the primal 
unity in which man and his total world were not separated. 
The poem, then, offers us a different kind of vision to 
the everyday. In it, we no longer see the physical world as 
science once preferred, as if inanimate and independent of us; 
through the poem we experience it anew, as sentient and 
animate, imbued with human essence. But this is something 
which, if it can be apprehended through particulars at all, 
can only be reflected down upon them from the whole. 
The Romantic poem thus employs a set of propadeutic 
devices for the cUltivation of superior vision. By shifting 
the conventional ground of our perceptions, by disturbing our 
habits of seeing, we become aware, as a direct experience, of 
what is 'mystical' in and behind the very fact of language; we 
are exposed to the embodied 'mystery of words' (1. 597). The 
signifiers of poetry, by attracting our attention inwards upon 
themselves, take us back to the roots of things: they alert us 
to the mystical that subtends the act of verba1isation itself. 
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It is this last element perhaps, that accounts for the 
unfamiliarity of tone, even when we find a coincidence of 
thought, between Wordsworth and recent literary theorists. Not 
for Wordsworth the 'pathos' and pessimism awakened by our 
imprisonment in human-created language. Indeed, especially 
when it is the reverential product of a 'wise passiveness', 
the mutual impress of man's mind on his environment is to be 
welcomed - as a sign of his belonging, not his alienation. And 
yet Wordsworth is as aware as Derrida or Hartman that human 
beings create the world they live in through their words. 
There clearly is a 'something more' in Wordsworth's 
world-picture, something not shared with his Deconstructionist 
successors, though he goes much of the way with them. 
Discussion of this additional element will have to wait until 
my next chapter: I am unable to press further with my main 
argument concerning affinities between Romantic and post-
structuralist attitudes, or to deal adequately with the two 
problems so far 'shelved' for later examination (Wordsworth's 
paradoxically 'optimistic' tone, and the controversay 
attending Coleridge's organicism) without returning here to 
one or two of the best-known and most primary statements of 
English Romanticism, to show that what I have said is not 
incidental but basic to matters Romantic as these poets 
conceived them. 
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Wordsworth's comparison of the 'mansion' of the poem to 
the 'proper home' that is Nature directs us onward in time to 
the text of coleridge's famous definition of creative 
imagination6 • It, too, sees in human creativity the microcosm 
of an act of universal proportions. 
The imagination then I consider either as primary, 
or secondary. The primary imagination I hold to be 
the living power and prime agent of all human 
perception, as a repetition in the finite mind of 
the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. 
The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, 
co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as 
identical with the primary in its kind and agency, 
and differing only in the degree, and in the mode of 
its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, 
in order to re-create; or where this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it 
struggles to idealize and to unify. It is 
essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) 
are essentially fixed and dead. (BL: 167) 
For all its fame, this passage still gives rise to 
confusion, as any teacher will have found. Everyone accords in 
seeing it as a grand, near-religious laudation of the almost 
superhuman powers of artistic imagination - appealingly 
hubristic in the expected Romantic fashion. The deeper 
problem, especially for new readers - though not only for them 
- seems to lie in the connotations of the words 'primary' and 
'secondary', as has on notable occasions been pointed out (cf. 
willey71964 [1949]: 22). 'Secondary' imagination somehow seems 
to imply a 'lesser' imagination. HOw, then, can this be the 
creative faculty that is so euphorically commended? Why is it 
not this faculty, human artistic creativity, which is in first 
place and so reflecting the creativity of the Supreme Being? 
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Especially difficult to accept is that what is being 
saluted in the primary position in the paragraph is not 
artistic power but simple perception, as its author plainly 
says (the 'prime agent of all human perception'). It is the 
familiar act of seeing and recognising that reflects 'the 
eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM', not creativity 
as we ordinarily understand it. Such familiar creativity, 
then, is an essentially human activity, though as coleridge 
carefully points out, it has many links with the first type: 
it 'echoes' it; it is identical with it in 'kind and agency', 
but differs from it in 'degree' and 'mode'. Coleridge's many 
quite vague qualifications to this effect show simply how 
reluctant he is to appear to diminish the 'divine' status of 
the secondary imagination, however much such diminishment 
might seem to be demanded by his logic. 
What is happening is that Coleridge is obliged to give 
place to the important insight he had from Schelling and Kant: 
that in its experience of the world, the mind is no mere 
passive tablet receiving impressions from without; it takes an 
active part in determining precisely what it manages to see or 
hear. That in perception subject determines object, and is 
determined by it, is in summary the lesson Schelling had for 
Coleridge. A tree is only seen as such through an act of co-
operation between the original brute sensory stimulus, and the 
full remembered portfolio of related experience in the 
observer's brain. Eventually, that is no more than common 
sensei though common sense is sometimes different from 'what 
is obvious'. 
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Though the fact itself is obscured by the mysterious 
letter - from Porlock, no doubt - that interrupts Chapter 
XIII, Coleridge has actually been arguing towards this end 
through all the preceding course of Biographia Literaria, and 
through all ten theses of the foregoing chapters. That 
perceiver and world are not independent Cartesian opposites, 
but are engaged in a process of mutual modification - that 
subject and object are, in the last analysis, aspects of each 
other - this is the fundamental insight of Coleridge's 
philosophical idealism, and the basic tenet of his faith since 
his abandonment of Hartley years before. Biographia Literaria, 
in a way which resembles the Prelude, is a self-consciously 
biographical account of his personal journey towards - and 
thus his personal right to - this truth. 
We see how modern notions of the 'arbitrariness of the 
sign' would contain no surprises for Coleridge, who was 
perfectly well aware of the way our universe of objects is 
human-created: that is what primary imagination means. 
However, what needs to be added here is that in consequence 
the 'world of objects' cannot be identified with ultimate 
reality, any more than it can in Schelling: its reality is 
contingent, dependent on the Subject who perceives it. If 'all 
objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead' CBL: 
167), this is another way of saying that there are no such 
things as objects. They are inventions of the scientific 
temper. 
There is still the question of why perception is like 
God's original act of creation. Here we need to recall that 
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subject and object are really one, but undergo an apparent 
cleavage in the act of perception: but it is 'object large A' 
from which the observer separates himself, in order the better 
to create 'object little A' from its materials by his 
contemplation. In a sense, every act of perception re-enacts 
the original distancing between the observer and his world: in 
order to be conscious of his objects, the subject must 
interpose difference between himself and them. By the same 
gesture, he becomes aware of himself as separate entity, a 
subject, and may even go on to make himself an object to 
himself. 
correspondingly, to Coleridge out of Schelling, the first 
act of creation was precisely God's saying to himself 'I AM'. 
When God became conscious of himself, he became an object for 
his own awareness. What was once a unified, undifferentiated 
totality was now cloven in two - into perceiver and perceived 
(however much those two were in essence still the same being). 
Only after that giant act could consciousness and a 
universe of things be possible. We might, of course, for our 
part feel that the sacrifice of totality involved was probably 
worth it: God also had his fall, though no-one mentions it. 
But we may now also see how this divine self-cognition could 
stand for Coleridge as a 'type' for human perception. 
Structurally, the equivalent processes are involved. 
To move on to the second of these powers: the crucial 
point of distinction regarding the human creative imagination 
seems to me to lie in a phrase almost tossed aside in the 
piece. Coleridge talks of secondary Imagination 'co-existing 
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with the conscious will'. By this we are apprised, obliquely 
enough, that creative imagination, in contrast with the will, 
draws powerfully on the unconscious for its materials and 
inspiration. This it does differently from perception, whose 
relations with the unconscious are more of the instinctual 
kind. Whereas the contents of the unconscious that Imagination 
draws upon have close affinities with the objects and 
impressions of our conscious world: it is not so much in its 
contents as in their linkages and re-ordering that this 
unconscious betrays its presence. 
The element of the unconscious distinguishes Imagination 
from mere Fancy, or fantasy, since Fancy as an artistic tool 
involves artistic juxtapositions made through conscious 
choice. Its appeal is to the intellect, not to the whole 
network of hidden associations that lie just out of sight, yet 
root down into our being. So interpenetrative and far-ranging 
may these interconnections be, they resemble the unified co-
operative activity that sustains a cellular creature. This is 
why their employment in the poem provides it a special 
vitality, in likeness to an organism. 
And yet Coleridge's account of the Imagination remains 
incomplete unless we supplement it by pointing out that the 
secondary Imagination relates to the primary in this respect: 
in its urge to unify it is attempting - but in a token and 
allegorical sense only - to re-integrate the subject and 
object that drew apart in the bare act of perception; and the 
harmony and unity it attempts to impose is really in 
microcosm, as we have already stated, a partial imitation and 
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attempt at symbolic retrieval of the original unity of the 
living cosmos - a unity lost by its division into subject and 
object through, in this mythology, God's first verbal act. It 
can inevitably be only a pale shadow, a synecdoche, an 
imitation of that whole - not the thing itself. But by 
imaginatively substituting for that unified world while the 
poem lasts, it may 'lead on' to some apprehension of the state 
of wholeness, if it is particularly succesful with its aims. 
Coleridge gives perhaps too little actual prominence to 
this particular feature of creative Imagination: its impulse 
to knit back together the elements of the universe, the 
observer with the things observed, in imitation of the 
primal - and Real - unity of the cosmos, which is the true 
source of its pre-eminence. Nevertheless, such an outcome is a 
clear implication of his argument. 'Fancy' works, by contrast, 
with illusory elements - with the so-called 'objects', the 
illusory objects, of perception. Thus it is not Romanticism, 
but the poetry of Fancy and wit, that gives credence to the 
'referential' interpretation of language: its province is the 
seeming 'fixities and definites' of the intellect, of the 
'objective' world. In its re-arrangement of them into a 
pleasing or clever pattern it merely imitates art of the 
Coleridgean kind. The strength of Imagination, on the other 
hand, is to do more than it seems to do - to draw powerfully 
on our own unconscious as readers; and by all that it unifies 
(or, at least, links in a coherent pattern), both within and 
without us, to put us - not just in mind of but, finally, in 
touch with - the original unity of all. As we see, these 
claims are in line with those Wordsworth makes for the 
language of the poem in the extract from the Prelude. 
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Having come so far, we are able to understand better the 
mysterious properties of the Imagination that Coleridge 
outlines in Bk II, Ch. I (Ch. XIV in some editions). When he 
there alludes to the reconciling of subject and object, we 
must remember that it is the whole subject Coleridge is 
concerned with: sensory, intelligent, imaginative, emotional. 
The ideal poet, we recall, 'brings the whole soul of man into 
activity' (BL: 173). 
The little world of the poem attempts, then, to imitate 
the cosmic unity, the primary world without divisions. In 
Lacan's different but closely parallel cosmology, this last 
would be the Real world, experience of which is duplicated for 
us in our earliest consciousness, before the 'mirror stage' 
and the intrusions of language. What Lacan's psychology adds 
is a concrete dimension to these Romantic speculations, by 
informing us that we actually once had direct knowledge of 
such a condition as Coleridge alludes to; for at the earliest 
period of our psychological growth, we knew no difference 
between ourselves and the rest of existence; nor did we divide 
ourselves off as subjects from the totality our mothers 
mediated to us. It is the arrival of language which most 
notably confirms the alienating intrusion of differences into 
our unified awareness. The realisation of his distinctness 
from the mother is only the most traumatic of the differences 
that the child is obliged eventually to accommodate. 
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Nonetheless, some recollection of his pre-linguistic state 
forms the groundwork for his later consciousness: such a 
supposition seems an inescapable consequence of Lacan's 
position. 
To stay for a moment close to Lacan's universe of 
discourse, it would be in this reflected Real world that the 
'binary oppositions' that so plague our intellectual life 
(including the opposition of subject and object) are 
ontologically reconciled: these binaries, too, are a product 
of our acquisition of speech. Small surprise that Coleridge 
sees these contraries as inviting reconciliation within the 
poem's more primal microcosm. Through the 'synthetical and 
magical' Imagination, the poet 'diffuses a tone and spirit of 
unity that blends and (as it were) fuses, each into each'; 
this power 
reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of 
opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with 
difference; of the general, with the concrete; the 
idea, with the image; the individual, with the 
representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, 
with old and familiar objects; a more than usual 
state of emotion, with more than usual order; 
judgment ever awake and steady self-possession, with 
enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement; and 
while it blends and harmonizes the natural and the 
artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the 
manner to the matter; and our admiration of the poet 
to our sympathy with the poetry. eBL: 174) 
There is another phrase in Coleridge's famous account of 
Imagination which deserves a separate comment. Coleridge 
speaks of Imagination struggling 'to idealize' as well as to 
unify. The activity and state of mind this refers to have, I 
think, often caused embarrassment for modern readers, but they 
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are axial to Romanticism. I wish to go back, for a moment, to 
Coleridge's account in Ch. IV of his first impressions of 
Wordsworth's poems, to the precise words he uses in praising 
their qualities: 
It was the union of deep feeling with profound 
thought; the fine balance of truth in observing, 
with the imaginative faculty in modifying, the 
objects observed; and above all the original gift of 
spreading the tone, the atmosphere, and with it the 
depth and height of the ideal world around forms, 
incidents, and situations, of which, for the common 
view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried 
up the sparkle and the dew drops. 
eBL: 48-9; Coleridge's emphasis) 
The way this begins is now familiar: it involves the apt 
conjunction in the poem of the poet's subjectivity and the 
objects language identifies in nature. In addition we must 
remember that Imagination is, paradoxically, the agent of 
truth; in imaginative work, properly speaking, we do not meet 
chimaeras. Yet there is a relativity implied: even if not 
truth absolute, the compounding of poetic sensibility and the 
so-called objects of nature is at least 'truer' - more 
unifying - than an account which leaves them separate. 
The second part is more unexpected than the earlier, and, 
at first glance, somewhat incompatible with it. After the 
praise of 'truth in observing' we see commended the impression 
of 'the depth and height of the ideal world. ' 
In one way, 'ideal' means to Coleridge ideal in a 
philosophic sense. In this usage it is not far, paradoxically, 
from 'humanised', its apparent opposite. As with idealist 
philosophy, which sees the world always in terms of mind, the 
ideal is simply that aspect of his own being the poet adds to 
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the natural world in his account of it. The 'ideal', then, is 
no more than what opposes the bare illusory world of objects. 
Coleridge would argue - as I have done above - that an 
observation which includes the observer, his feelings and 
impressions, is a truer observation than one which pretends to 
objectivity. 
In this sense, as in others, the ideal is the super-
natural: the humanized account of the natural. And both 
Coleridge and Wordsworth seem at times to have thought of the 
supernatural in a way that is little more exalted than this. 
For example, we recall once again Coleridge's account of their 
joint plans for the Lyrical Ballads collection: 
it was argued that my endeavours should be directed 
to persons and characters supernatural, or at least 
romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward 
nature a human interest and a semblance of truth 
sufficient to procure for these shadows of 
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for 
the moment, which constitutes poetic faith. Mr. 
Wordsworth, on the other hand, was to propose to 
himself as his object to give the charm of novelty 
to things of every day, and to excite a feeling 
analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the 
mind's attention from the lethargy of custom and 
directing it to the loveliness and wonders of the 
world before us ...• eBL: 169) 
Wordsworth's part in this was to present the ordinary 
world anew to his readers, and by the heightening power of his 
vision give them a sense of the supernatural in the real -
something which is really there for those who have the eyes to 
see it. But it appears, of course, only as part of the 
interaction of an individual and his world; particularly, it 
goes without saying, of an individual like Wordsworth. 
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It is informative how close the two terms come in the 
statement above: 'supernatural, or at least romantic'. This 
reflects, I am sure, an equally close link between them in 
Coleridge's thought, as our explorations of Chapter 2 
suggested. Again, we have an echo of the previous extract 
quoted - of, indeed, the 'sparkle and dewdrops' bedimmed by 
custom in the last lines of the passage above. This time we 
are redirected from the 'lethargy of custom' to the 
'loveliness and wonders of the world before us'. 
As before, the similarity should indicate to us that 
Coleridge is really discussing the same subject in both 
extracts. The 'ideal world' of the first passage is in 
practice interchangeable with the 'supernatural' of the 
second, this supernatural vision which Wordsworth is to bring 
to his descriptions of rustic scenes and folk. 
It is clear, though, from the allusion to The Ancient 
Mariner in the second extract, that the intended sense of the 
'ideal' now goes beyond the plainly philosophical, though it 
continues to include it. The concept of the ideal now includes 
the notion of a heightened, amplified realitYi but one no less 
true because heightened: it is a reality which bears about it 
traces of the fundamental ontological and psychological roots 
from which it springs. The 'loveliness and wonders of the 
world before us' appear from behind the screen of ordinary 
language and custom only when, through a conviction of cosmic 
unity, we see the world and its people with eyes newly 
conditioned to the fundamental and the essential. We see it, 
partially and in glimpses, as a mystic might. 
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We shall have to explore the nature of this second ideal, 
the ideal as a 'lesser form' of the mystical, more precisely 
later. For the moment, I would like to advance the idea that 
we have in these notions of the ideal one of the most 
essential attributes of Romanticism, and an important 
contributory element towards its definition. 
Though the 'ideal' figures in both Romanticism and Neo-
Classicism, there is a change and a progression between the 
super-natural and the Neo-Classical ideal. The latter was at 
once a formal, proportional, and supposedly communal ideal; 
whereas the appeal of the supernatural, like the appeal of the 
Gothic novel, is to our private and asocial instincts. It is 
the power of the ghost to undo our normative conceptions of 
reality that is the root of what is at once subversive and 
seductive about it; in that power we take a secret and 
privately anarchic delight. 
In its application to Romanticism, the supernatural has 
to be interpreted rather more widely, however. What is 
'supernatural' about Romanticism is its preoccupation with the 
hyper-normal, with reality viewed not with our plain, 
conventional vision, but with all the excitement and mystery 
that comes from emotional and imaginative heightening by an 
individual sensibility. From the soulful landscapes of 
Friedrich and the tempestuous, impassioned momumentality of 
Beethoven to the super-heroes of Wagnerian epic: whatever else 
Romanticism may have come to be, it was surely primarily a 
stage for imaginings and emotions larger, truer, more 
fundamental, than everyday life usually affords. Perhaps the 
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best definitions of Romanticism are negative: for it was first 
and foremost a denial that our everyday language and our 
habitual conceptions can adequately reflect reality; and in 
this it not only opposes realism but is at one with some more 
recent movements, Deconstruction included (however little the 
'ideal' is part of Deconstruction's list of priorities). 
One must emphasise, then, the importance of the 
individualistic element, the source of Romanticism's most 
salient departures from neo-classicism. The single, solitary 
figures that look absorbedly away from us in the centre of so 
many Friedrich canvases are properly the emblem of the 
Romantic man or woman of the age. Even their self-centredness 
was larger than life. Part of this mythology of the 
individual, expressed or not, part of the melancholia of these 
Faustian figures, lies in the unspoken responsibility that 
rests upon the shoulders of such isolated men and women: they 
are each aware of having to recreate the world in their own 
image, and - as if asking for external recognition of their 
burden - invite us to identify with their gaze. 
For Deconstruction and Lacanianism, in contrast, the 
individual is as much an illusion as the objects he or she 
prizes; what confronts the world is no more than a de-centred 
and divided subject. But such iconclastic individualism as the 
Romantics professed is not by itself the whole story: it co-
existed with a belief that at the depths of the entirely 
personal, idiosyncratic and individual psyche the communal re-
asserts itself - that though the means may be private, the end 
is not. Hence, at the most fundamental and hence most personal 
limits of our separate identities, what we discover is once 
again in common. 
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Although Eagleton can claim that 'One does not give the 
slip to the subject simply by collectivizing or universalizing 
it' (Eagleton 1990: 170), to see subjecthood against a more 
universal framework implies a considerable modification of its 
meaning: it makes a difference from which tangible moral 
effects may follow. Hence Wordsworth could claim that his 
experiments with simple poetic diction in the Lyrical Ballads 
were intended to expose the primary laws of human nature in 
action, and that this was sufficient justification for his 
undertaking them. 
Such 'universality' is not entirely at odds with Freudian 
and Lacanian models. We sometimes overlook the way that the 
generality of the Freudian or Lacanian hypothesis is one of 
its most important psychological facts. After all, oedipus is 
everybody's. If Lacan is right, the same kind of common right 
of access must pertain to the mystical dimension, too. Perhaps 
like sex, which is always, psychologically, our own (never our 
parents'), the innate sense of cosmic oneness is capable of 
being both universal, and unique to us. 
It is not surprising that such poets emphasized, then, 
the element of emotion in verse: for emotion is more primitive 
than and fundamental to language and abstraction; and it is, 
among the many emotions of the poem, the emotional state 
appropriate to the Ideal that the craft of the Romantic artist 
seeks to induce in us. 
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The Lacanian connection lets us know what this means. 
The ultimate ideal state, behind all its variations, is just 
that absorption of the subject into the cosmic oneness; and 
the ideal images of the Romantic poet owe a large part of 
their power to the way they hint at that state. For if it is a 
real one, a real memory in us, and it is prior to language, 
then it must be unlike all other memories; since it 
circumvents the mediation of language, it must be capable of 
returning to us in much its original form, as the experience 
itself. And so mystics of all ages would have it. 
This is why Romantic poetry, in seeking to describe 
situations that image the Sublime, often have the power to 
induce something of its emotional condition. Shelley courting 
a total, self-annihilating absorption into the unbounded power 
and freedom of the West Wind, or Keats slipping Lethe-wards, 
half in love with easeful death, despite his nightingale's 
song: these two salient Romantic moments are only 
superficially opposed. The loss of self into force or 
timelessness is, in either case, an aspect of nostalgia for 
the cosmic unity, beyond the troublesome accidents of personal 
existence. But these situations are built upon, and gain force 
from, their dramatisation of intrinsic paradox: the 
nightingale's living song is as enticing and mysterious as 
death itself. We remember the Grecian urn's domestic status: 
'bride of quietness .•• foster child of silence and slow 
time'. We remember, too, that 'Heard melodies are sweet, but 
those unheard/ Are sweeter'. In all these cases we are 
presented with a tension between individual and 
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undifferentiated existence, between being as entity and Being 
as totality. 
Together with its desire for constructions of words to 
overpass the functions of words, we have here one of the 
principal paradoxes of Romanticism: that in no other literary 
movement has the life been so related to the work; and yet one 
of its ultimate longings is for the shedding of self and its 
work into some larger whole. 
It is only with some such account of the Romantic ideal 
as that offered above that we are enabled to see the close 
link that exists between apparently diverse elements in 
Wordsworth's outlook: for example, his mysticism is shown to 
be related to his concern with the natural, the simple, and 
the real language of men. We have to bear in mind the 
importance of the 'return to roots' which Wordsworth, wearied 
with rationalism and the excesses of the French Revolution, 
sought after his return from France. We should not be 
surprised that in this search for roots, for what is basic and 
most true in us, it is to our childhood world of unbounded 
emotions and free-ranging imagination that Wordsworth turns. 
And, as we have discovered, in that place, too, we encounter 
the psychological sources of the Ideal. 
It is obvious enough that the Romantic world of awe, 
spectacle and mystery has its affinities with that of the 
child's untainted vision, where what is seen is seen larger 
for want of diminishing comparisons. (It is strange, as many 
must have noticed, how the history of the universe we inhabit 
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imitates our psychological development: on the borders of our 
vision, furthest in the visible past, lie the monumental 
entities, the quasars; and beyond them, a melding of all in 
the fires of the big bang, the cosmic origins.) 
Jacques Lacan teaches us that the Romantic concern with 
the Ideal is no mere fanciful aberration of literary history, 
but has a real grounding in our deepest psychological selves. 
Through Lacan's account of the psychological processes of 
infancy we see the connection between the Romantic search for 
'truer' vision, and a response to the world which has its 
origins in the monsters and good giants of childhood. 
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Long ago Rene Wellek, among other voices, said that the 'great 
endeavour' of Romantic poetry is 'to overcome the split 
between subject and object, the self and the world' (Welleck8 
1963: 132). As we have seen, we need to be careful to 
understand this correctly: we are talking of Subject and 
Object, not of individual self and particular thing. 
Lacan, too, explores the interdependence of 'subject' and 
'object' in his psychological thought. Characteristically, his 
locus is language: 
What I seek in speech is the response of the other. 
What constitutes me as subject is my question. In 
order to be recognized by the other, I utter what 
was only in view of what will be. In order to find 
him, I call him by a name that he must assume or 
refuse in order to reply to me. (Lacan9 1977: 85) 
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Barbara Johnson brings out some of the implications of 
Lacan's position vis-a-vis the object or, alternatively, the 
'other', in her discusssion of his famous treatment of a 
literary text, Edgar Allan Poe's 'The Purloined Letter'j she 
is discussing, too, Derrida's riposte to Lacan. 
'The sender,' writes Lacan, 'receives from the 
receiver his own message in reverse form. Thus it is 
••• that a letter always arrives at its 
destination'. What the reversibility of the 
direction of the letter's movement between sender 
and receiver has now come to stand for is precisely 
the fact, underlined by Derrida as if it were an 
objection to Lacan, that there is no position from 
which the letter's message can be read as an object: 
'no neutralisation is possible, no general point of 
view'. This is also precisely the 'discovery' of 
psychoanalysis - that the analyst is involved 
(through transference) in the very 'object' of his 
analysis. (Johnson1o 1978: 169) 
We note that by offering it a name the observer situates 
the object in his field. Names, speech - and language, 
generally - are of the symbolic order in Lacan's epistemology. 
since accession to the symbolic order is precisely what severs 
one's attachment to the Real, words and the Real will never 
meetj no matter how much the individual is driven by desire to 
use language for its re-appropriation. 
Admittedly, this is different in Wordsworth. In 
Wordsworth, words are employed as a means to cosmic 
consciousness. But this is because the word, in the poem, is 
not in the world. It is in 'a mansion like its proper home': 
and the proper home of whatever real ontological referents our 
words attempt to designate is not the discrete world language 
portrays, but the unified cosmos to which mystics alone claim 
access. Although the poem cannot equate with the original, 
undivided world, it offers a 'home' much more unified, much 
more like the original than our ordinary speech. 
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It is thus that the words of a Romantic poem may serve as 
an omphalos, in Hartman's sense: to represent precisely all 
they are not. Wordsworth recognises how the mediate 'object' 
can, to an extent and in certain circumstances, enable where 
it once frustrated. The 'strange fits' of a Wordsworth ian poem 
~ displacements of logic, grammar, and expected usage, 
paronomasia, paradox and oxymoron - are there to surprise us 
into seeing the word for what it is: a compound of subject and 
subject-determined 'object'. And in that very recognition of 
our linguistic restrictions for what they are, we may actually 
be filled with a paradoxical sense of our own fundamental 
freedom from them. In this the poem shares the same hope as 
psychoanalysis: to liberate through confrontation with the 
transfigured linguistic fact. 
Coleridge's statements about language have been widely 
quoted - I will have cause to refer to some of them in the 
next chapter - but he is often dealing with similar issues 
when he discusses perception; in their time and with their 
intellectual traditions, Wordsworth and Coleridge were 
inclined to think about such matters in these perceptual 
terms. Were he alive now, I suspect that Coleridge would have 
written of the same problems in a more decisively linguistic 
context. 
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Not that he and Wordsworth were, as poets, in any way 
blind to the implications of their thought for language. 
True, they saw it as part of a wider problem, and probably so 
should we. But in order to demonstrate that Wordsworth had 
little that is essential to learn from Derrida or from notions 
of the arbitrariness of the sign, let me quote a passage that 
bears on this subject. It comes from a deleted manuscript 
entry: a large part of this was discovered and presented by 
Helen Darbishire" in her notes to the first edition (1950) of 
The Poet Wordsworth; it is too germane to our topic not to 
refer to here. 
There are two versions. Though words are not directly 
m~ntioned in either instance, words and what they convey are 
clearly in the forefront of the poet's mind. He is comparing, 
however, two modes of being: the first, one might say, is 
living in Fancy - our everyday, differentiating mode of 
thought, in which we take the objects of our verbal thought 
and experience for real entities; the second is living in 
Imagination, in which we recognise these entities as our own 
creations. With regard to moments of the first kind 
Such consciousness I deem but accidents, 
Relapses from the one interior life 
That lives in all things, sacred from the touch 
Of that false secondary power by which 
In weakness we create distinctions, then 
Believe that all our puny Boundaries are things 
Which we perceive and not which we have made, -
In which all beings live with God, themselves 
Are God, existing in one mighty whole, 
As indistinguishable as is the cloudless East 
At noon is from the cloudless West, when all 
the hemisphere is one cerulean blue. [my italics] 
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Miss Darbishire's slightly awed comment is 'There is no 
escape from the meaning of this •.• we are God' (Darbishire 
1966: 129). (Note that the lines describing the 'false 
secondary power' are incorporated into the Prelude [1850; II: 
11. 215-221] in slightly modified form, as a direct tribute to 
Coleridge, to whom 'The unity of all hath been revealed' 
[221].) 
But Wordsworth intends much more by his lines than this 
Spinozan claim. His point is deeply psychological as well as 
metaphysical. The powers he describes are in the mind, first 
and foremost: the distinction is between the utilitarian mode 
of interaction with things, 'getting and spending', and that 
mode which as far as is allowed seeks Reality as it is, beyond 
our human conceptualizations of it. 
In the version Miss Darbishire quotes in her main text 
the points are made in a different order, the debt to 
coleridge a little disguised: 
... I was early taught 
That what we see of forms and images 
Which float along our minds, and what we feel 
of active or recognizeable thought, 
Prospectiveness, intelligence or will, 
Not only is not worthy to be deemed 
Our being, to be prized as what we are 
But is the very littleness of life. 
Such consciousness seemed but accidents, 
Relapses from the one interior life 
Which is in all things, from that unity 
In which all beings live with God, are lost 
In God and Nature, in one mighty whole 
As indistinguishable as the cloudless east 
At noon is from the cloudless west, when all 
The hemisphere is one cerulean blue. 
(Darbishire 1966: 99) 
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It is clear that in this version Wordsworth has 
suppressed the phrase Miss Darbishire remarked on. The passage 
is still, perhaps, too radical for inclusion in the later 
Prelude. Does it not, after all, say that the 'forms and 
images' of our minds, what constitutes 'recognizeable 
thought', even 'intelligence' itself, far from being our main 
distinguishing glory, are indeed 'the very littleness of 
life'? The contrast here is between the 'puny' conceptual 
'Boundaries', the 'distinctions' which in our human weakness 
we impose upon reality (and then almost at once suppose them 
to be 'things which we perceive and not which we have made'), 
and the pre-linguistic unity of all, present with us in non-
verbal memory among our 'recollections of early childhood'. We 
retain deep unrecognised impressions of our immersion in the 
One Life which our linguistic consciousness has terminated by 
its introduction of divisions and differences. 
For the Mariner who shot the albatross with his bolt of 
isolating and hence negligent rationality - he saw no magic 
there, or wider range of connection - the 'oceanic 
consciousness' that brings retribution takes the appropriate 
form of the sea. In contrast, Wordsworth's passages symbolise 
pre-linguistic consciousness by the sky, higher soeur-miroire 
of the earth, an undivided hemisphere of 'one cerulean blue'. 
Such a moment has the whole world trembling before its 
glassy reflection in a primordial and yet 'higher' medium; a 
world threatened with return beyond a mirror-stage of a cosmic 
order not unlike the child Alice about to pass through, 
back to a pre-logical freedom from utilitarian adult 
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rationality. such a return is even conceivable for the 
universe because in its familiar differentiated form its only 
existence is in the mind of man - the haunt and main region of 
Wordsworth's song. 
We may pause here to question Hartman's notion that 
Wordsworth was suffering a metaphysical hangover, to his own 
detriment, induced by Coleridge. Such statements underestimate 
the centrality of a shared perspective, which lasted 
Wordsworth at least through all his 'great decade'. By 
contrast with Hartman, H.D. Garrod's12 epigram comes down the 
years: 'Coleridge's greatest work is Wordsworth - and, like 
all his other work, Coleridge left it unfinished' (Garrod 
1927: 29-30). This is as witty and as oblique to the truth as 
are all epigrams. It needs to be corrected by the recollection 
that Coleridge in the early days characterized Wordsworth as 
the only man he had ever met whom he acknowledged as his 
superior in every field. The very least we can say is that 
Wordsworth seems to have understood Coleridge better than 
perfectly, in everything that was central to his art. 
We began this chapter by exonerating Hartman of 
complicity in Norris's statements about Romantic attitudes to 
language. It may be harder for us to do the same for some of 
Hartman's Deconstructionist colleagues. It seems likely that 
Paul de Man, for example, should be associated more closely 
with Norris's statements, in ways we shall have, in this 
essay's sequel, to examine. If we are right in this, then de 
Man fails to see that Wordsworth's conception of a union 
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between subject and object is a defensible notion precisely 
because it is underwritten by the deeper recognition that in 
Real terms, the object does not exist as such. Wordsworth 
knows just as well as de Man - and the Darbishire passages 
establish this - that the object is a human, all-too-human 
construct. 
On the other hand, such a view as Wordsworth's is saved 
from sOlipsism by the acknowledgement that an indefinable 
something does exist outside our perceptions, and is the 
ground of them; but that something is not identifiable with 
the entities described in our dictionaries and encyclopaedias. 
If he is more at one with de Man on some issues than de 
Man perhaps recognizes, then in his belief in a partially 
attainable metaphysical and psychological 'beyond' of language 
the affinity between Wordsworth and Deconstruction clearly 
ceases. Though de Man would agree that the subject creates his 
world through language, the further idea that some influence 
could come from that beyond to shape our responses would be 
anathema to him. Yet this is undoubtedly Wordsworth's and 
Coleridge's considered viewpoint. What I believe should be 
recognised, however, is that these poets do not by holding 
such views simply declare their conceptual naivety and 
philosophic unfitness in such Deconstructive company. Rather 
we should see them as engaging in the same debates but coming, 
for their own good reasons, to different final conclusions. 
That these Romantics ultimately diverge from their 
Deconstructive successors, despite sharing similar first 
principles, does not mean they were blithely unaware of the 
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possibilities of pessimism and nihilism that might easily 
follow. Their reasons for rejecting these alternatives I will 
pursue in a second essay,"'Wordsworth and Lacan: strange Fits 
and Concourse Wild! which follows upon this one. 
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In my essay 'Lacan at the Lakes: Wordsworth Beyond the 
Egotistical Sublime' I investigated some of the theoretical 
roots that Deconstructive theory may be shown to share with 
Romanticism; common roots which practitioners of the former 
criticism do not always proclaim, despite their own clear 
critical attraction to that period and its poets. I took, for 
convenient summary of this stance of ambivalent opposition, 
some passages from a popular work by the critic Christopher 
Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (Norris: 1982). 
In his book Norris presents Deconstructionists as in 
conscious reaction against what for him typifies the Romantic 
attitude to language: the supposition of an exact coincidence 
between linguistic constructions and the objects or states of 
affairs in the 'external world' which they are meant to 
designate. In other words the Romantics are, according to 
Norris, guilty of a naive faith in language as a reliable 
guide to what is 'really there'. 
Whatever the truth about the relations of words and 
reality, my earlier chapter took issue with some of Norris's 
claims about the Romantics and language, and even, 
occasionally, about Deconstructionists themselves. Examination 
of statements by Geoffrey Hartman showed that he does not 
always fit Norris's picture, nor underwrite his interpretation 
of Romantic ideas upon language. 
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In my essay I presented evidence to suggest that far from 
espousing a naive referentiality, the Romantics' implicit 
denial of the ability of ordinary language to represent the 
Real is an axiomatic - even a defining - element of their 
Romanticism. Certainly, for Wordsworth and Coleridge, the 
realisation that the object is subject-created is a 
cornerstone of their poetic faith and practice. 
Consideration of the further part of their Schellingesque 
equation - their belief that the subject and his perceptions 
are in turn determined by the object - I have until now 
postponed, maintaining that it did not materially affect the 
force of the initial proposition. However, there is distortion 
in leaving it out of account; and its implications will have 
to be dealt with here. 
Having thus argued that the Romantic view of language is 
not in contrast with, but is in fact complementary to, many 
linguistic assumptions on which Deconstruction is grounded, I 
went on to adopt a suggestion of Hartman's, and to isolate a 
theological and a countertheological strain in post-
structuralist critical thinking. I ventured to affirm that the 
former mode, taking Jacques Lacan as its mentor, was the more 
appropriate and fruitful to apply within the world of Romantic 
letters; and that the application of a Lacanian model could be 
justified in the event by the inherent interest of its 
results, especially when applied to Romantic notions of the 
sublime and the ideal. 
It may be that many of Paul de Man's statements accord 
better with Norris's rejections of a linked history with 
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Romanticism. If so, then de Man makes something of an 
exception of Shelley, at least. In his discussion of Shelley's 
poem 'The Triumph of Life' de Man' is prepared to concede that 
one interpretation of Shelley's poem - the interpretation he 
prefers - would make of 'romanticism a fragment, or a moment, 
in a process that now includes us within its horizon' (de Man 
b 1979: 40). However, Wordsworth and Coleridge are somehow 
incidental to that process, one is to judge. In his dismissal 
of Wordsworth's fictive role in the poem, de Man seems to 
share all Shelley's Oedipal impatience (53). But this joint 
impatience perhaps has a deeper source: it is possible that de 
Man is suspicious of precisely that extended theological 
dimension in Wordsworth that shelley, superficially at any 
rate, seems to stand against. 
To illustrate the point of my argument, let me quote 
Norris on de Man. I take this oblique approach not only for 
economy, but also since I find de Man, like Hartman, harder to 
pin down than Norris does. (It may be that it is Norris's 
picture of de Man, rather than de Man himself, that is my 
exact protagonist here.) At any rate, what is in question in 
the passage is Coleridge's vastly influential interpretation 
of the symbol and of symbolism. 
The rhetoric of Symbolism is that which seeks a 
transcendent unifying vision atop all the hateful 
antinomies of subject and object, time and eternity, 
word and idea. It deludedly hopes that such 
distinctions may simply fall away in the moment of 
unmediated, purified perception towards which poetry 
strives. De Man quotes Coleridge, among others: the 
Symbol is characterized by 'the translucence of the 
special in the individual, or of the general in the 
special, or of the universal in the general; above 
all by the translucence of the eternal through and 
in the temporal' (cf. de Man2 1983: 192). 
It is this last claim especially that vexes de Man, 
and which opens up the gap between logic and 
rhetoric that his essay proceeds to exploit. 
Romanticism achieves its moments of delusory 
transcendence only by ignoring or suppressing the 
textual operations that underwrite its will-to-
truth. Refusing to distinguish between experience 
and the representation of experience, Romanticism 
seeks to collapse all those awkward distinctions 
that force an awareness of the secondary, mediating 
character of language. The ethos of the Symbol is 
precisely this belief that language can attain to a 
pure ideality where subject and object, mind and 
nature would at last coincide without the 
interposition of mere arbitrary signs. And this 
would also mean - as suggested in the passage from 
Coleridge - that thought might be momentarily 
redeemed from its enslavement to the temporal 
condition of language. (NOrris3 1984: 200) 
To the extent that scepticism is all that is at issue 
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here - de Man's insistence on first putting his fingers in the 
textual wounds - there is little more to be said, apart from 
noting de Man's personal position. But insofar as it is a 
comment on Romanticism, its claims ought, I feel, to be 
examined further. I take as read, in doing so, the results of 
my earlier argument: that the product of the collapse of the 
force of the signifier in cases of Coleridgean symbolism, in 
so far as it imitates the reported union of subject and object 
in the moment of cosmic consciousness, has to do not with the 
union of an individual mind with a particular object, but with 
the fusion of some more primary subject with the entire field 
of consciousness - with object large 'A' crossed through (the 
barred ~her) in Lacanian terms: an attempt which is 
admittedly impossible in language, but for which language may 
sometimes provide the means, as we have seen. 
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I must admit to my own unease about the ladder of 
translucence Coleridge climbs in the given quotation. It has 
always suggested to me a rather uncomfortable attempt to unite 
different critical traditions in one formula. It is probably 
only in application to a particular example - say, the 
Mariner's albatross - that one can begin to see what it means. 
Coleridge is certainly not expecting us to believe that all 
cases of what is ordinarily called symbolism forcibly display 
such qualities: that is the whole point of the distinction 
between symbolism and allegory, which lies behind the passage. 
What de Man apparently does not acknowledge is that Coleridge, 
however successfully or otherwise, is attempting to find a 
formulation specifically enabling the multiple shiftings of 
the signified beneath the signifier, not denying them. 
Perhaps some of the discomfort one feels with Coleridge's 
words could be the return of the repressed, in the form of a 
creeping Neo-classicism which is to my view increasingly 
detectable in his writings and table pronouncements, in 
company with his mounting conservatism, as he grows older. 
Though the terminology is largely the same, the emphasis tends 
to be placed on the universal rather than the particular; 
instances are visualized in the static rather than kinetic 
mode'. In the present case, it is perhaps Plato in his 
1 The formalists and New critics seized upon this - to my 
view - maverick element, which permitted them to take Coleridge 
so incongruously for their ally. Much misunderstanding has since 
followed. In the end, these unwanted bedfellows have damned 
Coleridge by association; Norman Fruman' s classic demystification 
of Coleridge's own personal pretensions - necessary as the 
exercise probably was - was partly occasioned by his own desire 
to undermine New criticism through an attack on its supposedly 
most venerable authority (cf. Coleridge. the Damaged Archangel 
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classical, timeless aspect who shines out of sight behind the 
frame. opium-inspired transcendental quietism was not the main 
characteristic of the more vigorous, more flexible Coleridge 
(whatever the dating) who, reinspired by his sources, 
discusses the form of the poem in 'On Poesy or Art': 
Now the fulness of nature is without character, as 
water is purest when without taste, smell or colour; 
but this is the highest, the apex only - it is not 
the whole. The object of art is to give the whole gg 
hominem; hence each step of nature hath its ideal, 
and hence the possibility of a climax up to the 
perfect form of a harmonized chaos. 
(Coleridge4 1937: 263) 
The terms given here are meant to self-destruct around 
themselves, as they do. A 'fulness' which is 'not the whole'; 
a whole that is given ad hominem; where 'each step' of 'the 
possibility of a climax up to ... chaos' confronts and limits 
the 'ideal' of a 'perfect form •.. harmonized'. Art retains 
the idea of itself as a process, in other words; it does not 
exist only as a finished, polished, unblemished final product 
.•. certainly, not as a self-existent verbal icon2 • Only in 
such a spirit could Coleridge say, for example, that a poem of 
[1971]) . 
2 Who doubts that Coleridge would see The Waste Land, the 
chosen exemplum of I.A. Richards's principles - with its mantle 
of tarot, anthropology and Wagner, and its neo-classical 
citations from Dante and the dead Symbolists - as an impressive 
but gargantuan metaphysical conceit; Fancy incarnate, rather than 
a product of the living, inwrought entelechy of the organic 
Imagination? 
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any length 'neither can be, nor ought to be, all poetry' (BL3: 
173) • 
Indeed, apart from its added tone of scepticism, what 
does de Man's own famous description of form add to that of 
Coleridge given above: 'form is never anything but a process 
on the way to its completion' (Norris 1984: 202)? Of the two 
definitions, it is Coleridge's that auto-deconstructs the more 
fruitfully and extensively about itself. 
There is still this question of the timeless that so 
annoys de Man in Coleridge's account of the symbol. Do we 
really have a case of 'logic' (de Man's) confronting 
'rhetoric' (Coleridge's), as Norris would have it? Let us look 
at the question this way: if what is other than language and 
beyond human conceptualisings - the Real, in Lacan's terms -
is indeed without division, then it must, of necessity, be 
'without' time, at least as human beings conceptualise time: 
as a matter of hours, minutes, seconds. 
The point is this: time - time at least as we humans 
understand it - is unintelligible without the concept of 
division. At the very least, we are obliged to divide our 
temporal being into present and past; and these are only the 
most elementary of time's many possible compartments and sub-
divisions. The conclusion is unavoidable: if the Real is 
undivided, it cannot be temporal in our ordinary meaning of 
this term. 
3 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent references will be 
to the edition by John Shawcross (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1909), for reasons which will become apparent. Shawcross's 
edition will be represented as BiogL in the references. 
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In the absence of an unambiguous account from Lacan 
himself' of the temporal relations of the Rea15 , consideration 
of this topic inevitably moves us in the direction of 
philosophers who have worked within a recognisably related 
framework of concepts, and who have given thought to the 
matter of time: Bradley, for example, in his account of the 
Absolute. ('Immediate experience' in Bradley is in a great 
many respects a prevision of Lacan's psychological 'Real'; the 
term 'Absolute' is used by Bradley for the supra-personal 
metaphysical entity that corresponds to it. His philosophy 
hence offers one solution to the difficult question of the 
precise relation between such parallel 'psychological' and 
'metaphysical' accounts of 'Reality'; though any final answer 
to the question of which of the two should have priority is a 
complex matter, in many ways beyond the scope of this thesis). 
In Appearance and Reality6 Bradley offers a multitude of 
complex arguments to demonstrate that the Absolute is 
uncontained by any of our categories of the temporal (Bradley 
1969: 33-6). 
If it is possible in any limited way to use language to 
defeat the strategies of language - and innumerable artists 
and some philosophers persist in believing that it is (Keats 
4 The same is not true of the relation of time and the 
unconscious, which may provide some guide. See Jacques Lacan, 
1986: 31-2: 'It is apparent that (sic) the very level of the 
definition of the unconscious ••. that what happens there is 
inaccessible to contradiction, to spatio-temporal location and 
also to the function of time ..• ontically, then the unconscious 
is the elusive •... , See also the discussion of Lacanian concepts 
of time in Ronald schleifer, 'The Space and Dialogue of Desire: 
Lacan, Greimas, and Narrative Temporality', MLN Vol. 98 No.5, 
Dec. 1983, 871-890, esp. 877 ('The Real ••. is, as Lacan says of 
perversion ... "outside of time"'), and 883. 
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is near enough one of these: for him, too, the 'silent form' 
of the Grecian Urn 'dost tease us out of thought/As does 
eternity') - then there is nothing that is inconsistent per se 
in a vocabulary of timelessness, such as that Coleridge 
employs. We should rather apply the term 'rhetoric' to 
intellectual standpoints that fail to follow through the 
implications of their own paradoxes or see that, without at 
least the idea of the timeless, the prison-house of language 
is no prison. 
We may gain some closer idea of how Coleridge pictured 
this 'timeless' zone in the following statement, a defence of 
Wordsworth's use of the Platonic myth of pre-existence in the 
'Immortality Ode'. Since, evidently, he saw it as an inner, 
psychological phenomenon (as far as it was experiencable at 
all), our comparisons with Lacan's pre-linguistic Real or 
Bradley's (and Hegel's) 'Immediate Experience' may not be 
entirely beyond the mark: 
the ode was intended for such readers only as had 
been accustomed to watch the flux and reflux of 
their inmost nature, to venture at times into the 
twilight realms of consciousness, and to feel a deep 
interest in modes of inmost being, to which they 
know that the attributes of time and space are 
inapplicable and alien, but which yet cannot be 
conveyed save in symbols of time and space. For such 
readers the sense is sufficiently plain, and they 
will be as little disposed to charge Mr. Wordsworth 
with believing the Platonic pre-existence in the 
ordinary interpretation of the words, as I am to 
believe, that Plato himself ever meant or taught it. 
(BiogL, II: 120-
121) 
Wordsworth certainly thought that the latent capacities 
of words in general to function as symbols in Coleridge's 
sense could be activated and augmented within the special 
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circumstances of the poem. In doing so, such symbols bring 
into prominence their usually overlooked limitations: they 
appear as what they are, mediative signifiers; but released 
from their primary utilitarian function of conveying 
information, they are open to new and special interactions. 
Among these is the possibility of referring our attention 
beyond themselves. But, in these special circumstances, they 
refer us not to the external objects they are meant to 
designate, according to a naive view of language. Instead, by 
drawing attention to their own contingency, their own 
ontological limitations, they may bring us instead to the 
brink of the Real itself, to the effective borders of the 
timeless. 
At first, this overturning of our habitual perceptions in 
language may well strike us as no comfortable experience. 
Indeed, it may work most readily as a 'jarring' among our 
comfortable and over-confident categories. This effect of 
jarring away from centre that the Coleridgean symbol in its 
own way produces has many analogies among the stylistic 
devices and the portrayed events of Wordsworth's poetry. 
Prominent instances of the latter are those which dramatise 
the awe and fear that often herald the onset of a mystical 
experience in the Prelude. 
For example, this 'jarring' into the mystical is 
experienced by the child Wordsworth on the occasion when, 
having sneaked out onto the lake in a stolen boat, he is 
suddenly menaced by an alarmingly animated peak, rising above 
him (Prelude 1805: 11. 373-427). What really occurs, we 
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assume, is a trick of perspective produced by the motion of 
the boat, not the mountain; but in this moment of forced co-
operation between the child's mind and his setting the mere 
facts become irrelevant. For him, the unaccustomed in nature 
strips the illusion from nature; to the boy's imagination the 
shock of 'seeing through' the natural landscape is later 
domesticated into a myth of 'dim presences' controlling 
everything behind the drops and flats of this newly 
questionable scenic presentation; but before this stage 
for many days, my brain 
Work'd with a dim and undetermin'd sense 
Of unknown modes of being; in my thoughts 
There was a darkness, call it solitude, 
Or blank desertion, no familiar shapes 
Of hourly objects, images of trees, 
Of sea or sky, no colours of green fields; 
But huge and mighty Forms that do not live 
Like living men mov'd slowly through my mind 
By day and were the trouble of my dreams. 
(1805, I: 11. 418-427) 
Though he retains the myth of the 'thing', the particular 
signified, as an element in the sublime moment, Thomas Weiske17 
appropriately indicates the sense of surprise and discomfiture 
that may initiate that moment in his discussion of bathos, 
which, he says, 'is at the heart of the Wordsworth ian revision 
of the sublime', and is a response 'to the fission of word and 
thing, or signifier and signified' (Weiskel 1976: 20). 
Terry Eagleton8 praises the Deconstructive vision of the 
sublime seen as the 'mind-shaking' recognition of the failure 
of all linguistic and conceptual systems. One particular 
advantage of this formulation, in his view, is that it allows 
us to distinguish clearly between the beautiful and the 
sublime: 
In the presence of beauty, we experience an 
exquisite sense of adaptation of the mind to 
reality; but in the turbulent presence of the 
sublime we are forcibly reminded of the limits of 
our dwarfish imaginations and admonished that the 
world as infinite totality is not ours to know. It 
is as though in the sublime the 'real' itself - the 
eternal, ungraspable totality of things - inscribes 
itself as the cautionary limit of all mere ideology, 
of all complacent subject-centredness, causing us to 
feel the pain of incompletion and unassuaged desire. 
(Eagleton 1990: 89) 
I have given reasons why I think this Deconstructive 
interpetation gives an adequate account of the beginnings, 
only, of the sublime moment. What the sense of displacement 
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and the subversion of linguistic reality may result in, in my 
view, is something beyond these effects. It can usher in not 
merely a sense of our own diminishment but a corresponding and 
immediate openness to the psychological or cosmic Real -
according to whichever understanding we prefer. Certainly, it 
was Wordsworth's opinion that this 'beyond' effect was 
implicated by the sublime. 
The intriguing thing is that many of Wordswoth's poetic 
devices are intended to work in just the same way as did his 
sudden and alarming view of the advancing peak. One very 
subtle kind of poetic 'jarring' is provided by the 
Hartmanesque 'strange fits' of logic and grammar in, for 
example, the Lucy poems: the half-disguised 
inappropriatenesses of vocabulary, syntax, expression or 
circumstance, that all but constitute the principal technique 
of these works. How surprising, for example, that the mere 
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disappearance of the moon behind a cottage-roof should count 
as a 'strange fit of passion', one that can be confided to the 
'lover's ear alone'. Then there are the odd, near oxymoronic 
juxtapositions of 'She dwelt among untrodden ways'. What, 
exactly, are 'untrodden ways'? How, if there are 'none to 
praise' Lucy, can there be 'very few to love' her; which of 
the two is more, 'none' or 'few'? Do those who love her not 
praise her; why then does the poet praise her? similarly, if 
Lucy 'lived unknown', how can it be that 'few could know' when 
she died? Clearly, it is language itself which is under stress 
in such lines: our customary responses to conventional phrases 
and expressions are made the means of these words' own mutual 
undoing, when they are presented in incongruous company 
together. 
The same broad impulse accounts for queasy image 
transformations like that of the leech-gatherer first into a 
boulder and then, from that combination, into a sea-monster 
('Resolution and Independence'; stanza IX): significantly, 
Wordsworth offered this example as a special demonstration of 
Imagination at work, in his 1815 Preface9 • This curious 
compound merging of identities which ends in attaching to each 
stage of the transformation all the main qualities of the 
other stages, succeeds in undermining our fixed bearings and 
subverting language. 
But it is also an example of an alternative technique to 
disruption and surprise, emblematic, perhaps, of Wordsworth's 
conviction of the existence of a further dimension 'beyond' 
linguistic or perceptual collapse. The dissolving of verbal 
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boundaries may be only a first stage, prefatory to a mutual 
merging. Indeed, Wordsworth's most characteristic poetic 
method is that of 'excessive' unification, especially at 
moments of strategic emotional heightening. This is not merely 
a matter of choosing words with compatible expressive 
associations; it is also managed by means of sound, through 
extensive but jUdicious use of assonance and alliteration. 
(One may attempt, as others have, to count the number of 
internal aural echoes in such memorable Wordsworth ian phrases 
as 'the still, sad music of humanity': to my count, 16 out of 
24 sounds have musical partners here; again, a poem like 
'Elegiac stanzas' is structured upon repeated long 'e' sounds, 
which cease, appropriately, only at the point of the poet's 
transfiguration back into an ordinary mortal.) It was not 
Wordsworth's fault if his revival of this easily-imitable 
stylistic feature was practiced to excess, and with perhaps 
less theoretical understanding, by his Romantic successors. 
If it was Schopenhauer who said that to aspire to the 
condition of music was a necessity of art, then Wordsworth, a 
poet with his own highly responsive ear, was the first to 
understand the reason for this drive. In Wordsworth, music 
works to undermine the individuating tendency of the words and 
to merge sense back into experience. If sound is used by him 
against the tyranny of the verbal concept, then the 
compensating aim is not to draw attention to the medium, as it 
would be for the later formalists and symbolists. In the end, 
the motivation of Romantic art is, in contrast, all towards 
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experience; even if what it uniquely hoped to invoke through 
its artistry was the ultimate experience itself. 
The view of art I have been describing supposes that all 
metaphor, all figuration, all that is compositional, can hint 
at a more extensive unity that underlies these functions. To 
this perspective then, a poem must be, as has always been 
suspected, only a more appropriate way of speaking of Reality: 
'Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty', as Keats declared it. 
However, it is Reality we are speaking of here, not 
reality small 'r'. Mimesis in Romantic poetry does not imply 
any special attachment to the world of discrete and 
independent objects; in a way this world is actually inimical 
to the poet's task. Blake'o saw it this way, too: 
'What,' it will be Question'd, 'When the Sun rises, 
do you not see a round disk of fire somewhat "like a 
Guinea?" 0 no, no, I see an Innumerable company of 
the Heavenly host crying "Holy, Holy, Holy is the 
Lord God Almighty. II , (Blake 1966: 617) 
Indeed, the supposed actual world is recognized by Blake 
as, in certain senses, implicitly fictional. Certainly some 
similar concern to overturn the usual order of priorities is 
behind Coleridge's advice in his letter to Godwin 'to destroy 
the old antithesis of Words and Things ••• elevating, as it 
were, words into Things, & living Things too' (Coleridge" 
1956-71, I: 625-6). We should note carefully where the 
priorities fall here: coleridge is not advocating, naively, 
the subsumption of things into words, but the elevation in 
ontological status of the words themselves! 
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Though Thomas Weiskel's subtle Deconstructionist account 
of the sublime, referred to above, is not identical in all 
respects to mine given here, he too does not see the sublime 
moment simply coming to an end in a state of aporia and 
linguistic bafflement. Indeed, for him the collapse of 
signification is followed by a further phase in which 'the 
mind recovers the balance of outer and inner by constituting a 
fresh relation between itself and the object •.. symbolizing 
the mind's relation to a transcendent order' (1976: 24). 
An especially valuable insight of Weiskel's is that the 
physical location and circumstances of the sublime moment may 
themselves actually function as a kind of 'text'. However, 
this text is elusive, ungraspable, never more than on the 
verge of utterance. Indeed, its very undecipherability is what 
principally characterizes the experience: paradoxically, 'the 
absence of determinate meaning becomes significant': 
The absence of a signified itself assumes the status 
of a signifier, disposing us to feel that behind 
this newly significant absence lurks a newly 
discovered presence, the latent referent, as it 
were, mediated by the new sign. We recall Kant's 
terms: 'unattainability' (Unerreichbarkeit) is 
regarded as a 'presentation' (Darstellung): 
indeterminacy signifies. (Weiskel 1976: 28) 
weiskel's view thus seems to be that the impression of a 
'beyond' is illusory, though it may nonetheless impinge with 
all the force of a meaning - even if a meaning that cannot be 
articulated. 
Be this as it may, Weiskel's mention of Kant is salutory, 
here. We discover that even for Kant12 the sublime can be 
located in or identified with no individual object in the 
actual world: 
For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, 
cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather 
concerns ideas of reason, which, although no 
adequate presentation is possible, may be excited 
and called into mind by that very inadequacy itself 
which does admit of sensuous presentation. 
(Kant 1952, I: 92) 
2 
Kant's revolutionary picture of man's position in the world 
lies behind many of the Romantic developments we have been 
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looking at. In particular, his announcement of a radical and 
unbridgeable distinction between the human mental world and 
the real unseen nature of the universe was a major watershed 
for contemporary thought. As such, it has its affinities with, 
and historically underlies, Deconstructionist pessimism. 
It has been a central standpoint of these two chapters on 
Wordsworth that the Romantics, having assimilated the Kantian 
position, came to believe that it was possible, at least 
through art (but also through mystical experience) partially 
to penetrate the barriers between the human world and the 
ding-an-sich, particularly where this 'thing in itself' was 
thought of as naming a totality, not a particular. That they 
could sustain such a modification of Kantian thought was 
partly owing to the influence upon them of Kant's disciples 
and successors in Germany, in particular Friedrich Schelling. 
Though this was not always and exclusively the case, 
Coleridge and Wordsworth tended to view this problem as first 
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and foremost metaphysical in nature, as the German 
philosophers did. Part of my argument in these chapters is 
that, for readers of our own day, the problem may more 
usefully be approached from a psychological and psychoanalytic 
perspective, owing to the greater immediacy these concepts 
have for us at the present time (although this is to some 
extent to shelve the problematic question of the ultimate 
relation, if any, between the psychological and metaphysical 
world-pictures). 
When he is discussing Kantian matters, Coleridge's 
statements do, admittedly, sometimes sound somewhat at 
variance with my main claims in this thesis. For example, he 
is capable of such comments as the following, concerning a 
reinterpretation of Kant he felt to be necessary: 
In spite therefore of his own declarations, I could 
never believe, that it was possible for him to have 
meant no more by his Noumenon, or THING IN ITSELF, 
than his mere words express; or that in his own 
conception he confined the whole plastic power to 
the forms of intellect, leaving for the external 
cause, for the materials of our sensations, a matter 
without form, which is doubtless inconceivable. 
(BiogL I: 100) 
On the face of it, this passage seems unfavourable to the 
view of the Real I have so far advanced: that it corresponds 
to the undifferentiated totality, in which subject and object 
large 'A' are merged ••• the equivalent of which may be 
experienced, on the Lacanian model, in earliest childhood. To 
Coleridge the metaphysical counterpart of this psychological 
'Real' cannot be absolutely undifferentiated and featureless; 
if it were, it could not be the ground of our physical 
202 
sensations: there would be nothing particular there to serve 
as such a ground. (But, analogously, there is nothing to 
suggest that the Lacanian Real is featureless, either. All it 
lacks are our human conversion of its primordial marks into 
human concepts and separable 'things'.) 
What coleridge sensed was that if Reality contained 
difference and variety, then its features must impinge upon us 
in some recognisable way, and modify our responses. In any 
case, it is evident that Coleridge's contemplation of such 
matters led at a certain point to disillusionment with the 
exclusively Kantian approach. Unwilling to remain within the 
Fichtean linguistic solipsism which seemed to threaten, 
Coleridge moved on beyond his Kantian point of origin, and 
embraced instead Schelling's development of that Kantian 
theme; this in response to a desire to see man in dialogue 
with the nature of things, rather than conducting a monologue 
in the face of nothingness. 
In the same movement, Coleridge departs from any exact 
sympathy with his Deconstructive successors. Surely, then, in 
his Schellingesque phase he does become vulnerable to the sort 
of attacks which Norris mounts? Certainly, even some of 
Coleridge's most sympathetic supporters have assumed an 
interpretation of his position which admits this. 
At this point, one must concede that the intellectual 
development sketched above may be overly schematic; no doubt, 
with his early interest in nature and its effect on individual 
psychology, Coleridge would have been looking from the very 
first for some accommodation between the powerful Kantian 
203 
position and a recognition of the rights of the non-human 
world. He would have been hoping, from German idealism, for a 
reinforcement of his sense of the importance of Nature 
equivalent to that once provided by Hartley's Associationist 
psychology, now necessarily discarded. That this would have 
been true, too, of Wordsworth goes without saying. 
other qualifications are in order here, too. Kantian 
scepticism, for example, is not so monolithic as Coleridge's 
summary might suggest. In the Critique of Judgement so praised 
by Coleridge on his first acquaintance with it, Kant is far 
from dismissive of the idea that the intellect is capable of 
real knowledge of the external world. What he does insist on, 
however, is that no ultimate guarantees are offered or 
available as to the validity of any individual item of such 
knowledge. As John Kemp13 summarizes the matter, in his account 
of the Critique: 
Natural science requires us to be able to judge that 
this object belongs to a certain species, and that 
this is in its tUrn a species of a certain genus; 
and judging of this kind would be impossible if 
nature were not in a sense adapted to our powers of 
judging. This adaptation of nature to our mental 
faculties is not an objective principle - we have no 
direct knowledge that nature is, in itself, adapted 
in this purposive way - but a subjective principle 
which we have to use in order to direct our 
inquiries into nature. In technical terms, the 
principle belongs to reflective, not to determinant, 
judgment and is a regulative, not a constitutive 
principle of reason, in the wide sense of this last 
word. We have to regard nature as if it were the 
product of art. (Kemp 1968: 99) 
It was to an even more thoroughly art-centred philosophy 
that Coleridge was to turn in his quest for a clearer and more 
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positive account of the standing of nature. Schelling offered 
a restored sense that nature was indeed the canvas on which 
the artist of the mind imposed his creations, and - even more 
importantly - that the grain and fibre of the canvas played a 
necessary part in regulating the imaginative impressions he 
could place upon it. In Schelling's view, Subject determines 
Object, and is determined by it, in one and the same act. 
We are here, I believe, at the crux of our difficulty. 
This Schellingesque development in Coleridge's thinking has 
caused many commentators to assume that he returned from a 
Kantian excursus to a re-acceptance of dualism, to an 
acceptance of two primary principles - the equivalents of 
consciousness and Matter - not one. And such dualism, with its 
supposed faith in the real existence of transcendental 
objects, is of course unacceptable to our contemporary 
sceptical vision of language, governed as it is by notions of 
the arbitrariness of the sign. 
As Paul Hamilton14 puts it in his book, Coleridge's 
Poetics: 
If Coleridge were solely a Kantian, or exclusively a 
follower of Schelling, then things would be much 
simpler for his commentators. In fact he displays 
both influences. He thinks it possible to detect in 
nature the expression of the power which produces 
natural objects: the 'living words' which describe 
nature are not only a mode of how we interpret 
nature, but express the character of nature as it 
exists in itself - a view completely unacceptable to 
Kant. (Hamilton 1983: 88-9) 
If this last view were indeed Coleridge's, then Hamilton 
would be correct, and Coleridge could be indicted for 
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attempting to be at one and the same time on both sides of a 
philosophical divide. He would also, of course, again be 
vulnerable to the criticisms of Norris and de Man; 
particularly if it were from such a dualisitic position that 
he attempted to reconcile subject and object in the symbol and 
poetic work. 
The belief that such a position is indeed his has been 
common to his supporters and detractors alike; despite the 
difficulty that then arises in accounting for his many 
pronouncements about the inherent arbitrariness and 
independence of language. These statements have simply to be 
put down, in Hamilton's manner, to divided and unresolved 
philosophical sympathies on Coleridge's part. 
As evidence for this dualistic position, Hamilton cites 
such examples as the following, from the 'theses' eCho XII) 
which precede the definition of Imagination at the end of the 
first volume of Biographia: 
even as natural philosphers we must arrive at the 
same principle from which as transcendental 
philosphers we set out; that is, in a self-
consciousness in which the principium essendi does 
not stand to the principium cognoscendi in the 
relation of cause to effect, but both one and the 
other are coinherent and identical. (BiogL, I: 187) 
We have to read such statements with care, for the point 
they are making is a subtle one. In effect Coleridge is here 
re-stating Schelling's primary formula, which I have 
summarised earlier as 'in perception, subject determines 
object, and is determined by it.' The problem for commentators 
like Hamilton is that they are unable to reconcile their 
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knowledge that idealism requires one principle, not two, with 
a position that seems to accredit equal reality to the mind 
and to the material world. Since dualism is incompatible with 
idealism, this cannot be idealism: such seems to be their 
conclusion - a too hasty conclusion, as I maintain. 
The alternative possibility, that it is not dualism - at 
least, not what is ordinarily meant by dualism - is left 
unconsidered; and yet this latter is, in my opinion, the 
correct assumption. Part of the problem is that one is so used 
to meeting the term 'idealism' as a form of abuse in critical 
texts, that the fact that there is not one form of idealism 
but many has been obscured. Solipsism, it should be 
recognised, is only one very extreme variant of this position. 
In Schelling's system, as the developing argument of 
Coleridge's set of 'theses' in Chapter XII reflects, Subject 
and Object, mind and world, are not absolutes, but derive 
their reality from another prior condition, which subsumes 
both of them in one entity. This even more 'Real' entity is 
identifiable with the original state of things in, if we like, 
the mind of God; before he became self-aware, before he 
initiated creation by making himself an object to himself. We 
ourselves, individual subjects with our world of things, are 
only more derivative entities - though evolved in distinction 
from each other on the same pattern, out of one single, 
originating Being or Mind/World. 
Such a picture may seem to some unnecessarily mythical. 
Myth it is; yet perhaps we can appreciate how it came to be 
needed to express a situation where words or plain rational 
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concepts fail. Schelling's ontological sequence - a descent 
into difference - admittedly a little resembles a kind of 
Gnostic derivation of God the Son and God the Spirit, in their 
turn, out of God the father. Perhaps the mythical dimensions 
of this picture can be contained, and its conceptual content 
rendered more acceptable in principle, by translating it into 
psychological or psychoanalytic terms. It is, after all, 
exactly the process by which Lacan presents us as coming to 
rational consciousness out of the Real. To Lacan, we each of 
us appear as individuals out of just such a primary, 
undifferentiated state of being - from which we did not 
originally distinguish ourselves, our mother, or the world -
by a similar process of internal psychic self-division; by, in 
fact, our differentiation in the 'imaginary' into subject and 
object, self and Other. 
Perhaps some of the blame for the confusion - which 
arises from such passages as Hamilton quotes above - is 
Coleridge's own. In constructing his Schellingesque theses, he 
is so much at pains to investigate the nature and potential of 
spirit that his terminology becomes loose in dealing with the 
claims of the material: we are unsure when, by the term 
'object', we are to understand the whole project of 
consciousness apart from itself, and when we are to imagine 
instead the mere thing, single and discrete. 
Yet frequently there ~ pointers, which critics choose 
to ignore. (Note that in the Hamilton passage Coleridge talks 
of principles - the 'principium essendi' and the 'principium 
cognoscendi' - not of individual entitiesj and this choice of 
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terms is not a mere concession to ornateness.) Another case in 
point is the following quotation from chapter XII of the 
Biographia, which is sometimes evinced as contrary evidence in 
this particular argument: 
All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object 
with a subject ...• For we can know that only which 
is true; and the truth is universally placed in the 
coincidence of the thought with the thing, of the 
representation with the object represented. 
(BL: 144) 
This quotation - and the last part in particular - is 
sometimes offered as if it represented the sum and totality of 
Coleridge's views on truth; and more, as if it once again 
proved Coleridge to have subscribed to a naive referential 
theory of meaning, understood as a coincidence of word and 
referent. Of course, if it could be so taken, it would prove 
catastrophic to the picture I have been presenting of his 
opinions on language. 
Significantly, Coleridge begins the chapter from which 
this extract comes by insisting that future critics treat that 
chapter as a whole, for distortions will result from any other 
procedure: 'The fairest part of the most beautiful body will 
appear deformed and monstrous if dissevered from its place in 
the organic whole' (135). As it happens, the separating-out of 
the quotation in question is an instance of precisely the kind 
of distortion which Coleridge anticipates. 
We see how appropriate his warning is if we consider the 
context from which the extract comes. Almost all of what 
precedes and follows it runs counter to the conclusions which 
are so readily drawn from it in isolation. 
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When it appears, we have just encountered the extended 
Coleridgean image of knowledge as an inhabited vale, 
surrounded by a range of peaks that the mists obscure. Rivers 
enter this vale, we are told, but their source remains unknown 
to common perceptions of things. Philosophy, on this view, is 
precisely what explores beyond the protective range (in both 
senses) of familiar understanding and everyday knowledge. Its 
realities, Coleridge says, are not those of the common world. 
Philosophy's objects, we are to understand, are not ordinary 
ones. 
Secondly, we have just (140-142) had a list of 
philosophic schools whose apparently contending doctrines may 
actually turn out to be reconcilable, in Coleridge's opinion. 
Superior knowledge, we are promised, would harmonise together 
the following sufficiently 'true', yet nonetheless mutually 
opposed theories: 
The want of sUbstantial reality in the objects of 
the senses, according to the sceptics; the harmonies 
or numbers, the prototypes and ideas, to which the 
Pythagoreans and Platonists reduced all things; the 
one and all of Parmenides and Plotinus, without 
Spinozism; the necessary connnection of all things, 
according to the Stoics, reconcilable with the 
spontaneity of the the other schools; the vital 
philosophy of the Cabalists and Hermetists, who 
assume the universality of sensation; the 
sUbstantial forms and entelechies of Aristotle and 
the schoolmen, together with the mechanical solution 
of all particular phenomena according to Democritus 
and the recent philosophies - all these we shall 
find united in one perspective central point, which 
shows regularity and coincidence of all the parts in 
the very object which from every other point of view 
must appear confused and distorted. (BL: 141-2) 
Coleridge's rambling style makes it notoriously difficlut 
to distinguish what is central from what is mere digression. I 
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do, however, think the importance of the above passage should 
not be underestimated. We are being given - however 
obliquely - a general groundplan of how Coleridge believes his 
ultimate metaphysics (the same metaphysics which the chapter's 
later Schellingesque theses are supposed to prepare us for, 
but which are deflected thereafter by the inevitable 'letter 
from Porlock') will emerge. It will evidently, for example, 
stress the inherent unity and oneness of all things in a 
living transcendent totality which, while not abolishing 
objects, would render their reality a question of perspective 
merely. 
They would become both real (as for the Atomists and 
Aristotelians) and unreal (as for the Sceptics) at once: real 
as an element in the everyday consciousness of particular 
human persons, but of only contingent reality in the vital 
all-comprehensive organic absolute. From the vantage of this 
superior setting they would emerge anew, but as inseparable 
elements in a synthesis of the conscious and the material, the 
subjective and the objective. Coleridge clearly proposes as 
part of his plan to supply us with the structural laws 
governing all physical and metaphysical processes: as 
'centrifugal' and 'centripetal' tendencies these all reduce 
into complexes involving not only combination into, but also 
separation from, the whole. As we know, neither his own powers 
nor the natural philosophy of the time were equal to this 
mighty project, in the event. 
His brief 'prospectus' is nevertheless useful to us, or 
at least to our argument. It is clearly only in the context of 
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this vast perspective he has proposed that we are to 
understand the particular inflections of Coleridge's 
statements about 'truth by correspondence', previously quoted. 
Indeed, these are separated from the passage discussed above 
only by a digression on the a priori objective nature of 
mathematics; again, a topic involving the mixed or ambivalent 
inward- or outward-ness of objects of perception and thought. 
Thus if 'truth' is 'universally placed' in 'the 
coicidence of the thought with the thing' this implies not 
that Coleridge is wholeheartedly assenting to the description, 
but simply saying that it represents the general estimate of 
what truth as such amounts to. Coleridge is of course 
assenting to the description, which is invoked since it at 
least represents common ground on which most parties might 
concur. The definition is after all very nearly tautologous: 
it the thought exactly corresponds with what it its intended 
to reflect, then it must be true. That is no more than the 
meaning of the word 'true'. Such a concession does not, 
however, commit Coleridge to understanding all that others do 
by the word 'object' or the word 'truth'. Indeed, if from a 
different perspective we see that such 'coincidence' results 
from the way thought partially creates the 'objects' it 
designates, then the whole situation suddenly appears in very 
altered light. 
In the immediate passage from which the central sentence 
has been 'untimely ripp'd' by critics, Coleridge has in fact 
taken considerable pains to illustrate that the philosophical 
sense of 'object' he wishes to work with, is not the meaning 
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of the term in everyday usage - any more than the term 
'subject' is meant to designate one paradigm individual. 
Already - even before the 'theses' begin - both 'subject' and 
'object' are being dissoved into more general, more 
comprehensive entities: '(My readers have been warned in a 
former chapter that for their convenience as well as the 
writer's the term subject is used by me in the scholastic 
sense, as equivalent to mind or sentient being, and as the 
necessary correlative of object, or guicguid objicitur menti) , 
(BL: 144). 
This parenthesis is, in fact, all that separates the 
sentence elements divided by ellipsis dots in the 
controversial quotation, as I (in imitation of others) earlier 
presented it. No minor accident that it is usually so omitted 
by interested critics, or by impatient critics who blur over 
its tangled but essential complexities. Lest the inference be 
lost in the Latin, I must ratify that Coleridge is insisting 
that by 'object' he intends simply that which is an object of 
thought, not necessarily or absolutely at all a physical fact 
in the external world. 
If further confirmation were necessary, we see this same 
trend in the paragraph that follows. There Coleridge is 
refining his technical vocabulary in preparation for the 
coming analyses, not only by redefining our homely 'subject' 
and 'object', but by specifying special senses for certain 
words that are to be associated with them. He gives warning 
that he will sometimes wish to refer not to the respective 
essences of what is subjective and what is objective, but to 
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the sum of all that can be either. Though this is a very 
subtle distinction, and the two senses are in usual practice 
hardly to be differentiated from each other, he goes to the 
lengths of appropriating the new terms intelligence and nature 
for those occasions when he intends the second sense alone. It 
will be evident that if nature may be the equivalent of 
object, then this word cannot be understood as referring to 
particular things in the way a superficial reading might 
suppose. 
Now the sum of all that is merely objective we will 
henceforth call nature, confining the term to its 
passive and material sense, as comprising all the 
phenomena by which its existence is made known to 
us. On the other hand, the sum of all that is 
subjective we may comprehend in the name of the self 
or intelligence. Both conceptions are in necessary 
antithesis. (145) 
It is a 'necessary' antithesis precisely because a real 
state of synthesis lies behind it, although obscured in 
everyday experience: 'in all acts of positive knowledge there 
is required a reciprocal concurrence of both, namely of the 
conscious being and of that which is in itself unconscious 
.... During the act of knowledge itself, the objective and 
subjective are so instantly united that we cannot determine to 
which of the two the priority belongs. There is no first and 
second; both are coinstantaneous and one' (145). 
It would be foolish to deny that Coleridge's words are 
clearly assuming that there is something external to us which 
has a bearing on our visions and perceptions. But that 
something is, I still insist, not at all unproblematically 
identical with the entities we usually assume to be 'out 
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there'. Althought the term we might give to this true 
antithetical 'opposite' is nature, even here, self and nature 
are only properly to be explained by reference to an 
underlying unity of which they are individually only the 
partial reflection. And nature, though a totality, is not a 
bland or featureless plenum, but supplies, here and there, 
some grounds for our suppositions. 
The arguments that follow in Coleridge's text lead, from 
this foundation, on to the definitions of Imagination and 
Fancy in chapter XIII. These definitions are well nigh 
invariably presented by critics as being discontinuous, 
logically, with what has preceded them. I hope I have said 
enough to show that this is not the case, that they simply 
spell out some literary implications of what has so far been 
posited in the Biographia. It is the metaphysics which are 
deferred as a result of the intrusive letter; not the literary 
theory. 
It is a pity that John Shawcross's classic introduction 
to the 1909 Oxford edition of Biographia is not assumed as 
common ground in all discussion of this kind, so wise and 
informed is this work. Those critics who have since called its 
conclusions into question seldom seem to have anything more 
convincing of their own to offer. Shawcross gives due weight 
to Schelling's influence and demonstrates how the primary and 
secondary Imagination are in fact derived from Schelling's 
assumptions about perception. But what is especially 
significant in this context is the particular relations of the 
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various relevant mental faculties to truth. Far better than 
the much-quoted extract discussed above, we gain some idea of 
how Coleridge thought of truth as above all a specifically 
poetic preserve - even if poetry's 'immediate object' is 
'pleasure, not truth' CBL: 172; Coleridge's emphasis). This is 
because of the special relations of 'pleasure' with fictional 
detachment from the world's utilitarian aims and goals, and 
from its concern with limited factual 'truths'. In the 
'imaginative' circumstances of the artistic work subject 
'coincides' with imaginary object in a superior way: superior, 
firstly, because the 'personal' element is not purged away in 
the process; and secondly, because such unifications better 
echo the primal unity that underlies our linguistic reality. 
As we have seen, primary Imagination is the grand 
designation for plain perception, precisely because this 
reflex is in some sense a creative act: in figuring the world, 
in dividing ourselves from it as from the original plenum 
which includes it and ourselves, we make the world around uSi 
we position, define, categorize, place and relate. In other 
words, the nature and particularity of each object we 
encounter depends on USi it is only what it is for us. 
We might say that secondary Imagination and Fancy both 
have a relation to different attitudes to this scheme of 
reality. Fancy corresponds to the solipsist's dream of the 
real: it is an attempt on the part of false consciousness to 
disconnect and free, one which - paradoxically - accredits the 
'fixities and definites' of the logocentric in the process. 
Yet it is also a false attempt on consciousness's part to take 
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absolute reponsibility for things, to see itself as utterly 
the architect of all, to acknowledge no higher power. 
Secondary Imagination recognizes no less the creative power of 
mind, yet willingly subjects itself not to surfaces but to the 
Reality underlying apparent objects; it seeks to deploy the 
contingent images and emblems of experience in service of a 
deeper and truer revelation of the unity on which they are 
built. 
As Shawcross puts it: 'In the first case our excercise of 
the power [of the primary Imagination] is unconscious; in the 
second the will directs' - though truth. not itself, 
determines - the activity of the secondary Imagination (cf. 
BiogL: lxvii). This is the final stage of a process which 
began, then, in 'The fact that the poet, in impressing his 
conscious self upon the world of objects, seemed to penetrate 
to the core of their being' (p. lix). However, this core of 
being is not absolutely outside us, nor is it particular. As 
Schelling's own account has it: 'through the objective world 
as a whole, but never through a single object in it, an 
infinite is represented: whereas every single work of art 
represents Infinity' (Schelling, werke, i, 627; cf. BiogL: 
lxvii) . 
The important point about objects, as Coleridge says, is 
this: 'the spirit, in all the objects which it views, views 
only itself' (BiogL: 274). But to his Schellingesque 
perspective, this is a far less solipsistic statement than it 
might at first appear. spirit (not just 'the observer', note) 
looking at the world, views such a vision of itself because 
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that vision is 'out' there to be had. In the first place, 
there are all the possible varieties of valid human 
interaction with the world to explore, all of which, in a 
sense, are contained in Reality's 'unconscious'. And yet, this 
apparent profligacy and range of possibility is validated and 
grounded in the fact that both the viewing intelligence and 
the products of its attention are abstracted from one and the 
same source - as they are, too, in the Lacanian interpretation 
of our psychic progress .•. and an attentive and responsible 
act of observation will always seek to keep this potentially 
reconstituting component in mind along with itself. In other 
words, the world is so constituted that it co-operates with 
the creative process of perceptionj which suggests that mind 
is an aspect of world, just as world is of mind. 'Mind' is, 
after all, not invented by itself. 
One may readily turn the focus of the argument round upon 
the sceptic who originates it. We soon see that those who deny 
any significant influence from external reality upon our 
mental and linguistic life are in an invidious position. We 
are assumed, on their view, to be acculturated beings, whose 
language determines our perceptions. Yet the mind must be 
capable of making correct assumptions about some of the 
sensuous, perceptual and cultural information which comes to 
it, or the idea of an 'acculturated' vision would make no 
sense, for our culture could not reach us. The sceptical 
argument, in its purest form, is thus inherently self-
defeating. 
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Do Coleridge and Wordsworth really embrace an 
unjustifiably sanguine notion of the interdependence between 
linguistic man, as observer and reporter, and his world? If we 
admit the co-operation of the universe in the creation of the 
'things' of language, does this not inevitably establish them 
as 'real' entities once again? 
The point is that the recognition that individual objects 
as separate and self-existent entities are in themselves man-
made creations, convenient fictions merely, is not 
incompatible with an acknowledgement that nature provides 
'independently' the variety, the grain and texture, around 
which we weave our fictions. Nature cannot, as Coleridge 
noted, be understood as merely a featureless plenum, 'a matter 
without form, which is doubtless inconceivable'. Variety is 
only incompatible with unity, with indivisibility, to 
precisely that fallible all-too-human mindset which is fixated 
on the existence of separate 'things', in the first place. 
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Thus the proposition that every act in the world is always 
also an act of interpretation is not abandoned by Coleridge in 
his phase of indebtedness to Schelling; far from it. And it is 
as well for his posterity that he did not do so: for in our 
day, even advanced science accepts such a vie~. 
5 What, indeed, is modern quantum theory but a re-
statement in its own terms of Schelling's formula: 'In 
perception, subject determines object and is determined by it'? 
According to the uncertainty relation, it is the nature of the 
physicist's experimental intervention which determines whether 
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Nonetheless, it is the second part of the formula that 
would be the point of contention for many Deconstructionists: 
an insistence that the universe contributes its own ell of 
input to the interpretative act. It is Coleridge's and 
Wordsworth's tone, too, when they talk of such issues that is 
troublesome for the thoroughgoing sceptic. At the prospect of 
the subject-created object, we find neither schelling nor 
Wordsworth sorrowing. 
Wordsworth himself both states and exemplifies the issue 
in the well-known words of his prospectus to The Recluse: 
by words 
Which speak of nothing more than what we are, 
Would I arouse the sensual from their sleep 
Of Death, and win the vacant and the vain 
To noble raptures, while my voice proclaims 
How exquisitely the individual Mind 
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less 
Of the whole species) to the external World 
Is fitted: - and how exquisitely, too -
Theme this but little heard of among men -
The external World is fitted to the Mind; 
And the creation (by no lower name 
Can it be called) which they with blended might 
Accomplish: - this is our high argument. 
(Part I, Bk. 1: 11. 822-835. My emphasis.) 
Paradoxically, for those who wish to think of him as a 
nature poet, this is also the passage in which he declares his 
subject to be 'the mind of Man - /My haunt, and the main 
region of my song' (11. 804-5). Despite its 'problematic' 
optimism, we must I think understand that the poet's 
exclamation upon the 'exquisiteness' of the mind's mutual 
reality takes form as a wave or a particle in his apparatus, for 
example. Relativity, too, as its name suggests, is an exploration 
of the transforming effects of observers and their powers of 
observation upon the world, dependent in this case on their 
individual time-frames and states of motion. 
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fitment to reality is the product of his discovery that it is 
fitted at all: that it is fitted far more than we have a right 
to expect. It is only when set against its proper - and 
sceptical - philosophical context that the passage makes its 
intended sense. 
This qualification once made, it will be evident enough 
that the intellectual substance of the passage above is but 
another re-statement of Schelling's formula: the emphasis is 
this time, however, upon its second member. The parting of the 
ways between Norris, de Man and Wordsworth would presumably 
come in the double emphasis on 'external' and in that theme 
'but little heard of among men': how remarkably the world fits 
the mind. It is but little heard of among Deconstructionists, 
certainly; but, as I have tried to argue, that by itself does 
not mean it will not bear consideration. 
No doubt it is after some such plain process of reasoning 
and observation, and after having taken account of all 
necessary reservations, that Wordsworth feels justified in 
advancing with caution to the higher tier of Schelling's 
argument, to its claims that the human imagination at work can 
find its echo in the operations of the cosmos. 
We see how for Wordsworth, in the scene upon Snowdon 
which climaxes The Prelude, the sense of unity and serenity 
which pervades the moonlit scene (the sense of unity, note, 
not the moon or the abyss) suggests 'the type IOf a majestic 
intellect' (1850, XIV: 11. 66-7), or 'the emblem of a mind 
IThat feeds upon infinity' (XIV: 11. 70-71). The ambiguities 
of expression leave us undecided as to whether this mind is 
221 
simply the totality of scene and Wordsworth's involvement in 
it, or whether it is a self-existent entity of which 
Wordsworth and his mind are merely part, and as it happens the 
present focus: a microcosmic reflection of the whole. 
What is clear is that the decorative homogeneity shed by 
the light and mist upon this inspiring spectacle propels his 
own being into a lived apprehension of the true unity that 
underlies the textual divisions of the world. A seeming 
demonstration of nature's own artistry in the moonlight has 
the paradoxical effect of declaring the fictionality of the 
world, and revealing that the poet is at once both reader of 
and character in this fiction; and, in a certain sense, its 
co-author. The resultant sense of unity - an adumbrated 
healing of the primary breach of being into two parts, 
intelligence and nature - equates, as the separate elements of 
the scene converge before his eyes, with the primal unity 
organic imagination might uncover behind the elements of the 
poem: nell piu in uno, as Coleridge would put it. 
I shall quote Wordsworth's commentary on this moment upon 
Snowdon in the 1805 version, which, though missing the 
powerful diction and poetic compression - as well as some 
necessary integration of the thoug~t - nonetheless has the 
merit of being a little plainer than the 1850. The impressive 
scene, unified by moonlight, now resembles not an 'emblem' 
(1850) but the 'perfect image of a mighty Mind' (1805: 11. 
69), one 'that feeds upon infinity,/That is exalted by an 
underpresence' (11. 70-71), or, moved by 'whatsoe'er is dim/Or 
vast in its own being' (11. 72-3), succeeds in impressing its 
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domination 'upon the outward face of things' (1. 78); this is 
the 'One function of such mind' that 'Nature there /Exhibited' 
(1. 74-5): the power of subduing the ordinary separable 
elements of the scene into accord with a single dominant 
impression. Here the plainly cosmological giant-mind and that 
of the poet are hardly to be distinguished. Wordsworth makes 
the artistic ground of their connection explicit by explaining 
that such special scenes in nature resemble the work of human 
Imagination upon its materials; which 
So moulds them, and endues, abstracts, combines, 
Or by abrupt and unhabitual influence 
Doth make one object so impress itself 
Upon all others, and pervade them so, 
(1805, XIII: 11. 79-82) 
that its force is made manifest even to 'the grossest minds' 
(1. 83); 
The Power which these 
Acknowledge when thus moved, which Nature thus 
Thrusts forth upon the senses, is the express 
Resemblance, in the fulness of its strength 
Made visible, a genuine Counterpart 
And Brother of the glorious faculty 
Which higher minds bear with them as their own. 
(1805, XIII: 11. 84-90) 
As I have said, it may seem as if Wordworth is unsure 
whether the unification is wrought by Nature or by the 
observer's mind. The point is that it is both: it is a 
clairvoyant recognition on the poet's part of the small piece 
of cosmic unity in which he presently exists. The unifying 
Imagination is in reality an organ of clearer-than-human 
vision; its operations bring closer the invisible but Real 
world. It is 'a genuine Counterpart/And Brother' of that 
223 
world, says Wordsworth. Minds that are accustomed and attuned 
by the excercise of imagination are thus 'more prompt/To hold 
fit converse with the spiritual world' (1850, XIV: 11. 107-8) 
(' ... more fit/ To hold communion with the invisible world' 
[1805, XIII: 11. 104-5]). 
Close attention to this celebrated passage shows it to be 
making only the most guarded of transcendental claims. The 
effect of the scene is indeed similar to that of the crossing 
of the Alps in Book VI, where Wordsworth is thrown forcibly 
back on the mind's own powers, rather than being compelled to 
celebrate the sublime appearances of nature. However, the 
transcendental claims are inescapably there. 
As Hartman notes (Hartman 1971: 61ff.), the Snowdon 
episode and the Crossing of the Aps passage are linked with 
regard to their circumstances of composition; but they are 
curious mirror-images of each other in other ways. On Snowdon, 
we look outward to nature and discover the cosmic unity; on 
the Alps, we look inward and discover the same thing. For they 
are indeed the same thing, to Wordsworth's view. 
Curiously enough, Wordsworth's cosmological passages are 
often his least ambiguous, least paradoxical, however much 
they might attempt to incorporate a universal paradoxicality. 
To illustrate the spiritual affinity he sees between de Man 
and Empson, Christopher Norris quotes the latter's negative 
critique of just such a passage, one from 'Tintern Abbey'. In 
the lines concerned, Wordsworth speaks of having felt 
a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man. 
(11. 96-100) 
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In Seven Types of Ambiguity, William Empson15 plays havoc 
with the internal logic of these lines, mainly on the grounds 
of the ambivalent location of the 'motion and spirit' referred 
to (Empson 1961: 153). For Empson, this locational vagueness 
discloses that the passage is only strategic 'rhetoric', as de 
Man would later call it, rather than rigorous thought. As 
Norris puts it: 'Empson shares with de Man a principled 
mistrust of any totalizing rhetoric which would simply gloss 
over the elements of strain and contradiction in Wordsworth's 
inspirational language' (Norris 1984: 205). 
I think I have said enough already to demonstrate why 
'rhetoric' is hardly a just term; why 'interfused' is 
precisely the right verb; why Wordsworth believes he is being 
exact when he speaks of 'the living air', in which the rounded 
oceanic vision could well confront its metaphorical mirror 
image in the 'blue sky'. still more, why 'external' vision and 
'the mind of man' could be seen as hiding one Reality. 
4 
I return to the distinction between a countertheological and a 
theological movement in post-structuralist literary studies, 
the luminary of the first branch being Jacques Derrida, that 
of the second Jacques Lacan. (In this revolutionary ambience, 
one may be reminded of Dickens's radical society of 
interchangeable 'Jacqueses' in Tale of Two Cities.) 
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Part of the suitability of Lacan's theories to Wordsworth 
is a result of their being themselves an account of the growth 
of the child's mind: a topic which of course had especial 
interest for the poet. Although in their derivation from Freud 
they provide a very practical account of the way that 'the 
Child is Father of the Man', Lacan's ideas are far closer to 
Wordsworth's interests than Freud's might be: they too are 
founded on a concern with language. 
One need not over-state, for example, the way that 
Lacan's psychoanalytic theories at once provide the imagery of 
Platonic pre-existence in the 'Immortality Ode' with a precise 
and concrete source: the Real of pre-linguistic consciousness. 
(Indeed, Lacanian notions give a new dimension to all such 
'golden age' myths.) 
In turn, Wordsworth's meditations on the close relation 
of childhood to the poetic impulse offer a considerable 
extension of Lacanian ideas as they bear on the realm of 
poetic theory; on some of this I have already touched. But in 
particular, the application of French psychoanalytic theory to 
Wordsworth reveals the full radicalism of his idea that there 
is a 'poetic consciousness', different from and indeed in 
certain ways superior to, our ordinary rational discourse with 
reality. Such 'poetic consciousness' is not bound by the mood 
and atmosphere of individual poems, but is rather a mode of 
being with which we may at any time, in principle, make 
contact. 
Although it is possible that all of us have had 
experience of this mode in infancy, if Wordsworth is to be 
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believed, labelling it 'infantile' would be merely to succumb 
to one of the many strategies of a no doubt necessary, but in 
some ways misguided, socialization. 
The child, for Lacan and for Wordsworth, is closer to the 
undifferentiated totality, which his identification with his 
mother represents. The presence of the father, forbidding 
incest, forbidding return, adds the stamp of legality to the 
divisions of reality the word enables, in Lacan's 
interpretation. Yet language, according to both poet and 
psychoanalyst, is rebellious at its incorporation in this act 
of limitation and repression. Unable to sever entirely its 
umbilical connection with its origins, it is capable of 
betraying our hold on it, of forging new connections, of 
escaping us into shiftiness and paronomasia. 
These 'unregulated' caprices of language may be exploited 
by the poet; the purpose of this in Wordsworth, as I have 
suggested, is to draw us back towards a more child-like 
vision, a vision from which the idea of origins and of 
totality are not entirely divested. 
In passages like the following, one may easily discover 
the points of affinity between Lacan's views of the child's 
psychological development and that of the poet: 
Blest the infant Babe, 
(For with my best conjecture I would trace 
Our Being's earthly progress,) blest the Babe, 
Nursed in his Mother's arms, who sinks to sleep 
Rocked on his Mother's breast, who with his soul 
Drinks in the feelings of his Mother's eye! 
For him, in one dear Presence, there exists 
A virtue which irradiates and exalts 
Objects through widest intercourse of sense, 
No outcast he, bewildered and depressed: 
Along his infant veins are interfused 
The gravitation and the filial bond 
Of nature that connect him with the world. 
(Prelude 1850, II: 11. 233-244) 
As the passage continues, Wordsworth identifies the 
infant's sense of union with nature - mediated through the 
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Mother's presence - as the true poetic spirit, as the original 
manifestation of Imagination itself. 
Emphatically such a Being lives, 
Frail creature as he is, helpless as frail, 
An inmate of this active universe: 
For, feeling has to him imparted power 
That through the growing faculties of sense 
Doth like an agent of the one great Mind 
Create, creator and receiver both, 
Working but in alliance with the works 
Which it beholds - Such, verily, is the first 
Poetic spirit of our human life, 
By uniform control of after years, 
In most, abated or suppressed, in some, 
Through every change of growth and of decay, 
Pre-eminent till death. (11. 252-265) 
No need to emphasize how close Wordsworth's 'best 
conjecture' comes to Lacan's. But there is significant 
additional matter: the passage contains, for example, a theory 
of feeling; feeling as a power that fuels creation. Emotion 
here is not distinct from thought, but rather a more 'primal', 
more immediate (in every sense), sample of the same essence. 
Wordsworth clearly enough identifies with the group 
mentioned in these latest lines: the 'some' who have retained 
poetic spirit into adulthood. The insecurities of the 
'Immortality Ode' have not yet, officially, touched him. He is 
endeavouring in The Prelude, he says, 'to display the means 
/Whereby this infant sensibility,/Great birthright of our 
being, was in me/Augmented and sustained ... ' (II: 11. 269-
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272). In part, this was aided by the visionary moments, when, 
inspired by some particularly symbolic individual appearance 
of nature, 
the soul, 
Remembering how whe felt, but what she felt 
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense 
Of possible sublimity, whereto 
with growing faculties she doth aspire, 
with faculties still growing, feeling still 
That whatsoever point they gain, they yet 
Have something to pursue. 
(II: 11. 315-322) 
Linguistic man, as in Lacan's reading, once having tasted 
of the tree of knowledge, is irreparably fallen ... which 
impels him upon an unending and vain quest for what he has 
lost, usually projected onto unsatisfactory, intermediate 
goals in life, and into a futile search through the unending 
metonymic chains of language. To Wordsworth that everlasting 
quest for the ultimate is not perhaps quite so pitiful: the 
fact of our perpetual transcendence towards a 'something' that 
always eludes our grasp is itself an experience to be 
savoured, a potential hint of the imperfect quality of man's 
entrapment within the toils of linguistic being. 
Nonetheless, the unities poetic Imagination rediscovers 
among the fallen elements of reality, behind the division into 
subject and object, must always and inevitably be half-
projection and half-recognition: 
I still retained 
My first creative sensibility; 
That by the regular action of the world 
My soul was unsubdued. A plastic power 
Abode with me; a forming hand, at times 
Rebellious, acting in a devious mood; 
A local spirit of his own, at war 
with general tendency, but for the most, 
Subservient strictly to external things 
with which it communed. An auxiliar light 
Came from my mind, which on the setting sun 
Bestowed new splendour; the melodious birds, 
The fluttering breezes, fountains that run on 
Murmuring so sweetly in themselves, obeyed 
A like dominion, and the midnight storm 
Grew darker in the presence of my eye: 
Hence my obeisance, my devotion hence, 
And hence my transport. 
(II: 11. 359-376) 
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Although this was not exactly literary exercise as such, 
Wordsworth nonetheless felt it to be a toil 'more poetic as 
resembling more/Creative agency. That song would speak/Of that 
interminable building reared/By observation of affinities/In 
objects where no brotherhood exists/To passive minds' (11. 
381-386). Although this was, in one sense, 'Coercing all 
things into sympathy' (390), it was, at one and the same time, 
'converse/With things that really are' (393-4). 
Wordsworth here is discovering in the all but wilful 
conjunctions that Imagination actively inflicts upon 
experience some vestigial sense of that ultimate unification 
that underlies all individual things, and is their true 
Reality. It is on the one hand a deliberate, almost perverse, 
imposition of unity by the poet's own subjectivity, a fierce 
infliction of feeling. But on the other it is a recognition of 
a partial kind of the more total unity that pre-exists its own 
actions. Subject begins by determining, ends by being 
determined. 
It is in the same spirit that we should read Coleridge's 
advice to poets in the opening chapters of Biogaphia 
Literaria: that a poet's heart and mind should be intimately 
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unified with the great appearances of nature. Such advice has, 
once again, sometimes been quoted as evidence for Coleridge's 
belief in the possibility of unification with particular 
objects, but this is a misreading. Coleridge is not here 
offering an ultimate principle, but a prudential and practical 
manner of working. Such presented unification is merely better 
than what cerebral poets in the past have offered in its 
stead; it is not by itself an equivalent of ultimate Reality, 
even if its dramatic presentation may lead us a little closer 
to that state. 
In the same way, Wordsworth's method of perceiving 
affinities among objects where such brotherhood is 
conventionally invisible, is undertaken with the express aim 
of inveigling the reader as far towards a sense of primal 
wholeness as the materials will allow. The final state at 
which such method aims is in fact one where particular 
objects, as such, have ceased to matter; and such is 
Wordsworth's own youthful state of mind at the cUlmination of 
the proud trials of imaginative strength that he has been 
detailing to us: 
I felt the sentiment of Being spread 
O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still; 
O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought 
And human knowledge, to the human eye 
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart; 
(II, 401-405) 
We are reminded how F.R. Leavis16 , commenting on lines 
315-322 quoted earlier, impatiently admitted that he could 
find nothing more elusive than the 'something' that the poet 
was driven to pursue. Dismissively, he goes on to say how even 
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if Wordsworth was right in feeling he had something to pursue 
'the critic is here in a different case' (Leavis 1959: 174). 
It is sometimes such incidental asides that especially alert 
us to the way criticism has moved on since Leavis's time. 
I have made no secret of my belief that we disturb an 
important wholeness, that we in fact misread the whole, if we, 
like Empson or Leavis, underestimate the importance to his 
poetry of what Wordsworth thought. This is all the more 
pressing in view of the continuing relevance to us of the 
things Wordsworth was given to think most about. 
We should not, thereby, be pressed into thinking of 
Wordsworth as distinctly 'ours' - particularly if we lose 
sight by this of the special way he was 'his own'. This is so 
even if, thanks to changes which Deconstruction has certainly 
done much to bring about, Wordsworth may seem in certain 
respects closer to our own concerns than to those of a number 
of intervening generations. A little unwillingly, I take de 
Man's concluding point in Blindness and Insight'7: 
The less we understand a poet, the more he is 
compulsively misinterpreted and oversimplified and 
made to say the opposite of what he actually said, 
the better the chances that he is truly modernj that 
is, different from what we - mistakenly - think we 
are ourselves. This would make Baudelaire into a 
truly modern French poet, Holderlin into a truly 
modern German poet and Wordsworth and Yeats into 
truly modern English poets. (de Man 1971: 186) 
However, I am driven to believe that an older poet may 
become modern in a different, more fruitful way: when, without 
any sense of closure, we are able more openly to appreciate 
him as engaging in dialogue with us over our contemporary 
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perceptions of things. In which, one might say, he limits and 
so gives a dimension to our own modernity, yet forces us to 
add to ourselves. And in this capacity, for us, Wordsworth is 
a little different to the other poets on the list. Wordsworth 
seems now a closer, more awkward, therefore more formidable 
presence. 
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PART THREE: MYSTICISM AND MODERNISM 
Chapter 5: LITTLE OR NO GIDDING: T.S. ELIOT AND THE 
DELIQUESCENCE OF THE WORD. 
Words strain, 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
will not stay still. Shrieking voices 
Scolding, mocking, or merely chattering, 
Always assail them. 
(Burnt Norton V, 11. 13-19) 
There is a paradox to be encountered in the critical 
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literature on the great English-speaking Modernist poets. In 
spite of all the notorious privileging of the aesthetic object 
in the Modernist masters - or, at the very least, their 
insistence on the inseparability of their form and content -
explication of the text's literal meaning has traditionally 
dominated in such criticism. 
One understands the historic reasons for this. They lie 
partly in the deliberate and intentional difficulty of 
Modernist texts, a quality about which Eliot himself has, 
memorably, spoken. In consequence of this difficulty, exegesis 
virtually always becomes the critic's first task. Indeed, 
Modernism seems actually to create a predetermined place for 
the critic in his role as interpreter, with the added 
advantage for him that his function is clear and unambiguous; 
he may even allow himself to feel needed. To traffic in 
mysteries, even if not one's own, is usually a gratifying 
occupation. 
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Correspondingly, for the reader, the presence of so many 
helpful intermediaries means the literary rebuff that could 
otherwise follow from such difficulty - a factor otherwise 
almost inherent in the Modernist text - need hardly be felt. 
In contrast I would argue that too much accessibility can 
sometimes lead to a diminution of the text's intended effect. 
We often forget that these works are difficult not because the 
author was prone to over-compress his thoughts or in a hurry, 
but for a specific aesthetic reason. It may be that we are not 
always intended to understand everything perfectly, and that 
the uncertainty and shiftiness of the only half-intelligible 
language is really an essential (though sometimes 
unpredictable) part of the final effect. 
Nonetheless, determined students of Modernist poetry all 
of them by now have their palimpsest editions of Pound, Yeats, 
Dylan Thomas, stevens, Eliot - pencilled in, scribed and 
reinscribed with references and elaborations. without each and 
any of these references, a student might easily feel his 
understanding would be incomplete. 
Or would it? What seems left out, what seems never 
adequately expounded or refined upon - even after years of 
Practical Criticism - is our comprehension of the way 'Under 
Ben Bulben' or 'The Pisan Cantos' work upon the imagination as 
poetry. To say so is of course vague enough and so easy 
enough, even familiar enough; but I am not, I hope, speaking 
in a formalist or New Critical sense. And I am well aware of 
the irony that the cry 'but what about the poetry?' was in its 
time responsible for reams of interminable and dry analysis. 
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What I seem, more specifically, to lack in the critical 
literature upon these poems is an account of what it is that 
their distinctive words and thoughts appeal to in uSi how they 
create the different reality they draw us into, and what its 
presence, alongside our own world, implies. For the 
arrangement and choice of the words of a poem - by, at very 
least, being distinct from those of prose or speech - do 
create a different world from that which everyday language 
mediates to us. 
It is, I suppose, that psychic borderland between the 
writer's individual style and our subjective response to it 
that I think still needs to be explored in these Modernist 
entries. In this project the tired mechanics of Practical 
criticism on the one hand, and the function of context and 
interpretation on the other, must be implicated, but in ways 
that are not primary. Especially what the text's statements 
literally mean is secondary; though what they convey to the 
reader's imagination and inward experience is not. 
2 
No Modernist poet,has been the subject of referencing and 
exegesis more than Eliot has. It is a fashion he, to some 
extent, is responsible for: his own notes to The waste Land 
are an early example of the kind. But it was, I believe, a 
fashion he came deeply to regret. Certainly he subsequently 
implied that the notes in question were a kind of joke, one 
that unfortunately came home to roost. Most critics have 
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ignored such puzzling statements as cavil or evasion, and 
gone on to the serious business of tracking down more hidden 
references. In my view Eliot's reservations deserve to be 
taken seriously, and I will explore their nature in a moment. 
They certainly reflect in an instructive way a case of a poet 
intending us to respond to his poetry as poetry rather than as 
'meaning' in isolation. 
But in the service of attempting, in a small way and in a 
small area, a critical approach to his poetry which does not 
depend primarily on elucidation of linear meaning nor entirely 
on the symbolic value of its technical aspects (though it will 
involve both) my main focus will be on Eliot's highly 
individual approach to language in a single piece: Little 
Gidding. Both the informing attitude and the scale of effect 
on the reader are to be considered here, in terms of Eliot's 
sceptical and latitudinarian employment of words, his 
willingness to harness their most mutable and fluid qualities 
to his purpose. 
Of course, more is involved here than an effect of style. 
The importunate stretching of signification almost to the 
point of dissolution is, I maintain, both a central stylistic 
feature and also entirely of a piece with Eliot's overall 
purpose in Little Gidding. That purpose is precisely to 
undermine any linguistically-based idea of objects in their 
fixed identities, to undercut, and sUbstitute for, many of the 
ordinary processes by which we gain access to meaning. He does 
so because referential or logocentric meaning is not where the 
main purposes of the poem actually liej far from it. What the 
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poem 'says' is far less important than the pure effect of 
dissolution which runs counter to its speech; and this 
'solvent' force is there, finally, both for its aesthetic 
function per se and as an eschatological demonstration (of the 
vanity of this world, a verbally-created world, to what lies 
behind it) far more effective than anything to be achieved by 
mere 'saying'. 
I do not think Eliot would have balked at this 
fundamentally Gnostic account of his aims and means: a 
'heresy' like Gnosticism seems a comparative near-relation, 
compared to Heracleitus and the Buddha, who are after all both 
easily assimilated by Eliot's syncretic religious imagination. 
It is a perfect instance of what I have been saying, that 'The 
Word in the desert' (Burnt Norton V), the word which is 
consequently most attacked by the voices of temptation, should 
be not only the transcendent logos but at one and the same 
time that lesser earth-centred power - language iself - which 
veils 'Him' (the Logos as a dynamic expression of ultimate 
Reality) from us. The passage in question follows immediately 
on the one I have used as epigraph, which describes language 
under strain. Why should the Johannine and Heracleitean logos 
be threatened by the voice of the disconsolate chimaera, we 
might ask, were that chimaera not itself an uneasy product of 
words, as well as a would-be producer of them? Nonetheless, 
the chimaera too is the sort of being upon which words do not 
easily stick. 
This dissolution of identities (sometimes an equally 
subversive multiplication and merging of them) is, I hope to 
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show, at the heart of both the method and - in the widest, 
least determinate sense - the meaning of The Four Quartets. As 
Helen Gardner hinted long ago, the moment in the rose-garden 
at the beginning of Burnt Norton underlies the whole of the 
poem; it is there, overtly, at its close. For Gardner, this is 
an aspect of the musical structure of the text. 
It is worth going back to her book' again (Gardner 1968: 
45ff.) to trace with her the transmutation of key images 
throughout: the guiding bird; the shaft of sunlight, which is 
also fire - the fire of desire and of ascetic purification, as 
in The waste Landi the refining firei the fires of Dante's 
Hell; of the air raids; and, finally, of course, as in 
Heracleitus, the fiery divine energy and active spirit of the 
logos, source of all the other possible binaries and 
oppositions - and also the 'end' in which such warring 
elements are ultimately reconciled. As she tells us, at the 
beginning of Little Gidding the flash of sunlight flames 
again, but this time on frozen water, not, as at its first 
appearance, on an illusory pool. Here, as a gleam of light in 
darkness, it illuminates 'the paradoxical opposites which are 
reconciled in the Heracleitean system'; as 'pentecostal fire/ 
In the dark time of the year' it banishes illusions, not 
creates them. 
For Gardner, this movement of images through multiple 
variations of meaning - even between opposite meanings - is a 
structural device in imitation of the forms of music. It is 
certainly that, but I would like to suggest it is more than 
that, too; there is another dimension involved as well. As in 
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Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream, metamorphosis, while 
constituting a structural motif or 'pattern' in the poem, 
itself functions to put in question the whole relation of 
forms and meanings: it undermines our ordinary relation to the 
individual and personal - in other words, to identity itself. 
This last is indeed the most important of the illusions which 
the 'fire' in the poem seeks to vanquish: Heracleitean fire, 
by absorbing and issuing out forms, renders questionable the 
independent existence of such supposedly particular entities. 
There is much in Eliot's prose writings .to support both 
interpretations - Gardner's and mine - of the 'musical' 
function in the Quartets. While - as I have suggested - the 
interpretations are not mutually exclusive, they do represent 
distinct, not complementary, motives. The structural, formal 
motive - which we may think of as 'musical' - is not 
immediately reducible to the motive which seeks to dissolve 
forms and identities into one interpenetrative and 
interimplicated whole - except perhaps again through 
Heracleitus, where the supra-personal, super-individual divine 
logos does display itself in the world through the medium of 
form, or so we are told. 
Form is of course based on oppositions, a product of 
contrasts and tensions. To ordinary mortal eyes the all-
containing logos can only be appreciated by its effects: as a 
system of oppositions, great and small, though in itself it 
transcends them. Through form which holds tensions in balance 
we may gain some brief glimpse of what the logos might be; 
although we are obliged to remember that all forms and 
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contrasts are in themselves provisional entities, whose true 
nature is conditioned by their impending reabsorption into the 
dynamic and changing whole. 
An almost exact parallel to the Heracleitean vision may 
be found in the area of particle physics: just as the pressure 
of physical energy can only release a proton from the vacuum 
in accompaniment with its anti-proton, so here too form is the 
product of inherent opposition temporarily made visible. 
Should the particles re-encounter, we are told, they will 
annihilate back into the original energy. Through such new 
reformulations we bring our evolving clairvoyant myths up to 
date; and that in itself seems a sufficiently Heracleitean 
dynamic. Indeed, Heracleitus might well have been doubly 
pleased with the way history has offered this modern 
confirmation of his own original intuitions. 
It was the formal, structural motive Eliot had in mind 
when he wrote2 in the essay 'The Music of Poetry' on the 
likenesses of music and verse: 'There are possibilities for 
verse which bear some analogy to the development of a theme by 
different groups of instruments; there are possibilities of 
transitions in a poem comparable to the different movements of 
a symphony or quartet; there are possibilities of contrapuntal 
arrangement of subject-matter' (Eliot 1969 [1942]: 38). Here 
Eliot is responding to an impulse which begins for English 
readers with Pater's insistence on the primacy of music among 
the arts, as the most abstract of them, that in which content 
is most determined by form. 
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I do not propose to trace this formal insistence here, 
interesting as it is, but to follow the alternative line of 
inquiry. It must be remembered that the transmutative approach 
was pioneered by Eliot not in the Quartets, but in The waste 
Land, where he justifies rather differently the appearance of 
the dramatis personae of subsequent reincarnations in Madame 
Sosostris's tarot pack - implying the interdependence, for 
example, of Mr Eugenides, Phlebas the Phoenician, the card 
representing 'Death by Water', and the relevant vegetation-
myths. In this earlier formulation they are more than 
'musical' variations of each other (but so is music itself 
more than a merely 'structural' entity, as we shall see). 
That the musical element may involve a great deal more than 
mere formal patterning he hints at in the following comment -
effectively a critique of a piece of music, stravinsky's Rite 
of Spring, although admittedly it is the mythic ballet which 
is uppermost in Eliot's mind. The application to the music, 
and, even more, to Eliot's poem, can, however, readily be 
made. 
In art there should be interpenetration and 
metamorphosis. Even The Golden Bough can be read in 
two ways: as a collection of entertaining myths, or 
as a revelation of that vanished mind of which our 
mind is a continuum. (quoted Southam3 1968: 70-1) 
Here too, then, there is something more fundamental than 
the individual and the particular: a developing unitary 
reality (the universal cultural unconscious), whose underlying 
presence informs and alters the true meaning of more immediate 
entities. Constantly - he seems to suggest - the momentary is 
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losing itself into, and re-emerging from, this comprehensive 
vision, in terms of which its own identity is entirely 
contingent. In these circumstances, no seen particular is 
truly itself: it will have multiple features, culled from the 
All, at any moment accreting to it. As such a phenomenon 
continually emphasises, differance and identity are inter-
implicated. 
(Understood in this same way, the notes are a necessary 
'supplement' to the poem. We need the notes to grasp a feature 
which Eliot could not successfully dramatise within his work: 
the final transmutation of all the characters into an 
omnipresent Teiresias, who combines in himself the fundamental 
psychic binaries of male and female. Like the 'cultural 
unconscious' in the quotation above, Teiresian is an all-
embracing underlying entity into which things return.) 
Taken in the way suggested, as a description not only of 
folk-myth, poetry or ballet, but also of music, the passage 
has affinities with the analysis of music as an art-form 
which Nietzsche offers in The Birth of Tragedy. Schopenhauer 
was the true Western source of the dictum that all art aspires 
towards the condition of music, and Nietzsche, building upon 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the antipathy of noumenon and 
phenomenon, finds in the Dionysiac force of music the awesome 
natural antidote to the principium individuationis, and to the 
separable existence of things. 
Nietzsche4 attributes to Schopenhauer recognition of 'the 
stupendous awe which seizes upon man, when of a sudden he is 
at a loss to account for the cognitive forms of a phenomenon': 
Add to this awe the blissful ecstasy which arises 
from the innermost depths of man, ay, of nature, at 
this same collapse of the principium 
individuationis, and we shall gain an insight into 
the being of the Dionysian •.. It is either under 
the influence of the narcotic draught, of which the 
hymns of all primitive men and peoples tell us, or 
by the powerful approach of spring penetrating all 
nature with joy, that those Dionysian emotions 
awake, in the augmentation of which the subjective 
vanishes to complete self-forgetfulness. So also in 
the German Middle Ages singing and dancing crowds, 
ever increasing in number, were borne from place to 
place under the same Dionysian power. 
(Nietzsche 1910: 25-6) 
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It is in music, and, to an extent, in the musical element 
of poetry and tragic drama, Nietzsche tells us, that the 
Dionysiac finds its true artistic embodiment, simply because 
the function of music is to undermine that within itself which 
resembles individuation: the Apollonian and the discrete. 
For those participants spiritually and bodily invested in 
the music, it is 
as if the veil of Maya had been torn and were now 
merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious 
Primordial unity. In song and dance man exhibits 
himself as a member of a higher community: he has 
forgotten how to walk and speak, and is on the point 
of taking a dancing flight into the air. (1910: 27) 
Eliot, like Nietzsche, is reinterpreting classical 
sources in a modern way. That the gestures of dance mimic an 
unconscious preparation for flight ... this reminds us that 
dance, too, is one of the motifs which mutate through the 
Quartets; indeed, in spite of the 'musical' title of the poem, 
it is more often to 'dance' - an enacted and embodied 
'music' - that Eliot in practice refers. 
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Correspondingly, to trace through his poem the varied 
metempsychoses of the 'dancing' motif is actually to reveal 
certain differences to Nietzsche's position. It is not only by 
their receptiveness to a disordering of this world, but also 
through their acceptance of a higher transcendent order, that 
his dancers function ... where they 'move in measure' to 
complete their formal rings, signifying the matrimony of 
primary opposites. Apollo as much as Dionysus is implicated in 
the 'ultimate Reality', to Eliot's view: 
at the still point, there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. 
(Burnt Norton II, 11. 63-4) 
Eliot insists that just as 'Words after speech reach into 
the silence', so it is only truly 'by the form, the pattern' 
that 'words or music' may hope actually to grasp that elusive 
goal beyond themselves (Burnt Norton V, 11. 139-141). Hence 
this formal Appollonian element is for Eliot just as much of a 
bridge to a Reality beyond words and their meanings as is the 
Dionysiac: music and poetry still hold out to one the 
possibility of a loss of self, but it may be achieved as much 
through contemplation of their pure forms as through Dionysiac 
intoxication. Indeed, this overwhelming and annihilation of 
the individual identity is also offered by 
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, 
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts. 
(The Dry Salvages V, 11. 208-212) 
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Eliot's 'impersonality', then, is more 'measured', less 
Dionysiac altogether, than Nietzsche's - but, and this is what 
I want to emphasise, they spring from the same source, from 
the contingency of all things individual. Such recognitions 
underlie even that 'continual extinction of personality' 
enjoined upon the artist in 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent'S, with its rejection of self-expression in favour of 
the 'expression of significant emotion, emotion which has its 
life in the poem and not in the history of the poet' (Eliot 
c 1932: 22). The statement is not merely an anti-romantic 
gesture on Eliot's part (though it is that, too). 
The point of view which I am struggling to attack is 
perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the 
substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, 
that the poet has, not a 'personality' to express, 
but a particular medium .•. in which impressions and 
experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. 
(193:Z:: 20) 
We see that for Eliot, as for Jacques Lacan, the 'self' 
is really a divided entity. Again, for those French thinkers 
who are influenced by Saussure's linguistic theories, 'langue' 
(the holistic language-system) stands above 'parole' (the 
individual act of speech) and so limits what can be stated by 
it; in a comparable way the individual poet is dependent upon 
the cultural and artistic discourse of his own time for what 
he can express. His own individual point of view matters less 
than the tradition he represents. 
In adapting this last principle from Matthew Arnold, 
Eliot modified it for his own purposes in ways which give 
expression to its wider implications; in his case, too, it may 
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be applied to the topic of meaning. Meaning, for Eliot, cannot 
be personal meaning of the sort 'self-expression' implies. 
What the poet may speak is not what he has to say but what his 
medium has to say, from where it has so far developed to 
permit such speech. He, as poet, simply locates himself where 
he may transmit some new aspect of this unfolding tradition. 
He 'interprets' it only as subject to his human inadequacies. 
Behind this lies the intense humility of his acceptance 
that 'he' - Thomas stearns Eliot, for example - is no more 
than an artifact, a by-product, an effect more than a cause. 
The poet must recognise that he does not signify - or, rather, 
that he is only an empty 'signifier' - in relation to the 
logos, the progressive revelation of Being in history, of 
which the development of his craft is only one aspect. 
It is important to recognise the constancy of Eliot's 
scepticism about the claims of personal identity throughout 
his career, from its beginnings in his reading of F.H. 
Bradley, who is likewise dismissive about the 'self'. This 
scepticism is crucial for The Four Quartets, not least in the 
way the poet's prescence functions there: he, like Teiresias 
in The Waste Land, is essentially a 'medium' (in every sense) 
for a vast echoing intertextuality, the synthesised amalgam of 
past culture. For it is simply this - the past - which, in 
Eliot's view, speaks through him, not the vagaries of his own 
subjectivity; or, at least, those vagaries may be the least 
fortunate elements in the resulting product. The poet's 
originality, for Eliot, consists in his learning to speak with 
a different, more responsive voice than his own. 
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Thus the explication of the references in the poem is 
less central to its poetic functioning than is the simple 
presence there of these 'windows' onto prior writers. Such 
half-ironic imitation of the eighteenth-century neo-classical 
practice so decried by Coleridge is a deliberate rebuff to the 
romantic emphasis on the individual poet. It functions as an 
assertion that, for the poem, the poet does not truly exist -
at least, if it is as an individual that he is to be invoked. 
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We see how even Eliot's Mallarmean desire to 'purify the 
dialect of the tribe' is an impersonal quest: a concern with 
'the language', seen as an entity which transcends the 
subjectivities of the individuals which employ it, to arrange 
its maximal activation for 'the tribe'. 
This is in spite of, because of, the fact that language, 
by its inherent nature, cannot say enough. In spite, too, of 
the suspect nature of the supposedly discrete entities with 
which language deals - including the personality. Eliot thus 
does retain at least the disdain for 'individuation' of 
Nietzsche's Dionysus. We may appreciate the fact that his 
theoretical adoption of 'impersonality' on behalf of the poets 
is really permitting facets of mystical Reality to have their 
part-way influence upon artistic practice in the actual world. 
It is no accident that Eliot prefaces the Quartets with a 
fragment from Heracleitus which runs, in translation: 
'Although the law of meaning (logos) is common, the majority 
of people live as though they had an understanding (wisdom) of 
their own.' It is this insufficient personal wisdom which must 
251 
be set aside in the interests of greater contact with 'meaning 
itself' - with what the logos in its totality represents. 
Lest the personal self-immolation implied here seem 
needlessly depressing, it is worth noting that in Eliot's 
cosmology, it stands as the first step to a truer and more 
positive discovery of the Real Self, beyond its accidents. The 
mystical via negativa was entirely, through its negations, a 
process of discovery. As the lines from st John of the Cross, 
with Eliot's continuation, put it: 
In order to arrive at what you are not 
You must go through the way in which you are not. 
And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
And what you own is what you do not own 
And where you are is where you are not. 
(East Coker III, 11. 142-6) 
Inevitably this passage recalls Lacan's version of the 
cogito of Descartes: 'I think where I am not, therefore I am 
where I do not think to think ... What one ought to say is: I 
am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of 
what I am where I do not think to think' (Lacan 1977: 166). 
Lacan's psychoanalytic theory is centered upon language; 
and, as we remember, in the Lacanian picture of things, a 
remarkable barrier is posed for us by the point in childhood 
at which we acquire language. Since the barrier is an impasse 
for speech, Lacanian theory concerns itself with what lies on 
its near side; yet, it is hard not to suppose that, like the 
rose-garden in The Four Quartets, the pre-linguistic trace is 
somehow omnipresent, continuing to affect us in our articulate 
later life. It acts through the unconscious with a disturbing 
solvent force, shifting meaning and rendering sense uncertain. 
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This is because, to a certain extent, the linguistic 
world is an unstable illusion, a structured human artifact. 
The intimation of a 'beyond' to language at once throws its 
authority into question; yet all we can suppose about the 
beyond - which is, in the linguistic sense, non-existent, a 
non-centre - can only be said negatively. It is, for example, 
a-temporal and a-causal, since words are necessary to underpin 
our sense of 'before' and 'after', to reflect such 
'differences'. It was Schopenhauer, again, who pointed to the 
gift of occasionally regarding men and things as mere dreams 
and phantoms as the criterion of natural philosophical ability 
(cf. Nietzsche 1910: 23). The simultaneous presence and 
absence of a 'beyond' to language introduces just such an 
uncertainty into our perceptions. 
Even for Helen Gardner, the rose-garden of the poem's 
beginning seems to have the force of our 'first world' of 
Eden, before experience (Gardner 1968). There can be little 
doubt that the moment in the rose-garden, situated in the same 
relation to the poem's whole as our pre-linguistic experience 
maintains to life, acts catalytically throughout the Quartets 
to effect the dissolution of forms and to render meaning 
uncertain. As such a catalyst, it is a metonymy for the larger 
ontological scepticism of the work. Its presence may be felt 
through the fragmented influence of its separate garden-
related images, which shift and re-compose themselves, acting 
with a viral-like effect on the whole. It is as if the Edenic 
'garden' is always there, exerting an undercover influence 
towards denaturing and disintegration. 
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All this contributes to the strange sense, everywhere 
felt, of the movement of 'darkness on darkness', when it is as 
if 'we know that the hills and the trees, the distant 
panorama! And the bold imposing facade are all being rolled 
away - , (East Coker III, 11. 115-7). Yet, in our perplexity, 
we are further tormented by other inexplicable impressions not 
far off: 'The wild thyme unseen and the wild strawberry,! The 
laughter in the garden, echoed ecstasy! Not lost' (11. 130-2~. 
If what the 'bold imposing facade' hides is a higher 
reality, the Real, to which the unreality of hills and trees 
might, we feel, suddenly give way, then the interacting 
glimmer of poetic words can only, of necessity, obliquely 
reflect it to us. But for us, imprisoned within language, 
there is the threat of deception here, too - for we can know 
nothing of this sort clearly. Only the fact that the 
'deceiving' thrush which leads us into the rose-garden later 
transforms itself into the pentecostal dove (which may also be 
a dogfighting aeroplane) seems a kind of hopeful portent, 
through the very instability of its forms. But of course we 
are not in a situation where objective tests are what signify. 
Instead 'Through the first gate,! Into our first world, 
shall we follow! The deception of the thrush? Into our first 
world' (Burnt Norton I,ll. 20-23). This 'first world' has 
some of the qualities of the Lacanian Imaginary order; 
encountered first as in the pre-Oedipal stage of development, 
the Imaginary is a kind of half-way house between language and 
the Real. It was perhaps Hugh Kenner6 who first saw this moment 
in the rose-garden as something positive rather than the mere 
254 
illusion it is sometimes thought to be (Kenner 1965: 248ff.); 
for him it represents not illusion but the reality of which 
mankind cannot bear too much. We have seen how it may, in 
fact, at once implicate both Reality and illusion. It is, 
after all, a borderland world, between language and silence, 
where forms are suggested but are still undifferentiated, and 
where the undefined shapes of near-invisible children hover 
and yet command the scene. 
If language is here not yet a tangible influence, even so 
there is 'unheard music hidden in the shrubbery' (1. 27). 
Although in this place speech falters to gain its first 
foothold, nonetheless Being may still intimate its origins, 
for the element of fire in sunlight produces the effect of its 
opposite in the drained pool: a blurred Heracleitean 
manifestation of 'water' and 'fire' together, in which neither 
element predominates. 
The nostalgia of the forgotten past which haunts the 
deserted garden, together with its strangely importunate -
even imperceptibly dangerous - unborn infant ghosts, thus 
gives way to a sudden apprehension of positive being, so 
momentary it too may be unreliable. While in the unstable 
paradox of 'water out of sunlight' (1. 35), actuality may have 
been 'seen through', in the pool's reflection is enacted a 
version of the Lacanian mirror stage, said to signal - in the 
moment of the child's first recognition of his or her 
reflection - the impending arrival of language and identity. 
Appropriate that in this ambivalent intermediate stage 
when all things are in question, the mirror should itself 
hover in a ghostly fashion, half-way to or from 
materialisation: 
The surface glittered out of heart of light, 
And they were behind us, reflected in the pool. 
Then a cloud passed, and the pool was empty. 
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Go, said the bird, for the leaves were full of children, 
Hidden excitedly, containing laughter. 
Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind 
Cannot bear very much reality. 
(11. 37-43) 
What is important here is not that we relate this passage 
to Mime in Wagner's Siegfried, or to Kipling's They or de la 
Mare's The Looking Glass (though prior knowledge of these 
stories might add an extra 'poetic' dimension, especially if 
we knew of them but had also half-forgotten such knowledge) . 
What is significant, poetically, is that Eliot has sketched a 
situation which reminds us irresistibly of the world of the 
children's story, or of a story we may half-believe that we 
remember, the further details of which we might almost be able 
to fill in. 
With this intriguing and suggestive shaping and 
unshaping, full somehow of vague but imposing significance, 
the main engine of Eliot's (post-)Symbolist poetic method has 
come into play; but its most distinctive characteristic 
depends not on its meaning, but on defeating meaning. 
(I should properly refrain here from adding to the list 
of potential sources another which seems to me likeliest of 
all to have been influential: the scene from George 
MacDonald's faintly heretical Christian fantasy Lilith7 in 
which the hero finds himself in an orchard tenanted by 
friendly but pagan-innocent children, who climb and eat the 
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fruit but are invisible to the orchard's debased and brutal 
owners [MacDonald 1895: Ch. XIII]. The group is 'mothered' by 
an older girl who is yet not their mother; children who 
unfortunately grow up may join the orchard's debased workers 
and forget their past. 
To be consistent I would have desisted from suggesting 
yet another source - since it matters hardly a jot to the poem 
- were not the symbolism [recalling the transition from the 
Lacanian pre-linguistic state] closely complementary to 
Eliot's, and the free-wheeling employment of ~mitation 
archetypal folk-tale and Christian myth in MacDonald a kind of 
preparation for Eliot's imaginative world, and a hint as to 
its cOlouring. Eliot's rose-garden scene is in any case a 
composite creation, not imitated directly from its sources, 
and not intended to be dependent for its imaginative and 
evocative power upon any of them - except in a sense he would 
recognise: that his unwritten story reflects the inherent 
intertextuality of art.) 
While we are concerned with the rose-garden of the poem's 
(and, symbolically, our own) beginning, I wish briefly to 
trace the progress of one image plucked from this garden -
that of the rose - through its successive transformations in 
the poem. As I have implied, this is a question not of 
repetition or return but of metamorphosis and mutation. It is 
as if the rose is itself like the Lacanian pre-linguistic 
'trace', for it brings protean instability in its wake. 
In The Four Quartets, the manifestations of an image 
should be treated as apparitions of one single morphic 
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reality, undergoing its own fluid evolution through the work; 
apparent units of meaning are transforming themselves, in the 
context of other such units from which their history is really 
not separate. The conscious or unconscious appreciation of the 
instabilities involved is highly important aesthetically: we 
become imaginatively and almost physically involved in the 
poem's transformative effects. 
In this work, as it turns out, a rose is not dependably a 
rose. In due course, the humble rose transforms itself over 
and again, until at last it becomes the vast rose-like 
apparition of Dante's Paradiso, its multitude of infolding 
petals symbolic of the reconcilation of the binaries of being. 
In this final apotheosis where love and strife, desire and 
purification, begetting and dying, come together, the 
Heracleitean fire which upholds the world and the rose are 
one. 
The signifier 'rose' thus starts to slide away from its 
mere connection with the garden flower, though that is never 
finally shed. To shift one's botany a little, the miracle of 
in-carnation is represented in this widely accommodating 
relation between meaning and its appearances; and incarnation, 
like the manifestation of Platonic forms, is a timely as well 
as an eternal mystery. Correspondingly, the humble flower is 
never absolutely free of its other significations: though they 
are out of sight, they may be scented from the beginning. 
The exploration of possibilities not actual, not in our 
personal experience, is thus almost enjoined upon us by the 
spreading relation of words and meanings. So it is 'the door 
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we never opened', not surprisingly, which leads into the rose-
garden (Burnt Norton, 1. 13). Since meaning is not our own, 
there is no reason, paradoxically, why we should be limited to 
our allotted part of it. The poet, in particular, goes beyond 
any restriction to what concerns the self alone. 
Like Prufrock, Eliot's speaker at the poem's beginning 
feels reluctant to unsettle the universe, to contemplate the 
effort of exploring this mysterious coalescence of other 
people's memory and his own. The dust which settles is the 
dust of the past and of forgetting; for our mortality and our 
will to forgetfulness are linked, as the start of The Waste 
Land iterates. Why should Eliot - he seems to ask himself -
try once again to refurbish this common meaning, a meaning 
which is after all not his own, and which must be divined 
virtually from the Earth itself at the four nodal places of 
the poem's setting, in order to be disclosed; why disturb 'the 
dust on a bowl of rose-leaves'? It cannot be for personal 
aggrandisement, for the personal does not matter, as we have 
seen. Nonetheless, the process is set in motion, and the poem 
proceeds. 
The partial answer to his question comes a little later. 
Paradoxically, it concerns the poet's freedom. To forget or 
overlook the deep sources of meaning in the past, Eliot 
implies, would be simply to submit oneself to the total 
domination of immediate appearances, the only alternative. By 
ignoring the his~orical - and beyond it the eternal - one is 
paradoxically sUbjecting oneself to 'the enchainment of past 
and future' (1. 79) without realising it. 
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Yet Eliot is not privileging the unconscious over the 
conscious or the past over the present. Although 'Time past 
and time future/ Allow but a little consciousness), 
nonetheless 'only in time can the moment in the rose-garden, 
... The moment in the draughty church at smokefall/ Be 
remembered) (II, 11. 83-9). Only in the conscious recapture of 
the past can its unconscious lessons be elaborated, to the 
point where we are at last free from their domination. 
Knowing, in the true sense, is a kind of freedom from time, as 
it is a freedom from signification. 
It is because they are already part of the vast 'cultural 
unconscious) that 
the communication 
Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language 
of the living. 
(Little Giddinq I,ll. 50-1) 
In East Coker II the rose is again directly implicated in 
a union of opposites: 'Late roses filled with early snow) (1. 
57). Here it is a metonymy for the confused seasons. A similar 
paradoxical pattern in The Dry Salvages ('The salt is on the 
briar rose/ The fog is in the fir trees) [I,ll. 26-7]) 
reflects the encroachment upon life of that which is beyond 
it, for Being in this case is expressed not through fire but 
sea, the 'oceanic), a trace of which persists where we might 
least expect to recall its presence. Again when we are told in 
the last movement that 'The moment of the rose and the moment 
of the yew tree/ Are of equal duration) (Little Gidding V, 1. 
232), the rose has come to stand for all love and life, facing 
a different opposite: death. 
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Yet it is in their cremated form, as a vestige of human 
love and mourning, of bouquet and wreath, that the 'burnt 
roses' remain as 'Ash on an old man's sleeve' (II, 11. 54-5). 
They are not, however, banished - they again take sides with 
the fleeting yet remembered, when summoned as 'the spectre of 
a Rose' (III, 1. 184). The connection is not to the ballet but 
in this case to the Wars of the Roses, yet another signifying 
permutation; while the past, even the historic past, now 
becomes at once both spectral and yet everlasting. 
The precise details of the transmutations are, as I have 
suggested, less significant than the fact of transmutation 
itself, and the reader's oblique awareness of it. In a way the 
echoes which catch his ear work not to create symbols, but to 
establish a different idea of meaning. To the call of those 
elfin horns he hears and responds, if the poet has achieved 
his ends; such conscious or unconscious self-involvement is 
the essence of how the poetry at such moments works upon the 
reader, and its mixed tone-colourings account for its 
distinctive quality. 
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By way of justification in Eliot's own words of his belief 
that to over-emphasize meaning in a reading is actually to 
turn meaning against the poem, it is worth going back to read 
again perhaps over-familiar passages on the function of poetic 
technique, which may now appear in a new light. The following, 
for example: obscurity in modernist poetry 
is due to the suppression of 'links in the chain', 
or explanatory and connecting matter, and not to 
incoherence, or to love of the cryptogram. The 
justification of such abbreviation of method is that 
the sequence of images coincides and concentrates 
into one intense impression •••• The reader has to 
allow the images to fall into his mind successively 
without questioning the reasonableness of each at 
the moment; so that at the end, a total effect is 
produced. Such selection of a sequence of images and 
ideas has nothing chaotic about it. There is a logic 
of the imagination as well as a logic of concepts. 
(quoted Williamson8 1967: 41; my emphases) 
In this view of poetry's meaning, the most important 
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aspect of that meaning is provided by the 'total effect' and 
not the specific parts; indeed, the reader must encounter 
those parts 'without questioning the reasonableness of each'. 
The justification for this is that there is a higher 'logic' 
that is different from conceptual logic, and is more 
appropriate for poetry. 
One of the most plain and uncompromising of Eliot's 
statements about literal meaning appears in The Use of Poetry 
and The Use of Criticism9 (1938). Here is made explicit the 
general tendency of the passage above. 
The chief use of the 'meaning' of a poem, in the 
ordinary sense, may be (for here again I am speaking 
of some kinds of poetry and not all) to satisfy one 
habit of the reader, to keep his mind diverted and 
quiet, while the poem does its work upon him: much 
as the imaginary burglar is always provided with a 
bit of nice meat for the house-dog. 
(Eliot 1955: 144) 
It should be noted, as Eliot himself does, that the 
passage does not discount meaning altogether, or call for its 
entire elimination. Yet it seems quite unconciliatory enough, 
by placing this element on so relative a footing. 
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He gives voice to similar opinions again in his essay on 
Dante10 ; indeed, his views on the classic Italian poet must 
have perplexed and frustrated many readers. Yet they pose a 
direct criticism of the kind of literary-critical exercise 
most common in relation to his own poetry. 
'In my experience of the appreciation of poetry,' Eliot 
notes, 'I have always found that the less I know about the 
poet and his work, before I begin to read it, the better' 
(223). He tells us of his own passion for certain French poems 
long before he was capable of correctly translating two 
verses. In respect of Dante, Eliot does not discount the value 
of scholarship entirely, 'but certainly there is an immense 
amount of knowledge which, until one has read some of his 
poetry with intense pleasure - that is with as keen a pleasure 
as one is capable of getting from any poetry - is positively 
undesirable' (ibid.). 
It is the modifying interpolation in this quotation which 
is especially significant, for it clearly asserts that 
scholarly knowledge is capable of adding nothing whatever of 
any kind to the pure poetic enjoyment of a poem. In fact, he 
suggests, it is positively detrimental to a perfect emotional 
and imaginative appreciation of the work, though - he appears 
to concede - there is no reason why it should not be pursued 
for its own sake. But that is a different matter. 
Although such statements have been siezed upon by 
generations of Practical and New Critics, it is not really in 
their sense that Eliot is speaking here. What he means is that 
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the quality of the poetry is fundamentally independent of the 
conceptual aspect of the signification. 
Hence his statements about the function of allegory, 
wnich to many must have seemed purely perverse: 
I do not recommend, in first reading the first canto 
of the Inferno, worrying about the identity of the 
leopard, the lion, or the she-wolf. It is really 
better, at the start, not to know or care what they 
do mean. What we should consider is not so much the 
meaning of the images, but the reverse process, that 
which led a man having an idea to express it in 
images •.• and, for a competent poet, allegory means 
clear visual images. And clear visual images are 
given much more intensity by having a meaning - we 
do not need to know what the meaning is, but in our 
own awareness of the image we must be aware that the 
meaning is there too. Allegory is only one poetic 
method, but it is a method which has very great 
advantages. (1932b: 228'-9) 
That the 'allegory' in The Waste Land is an artistic 
addition, not to be expounded as a weighty philosophy of life, 
but there instead as a functional aid in structuring and 
inspiring the play of scene and image within the work, is an 
interpretation that cannot be overlooked, though it may be 
disturbing to many. Though the sense of mythic 'meaning' may 
contribute its half-apprehended buzz of interacting 
signification beneath the images, such an interplay of sense 
is perhaps intended as only one aesthetic element among 
others, less important than the synthetic and transformative 
possibilities opened up by the mythic framework. 
certainly it is possible to extrapolate from this pattern 
some thesis about the active effect of the poetic element in 
man's past and present consciousness, leading up to a judgment 
about the nature of creativity and what prevents it in the 
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present day. But the centre of the poem lies rather in its 
aesthetic transformations themselves, and not in the 
anthropological or philosophical or autobiographical 'sense' 
that we might be able to derive from them. 
The Four Quartets offers us a far more satisfying blend 
of form and purpose than The waste Land, hence its greater 
intensity. But this is only so if, equally, we appreciate that 
the details of the underlying synthesis between Pre-Socratic 
philosophy and Christian mysticism is of far less moment than 
the transmutation and even the dissolution of meaning that it 
brings about. Not the elaboration of the signified, but its 
subversion in favour of a Reality anterior to and independent 
of our linguistic recognition of it, is what is dramatised 
here; and our proper response is not the grasping of a schema 
but participation in the poetic effects by which that 
subversion is embodied. 
It is appropriately in his essay 'The Music of Poetry' 
that Eliot begins to experiment with the idea of a confluence 
between the 'music' of the verse, in the broadest sense, and 
those aspects of a poem which are meaning but not sense: 
if we are moved by a poem, it has meant something, 
perhaps something important, to uSi if we are not 
moved, then it is, as poetry, meaningless. We can be 
deeply stirred by hearing the recitation of a poem 
in a language of which we understand no word; but if 
we are then told that the poem is gibberish and has 
no meaning, we shall consider that we have been 
deluded - this was no poem, it was merely an 
imitation of instrumental music. If, as we are 
aware, only a part of the meaning can be conveyed by 
paraphrase, that is because the poet is occupied 
with frontiers of consciousness beyond which 
words fail, though meanings still exist. (1969:30) 
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In a situation where the content is not the central or 
final end, curiosity may be the bane of poetry. In fact, 
Eliot's poetic effects are attempting to by-pass consciousness 
with its own mater'ials, to conjure responses and affinities 
from an unconscious which itself is not chaos but is 
'structured like a language'. As cultural beings, we are being 
drawn into an interaction with the cultural unconscious, 
larger than any individual, of which Eliot himself earlier 
spoke. (It would almost be the same thing to say that we have 
been brought into relation with the Lacanian unconscious of 
the language.) There is a being unconscious which is like 
forgetting; it is the unconscious which is more like 
remembering that Eliot seeks to stimulate. 
But not just for the sake of remembering, nor for the 
sake of extracting the swimming fish from its medium. Eliot 
was inclined to place the blame for the fashion for literary 
detection upon The Road to Xanadu, with its intensive 
excavation of the vast reading that underlay Coleridge's 
'Kubla Khan'. As I have already supposed, this is somewhat 
disingenuous of him, for the notes to The Waste Land also 
contributed their ell; at any rate it is a fashion whose 
excesses he was led to deplore - and it is clear that there is 
an oblique and anxious glance here at the burgeoning critical 
treatment of his own poetry. 
On the other hand, Eliot was no more favourable towards 
an intensive analysis which disregards context; it, too, 
attempts an 'exhaustive' account of the poem, to its ultimate 
detriment. He once commented on a book by Cleanth Brooks that, 
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after reading it, he was quite unable to look at the poems 
dealt with, including some of his own, with any pleasure 
thereafter. Eliot's perception is that, for all that is 
essentially poetry, the ordinary verbal relationships are not 
what - literally - signify. If the unconscious is involved, 
then inevitably to try to bring meaning into full awareness 
will mean a mistranslation. Only within the body of poetry -
while the song lasts - is the Orphic passage to the 
unconscious laid open; and any attempt to turn around upon it 
with our daylight eyes would be to consign the hidden 
'feminine' side of language back to the underworld. 
But, as Eliot has indicated, it is not unconsciousness 
that poetry requires, but a more 'alive' way of being 
conscious: a consciousness in which the vast and echoing 
converse with the 'supernatural' is not excluded, as it is in 
our material life. In both The Waste Land and The Four 
Quartets Eliot attempted to open channels between our ordinary 
language and its 'beyond'. 
4 
Heracleitus is best known as the philosopher of flux, as the 
sage who pointed out that it was impossible to step into the 
same river twice; or, as one of his pupils is said to have 
reported it, that it was impossible to step into the same 
river even once. Though this reminiscence may have been 
apocryphal, that pupil had certainly steeped himself in the 
true atmosphere of his master: for the implication stands that 
there is an incompatible divide beween the intellect's innate 
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desire to deal with fixities and definites, and the real 
outward things of this world which are all in a state of 
uncooperative change and flow. This is all the more so if we 
see language not so much as taking its substance from external 
things, but as imposing upon them what definition and 
concreteness they possess. 
Little Gidding takes up this insight, together with the 
gnomic Heracleitean method, in attempting to return the 
'things' specified by its own words to the fluid medium which 
underlies them. Since this is an inherently paradoxical 
enterprise, its main means must be the paradox: paradox is, 
after all, the most subversive of literary forms. As in 
Heracleitus, our sense of things is assumed to be derived from 
the play of opposites, of differences and similarities 
together. Hence the confrontation of antinomies within the 
paradox is best fitted to expose the true process - though 
ordinarily repressed from view - of deliquescence that is 
always sapping its application from the word. 
Even in Heracleitus, all this does not amount to 
unrelieved ontological pessimism. Behind appearances lies the 
logos, the reflection of the great fluid and evolving unity of 
all being, whose unity is dimly visible even to our eyes, at 
least whenever we seem to perceive an unusual form, order, and 
harmony in things. In ordered movement, as in escape from 
movement, the presence of the logos may be felt. 
Yet it is necessary first to disorder our ordinary 
perceptions for this heightened awareness to be possible. The 
opening of Little Gidding thus plays upon the opposites of the 
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four seasons as it will later play upon the four Heracleitean 
(or Empedoclean) elements, transmuting each into each in 
alchemical fusion and dissipation - for the purpose is to 
demonstrate that not even elemental 'things' are absolute. The 
only absolute is the total dance, in which the elements are no 
more than fluid and uncertain movements. 
The season that counts is the season 'out of time' - in 
the sense of being beyond appearances. Hence 'Midwinter spring 
is its own season' (I. 1), discoverable suspended 'between 
pole and tropic' (I. 3) - between two fixed points, but 
determined by neither. Here in this strange mixed zone it is 
as if latitude, not longitude, determined time; which it might 
the more appropriately do, since latitude enforces the 
opposites, the heat and cold, of climate, whereas longitude 
mediates between the poles. Here 'Hith frost and fire,/ The 
brief sun flames the ice, on ponds and ditches' (11. 4-5). The 
opposite elements of fire and water are already in play, 
interimplicated with the seasons, and displaying their own 
capacity for metamorphosis - fire to sunlight, water to frost 
and ice - parallel to the manner in which seasons change, and 
so become 'not themselves'. 
It is evident that this midwinter spring is also an 
ecstatic inspirational moment for the unnamed speaker, one 
which comes upon him in the depths of the cold season. The 
poem's language attempts to reproduce the same experience in 
the conflicts of its paradoxes. In the background, a 'watery 
mirror' glimmers upon water or ice, reflecting, as such 
surfaces always do, the mirror-thin insubstantiality of the 
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presences they shadow back. In this case it transmits a 
'glare' which is also 'blindness' (1. 8): just as appearances 
are 'blind' to the Real, so the experience which transcends 
them is blind to all transient externality. 
Thus the lines move between their variant readings, none 
of which are exclusive or finally determinant. The description 
'windless cold which is the heart's heat' (1. 6) is, apart 
from its mixture of contraries, a line it would be futile to 
search out a 'right' explanation for. We recognise that it 
defines an emotional and spiritual condition, an inner stasis 
which 'fires' the heart's life, but nothing would be gained by 
greater specificity. The line serves as something like a 
linguistic 'shifter': a category broad enough to embrace all 
or any suitable specifics. We could interpret it, but it would 
not be the same as our interpretation. 
The main poetic feature of these lines is their surprise, 
a surprise which is also subversive. They are so constructed 
as to make a 'right' interpretation irrelevant for their 
poetic understanding. As with the 'clear visual images' of the 
Dante essay, or the poems in an unknown language which may 
still be poetically effective, our reader of Little Gidding, 
confronted by the sharpness of the conflicting pictures and 
yet baffled as to the meaning, will have arrived at the right 
sense anyway. Bafflement of the linguistic sense is exactly 
what the passage is about. 
We need not suppose that Eliot, like his speaker, went 
for a walk and had such a mystical experience - except as a 
fictional indulgence, if we wish. The country scene serves 
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rather as a compressive device, whose neatness we appreciate, 
for it is able to contain without strain all the symbolic and 
imagistic weight demanded, through all its ramifications: 
including the hedgerow which 
Is blanched for an hour with transitory blossom 
Of snow, a bloom more sudden 
Than that of summer, neither budding nor fading, 
Not in the scheme of generation. 
(11. 15-18) 
Why else the poignancy of the passage if it is not owing 
to the pleasurable (because, ultimately, containable) short-
circuit of sense involved? There has been a vast, energetic 
conflation between the pure shroud-like whiteness of the 
clinging snow, and the blossom, something so much the polar 
opposite of this season of wintry death. The white May-time 
blossoms are absorbed into the snow's being to create a new 
reality. Yet just as the snow literally cannot bud or fade, 
this newly minted linguistic reality is also beyond the 
depredations of time. Eliot's new reality of the snow/bloom 
alerts us to that further undercurrent Reality, which is 
itself 'suspended in time' (suspended = temporarily ended or 
excluded, as well as 'hanging') and so also free of 
generation. 
It is the absolute confluence of image with meaning - the 
cold white blooms are not left behind - which creates the 
distinctively poetic excitement of this passage. We see that 
the augmentation or crowding-in of meaning is as important in 
disturbing our ordinary linguistic expectations as is the 
undercutting of meaning. Like the synthesis of Heracleitus, st 
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John of the Cross, Dante and the air-raids, the smoothness, 
completeness and conviction with which the metamorphoses are 
effected are a particular cause for poetic satisfaction. It is 
like the reasons for which wit appeals to Eliot (Eliot" 1932 
[1929]: 289): its 'recognition, implicit in the expression of 
every experience, of other kinds of experience which are 
possible'. As Heracleitus'2 says, 'you would not find out the 
boundaries of soul, even travelling upon every path: so deep a 
measure does it have' (Fr. 45). 
A paradox may be said to have three logical terms: its 
two contradictory elements and also its resolution. But there 
is also a sense in which the antinomies are not, after all, 
reducible to the resolution: the resolution offers 
appeasement, not permanent peace. In the same way there is a 
refusal of the mathematical product 'winter' to the equation 
'Zero summer' in lines 18-19. This zero, which is both the 
zero of temperature and the zero of negation of the word, 
cannot do its work: the summer remains, only partially elided. 
Hence the zero summmer is 'unimaginable'. In what unknown 
space do they exist, the realities of this purely linguistic 
concatenation? Is it somewhere 'beyond sense', as the line 
(19/insert/20) from Eliot's original draft puts it: 'Where is 
the summer, the unimaginable/ Summer beyond sense, the 
inapprehensible/ Zero summer?' ('Sense' could imply here 
either the sensory or the meaningful.) Eliot's final decision 
was the right one: the remaining lines say everything needful: 
Where is the summer, the unimaginable 
Zero summer? 
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The answer is, then: in that joyful summer-like space 
that is beyond the determinations of the word, and where such 
designations as 'summer' are reduced to zero. Such a 
winter/summer escapes both the snows of yes~eryear and of 
tomorrow. But is such a place summery? Or is it rather a 
'windless cold that is the heart's heat'? 
At the same time, we see how in such a context to pray is 
to 'put off/ Sense and notion' (11.41-2): it is to attach 
oneself to a region where the senses and physical movement are 
as irrelevant as signification. 
5 
The linguistic 'loop' from which we imagine, but cannot find, 
true or final release - even in poetry - is not the only 
circle of its kind. Heracleitus may have insisted in Fragment 
60 that the way up and the way down are identical, but of 
course they also are not, or the statement would not signify. 
Among the cycles of transmutation, the most fundamental is 
that of the elements, and it is this to which Eliot turns in 
Little Gidding II. 
But the elements themselves depend on oppositions, and 
are thus not absolute and ultimate entities. According to 
Heracleitus, behind the fire we know lies the unifying fire of 
the divine Energy, into which all else is dissoluble. As 
Heracleitus gnomically records, 'Thunderbolt steers all 
things' (Fr. 64). If we read his perception aright, he was the 
first to enunciate both Einstein's principle of the 
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convertability of energy and matter, and the law of 
conservation of energy: 'All things are an equal exchange for 
fire and fire for all things, as goods are for gold and gold 
for goods' (Fr. 90). 
The Unity - which for Heracleitus is closely identified 
with this primal creative energy - is, then, prior to both the 
elemental opposites and the binaries of appearance, from which 
human perception can, in any case, never disentangle them: 
'God is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger; 
he undergoes alteration in the way that fire, when it is mixed 
with different kinds of incense, is named according to the 
scent of each of them' (Fr. 67). Even the contraries of life 
and death are better understood not as absolutes, but as 
aspects of transmutation: 'For souls it is death to become 
water, for water it is death to become earth. From earth water 
comes-to-be, and from water, soul' (Fr. 36). If these entities 
are understood as referring not to physical realities as much 
as to moments in the cycle of life and death, these statements 
are not merely quaint. Their real message is that death as 
finality is overcome if we understand that death in one 'form' 
is life in another: 'Fire lives in the death of air; air lives 
in the death of fire; water lives in the death of earth and 
earth lives in the death of water. ' 
Eliot takes up the spirit of Heracleitus's high theme by 
adding, as he does again in Little Gidding IV, transmutations 
of his own. The aeroplane of strife and war becomes the dove 
of benediction spitting pentecostal tongues of fire (the 
'dove-bomber' Williamson wittily calls it [Williamson 1967: 
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229]): 'speaking in tongues' is, after all, another kind of 
speech probing beyond signification. The fire of desire and 
passion becomes the fire of purification, of the funeral pyre, 
of the respiratory process, of the Nessus shirt, of universal 
love and of the unifying power of the logos. 
We only live, only suspire 
Consumed by either fire or fire. 
(IV, 11. 212-3) 
The lyric at the start of Little Gidding II thus takes 
the elements and their changes in turn. It allows that death 
may be the leveller which reduces human pride, vanity and 
personal nostalgia. But behind this, death not only 
disintegrates the individual things that words would fix and 
encapsulate, but disseminates them into a continuing process 
of metamorphosis. Indeed they were in this process all along. 
Ash on an old man's sleeve 
Is all the ash the burnt roses leave. 
Dust in the air suspended 
Marks the place where a story ended. 
Dust inbreathed was a house -
The wall, the wainscot and the mouse. 
The death of hope and despair, 
This is the death of air. 
(11. 54-61) 
What is involved in the three related stanzas is, then, 
not only the death of the four elements of the material world. 
The Christian application is expanded to embrace a broader 
kind of death: the death of the individual identities of all 
the things conveyed by words, a death in which they are 
constantly participating. Even the elements are implicated, 
for ultimately they are only more comprehensive 'things' 
themselves, no less illusory than what they constitute. 
275 
To touch in passing on a point which usually receives no 
comment. It is worth pausing here to meditate on the poetic 
tendency - not confined to Eliot - to insist on the 
Empedoclean or Aristotelian elements in preference to the 92 
or more of science, even after these are well-known. Here it 
is not just a question of metaphoric shorthand, convention, or 
of poetic 'antiquing'. The deliberate archaism is itself a 
statement. Not only is the point in the preceding paragraph 
better made with counters that are already known to be 
mythical (so that the transitoriness and changefulness of 
human interpretations is also incorporated). It is also a 
deliberate privileging of the metaphoric vision of reality 
over the scientific: an insistence that the poet's echoing and 
allusive reality is more, not less, real than the physicist's. 
In this regard, it is to Aristotle's advantage to have been 
superseded by physics, for he is now elevated to the domain of 
myth, with its superior incorporative power. 
It is the reverse achievement to the use of archaism -
the entirely successful weaving of all the past threads into 
the actual moment of the poem's composition - which 
constitutes the tour de force of the last stage of Little 
Gidding II. Here myth and moment merge in a collaborative 
illusoriness. The multiple expansions of meaning we have been 
witnessing at last incorporate even the air-raids in war-time 
London, and the poet's perambulations as an air-raid warden 
there. 
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Yet even this is seen, as it must be, through an 
acculturated vision. The cultural mind of the tribe asserts 
its presence through the parallels between this wartime world 
and Dante's Inferno; and we remember the way even strife and 
love are bound together in meaning. 
As the oxymorons and other antithetical figures of the 
verse serve to underline, the metamorphic purpose is, even at 
this stage, not relinquished. As Elizabeth Drew13 may have been 
the earliest to say: 
the dove becomes the 'airplane'; the tongues of 
flame those of the guns; the 'rushing mighty wind' 
that of the 'urban dawn', blowing the 'metal leaves' 
of the fragments of shrapnel over the asphalt. 
(Drew 1954: 230) 
We inhabit the 'uncertain hour' which we have in fact 
occupied throughout the poem: the hour is uncertain for this 
is the 'no-time' of semantic and directional uncertainty. 
Here, we follow through the contradictions of our situation: 
we are 'near the ending of interminable night' where we face 
'the recurrent end of the unending' (11. 79-80). Even the 
poet's personal identity is drawn into the universal 
deliquescence of this apocalyptic hour. The 'compound ghost' 
he encounters in his patrol is not only Yeats dissolving into 
Dante, it is the poet himself. What he confronts in the waning 
dusk is his Lacanian mirror self, who is nevertheless not 
himself but an amalgam of the transmigrating ghosts 'both one 
and many' (1. 94) who intertextually compose him. 
So I assumed a double part, and cried 
And heard another's voice cry: 'What! are you here?' 
Although we were not. I was still the same, 
Knowing myself yet being someone other -
And he a face still forming 
(11. 97-101) 
The lesson the ghost has to tell Eliot is that he has 
accepted that his own 'thought and theory' 
have served their purpose: let them be. 
So with your own, and pray they be forgiven 
By others, as I pray you to forgive 
Both bad and good. Last season's fruit is eaten 
And the fullfed beast shall kick the empty pail. 
For last year's words belong to last year's language 
And next year's words await another voice. 
(11. 113-119) 
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Though together they agree that 'our concern was speech' 
(1. 227), and though they recognize that their contribution to 
enlarging the scope of what language might say has added to 
the 'aftersight and foresight' of the tribe, it is necessary 
that that achievement will be overturned and discounted by 
future generations of writers they have helped produce. 'What 
does this matter?' Eliot seems to ask. In fact it matters 
little, beside these poets' joint recognition that their 
involvement in the project was not a personal one, in the last 
resort. Thus, of what they dared to contribute, even the good 
must be forgiven; for the hubris was not their own. 
What the Yeats ian ghost leaves behind him in testamentary 
fashion is the image of the dancer. For that is what Eliot 
must make this poem into, at its close. Since its shifting 
meanings are - like Yeats's dancer - in constant movement, it 
cannot be sculpted into a static object; but what it can be is 
a dance: an ordered pattern of movements. Only, finally, in 
its formal aspect may it have transcendent qualities '(where 
every word is at home,l Taking its place to support the 
others, .•• The complete consort dancing together)' (V, 11. 
217-223). 
This ultimate course accepts, nonetheless, that though 
meaning may be patterned, it cannot be contained: 
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Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning, 
Every poem an epitaph. And any action 
Is a step to the block, to the fire, down the sea's throat 
Or to an illegible stone: and that is where we start. 
(11. 224-227) 
since meaning spreads so wide, it cannot be anyone's 
possession. But that is the guarantee of our community, for 
all meaning is our own as well as others': 'We die with the 
dying' (1. 228) and ' ... are born with the dead' (1. 230). 
Dead, even Yeats's images are no longer his own. 
We see, in part, why it is that Eliot writes in an elided 
way, or leaves lacunae in his verse. It is because the meaning 
is to an extent undetermined because undeterminable: it is 
there to be filled in by the community for whom the poem is a 
meaningful artifact. Its circles of signification spread 
outwards, incorporating synthetically into its patterns still 
unforeseen convergences - which were, in every sense, there in 
the original, however invisible they may once have been. 
Hence, also, Eliot's reported lack of proprietary concern 
about variant interpretations of his work. After all, the 
poems were no longer his. 
A poem may appear to mean very different things to 
different readers, and all of these meanings may be 
different from what the author thought he meant 
The reader's interpretation may differ from the 
author's and be equally valid - it may even be 
better. There may be much more in a poem than the 
author was aware of. The different interpretations 
may all be partial formulations of one thingi the 
ambiguities may be due to the fact that the poem 
means more, not less, than ordinary speech can 
communicate. (Eliot 1969 [1942J: 30-31) 
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Eliot's forceful recognition of the text's own signifying 
'unconscious' shows remarkable clarity of insight. 
There is, however, one further fact: that meaning is not 
all there is. Or rather, that human beings may at least 
conceive of casting themselves beyond language. The clue is in 
the visionary phrase over which Juliana of Norwich meditated 
for fifteen years. Her fourteenth revelation from the cross 
ran, we are told, 'I am the Ground of thy Beseeching' (cf. 1. 
199). 'Beseeching', among the varied echoes of its sound and 
sense, seems allied with 'be-speaking'; it is, at any rate, a 
form of speech most expressive of the metonymies of desire. 
It is, finally, what is outside words, beyond 
signification, which is both the ground and basis of language, 
in the sense of giving rise to it. But that 'beyond' is also 
the ground of our beseeching - Juliana's mysterious informant 
might have added - in the sense of being the only Reality 
which could satisfy language, and its inherent desires. 
It is not as creatures of language, then, that we may 
approach that something that is not a thing (11. 253-4). It is 
approachable, if at all, only in 
A condition of complete simplicity 
(Costing not less than everything.) 
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Chapter 6: CLARISSA DALLOWAY'S DEATH-WISH: THANATOS AGAINST 
LOGOS IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S MRS DALLOWAY. 
Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway' is a deliberately mysterious 
work, perhaps more mysterious than critics have always 
realised. Its elusiveness is indeed a little different from 
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that of her other novels, the meaning of which is, admittedly, 
never straightforwardly given. However much difficulty we may 
have in fully comprehending her books, we can at least always 
be sure that there is a firm structure to be found, and that 
the novels will 'work out' beautifully in a moment of formal 
dovetailing, in accordance with the requirements of 
'significant form': the rigorous theory of artistic form she 
learned from Bloomsbury art theoreticians like Clive Bell and 
Roger Fry2 (cf. Fry 1937: 231). 
In To the Lighthouse3 , for example, the tensions which 
have been set up in the course of the work are resolved 
without strain by its close. Masculine and feminine, art and 
life, order and time, the self and experience: all have found 
their proper place by the final moments. Even if this 
accommodation of the opposites of human experience is managed 
as a triumph of art, rather than life, this in no ways 
devalues the achievement in the book's own terms. After all, 
part of what it advocates is that art and its consolations 
should be seen as an essential ingredient of life. Art acts as 
the agency of a higher even if principally human reality, one 
which alone is proof against the inadequacies and failings of 
physical existence - including death. 
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In view of this, the reader's final position in To the 
Lighthouse is meant to be an optimistic one: she or he are 
left with a sense that, whatever forces may combine from 
experience to threaten individual works or lives, the basic 
human activity of Art itself remains. Art persists as an 
affirmation of human existence which comprehends and 
sUblimates all change and suffering. There is even a hint or a 
hope which the form of the artwork offers of something beyond 
itself: its formal structures may, it is suggested, dimly echo 
a vast and universally accepting ~nderlying Reality which is 
perceptible also in the mind's depths; a Reality beyond the 
simply human, which, if it exists, somehow subsumes the 
world's binaries - including life and death. 
It is probably significant that in the major novel 
preceding To the Lighthouse it is, in contrast, the strains 
and tensions that are given expression, and indeed allowed to 
dominate. If what lies at the root of such tensions are, to an 
extent, reified out into a separate 'section' ('Time Passes') 
in To the Lighthouse, one which isolates and contains most of 
what threatens its characters, they are not so safely 
insulated here. In Mrs Dalloway we cannot but be aware of 
powerful disruptive forces everywhere threatening the 
deceptively safe and familiar surfaces of life: the novel is 
indeed structured to reinforce this sense. In terms of the 
relation of the two books, it is almost as if an act of 
exorcism was necessary as a preliminary to the more balanced 
creation that came on this work's heels. Of course, one other 
enabling factor was that To the Lighthouse drew on memories of 
childhood, whereas Mrs Dalloway concerns the contemporary 
adult world: and in it present bitternesses came, 
understandably, to the fore. 
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Not that there is any shortage of pattern and design in 
Mrs Dalloway (even if critics at one time may have had 
difficulty in finding it). If anything, it is perhaps too 
densely constructed: indeed, its obsessively layered structure 
is actually an inverse sign of the powerful strains such 
formal elaboration is meant to hold in check. 'Overwrought' is 
a doubly appropriate term for such a structure. 
An earlier generation of critics missed the structural 
aspect through being waylaid by their own idea of what they 
saw as the book's 'impressionistic' surface. Certainly, the 
surface glitter and multiplying associations of Clarissa's 
consciousness are what first engage the reader. Even the 
external narrative links seem to operate in the lateral manner 
of random thought-associations: through the use of 
transitional devices (like the aeroplane which writes 'toffee' 
in the sky and so allows us to hop from one spectator to 
another without a break), events move smoothly one out of the 
other. So smoothly, in fact, that we tend to forget the total 
design, and are rather surprised when Woolf records in her 
diary4: 'I think the design is more remarkable than in any of 
my books' (October 15th, 1923); and again, more revealingly, 
'The design is so queer and masterful. I'm always having to 
wrench my substance to fit it' (AWD, 58. June 19th, 1923). 
Virginia Woolf is correct: the pattern is 'masterful', 
'remarkable' and 'queer'. It is also elusive, for reasons that 
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have less to do with the book's distracting surfaces than with 
the 'queerness' of what it advocates. Its main themes, the 
values it advances, are in their very nature so abnormal and 
unfamiliar that the reader's or critic's mind may refuse to 
take hold: for the critic, it is as if one had to name objects 
simply by touch, in the face of a heartless and uncompromising 
dazzle to the sight and rational sense. 
Until recently, criticism has to some extent quailed 
before the demands of such a radical vision, and has preferred 
to situate the work within more familiar and more comforting 
categories. We should not, however, minimise the extremist 
character of the authoress's intentions, however uncomfortable 
we may be with them. At every stage, behind the surface 
glitter or the social show, she is concerned to disturb the 
conventional ideas - even the processes - not only of the 
external world and of society, but of the ways the mind deals 
with that world. Our strategies of conceptual appropriation 
and of social manipulation are all in question. 
Of course, we are much more cognisant of and even open to 
such literary tactics than we once were, or than Virginia 
Woolf's original readers would have been. The real enormity is 
that what looms behind the rejected categories, as a more 
authentic alternative, is a state hardly distinguishable from 
death. To put it plainly: this is a novel obsesssed with death 
- strangely, seductively, compellingly. Death appears as the 
one decisive transvaluer of all values; as, paradoxically, an 
alternative way of life. Finally, death is advocated as the 
most absolute agent of social change, an ultimate force 
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against social ills: the one power for rebarbative action 
decisively within the grasp of us all. 
Avrom Fleishman is one critic who seems to have sensed 
this element at work, though he wishes to redeem it within a 
structure in which Clarissa 'opposes' septimus's suicidal 
tendencies: by choosing to continue living, she ultimately 
reaffirms life's value, a value which septimus's suicide shows 
that he holds in small esteem. 
In my belief, this view - though it has its force -
underrates the intensity and bitterness behind the novel; and 
hence the radical nature of what it advocates. That Clarissa 
cannot easily be contrasted with septimus in this way, some of 
Fleishman's more detailed and sensitive comments actually 
themselves disclose: 
Clarissa's repeated quotation of the dirge from Cymbeline 
- 'Fear no more the heat of the sun' - has generally been 
taken as her self-encouragement to face life and the 
demands of the social world, in contrast to Septimus's 
escape from his fear by suicide. It will be recalled, 
however, that the dirge contains a biting ambiguity, 
which makes its way into the fiction: the singers are 
congratulating the (supposed) departed for escaping the 
rigors of nature, history, age - of life itself. Thus 
Clarissa's affinity for the refrain may be taken as a 
mark of her strong propensity for death, which she 
indulges in imagination throughout the work: on her 
morning walk (12), during her midday activity (45), and 
on her withdrawal from the party (202-4J. 
(Fleischman 1975 : 87) 
Perceptively, Fleishman sees that other aspects of Clarissa's 
behaviour may be traced back to her intense relationship with 
death: 
A passage from the manuscript version makes her 
drift toward death even clearer by ringing in 
another line of the dirge: 'Though thy worldly task 
has done, Mrs Dalloway read. Tears unshed, tears 
deep, salt, still, stood about her for all deaths 
and sorrows ••• ' (BM, II, 128). We can sense from 
this that Clarissa's tendency toward virginal 
coldness and withdrawal into chaste isolation is an 
expression of the universal reversion to the 
security of effortless stasis. And her temptation by 
death is furthered by her anxiety in the face of the 
dangers of living. Summing up a number of marks of 
this fear, in a canceled passage, Clarissa is seen 
'thinking of her childhood all the time; the oddest 
ideas coming to her; fragments of poetry; & a sense 
of being out out far to sea, & alone; & blown on, 
very dangerously, for she never lost her sense that 
it is dangerous, living even one day. A rope walker, 
& beneath death; so she thought most people felt 
••• ' (BM, I I, 125). ( ibid. ) 
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This cancelled 'rope walker' passage is indeed very revealing 
in the connection it sets up between the sea, childhood and 
death: indeed, we might sense here an anticipation of her 
later novel The Waves, in which these elements are more 
overtly and directly linked by that book's symbolism. 
certainly, the presence of images of death even in the 
cancelled passages shows just how ubiquitous this concern is 
in Mrs Dalloway. They are also an indication that these 
meditations upon death go further than the fantasy indulgence 
which Fleischman apparently takes them for. 
The last of Fleishman's comments on this passage attempts 
to re-establish a more positive, if still equivocal, position: 
'It is at the end of this prolonged transaction with death 
that Clarissa chooses life, and her affirmation must be seen 
as the temporary resolution of a continuing ambivalence in the 
heroine - and in her creator' (ibid.). 
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As Fleischman's unease may disclose to us, Clarissa's 
'affirmation' is really even less than 'temporary'. Rather 
than enacting some final 'affirmation of life' as Fleischman 
wishes, it is more that she unwillingly resigns herself to 
being alive at all. Clarissa is, indeed, as implicated in the 
death-design as is her 'double', Septimus. 
It is clear that we cannot easily recuperate this 
radically subversive element; it eludes our best efforts to do 
so. Indeed, if we read the work in - what I believe to be -
the correct way, then behind almost every line or image we 
should be hearkening to the far, seductive harmonies of this 
preferred state, represented as being death itself. Now, 
although we may be repelled to encounter the 'death wish' so 
centrally placed in an eminent literary work of this kind, it 
is as well to remind ourselves that in the founding vision of 
modern psychoanalysis, the death wish came to be seen as a 
universal unconscious drive, applicable to everyone. Thanatos, 
the death drive - the urge to destruction and dissolution of 
the self and even the bodily organism - was for Freud the 
natural counterpart of Eros, that unifying impulse which 
includes the sexual instincts. 
Freud's analysis of these drives remains controversial; 
and there is no doubt that a state of mind in which the death 
drive predominates can be seen as neurotically depressed .•. 
even, by some, insane. Since I am nonetheless asserting that 
Mrs Dalloway gives expression to just such a state of mind, 
for reasons which are displayed within the work itself, it may 
be helpful to look at Freud's account of this drive. 
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Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)6 is generally 
recognised as the first text in which he deals at length with 
the death instinct. Here it is understood not only as the 
genetically-encoded instruction which brings about the 
organism's eventual demise, but also as an urge related to a 
primitive yet self-protective desire for 'quiescence', for the 
most economical mastering of energies within the psychic 
being, 'the expression of the inertia inherent in organic 
life' (BP: 36). 
In these later Freudian essays, such a desire on the part 
of living matter for an earlier, non-living, state is actually 
seen as prior to, and hence potentially more powerful than, 
the pleasure principle itself. The quest for pleasure, 
together with other life-directed impulses, are now viewed as 
somehow 'forced upon' the organism by the necessities of 
life - life being something of a latecomer on the plane of 
existence, compared with inorganic matter. Life's demands 
combine to overlay and inhibit the 'return' to the inorganic 
which is still the organism's most primitive desire. 
Though this explanation relies on some dubious quasi-
mythical suppositions about the origins of organic life, it 
fits well with Freud's general treatment of the instincts 
which he had recently linked together with the 'compulsion to 
repeat': 'It seems. then. that an instinct is an urge inherent 
in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which 
the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the 
pressure of external disturbing forces .•. ' (BP: 36; Freud's 
emphasis). 
And now the instincts which we believe in 
divide themselves into two groups - the 
erotic instincts, which seek to combine 
more and more living substance into ever 
greater unities, and the death instincts, 
which oppose this effort and lead what is 
living back into an inorganic state. From 
the concurrent and opposing action of 
these two proceed the phenomena of life 
which are brought to an end by death. 
(Freud7 1973: 140) 
The evolutionary speculation upon which this stands is 
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vivid enough, but perhaps less than intellectually satisfying 
as a final explanation. In the hands of Jacques Lacan, 
'Freud's biologism', as he calls it, is reinterpreted, and his 
fundamental ideas vindicated in a new context: that of 
language. Now Freud's biological explanation is treated as a 
metaphor, not a neo-scientific hypothesis; nonetheless, Lacan 
in his revision of Freud's thought continues to affirm that 
'to ignore the death instinct in his doctrine is to 
misunderstand that doctrine entirely' (Lacan8 1977: 301). The 
true setting for the death drive is henceforth in that 'loop' 
where 'desire becomes bound up with the desire of the Other'. 
Effectively, this 'universalisation' of desire undoes the 
particularity of language and its objects altogether. I 
suggested in Chapter One that the Other's desire is, properly 
understood, a desire for the Real: which is to say that the 
ultimate but impossible aim of the whole language-system is to 
cancel itself and reach that unspeakable or inexpressible 
something which lies always just out of the range of symbolic 
discourse. 
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For Lacan, the self is constituted by the fact of 
language. But since language is not and never can be Reality, 
this supposed self shares in the instability of language as a 
legacy of 'the scandal' of their joint origins: 
Being of non-being, that is how I as subject comes 
on the scene, conjugated by the double aporia of a 
true survival that is abolished by knowledge of 
itself, and by a discourse in which it is death that 
sustains existence. (1977: 300) 
Seen in this way, the death drive becomes a force which 
seeks to undermine the phallic authority of all that is 
constituted by language, in unconscious recognition of the 
unstable nature of its psychological origins. As aspects of 
the Name of the Father, the 'Name' which is the symbolic 
prototype of all language, traditional ideas of social 
hierarchy and power - and everything else associated with the 
advent of logocentric rules and laws - become the sort of 
entities which the death drive naturally opposes: a situation 
which Shakespeare's song from Cymbeline aptly dramatises. 
The universality of death certainly helps to undermine 
the ultimate efficacy of 'the tyrant's stroke', since the 
tyrant, too, is subject to death. But by the same token death 
threatens the autonomy of the self; and it renders equally 
futile the self's attempt to differentiate itself from the 
world of material objects through the agency of words. The 
death drive deconstructs the distinctions between the self's 
body and material objects, just as it undermines language's 
pretensions to deal with discrete and distinct 'things' -
which are, in fact, of language's own making: 
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the reader should recognize in the metaphor of the return 
to the inanimate (which Freud attaches to every living 
body) that margin beyond life that language gives to the 
human being by virtue of the fact that he speaks, and 
which is precisely that in which such a being places in 
the position of a signifier, not only those parts of his 
body that are exchangeable, but this body itself. Thus it 
becomes apparent that the relation of the object to the 
body is in no way defined as a partial identification 
that would have to be totalized in such a relation, 
since, on the contrary, this object is the prototype of 
the significance of the body as that for which being is 
at stake. (1977: 301). 
Even the very objects of our physical world are, it appears -
as language-designated entities - vulnerable to the menaces of 
the death drive - exactly like the body upon which we might 
hope to ground our tenuous identity and independent existence. 
The very existence of that 'margin beyond life' which should, 
by definition, be termed 'death' serves to attract to itself 
everything the symbolic process cannot assimilate - including 
the problematic relation between objects and the body. The 
body, it seems, is neither wholly an 'object' nor can it be 
'part of a subject'; and yet if it is not an object then it 
has none of the solidity and reliability we wish to discover 
in it. If, as an impossible object/subject, its status is in 
doubt, then so perhaps may be that of objects in general! 
Whether or not Lacan has hit on the essence of the 
Freudian force in question, it is clear that his analysis of 
the death instinct is of great potential value as an aid to 
understanding aspects of Mrs Dalloway which might defeat 
another model. If we accept a close correspondence between 
Lacan's ideas and Virginia Woolf's, then it must be admitted 
that her book actually adds a further dimension to Lacan's 
picture: a conception which, interestingly enough, Lacan 
himself came to acknowledge in later life, along with others 
of his school - that not only death, but the feminine, are 
implicated in the 'beyond' of language (cf. Ch. 1). 
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There is, of course, some psychological justification for 
this inference, since it is entirely into the mother's world 
and being that the child is unconsciously absorbed before the 
onset of the Oedipal crisis - which, in Lacan's view, is 
intimately bound up with the arrival of language in its life. 
with the arrival of the Oedipal stage, a different 
'phallic' vision now vies for the child's attention. The real 
father's form is less significant here than what he 
represents, through the imposition of the incest-taboo, which 
inevitably accompanies his person and role: as the embodiment 
of the Name of the Father, he brings law and authority; and 
along with the language it learns the child acquires a respect 
for the power and importance of conceptual divisions. 
Henceforth the literalist and legalist attitUdes to rules and 
words, respectively, are linked together by the same Oedipal 
imperative. They are also part of an institutional system 
which separates 'selves', one from the other. 
2 
with such a preparation, we may now recognize that Mrs 
Dalloway is about 'full' as opposed to 'cramped' selfhood. 
strangely, the 'fullest' self is the one which entertains with 
a sense of welcome the possibility of its own dissolution - at 
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least in its relation to other selves and to the idea of 
bordered·selfhood. This less bounded personality is actually 
at home with the insubstantiality of its own borders on to 
experience: it is therefore by the same token a self more open 
for communication with others on the deepest, unconscious 
levels of being. As her book reveals, Virginia Woolf 
identifies such an all-incorporating perspective on life and 
reality as specifically feminine in character. 
The main threat to the worldly exercise of this different 
perspective a threat which is treated with scant mercy in 
these pages - is society's dominant masculine ideology, 
enforcing conformity to laws, rules, traditions: involving, in 
effect, the unquestioning observance of verbal boundaries. Its 
most notable representative in Mrs Dalloway is Sir William 
Bradshaw; he and his cohort Evans attempt blindly to inhibit 
this 'deeper' communication which they sense as alien. 
On the whole, society's masculine strategies have been 
successful: as a representative of the 'feminine', Clarissa 
herself has been imprisoned, in all but her deepest hidden 
self, by the male-dominated social structure. Her only 
resource as a consequently damaged being is to nurse her 
privacy, to pretend to the world, to immure her true inner 
being even further - beyond the possibility of further harmful 
contact from 'outside'. 
We are to understand the role of Septimus Smith in the 
novel in a complementary light. Since the 'feminine' psychic 
perspective is by no means the exclusive prerogative of 
biological females, or even definitely to be found in all of 
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them (witness Lady Bradshaw and Miss Kilman), there is 
symbolic justice in the fact of Septimus's physical gender; 
for Septimus is Clarissa's feminine inner world as it would 
have been, had she foolishly made it visible: lacerated, 
traumatised by a male-inspired war, effectively driven insane. 
Obviously enough, we are being shown that there is a truth in 
Septimus's insanity that goes beyond any of the 'saner' truths 
offered by the world of pomp and power. 
His is a tragic sacrifice for the knowledge he and 
Clarissa both share. But the sacrifice represented by his 
suicide is also a release. As the Lacanian references help to 
clarify for us, death here stands as the equivalent of some 
primal experience of cosmic union of subject and world: a 
merging of the isolated consciousness with Reality which has, 
indeed, a mystical character. We may take death in the novel 
as a symbolic fact which 'stands for' mystical dissolution of 
the self into the cosmic whole; or else as a tragic and 
desperately physical sUbstitute for this in a world which 
allows no scope or place for mystical perceptions of a more 
gentle kind. Clarissa, however, certainly sees death quite 
literally as a merging back into the whole, without - any 
longer - those contingent distinctions of identity that the 
restrictions of language help to impose: 'Death was an attempt 
to communicate', she tells herself, after Septimus's suicide 
(Q: 202-3). This sort of communication does not, of course, 
depend on speech. 
Certainly, her interpretation of Septimus's suicide is 
buoyed up by the sentimental quasi-metaphysical theories of 
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death with which she occasionally consoles herself. But just 
as septimus's ramblings disclose a 'reason in madness' as 
pellucid as Lear's, Clarissa's effusions are an attempt to 
transpose into a workable myth the transcendent 'feminine' 
vision. Significantly, her myth scorns the entrapments of both 
personal identity and personal immortality: 
Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards 
Bond Street, did it matter that she must inevitably cease 
completely; all this must go on without her; did she 
resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that 
death ended absolutely? but that somehow in the streets 
of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, 
she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she 
being a part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of 
the house, there, ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces 
as it was; part of people she had never met; being laid 
out like a mist between the people she knew best, who 
lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees 
lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, 
herself. (12: 11-12) 
For all its sentimentality, this passage helps towards 
understanding the present novel. However, even in so classic a 
study as that of A.D. Moody9, he takes it all merely as 
evidence of Clarissa's superficiality, its intention 
apparently being to show her as 'something of an animated 
mirror' (Moody 1963: 20). This misreading later leads him to 
identify Clarissa and Sir William Bradshaw! 
The quotation above is associated first of all with an 
image, that of throwing a shilling into the Serpentine, and 
also, as we have seen, with the first lines of the song from 
Act IV of Cymbeline: 'Fear no more the heat 0' the sun.' Both 
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these tags recur throughout the book as 'little rhythms" (cf. 
Forster'O 1966). They enter and re-enter the mind not only of 
Mrs Dalloway, but of Septimus, the madman who commits suicide. 
The intention is quite plain. Shakespeare's song, and the 
discarded shilling, are symbols of death. Even the original 
lyric may still trouble a sensitive reader who discerns, 
behind its hypnotic and seductive harmonies, its forbidden 
enticements to oblivion. But, as the passage above hints, 
there is something more (or less) than sheer oblivion 
involved: the insignificant falling shilling does not 
disappear without transforming itself into ripples on the 
lake. Similarly, Virginia Woolf seems to suggest, the death of 
a human personality cannot be an event entirely without 
consequences for the whole, as the ripple image suggests. 
There is at least this compensation, then, in the fact of 
death. We need 'fear no more', firstly because 'life is all' 
(~, 13): it is the only thing we shall know. We must face 
life's finality, since our share of life 'is all' we shall 
get, in personal terms. (It would be wrong to read this ironic 
slogan as 'affirming life' in Fleischman's fashion; indeed, 
its apparent affirmations are so large and all-inclusive as to 
become meaningless: they simply affirm 'all', whatever that 
contains.) 
, ~: 11, 202, 12, 45, 154. The term 'little rhythm' or 
'little phrase', applied to a literary device something akin to 
a Wagnerian leitmotif, is one of the central analytic tools of 
E.M. Forster's Aspects of the Novel (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1966 
[1927]). It seems entirely appropriate to apply this term to the 
equivalent entity in the work of his fellow Bloomsburyite. J.K. 
Johnstone deals with this device in his still highly valuable The 
Bloomsbury Group (London: Secker and Warburg, 1954). 
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But life is 'all' also in the sense that it extends 
beyond the individual, as a cosmic mode of being; so that the 
'life' meant is not, necessarily, the personal life at all. 
Indeed, it may even incorporate a kind of 'life as death', 
beyond the self. Hence, if life is celebrated in Mrs Dalloway, 
it is is vaunted here in a form which comprehends with 
equanimity the fact of death and the individual's 
annihilation. 
It is only to a literally self-centred consciousness that 
such an ending in death is devastating or even momentous, to 
Virginia Woolf's picture of things. If we choose to view the 
matter less narrowly, then however absolutely the spark of 
individual consciousness may be extinguished, there may still 
be some meaning to survival, it is hinted here: for even if 
awareness is no more than some illuminating bar of light over 
which we pass the woven skein of universal history, its design 
is still one in which we each have our place, in which we are 
figured through the simple fact of having lived. We have made 
a difference to the pattern, however small, and may surely 
take some crumb of comfort from the fact. 
A hypothesis like this is presented as one of Peter 
Walsh's memories. It is clear here that Peter is aware of the 
theory's danger, its compensatory features: 
Clarissa had a theory in those days - they had heaps of 
theories, always theories, as young people have. It was 
to explain the feeling they had of dissatisfaction, not 
knowing people, not being known. For how could they know 
each other? You met every day; then not for six months, 
or years. It was unsatisfactory, they agreed, how little 
one knew people. But she said, sitting on the bus going 
up Shaftesbury Avenue, she felt herself everywhere; not 
'here, here, here'; and she tapped the back of the seat; 
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but everywhere. She waved her hand, going up Shaftesbury 
Avenue. She was all that. So that to know her, or anyone, 
one must seek out the people who completed them; even the 
places. Odd affinities she had with people she had never 
spoken to, some woman in the street, some man behind a 
counter - even trees, or barns. It ended in a 
transcendental theory which, with her horror of death, 
allowed her to believe, or say that she believed (for all 
her scepticism), that since our apparitions, the part of 
us which appears, are so momentary compared with the 
other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the 
unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to 
this person or that, or even haunting certain places 
after death. Perhaps - perhaps. (Q: 167-8) 
Such conceptions may help to mitigate the negativity of 
the novel's 'death-longings' to a degree, since it is not to 
simple annihilation that the siren-calls of death invite us, 
even though our personal 'self' may be irrecoverable from the 
event. 
It is, then, only to a consciousn~ss which has fetishised 
individuals and particulars that the apparent loss of one of 
these is an overwhelming disaster. The alternative -
'feminised' - truth is that the world beyond our limited 
perceptions of it is essentially homogeneous and undivided, 
even perhaps to the extent of somewhere figuring all its 
elements - past as well as present - seamlessly within itself. 
But such a truth can be fully appreciated, it appears, only by 
someone who has already in a sense settled her accounts with 
death; it can be seen only, so to speak, through the 'eyes' of 
death, through a vision in which death is already implicated. 
The result is, strangely, not all that different from seeing 
the world through the eyes of love, an expedient which Lily 
Briscoe in To the Lighthouse advocates while watching Mrs and 
Mr Ramsay together: 
They became part of that unreal but penetrating and 
exciting universe which is the world seen through 
the eyes of love. The sky stuck to them; the birds 
sang through them. And, what was even more exciting, 
she felt, too .•• how life, from being made up of 
little separate incidents which one lived one by 
one, became curled and whole like a wave which bore 
one up with it and threw one down with it, there, 
with a dash on the beach. (TL: 76) 
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startling as such views are, it is perhaps worth noting 
that they were not without their equivalents in some of the 
respectable psychology and philosophy of the years of Virginia 
Woolf's early maturity. There are elements in William James's 
Principles of Psychology" which key in well with certain of 
Virginia Woolf's notions - and there can be little doubt of 
James's direct influence. 
Once more take a look at the brain. We believe the 
brain to be an organ whose internal equilibrium is 
always in a state of change, - the change affecting 
every part ••• in the brain the perpetual 
rearrangement must result in some forms of tension 
lingering relatively long, whilst others simply come 
and pass. But if consciousness corresponds to the 
fact of rearrangement itself, why, if the 
rearrangement stop not, should the consciousness 
ever cease? (James 1901: 246) 
This quotation comes close to the passage in which 
'stream of consciousness' is mentioned for the first time. 
There is a hint in James's final unanswered question which 
Virginia Woolf can hardly have missed - that 'consciousness' 
is dependent more upon changing patterns themselves than upon 
any individual or personal centre of being: and if so, may 
even be considered to exist independently of the individuals 
who contribute to it. 
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But even in the work of James's arch-opponent, F.H. 
Bradley, we may see some affinities. Bradley, upon whom 
Virginia's friend T.S. Eliot had written his thesis, 
distinguishes in his system between modes of perception 
conditioned by Appearance and those which are directed toward 
Reality. Bradley's 'Absolute' is in its essentials a 
transfigured universe, shorn of the 'unreality' of perceived 
'relations'. For Bradley too, the self is unreal; an aspect of 
'appearance', only. Though Virginia Woolf's terms may be 
different, her underlying vision is comparable. 
In certain unexpected moments Bradley'2 even sounds a 
little like the novelist, for she and he sometimes choose 
s'imilar images to symbolise their not entirely dissimilar 
ideas; for example, in the following picture of the action of 
consciousness in time: 
Right under our faces is a bright illumined spot on the 
water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its area, and 
shows us what passes away on the current. And this spot 
that is light is our now, our present. We may go still 
further ••.. We have not only an illuminated place, and 
the rest of the stream in total darkness. There is a 
paler light which, both up and down stream, is shed on 
what comes before and after our now. And this paler light 
is the offspring of the present. (Bradley 1922: 54-5) 
Like Virginia Woolf, Bradley'3 l~oked towards a form of 
communication beyond the restrictions of language and other 
constraints. He felt that it was unfortunate that 'I cannot 
spread out my window until all is transparent, and all windows 
disappear' (Bradley 1897: 253). The symbol of the window, both 
as a barrier to communication, and again as the link between 
the 'room' of one person and the outside world, is widely used 
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in - as the title anticipates - Jacob's Room; it will be a 
feature of To the Lighthouse, and it is important in Mrs 
Dalloway. It is, after all, from a window that Septimus leaps 
to his death. 
The elements of room and window alert us to a seeming 
paradox in the novel - they emphasize the importance of 
individual privacy and personal diginity, in a context where 
we are also continually being made aware of the 
insubstantiality of the self and its openness to dissemination 
into externals, into other consciousnesses. For example, on 
pages 140-1 of Mrs Dalloway we see Clarissa inwardly raging at 
the twin threat to the privacy of the soul that love and 
religion jointly present. For Clarissa, these forces crassly 
intrude upon the freedom of the inner life of imagination and 
intuition. At this point she goes to the window and sees the 
old lady in the house opposite climbing upstairs to bed. This 
lady is herself a symbol - of the dignity of the individual 
human presence which moves towards death: 'love and religion 
would destroy that whatever it was, the privacy of the soul. 
The odious Kilman would destroy it. Yet it was a sight that 
made her want to cry'. Neither religion nor love can solve the 
supreme mystery: 'here was one room; there another.' 
We may see this as an inconsistency, if we like. But, 
clearly, since humans confront a social situation which 
endangers and inhibits any possibility of full communication, 
society's depredations and intrusions somehow must be 
resisted; defences are necessitated by the colon ising 
ambitions of the male vision. Hence it is only on the deepest 
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levels of consciousness and being that such contact can ever 
take place: perhaps art is the only effective medium for its 
open transmission. Clarissa's damaged self strikes out in 
thought against whatever in her male-dominated environment 
threatens her privacy, precisely because at the depths of her 
private soul is her female 'secret': her intuitive awareness 
of the possibility of a different mode of being, not confined 
to restrictive categories of selfhood. But this 'other' 
awareness is precisely what the power structures behind the 
social process force her to suppress and hide. 
The 'rooms', too, are thus - finally - artificial 
constructions, a protection against an uncomprehending public 
world. Nonetheless, the ideal possibility exists of their 
removal; though it would take a madman like Septimus to 
attempt it in the present order of things. 
As Septimus goes to commit suicide, he sees an old man 
coming down the staircase opposite, a figure who is, no doubt, 
the counterpart of Clarissa's old lady (~: 164). It is the 
symbolic appeal of this figure that Septimus must set aside in 
order to perform the act he plans. He must waive his right to 
individual dignity and privacy in the interests of the 
'madcap' sacrifice he feels impelled to perform: a sacrifice 
which is indeed utterly mad in the world's terms. 
Some time later, during her party, Clarissa hears of the 
suicide, and goes for a moment into a private room to 
accommodate herself to the news. (She has never actually 
encountered Septimus; her relationship with him is thus 
entirely intuitive - 'psychic' if you willi but Virginia Woolf 
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gives a new meaning to the term.) Once more she sees the 
little old lady going to bed, and at this point realises that 
'Death was an attempt to communicate' (202). What has to be 
realised to grasp the nature of the unfolding drama is that 
the true level at which it moves is not at all the social 
planej indeed, its action opposes that plane. 
We see that a principal theme of Mrs Dalloway is one 
which has occupied Virginia Woolf, in different variations, 
from her earliest fiction onwards: the conflict between 'night 
and day', 'the inner and the outer', between the private life 
of imagination and contemplation and the public life of 
action. Now, more than this, Mrs Dalloway is about the 
opposition of the public and private identity. 
We find that the freedom of the unrestricted spiritual 
life has one overriding enemy in the novel, or rather, two, 
but each threatens in the same way: it adores to see its face 
stamped on the face of others. The enemies are Proportion and 
Conversion, twin sisters. Sir William Bradshaw, the Harley 
Street psychiatrist, and Miss Kilman the frustrated evangelist 
are respectively, their two exemplars. 
But there is another element, one perhaps even more 
alarming, from the reader's viewpoint. We remember Clarissa 
castigating both religion and love as her predatory enemies. 
Although we might be inclined to blame an unwitting and 
insensitive Richard Dalloway as the culprit here, in fact 
Clarissa has quite deliberately immured herself in the safety 
of a loveless and undemanding marriage, without physicality. 
It is Peter Walsh, the old flame newly returned from India (he 
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plays ominously with his divisive 'masculine' penknife) who 
serves to inflame her sense of threat: far more potently than 
her husband, Peter represents the dangers of heterosexual 
passion. When he first returns from India, '[s]he made to hide 
her dress, like a virgin protecting chastity, protecting 
privacy' (~: 45). Clearly, so terrified is she of insensitive 
inroads into her deepest recesses of being, she secludes 
herself even from meaningful romantic fulfilment - with either 
men or women. 
Hence - from Clarissa's point of view - love in the guise 
of Possession must be added to the other negative forces, to 
form a trio of unwelcome external demands: Proportion, 
Conversion and Possession are the three enemies of Clarissa's 
'disproportionate' vision. 
As a character, Bradshaw is certainly the worst of the 
representatives of such negative powers. His method of 
treatment for Septimus, as a shell-shocked ex-volunteer 
returned from the war, is to lock him away in an asylum. 
Bourgeois mediocrity - proportion - is Sir William's universal 
panacea, administered liberally on society's behalf. What he 
is really doing is not curing but imposing upon his patients 
his society's standards of 'normalcy': 
Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered 
himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, 
forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it impossible 
for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, 
shared his sense of proportion - his, if they were men, 
Lady Bradshaw's if they were women (she embroidered, 
knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home with her 
son) . (~: 110) 
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In this work Woolf has adopted a decidedly combative 
stance; if her personal anger leads to a certain occasional 
shrillness in the tone, we should take this as a sign that the 
issues are deeply-felt by the novelist. Such personal 
identification may pose a threat to her ability to distance 
herself from her characters, to 'see round' them; and this is 
one criticism which could be brought against Mrs Dalloway. The 
book has no interest in presenting fair and balanced views - a 
task her later novels did, in contrast, attempt. 
In what follows it will be important for us to recognize 
to what extent Virginia Woolf may be supposed to identify with 
Clarissa and septimus, and to what degree she is critical of 
them, for we have it on her own authority'4 that the two are 
'one and the same person' (Woolf 1928: vi). We find that they 
each have one central flaw in their character: septimus is 
aware of his. It becomes his 'crime', for which in his 
deranged state he believes human nature, the 'brute with the 
bood-red nostrils' (~: 102, 162), is sentencing him: it is 
'that he could not feel' (96). Once you stumble, 'human nature 
is on you', he cries. 
Clarissa, likewise, while her response to life is full, 
also shows on some occasions a strange lack of feeling. She 
realizes she is missing 'something central which permeated' 
(36)2,'5. She sleeps in a separate room. The friends of her 
2 Clarissa, we are told, lacked 'something central which 
permeated; something warm which broke up surfaces and rippled 
the cold contact of man and woman'. Since this is a sign of the 
imprisonment and sterility of her feminity in a masculine world, 
it is appropriate that J. Hillis Miller ('Mrs Dalloway's All 
Souls Day', in The Shaken Realist: Essays in Modern Literature 
in Honor of F.J. Hoffman, ed. O.B. Hardison [Baton Rouge, 1970], 
girlhood, Peter Walsh and Sally Seton, contrast with her in 
this. They felt 'more deeply, more passionately, every year' 
(214). The blame for this absence of sympathy and feeling is 
placed squarely on the shoulders of society, Pound's 'old 
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bitch gone in the teeth', responsible for the First World War. 
We learn that Clarissa has recently suffered 'an illness'; 
there is no such euphemism for the source of Septimus's lack: 
it was in the war, where his best friend Evans died, that he 
lost the ability to feel. He has married his wife, the Italian 
girl Rezia, as a desperate reaction against this growing 
emotional sterility. His madness is the price he pays. 
Clarissa, the society hostess, the wife of a conservative 
MP, may also blame postwar British society as the root cause 
of her personal failing. She, like Richardson's Clarissa, is 
in a sense imprisoned - but in herself. Her lack of 'something 
central' is due to the existence of two identities in her, and 
the dichotomy between them. Her private inner life, which she 
protects even from the demands of love, forms one of these 
selves. Her other self is her public persona, her public 
function, Mrs Richard Dalloway, 'the perfect hostess' (69) as 
Peter once called her. 
But how often this body she wore ••. , this body, with all 
its capacities seemed nothing - nothing at all. She had 
the oddest sense of being herself invisible; unseeni 
unknown, there being no more marrying, no more having of 
children now, but only this astonishing and rather solemn 
progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this 
being Mrs DallowaYi not even Clarissa any more; this 
being Mrs Richard Dalloway. (~: 13) 
113) should discern a certain lack of power in Clarissa's 
narrative voice. 
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In her public life she is forced to give up the infinite 
possibilities of personality and become something fixed. 
Regrettable as this is on many levels, the situation is not 
without its rewards. Other people, attracted by her seeming 
stability, revolve around her at parties like boats around a 
lighthouse: she 'forms' their lives on these evenings rather 
as if she were the centre of a diamond or cone: 
That was herself - pointed; dart-like; definite. That was 
herself when some effort, some calIon her to be herself, 
drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, 
how_ incompatible and composed so for the world only into 
one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her 
drawing-room and made a meeting-point, a radiancy no 
doubt in some dull lives, a refuge for the lonely to come 
to, perhaps, she ... had tried to be the same always, 
never showing a sign of all the other sides of her. (42) 
At the same time she realizes that like herself, the 
parties, 'these semblances, these triumphs ••. had a 
hollowness; at arm's length they were, not in the heart' 
(192). The metaphor for what is needed to fill her 'missing 
centre', a 'shadow' counterpart of her own failing, is 
provided when the Bradshaw's enter the party which is one 
climax of the novel and report Septimus's suicide. 'Oh! 
thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here's death she 
thought' (201). 
This death-in-the-centre is also, paradoxically, what may 
liberate. It is the most real and concrete thing in the 
glitter of her shallow achievement - yet to call it shallow is 
not quite appropriate. Her party is, in a sense, Clarissa's 
'work of art', her significant form ... not unlike Mrs 
Ramsay's dinner party in To the Lighthouse. Others find a 
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meaning there, discover their place in the 'structure' 
Clarissa composes, even if they do not see the ultimate truth 
that underlies it. 
When we first meet her, we find that her reaction to life 
is much like that of the artist: 'Heaven only knows why one 
loves it so, how one sees it so, making it up, building it 
round one, tumbling it, creating it every moment afresh' (6). 
We learn that she is part of the procession of public life, 
since her ancestors were courtiers in the time of the Georges. 
Thus, that night she too was going to celebrate in traditional 
manner; she was going to 'kindle and illuminate' (7) by giving 
her party. Despite its private meanings for her, the artwork 
she actually creates is determined by her public role. Her 
party is 'her gift. Nothing else had she of the slightest 
importance; could not think, write, even play the piano' 
(135). From the moment her invitations are delivered, Clarissa 
collects and orders people into an artistic 'form' much as a 
novelist does with his characters. 
Here was So-and-so in South Kensington; someone up in 
Bayswater; somebody else, say, in Mayfair. And she felt 
quite continuously a sense of their existence ... and she 
felt if only they could be brought together; so she did 
it. And it was an offering; to combine, to create; but to 
whom? (135) 
So Clarissa, restricted by the nature of things from 
revealing her true unlimited self, forced to hide it from 
unsympathetic eyes, is nonetheless able to communicate in her 
own oblique way. But she does so not through the medium of 
words; rather, through the more direct and yet less exposed 
medium of pure form. An offering of 'significant form' - to 
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combine, to create: again a sacrificial gesture to the 
principle of unlimited contact, to the Reality obscured behind 
appearances. This is in curious contrast to the Clarissa who 
feels 'alone for ever' and who had 'gone up into the tower 
alone and left them blackberrying in the sun' (57): the 
introspective, isolated Clarissa. 
Thanks to the Bradshaws, though, Clarissa herself is 
rudely awakened to the underlying reality behind the formal 
triumph of her party. Death itself lies at the centre of her 
artistic work of form. 
But this may also be death in its benign guise - death as 
an embrace with the mystic totality, a dissolution of self 
into the whole. Somehow, Clarissa's 'significant form', as a 
pure form whose separate significance transcends that of any 
of its contributing elements, serves to evoke the thing-in-
itself, exactly as the Bloomsbury art critics predict: its 
non-signifying formal aspect calls into presence an extrahuman 
reality, indistinguishable, in what it negates, from death. 
So this is where Clarissa's tragedy lies, as the oblique 
communication of her party subtly reveals: she leads a 'double 
life', in which her outer self is not an expression of her 
inner reality. For the world, she stands as a kind of 
signifier others believe they know the value of, but in truth 
the real 'signified' is unreachable - even, on occasions, by 
herself. Her public bodily being and its actions have become a 
kind of hostage to the world: she has allowed herself to 
become an object, to be crystallised into the hard surface of 
society as one of its ornaments. 
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But, paradoxically, this is necessary if she is to retain 
her inner freedom, and to preserve her distance from a society 
hostile to her true nature. She excludes even the demands of 
feeling, as the sort of bridge she seeks to avoid between her 
inner being and the social world. This enforced duplicity, it 
is implied, is the only reason she is not insane as Septimus 
is. In the original draft of the novel (see the novelist's own 
Introduction to the Modern Library edition [Woolf 1928J) he 
did not in fact appear, and Clarissa herself was to commit 
suicide at the height of the party. 
What we have here is an unresolved gap between signifier 
and signified, between symbol and meaning, which is in fact 
one of the symbolic motifs of the work: it is as if the 
elements of Clarissa's world constantly threaten to dissolve 
into significances far too large to grasp - as if Lacan's 
mirror stage had somehow been undone, or finally repudiated. 
What is fully recognised and asserted here is that what may be 
seen in the mirror is not in any way the true reality. 
Hence we even find a deliberate ambivalence, something 
ungraspable, in Clarissa's own characterisation. We are denied 
the clarity which would enable us to pin her down or, 
especially, make absolute value judgments about her. Hence our 
positive and negative notions of Clarissa are mere defining 
points in a widely varying, sometimes irresolvable, 
presentation. This aspect evidently caused difficulties even 
for the first readers. Included in the diary is strachey's 
understandable comment on Clarissa: 'he thinks that I 
311 
alternately laugh at her and cover her, very remarkably, with 
myself' (AWD: 78).3 
Virginia Woolf clearly does approve of a great deal of 
both Septimus and her heroine, who is a far cry from the 
shallow socialite we first met aboard the good ship Euphrosyne 
in The Voyage out16 • Aspects of her own experience are 
incorporated into the presentation of both of the main 
characters. For example, in her diary she records the struggle 
she had over the descriptions of Septimus's insanity, 
necessitating the entry into the mind of a madman: 'Of course 
the mad part tries me so much, makes my mind squirt so badly 
that I can hardly face spending the next weeks at it' (June 
19th,1923i AWD: 57). These pages taxed her because they drew, 
painfully, on her own experience. 
As is now well known, Virginia Woolf suffered four 
breakdowns during her life: a minor one in childhood, a major 
one after her brother's death in 1895, another in 1914 and a 
fourth in 1940. As Leonard Woolf17 records the experience: 
In the manic stage she was extremely excited: the mind 
raced; she talked volubly and, at the height of the 
attack, incoherently; she had delusions and heard voices, 
for instance she told me that in her second attack she 
heard the birds in the garden outside her window talking 
Greekj she was violent with the nurses. In her third 
attack, which began in 1914, this stage lasted for 
several months and ended by her falling into a coma for 
two days. During the depressive stage all her thoughts 
3 virginia Woolf was aware of some unwanted distaste on 
her own part intermixed with her other responses to her created 
character: 'I think some distaste for her persisted. Yet, again, 
that was true to my feeling for Kitty and one must dislike people 
in art without it mattering, unless it is true that certain 
characters detract from the importance of what happens to them' 
(AWD: 79). 'Kitty' is evidently one of the real-life models for 
Clarissa. 
• 
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and emotions were the exact opposite of what thy had been 
in the manic stage. She was in the depths of melancholia 
and despair; she scarcely spoke; refused to eat ... 
refused to believe that she was ill and insisted that her 
condition was due to her own guilt; at the height of this 
stage she tried to commit suicide, in the 1895 attack by 
jumping out of a window, in 1915 by taking an overdose of 
veronal; in 1941 she drowned herself in the river Ouse. 
(Woolf 1964: 76; my emphasis) 
The similarity of this to Rachel's 'mystic' fever in The 
Voyage Out and to the madness of Septimus need not be 
emphasised. On page 28 of Mrs Dalloway, for example, we are 
actually placed inside the mind of the 'madman': 
Men must not cut down trees. There is a God. (He noted 
such revelations on the backs of envelopes.) Change the 
world. No one kills from hatred. Make it known (he wrote 
it down). He waited. He listened. A sparrow perched on 
the railing opposite chirped Septimus, septimus, four or 
five times over and went on, drawing its notes out, to 
sing freshly and piercingly in Greek words how there is 
no crime and, joined by another sparrow, they sang in 
voices prolonged and piercing in Greek words, from trees 
in the meadow of life beyond a river where the dead walk, 
how there is no death. 
There was his hand; there the dead. White 
things were assembling behind the railings opposite. 
But he dared not look. Evans was behind the 
railings! (~: 28) 
The passage is redolent with private symbolism, and, it 
will be readily appreciated, is a nightmare-view of Virginia 
Woolf's own private 'message'. Especially significant are 
Septimus's prophetic judgments that there is no crime or 
death; evidently, he has repudiated the rules and laws of 
society, dependent upon the Name of the Father, along with the 
distinctions and separations of language. The irony (indeed, 
even the element of mild self-mockery) in the fact that it is 
a madman who expresses so many of Virginia Woolf's views 
should not be overlooked. 
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Just as unsettling as its bizarre content is the form of 
the passage, its disturbance of ordinary linguistic and 
logical connections; and yet like Lear's madness it has a non-
rational connective structure of its own .•. especially so in 
the way reality is taken as symbolic, as a text by septimus; 
and is, consequently, not figured as external to and alien 
from himself as observer, but as bound up intimately with his 
life and being. Since language undermines itself among these 
contradictories, what results is a vision not so dependent on 
the logocentric: a more unifying, metamorphic world emerges. 
Though these lines are both comically bizarre and yet contain 
moments of pure terror, Septimus's is also the language of 
ecstasy. 
Leonard Woolf'8 describes how during Virginia's illness he 
and she visited three famous Harley Street doctors and secured 
three different diagnoses. They ignored all, and she 
consequently 'recovered from three fatal and incurable 
diseases'. At their last interview, 'the great Dr Saintsbury, 
as he shook Virginia's hand, said to her "Equanimity -
equanimity - practise equanimity, Mrs Woolf" •..• I felt he 
might just have usefully have said: " A normal temperature -
ninety-eight point four - practise a normal temperature, Mrs 
Woolf'" (Woolf 1968: 30). Surely here is the origin of Sir 
William Bradhaw's 'Proportion'. 
Proportion is abandoned in septimus's ravings: but this 
is only to open them all the more to a strange kind of truth. 
However, what septimus sees and says is not Reality itself, 
only its more amplified and hence distorted echo. As I have 
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indicated, the reason for the novelist's identification of the 
two main characters is that Septimus is representative of 
Clarissa's inner life: his sensitivity, his insights, are the 
same as hers, but they are distorted by his delirium. However, 
the fact that this is delirium and not sanity is a product of 
septimus's 'insane' vulnerability, a characteristic Clarissa 
does not share. 
I shall quote from another fragment of Septimus's 
demented thought-process: he is once again seated in the park, 
observing the world about him. The reader will see at once 
that the picture given is of the Bradley-like 'homogeneous' 
universe, gone haywire: 
But they beckoned; leaves were alive; trees were alive. 
And the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with 
his own body, there on the seat, fanned it up and down; 
when the branch stretched he, too, made that statement. 
The sparrows fluttering, rising and falling in jagged 
fountains were part of the pattern; the white and blue, 
barred with black branches. Sounds made harmonies with 
premeditation; the spaces between them were as 
significant as the sounds. A child cried. Rightly far 
away a horn sounded. All taken together meant the birth 
of a new religion .... (26) 
So, despite its absurdities, this is a vision far closer 
than the everyday to the 'Absolute', the undifferentiated 
totality, where even distinctions of subject and object become 
meaningless. Such, then, is the alarming truth about 
Septimus's 'madness': he has broken part-way through the 
conventional patterning of experience mediated to us through 
language. What he finds, half-way to the other side of speech, 
is still as yet uncontrollable, disturbing. But whatever it 
is, it is at least closer to a real response to the nature of 
315 
things than Sir William's logocentric blindness. Septimus is 
mad only to the world; the truth is, he is for the first time 
seeing at all clearly - even if not yet clearly enough. But we 
understand why this private or supra-private vision might pose 
a threat to Sir William's worldj and why Sir William, with all 
the authoritarian force of convention, must suppress him. 
Indeed, Septimus's clarifying sight has the potential 
force of a 'new religion' - if its ultimate implications were 
ever to be recognised. But it is a religion of psychic 
liberation, unlike Kilman's: a liberation which the public, 
masculine world cannot bear, and will oppose to the death. 
What the novel presents is a parallel vision where, side 
by side, the sane and insane 'realities' confront each other, 
and each poses its criticism of its rival. In the middle 
ground, partaking of both, lies the poetic exploration of 
consciousness that constitutes the work's artistic style: 
virginia Woolf's own poetry of the mind. Her evocation of her 
various characters' streams of consciousness, with all their 
semantic compression and multi-layered significance, is itself 
a prose which has taken the pressure of an alternative Reality 
to the linguistic, and become transformed by the contact. 
Unlike Septimus's mad ramblings, however, it recognises still 
the ordinary world's demands of intelligibility. 
The relevant diary entries are informative about these 
matters, once one has come to appreciate something more of the 
understandably private context to which they obliquely refer: 
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Friday, June 23rd, 1922: If they say this (Jacob's Room) 
is all a clever experiment, I shall produce Mrs Dalloway 
in Bond street as the finished product. 
Saturday, October 14th: Mrs Dalloway has branched 
into a book, and I adumbrate here a study of 
insanity and suicide: the world seen by the sane and 
the insane side by side - something like that ..• 
and to be more close to the fact than Jacob: but I 
think Jacob was a necessary step for me, in working 
free. 
Monday. June 4th. 1923: I want to bring in the 
despicableness of people like ott. [Lady Ottoline 
Morrell] I want to give the slipperiness of the 
soul. I have been too tolerant often. The truth is 
people scarcely care for each other. They have this 
insane instinct for life. But they never become 
attached to anything outside themselves. 
Tuesday, June 19th: In this book I have almost too 
many ideas. I want to give life and death, sanity 
and insanity; I want to criticise the social system, 
and to show it at work at its most intense. 
(AWD: 46, 52, 55, 57) 
3 
The social element is inseparable from another element, that 
of time. In August and October 1924 she records the discovery 
of two technical innovations which gave great impetus to her 
progress. Both are 'time devices', and are already present 
potentially in 'The Mark on the Wall', the short story written 
in 1917. (Before she had read Proust, Joyce or Dorothy 
Richardson, so Leonard Woolf tells us. There is no doubt that 
Mrs Dalloway does owe something to Ulysses, although, as Maria 
Dibattista19 convincingly argues in 'Joyce, Woolf and the 
Modern Mind' [Dibattista 1983], the relationship between the 
two works is productively contrastive, rather than 
derivative.) 
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The first device she describes as the digging out of 
'beautiful caves behind my characters ••. the idea is that the 
caves shall connect and each comes to daylight at the present 
moment' (AWD: 60). She no doubt means by this the movement in 
her characters' minds from awareness of the world about them 
to their own thoughts, ruminations, and especially memories, 
and then back again to the present. In this stylistic 
acknowledgement of the importance of 'inward' reality over the 
outer, sometimes physical actuality intrudes only briefly, 
between brackets. But what is also implied in the idea of the 
'caves' connecting together is that the inward world is 
capable of enlargement and extension into something more than 
the merely personal; that underlying individual minds is a 
form of pre-unconscious being that links and binds them - as 
does, on some interpretations, the Lacanian Real. 
The second time-device, as the metaphors suggest, is 
linked to the first: 'It took me a year's groping to discover 
what I call my tunneling process, by which I tell the past by 
instalments, as I have need of it' (AWD: 61). An example of 
this is the minor incident at Bourton nearly thirty years 
before, when Hugh Whitbread kissed Sally Seton in the smoking-
room. This memory, so out of key with the present-day 
personality of Hugh, a pompous and reactionary toady, is 
returned to on several occasions in the course of the novel, 
each time with a different twist to it. When Clarissa first 
thinks of it, it surprises us as a deviation from Hugh's 
accepted creed, and as such it prejudices our view of him. 
Gradually the incident is filled out for uS I until at the 
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party which closes the book we learn that the reason he had 
kissed her was to punish her for saying that women should have 
votes (~: 199). Memory plays tricks, as well. One of Sally's 
misdemeanours at Bourton was to leave a book belonging to 
Clarissa's father out on the verandah in the rain, as we learn 
from Clarissa early on. When she recalls this momentarily at 
the party (ibid.), in her mind it is in the punt that the book 
has been left. 
Again, all her life the heroine has hero-worshipped 
Sally, and has been physically attracted to her, because of 
her outrageous liveliness at Bourton. This vitality itself 
gains a new dimension when, at the party, Sally admits to 
herself that going to Bourton had 'kept her sane, she 
believed, so unhappy had she been at home' (207). The novel 
abounds in sharp human psychological observations and ironies 
like these, which add to one another to give depth of field to 
our view. 
What we have here is not simply a demonstration of the 
way the human mind inevitably changes and shapes the world in 
order to give it meaning. In addition to this, such 
complementary recollections make the past 'grow' for us in 
company with the present, so that the book stands as an emblem 
of Virginia Woolf's attitude to time (which resembles 
Bradley's above): the 'past in the present'. Accompanying the 
heroine for a few hours of a single day, we trace out in the 
same time her whole past history. 
That a more rounded, more unified, less 'linear' 
treatment of time is an attempt at a distinctly 'feminine' 
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approach to this narrative dimension, in reaction against the 
-
linear chronology and discrete instants beloved of the 
'masculine' novel of action, need not be emphasised. However, 
Virginia Woolf's approach also implies a different attitude to 
time itself, as a component of Reality. 
As the 'Time Passes' section of To the Lighthouse shows, 
she sees time as humanity's greatest enemy, that which most 
threatens the ordered creations of human beings, and which 
dissolves their relationships. The entropy time brings may, 
however, be held at bay on three fronts: there is the timeless 
dimension within that Mrs Ramsay contacts in a moment of 
selfless contemplation in part 11 of 'The Window'; there is 
the pattern of human affection and relationship which persists 
in memory; and there is the direct experience of timelessness 
which is one of the subtle experiences offered by the form of 
an artwork: 'Life stand still here' (TL: 249) Mrs Ramsay 
decrees, as an artist whose medium is life; this power over 
time is a capability somehow within her feminine power. 
What this amounts to, in terms of the treatment of time 
in Mrs Dalloway, is that there is an alternative, feminine 
approach to time, which is based on an understanding of its 
ultimate contingency, in the light of the Real. From such a 
viewpoint, eternity may be contained in an hour and all the 
past and future be implicit in each instant. 
We see how, in this novel, different characters and their 
approaches to reality may actually be judged in terms of time. 
Clock time, the 'outer time', is the publicly authorised time 
of society. It forms a common area of contact for different 
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people with different individual inner times. In Mrs Dalloway 
the ever-present clock comes to symbolise a society that in 
its brutish ignorance and its herd-like conformism seeks to 
impose its own time as the 'norm': by misunderstanding the 
nature of the internal it seeks to exclude all temporality it 
cannot comprehend. 
Shredding, and slicing, dividing and subdividing, the 
clocks of Harley Street nibbled at the June day, 
counselled submission, upheld authority, and pointed out 
in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of 
proportion. (~: 113) 
Shredding, slicing, dividing and subdividing: these are 
the operations of the analytic masculine intellect which 
murders to dissect. 
The original title (AWD: 78) for the work was The Hours, 
and in it on nearly twenty occasions, clocks strike. Almost 
always they are accompanied by the 'rhythm': 'the leaden 
circles dissolved in the air'. This reference to the 'ripple' 
image represents, first of all, the reverberations of the 
moment in time, and, by extension, the reverberations of 
individual consciousness in the minds of others through 
interaction and influence. To some extent, then, the insistent 
pressure of the moment symbolised by the knelling of the hours 
is absorbed and rendered ineffectual by the forces which 
promote homogeneity among human kind. Once again, what begins 
to be intimated here is an alternative dimension to clock 
time, one which escapes into the timeless. And yet ultimately, 
in the novel, this spreading-out of time and self is still 
ultimately to be identified with death. 
321 
Mrs Oalloway's life, we are told, is a succession of 
'moments'. Through attention to the nature of these 'moments', 
we come closer to what Virginia Woolf meant by what she calls 
her 'moments of vision': 'a match burning in a crocus; an 
inner meaning almost expressed' (~: 36). Even the way she 
chooses to define them here - by images, rather than an 
analytic formula - helps to reveal their essence. 
To begin simply by considering the image offered us: 
perhaps the idea of a match burning in a crocus seems an 
unwarrantably surrealistic juxtaposition at first sight; if 
so, it is nonetheless one which does have meaning, albeit of 
an intangible sort. There is, for instance, the similarity 
between the bounded and contained leap of the flame, with its 
lively bright energy, and the life and shape of the petals; 
again, the stamen-like matchstick seems a masculine force 
within the enclosing female bowl-like repository of the 
flower: yet taken together, the one life consumes the other, 
or defies our expectations by failing to do so. 
Yet in spite of all these links and hints, the full 
meaning continues to elude us, while trembling on the verge of 
its expression •.. all we may say is that, as with Surrealist 
imagery proper, the mystery and oddness of the juxtaposition 
seem to turn the handle on a door to a dimension beyond 
language, or else provide the illusion of doing so. 
The case is similar with the 'moment of vision', which 
achieves the same effect by a sudden and unexpected union of 
unlikely elements in a meaningful whole, but in this case the 
conjunction happens at random in the ordinary course of life. 
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For a very brief while, life seems to take on some of the 
formal coherence of art - without our being able at the same 
time to pin down its proffered meaning. It is as if a little 
of septimus's madness somehow intruded into the ordinary 
everyday round of things. 
The essence of the 'moment' is thus an entirely unwilled 
and unanticipated coming together, a crystallization, an 
ordering ..• yet as transitory as the sweep of the lighthouse 
beam. Yet somehow through it 'Reality' seems manifested to us. 
On one notable occasion, the 'moment' comes upon 
Clarissa, 'collecting the whole of her at one point' (42). For 
Peter Walsh, too, it starts with the 'drip, drip of one 
impression after another down into that cellar where they 
stood deep, dark, and no-one would ever know ... really, it 
took one's breath away, these moments; there coming to him by 
the pillar-box opposite the British museum one of them, a 
moment, in which things came together; this ambulance; and 
life and death' (167). 
Here what is unexpectedly ordered and unified is the 
binary opposition represented by the passing ambulance and the 
pillar-box and museum: death and life, symbolically joined; 
time and utterance linked with the extinction of self. (Is it 
going too far to see in the 'pillar' and 'box' which represent 
the sending-on of the letter a hint of both column and coffin? 
Death as a mobile escape, along with the ambulance, from 
immurement in the museum-house of life?) For a brief, perhaps 
infinitessimal, span these apparent opposites seem not so 
unlike; indeed they appear almost as aspects of each other. 
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And this is also similar to the vision of the end of the 
novel, when Clarissa finds death in the middle of her party: 
death as an attempt to communicate. But true communication -
like that the post-box might represent - can only happen when, 
as here, all the signifiers concerned, even the human ones, 
are stripped of their conventional content, and take their 
place in some larger whole. 
Septimus, like Clarissa and Peter, has 'moments', but 
they strike him with an almost horrific force, as on the 
occasion he sees a representation of the 'metaphysical' 
forming pattern on the blinds of the dignitary's car: 'upon 
them a curious pattern like a tree, Septimus thought, and this 
gradual drawing together of everything into one centre before 
his eyes •.• terrified him' (18). 
This sort of signification, which is both a response to a 
particular pure form and yet somehow unbounded in meaning, 
contrasts with the symbols characteristic of society, which 
are marked by a vacuity rather than a plenitude of underlying 
significance. Mrs Dalloway's own dilemma, that her outward 
pose does not express her inner reality, is parodied by two 
other group-symbols, the mysterious car and the prime minister 
himself. The mysterious official car which passes down Bond 
Street with its blinds drawn (the 'Proime Minister's kyar', 
someone says - but who really knows?), which has such an 
enormous effect as it passes, is really something comic, 
because no-one ever sees who or what is inside it - it may 
only be a royal chambermaid delivering a message or a poodle 
being taken to the trimmer - and when it passes through the 
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gates into Buckingham Palace the crowd who have gathered to 
cheer it, all at the crucial moment have their attention 
diverted by the aeroplane writing 'toffee' (another displaced 
and unexplained signifier) in the sky, and fail to do so (~: 
23) • 
Maria Dibattista, in the essay already referred to, 
remarks cogently upon the sky-writing's effect on septimus: 
Initially, the letters the aeroplane inscribes in the sky 
do not form actual words; its writing is illegible, 
unreadable. Even the letters are indistinguishable in 
their first outlines: 'A C was it? an E. then an L? Only 
for a moment did they lie still; then they moved and 
melted and were rubbed out up in the sky, and the 
aeroplane shot further away and again, in a fresh space 
of sky, began writing a X, and E, a Y perhaps?' (23-4). A 
spectator, Mrs Coates, ventures 'Blaxo'i another, Mrs 
Bletchley, offers 'Xreemo' - the neologisms of nonsense 
or commercialism. These comic readings dissolve, however, 
into the interpretations of septimus for whom the 
skywriting is identified, not with the seemingly eternal 
exercise of temporal power, but with the more fugitive 
and transient appearances of Beauty. To him the 'smoke 
words' bestow 'in their inexhaustible charity and 
laughing goodness, one shape after another of 
unimaginable beauty •.. signalling their intention to 
provide him, for nothing, for ever, for looking merely, 
with beauty, more beauty' (25). Septimus, the castaway 
prophet, reads the smoke words not as definite signs 
linking him to a stable world of referentiality; for him 
is reserved the message of the world transmitted through 
the caritas of art, the inexhaustible charity and 
laughing goodness of the perishable word. 
(Dibattista 1983: 108) 
Dibattista notes: 'The complicity of writing and 
established power is the suppressed, never fully realized 
subtext of Mrs Dalloway, the source of the novel's deep and 
unresolved ambivalence towards its own representational 
activity' (109). However, it seems to me that the word is 
enabled to present itself as a purveyor of what is called 
'laughing goodness' only through the 'inexhaustible charity' 
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of a demented Septimus, not through any of its own; and that 
the connection between power and logocentric signification - a 
connection which the style and structure of Mrs Dalloway seek 
constantly to undermine - is far more than a subtext to the 
novel: not at all suppressed, and fully realised (though 
perhaps somewhat disguised), it is the crux upon which the 
novel is constructed. The dissolution and fading of the 
'toffee' sky-writing really provide a remarkably apt symbol of 
the indeterminacy and instability of the public word - which 
includes the signifiers of authority and social control. 
Both car and aeroplane do also, as we have said, serve as 
transitional devices - and these linkages of place with place 
are closely parallel to the temporal unifications of the book, 
discussed above. There are more connections than these 
mechanical ones: Septimus's story is linked by common 
experiences, thoughts, and imagery, with that of Clarissa. 
It is important to see that the connectedness does go 
beyond the merely formal; indeed, the story seems actually to 
be saying that such separations as we so readily accept are in 
reaiity spurious. Hence, the unifying devices are partial aids 
to conveying this truth that, at the deepest level, we inhabit 
one world. This fact of Reality's undifferentiated condition 
is of course fatal to the imaginary divisions which support 
both self and word, in virginia Woolf's view. 
Another comic instance of an 'empty signifier' is added 
on the appearance of the revered Prime Minister himself at 
Clarissa's party. He too is all symbol, all exterior: an 
object not expressing its content. 
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One couldn't laugh at him. He looked so ordinary. You 
might have stood him up behind a counter and bought 
biscuits - poor chap all rigged up in gold lace •.• they 
all knew, felt to the marrow of their bones, this majesty 
passing; this symbol of what they stood for, English 
society. (~: 189) 
On the novel's first page, in memory we meet Peter Walsh 
and know at once where he stands: 'I prefer men to 
cauliflowers', he says. He prefers the substance to the 
object, the symbol. Miss Kilman, Clarissa's enemy, seeks, as 
her name suggests, to reduce the infinite possibility of human 
personality to one thing; she seeks to turn men into objects. 
It is not her Clarissa hates but 'the idea of her': 'one of 
those spectres who stand astride us and suck up half our life-
blood, dominators and tyrants' (15). Conversion is, in this 
sense, the insistence that human beings be congruent with the 
categories set out for them, that they impose some form of 
predetermined conformity in the place of true unfettered 
selfhood. 
Even Rezia, Septimus's wife, a person whose communication 
is hampered by her inadequacy in English4, recognises the truth 
about Holmes, Bradshaw and co. She gains greatly in stature 
and personal dignity by resisting their blandishments: for 
her, they were 'men who made ten thousand a year and talked of 
proportion; who differed in their verdicts (for Holmes said 
one thing, Bradshaw another), yet judges they were; who mixed 
the vision and the sideboard; saw nothing clear, yet ruled, 
yet inflicted. Over them she triumphed' (163). The vision 
4 This characteristic of Rezia's was apparently inspired 
by Lydia Lopokova, Maynard Keynes's Russian wife. 
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pinned down by the symbolic sideboard is another would-be 
instance of an attempt to fix and control infinitely spreading 
meaning through the power of words - with the aid of a 
signifier neither Holmes nor Bradshaw recognises as being 
utterly inappropriate for the task. (Apparently, to judge by 
the particular signifier chosen, they hoped to hold the 
'vision' firmly down with something heavy and sufficiently 
material.) 
The truth is what Septimus himself proclaims it to be in 
his delirium: that there is no crime, and so no need of 
judges. 'Why seek truths and deliver messages', he asks 
himself, 'when Rezia sat sticking pins into the front of her 
dress, and Mrs Peters was in Hull?' (157). Existence is 
enough. Life, Bond Street, 'That is all' (13), Clarissa says 
to herself, and the only sins are sins against such life; 
like, for example, the desire to turn people into objects. 
This even Clarissa refuses to do: 'She would not say of anyone 
in the world now that they were this or were that' (10). 
Yet, ironically, it is precisely in his willingness to 
become an object - a corpse, in death - that Septimus 
expresses the height of his heroism. For it is not one object 
he will become in death, but all. Suicide is seen here as the 
ultimate willed violation of language, just as it is a 
violation of personality - an ultimate attempt to break 
through the limiting signifiers that crowd down existence. 
So there was a man outside; Evans presumably; and the 
roses, which Rezia said were half dead, had been picked 
by him in the fields of Greece. Communication is health; 
communication is happiness. Communication, he muttered. 
(103-4) 
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Here is the heart of the tragedy of Clarissa and septimus. 
Imprisoned inside her social facade, her public role, isolated 
from the encroachment of a philistine society, but also from 
love, Clarissa has lost the ability to communicate. similarly, 
Septimus is cut off from other people by his lack of feeling: 
'That was the doom pronounced in Milan when he came into the 
room and saw them cutting out buckram shapes with their 
scissors; to be alone for ever' (160). The isolation of the 
scissors, of a divided existence, pronounced upon him, 
parallels the nationalism (another act of isolation) which 
brought on the horror of the war. 
In his madness, Septimus cannot dislodge the absurd idea 
that all men, including himself, are to blame for the calamity 
in which Evans died. That none of this is his fault is too 
simple a nostrum for him to accept. pathetically, when he is 
in front of Bradshaw's desk, he is tempted to present his 
'message': 'But if he confessed? If he communicated? Would 
they let him off then, Holmes, Bradshaw?' (109). For both the 
main characters, the outcome moves forward to Mrs Dalloway's 
realisation in the ante-room: 'Death was an attempt to 
communicate' (202). 
Communication at the deep level which requires no speech 
or even personal contact seems already to have taken place 
between Septimus and Clarissa, at least. There is, for 
instance, the correspondence between the much-quoted scene 
where Mrs Dalloway is sowing her green dress, and the state of 
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septimus, some hundred pages later, shortly before his death. 
In the earlier passage, Clarissa has likened her sowing to the 
motion of the waves. 
her needle, drawing the silk smoothly to her gentle 
pause, collected the green folds together and attached 
them very lightly to the belt. So on a summer's day waves 
collect, overbalance and fall; and the whole world seems 
to be saying 'that is all' more and more ponderously, 
until even the heart in the body which lies in the sun on 
the beach says too, that is all. Fear no more, says the 
heart, committing its burden to some sea, which sighs 
collectively for all sorrows, and renews, begins, 
collects, lets fall. And the body alone listens to the 
passing bee; the wave breaking; the dog barking, far away 
barking and barking. (44-5) 
In a remarkable way, the passage succeeds in embodying 
the very principles which the work has directed us to; through 
the medium of language, it begins to evoke a state to which, 
once achieved, language is all but irrelevant •.. just as in 
the extract personal existence seems all but superfluous to 
the all-embracing collectivity of the sea. And so in the 
distance we hear again the strains of 'Fear no more', with its 
burden of death. 
In such a context, a hundred or more pages of the novel, 
and all the social and geographical distance separating the 
two characters, count for nothing. Like Rachel in The Voyage 
Out, Septimus too feels himself 'floating on the top of the 
waves, while far away on shore he heard dogs barking and 
barking far away. Fear no more, says the heart in the body; 
fear no more' (154). As we recognise, the images are somehow 
appropriated from Clarissa's separate meditation. 
One more symbolic link between Septimus and Clarissa 
needs to be noted. This is that both Clarissa and Septimus 
must be thought of as artists. 
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We have seen already how the term may be applied to 
Clarissa. For Clarissa, her party is her personal work of 
art. But Septimus, too, is an artist. He too makes a 'form', 
one which corresponds to Clarissa's party, shortly before his 
suicide. He decorates Mrs Peters's hat for Rezia: 'Never had 
he done anything which made him feel so proud. It was so real, 
it was so substantial, Mrs Peters's hat' (159). 
His sacrificial offering once made, Septimus climbs out 
on the windowsill of his Bloomsbury flat; finds 'the sun hot'; 
but presumably he has nothing further to fear from it. 'Only 
human beings?' he asks himself (165). This simple question can 
be read with several variations of meaning, all of them 
significant. He may be asking, for example: 'Is it only human 
beings who make so much commotion in the world, who have 
combined to drive me to this point?' But especially important 
is an alternative sense: 'Are we only human beings; are we 
limited to the facts of our individuality?' 
Then he throws himself to his death on the area railings 
('railings' which once obscured the ghost of his dead friend 
Evans) with the symbolic and ironic words 'I'll give it you!' 
(165). The words of this common threat open out to convey to 
us that Septimus - like the Christ-figure he is compared with 
on page 29 - has offered to Reality the ultimate possible 
gift. If Clarissa's party is her own 'gift', then septimus's 
generosity is more total than hers: he offers up his self and 
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his personal existence in order to break through the 
'railings' which divide human actuality from the alternative 
world of death. 
At the party, Peter Walsh, watching Clarissa, is moved to 
think that she looks as if she must in a moment leave the 
world altogether; 'being on the very verge and rim of things, 
and take her leave' (191). She goes for a moment into the 
anteroom where she can be alone, and in fact her time there -
in a way her Gethsemene - is so connected by imagery with 
Septimus's suicide that it forms the counterpart for this 
suicide in her own life. But Mrs Dalloway returns from the 
room, the Messiah-figure, Septimus, in a special way 
resurrected in her. Henceforth Mrs Dalloway and Septimus are 
indeed, as Virginia Woolf has told us, 'one and the same 
person' (Woolf 1928: vi). 
Clarissa's moment in the room is sufficiently intricate 
and vital to the book to warrant examination by itself. First 
of all, she recalls the image of throwing a shilling into the 
Serpentine - recalling the widening ripples of individual 
consciousness in others - and she realizes that Septimus, too, 
had 'thrown it away': 
A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about 
with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop 
every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had 
preserved. Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to 
communicate, people feeling the impossibility of reaching 
the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew 
apart; rapture faded; one was alone. There was an embrace 
in death. 
But this young man had killed himself - had he plunged 
holding his treasure? 'If it were now to die, 'twere now 
to be most happy', she had said to herself once, coming 
down, in white. (~: 202-3) 
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Corruption, lies and chatter: in terms of the values of this 
novel, these three amount to the same thing. 
Like Richardson's Clarissa, Mrs Dalloway finds herself 
alone in a male-dominated external, conventional, 'public' 
environment. The counterpart of the brothel in her own life is 
the world of society and politics; her other self, Septimus, 
is 'raped' by that society, yet like herself and Richardson's 
heroine, somehow remains superior to it all; and thus gains 
the victory, because of what he retains morally. However, when 
Clarissa speaks of septimus's 'treasure', it is surely the 
form, Mrs Peters's hat, she is referring to, the counterpart 
of the gift of the party in her own life: 
the words came back to her, Fear no more the heat of the 
sun. She must go back to them. But what an extraordinary 
night! She felt somehow very like him - the young man who 
had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; 
thrown it away while they went on living. The clock was 
striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. But 
she must go back. She must find Sally and Peter. And she 
came in from the little room. (204-5) 
She has not forgotten her task. She goes back now to 
'assemble', to create. She goes back, too, to other people: 
Sally and Peter. But the walls between living and dead have 
grown thinner. 
The dedicated reader of virginia Woolf's work will be 
used by now to her habit of attaching special significance to 
the last words of her novels. We might of course have expected 
something like the final line presented here - 'For there she 
was' - in a novel given a personal title at the start like 
'Mrs Dalloway'. In this case we might well have received it as 
the triumphant and appropriate conclusion to an accomplished 
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piece of character-drawing. Whereas Jacob in Jacob's Room was 
the missing centre of his own novel, represented at last only 
by his shoes, Clarissa Dalloway is firmly in place, or so we 
might judge. 
We are now, of course, in a position to understand the 
line somewhat differently. The declaration 'For there she was' 
which closes the book, refers not to her portrait, but to her 
'place', her position in her society, her social and personal 
environment and the conditions which surround her - and her 
importance for others. All of these have been detailed in the 
preceding pages of the novel: their combined force cUlminates 
in this final phrase. 
But there is an irony. All those who have understood 
Virginia Woolf's points about the insufficiency of verbal 
signification and the instability of our ideas of the self 
will have realised that the line is a concealment. If it is 
meant to suggest that Mrs Dalloway is inseparable from her 
social role, then the words hide the truth. As such readers 
will by now readily have recognised, the declaration should 
properly read: 'For there she wasn't. ' 
334 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES: Chapter 6. 
1. Woolf, Virginia, Mrs Dalloway (London: Hogarth, 1950 [1925]). 
Hereafter ~ in references. 
2. Fry, Roger, Vision and Design (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1937 
[1920» . 
3. Woolf, Virginia, To the Lighthouse (London: Hogarth, 1949 
[1927]). Hereafter TL in references. 
4. Woolf, Virginia, A writer's Diary, ed. Leonard Woolf (London: 
Hogarth, 1953). Hereafter AWD. 
5. Fleischman, Avrom, Virginia Woolf: A critical Reading 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). Fleishman is 
using the standard Hogarth edition, which is also the source in 
this essay. BM refers to the British Library MS. 
6. Freud, Sigmund, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XVIII, ed James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1955), 3-66. Hereafter BP. 
7. Freud, sigmund, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 
tr. James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1973). 
8. Lacan, Jacques, Ecrits, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 
1977) . 
9. Moody, A.D., Virginia Woolf (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 
1963) . 
10. Forster, E.M., Aspects of the Novel (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 
1966 [1927]). 
11. James, William, The Principles of Psychology I (London: 
Macmillan, 1901 [1890]). 
12. Bradley, F.H., Principles of Logic (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1922). ' 
13. Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1897 [1893]). 
14. Woolf, Virginia, \ Introduction', Mrs Dalloway (New York: 
Modern Library Edition, 1928). 
15. Miller, Hillis J., 'Mrs Dalloway's All Souls Day', in The 
Shaken Realist: Essays in Modern Literature in Honor of F.J. 
Hoffman, ed. O.B. Hardison (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana 
Press, 1970), 112 - 136. 
335 
16. Woolf, Virginia, The Voyage Out (London: Hogarth, 1965b 
[1915]). 
17. Woolf, Leonard, Beginnning Again (London: Hogarth, 1964). 
18. Woolf, Leonard, Downhill All the Way (London: Hogarth, 1968). 
19. Dibattista, Maria, 'Joyce, Woolf, and the Modern Mind' in 
Virginia Woolf: New critical Essays, ed. Patricia Clements and 
Isobel Grundy (London: Vision and Barnes and Noble, 1983), 96-
114. 
Chapter 7: FERNANDO PESSOA'S ENGLISH POEMS 
PERSONAE 
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THE POET AND HIS 
Both T.S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf are sceptical, as we have 
seen, of the claims of individual identity. In both cases it 
is possible to relate this scepticism to the mystical leanings 
which are evident in their work, for the loss of the sense of 
self is one of the characteristics of mystical experience (see 
'Introduction', section 2ff.). 
A Modernist writer whose work is also profoundly 
orientated towards mysticism and who carries the dissolution 
of personal identity to unusual extremes in his verse is the 
Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa. Although Pessoa is widely 
thought of in Portugal as that country's major modern poet, it 
might seem strange to include a chapter on his poetry in a 
thesis whose examples are mostly drawn from English 
literature. 
However, Pessoa is an appropriate choice for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, not even in Yeats's poetry is it possible 
to find so extensive a use of the idea of 'masks' or personae. 
Pessoa seems to have elaborated his own version of the concept 
quite independently of Yeats or Pound: his first exercises of 
the sort are his schoolboy poems written at the turn of the 
century. Since he is also an overtly mystical poet, 
fascinated by Rosicrucianism and the like, he provides an 
unusually marked instance of the connection between mysticism 
and the poet's self-dispersion into multiple poetic 
personalities. 
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Secondly, this thesis is being written in South Africa, 
and Pessoa offers me the opportunity to introduce at least one 
local connection with my main theme. For, although he was 
born in Portugal, he spent his childhood in Natal and 
completed his schooling there. This fact relates to my third 
reason to choosing Pessoa for my purpose: Pessoa did in fact 
write in English, as well as Portuguese. Indeed, all his 
earliest attempts at verse are in the English language, 
composed before he left South Africa for Lisbon in 1905. 
Although in his late 'teens Pessoa defected to Europe and 
to the European sources of his culture, he continued all his 
brief life to write English verses, and the little he 
published in those years was predominantly in English. It is 
clear that in his circumscribed and self-defeatist lifetime 
Pessoa cherished the wilful dream of an international 
reputation, based on the other culture he had imbibed in the 
foster-country of his youth. Ironically, in view of this, his 
reputation rests entirely on his Portuguese poems, most of 
them unpublished before his premature death from hepatitis (or 
cirrhosis of the liver) and alcohol abuse in 1935. The 
English work, in contrast, rests largely unknown and unvisited 
in manuscript libraries; it will, however, be a principal 
focus in this chapter. 
Although he barely stirred from Lisbon after 1905, the 
bulk of his work seems to specify no particular place or 
location (apart from Mensagem, the only complete book of 
Portuguese verse he published during his lifetime, which lauds 
the Portuguese sailor-explorers and the spirit that inspired 
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them; and there are also references to certain Portuguese 
historical figures who especially fascinated him). Though one 
does imagine Iberian equivalents for the rivers, valleys and 
flocks that figure in his works, the settings of these poems 
are most often really a landscape of the mind. 
Some of the few references to events in a specific modern 
time and place that I can find appear in the early English 
verse. In a poem called 'Liberty', composed on the 20th June 
1905, presumably in Durban, Pessoa writes: 
Ireland and the Transvaal, you are a shame 
On England and a blot! Oh, shall we see 
For ever crushed and held who should be free 
By human creatures without human name?' 
Pessoa was seventeen at the time: strong feelings for a 
young man who could have claimed the immunity from concern his 
Portuguese birth and home entitled him to; and whose adopted 
culture was English-speaking. The day before, he had written, 
in a piece called 'To England (when English journalists joked 
at Russia's disasters"', the lines: 
... 111 scorn becomes us, men of war and trick, 
When groaning nation poured her fullest might 
To take the freedom of a farmer race. 
These poems are signed, one ought to point out, not by 
Pessoa, but by one Alexander Search. Whatever the historical 
Fernando's real feelings were on these matters - and there is 
no evidence to suggest that Search has failed to express 
them - he left for Lisbon two months later, never to return. 
These strong anti-English views over the conflict between 
England and the Boers should be set against the enormous 
339 
influence that English literature had on the young Pessoa; of 
this there can be no doubt. Although as withdrawn, 
introverted and difficult to know at school as he was to be 
for the rest of his life - except with a few very close 
friends - at Durban High School Pessoa proved to be a 
rewarding pupil, with English as one of his best subjects. He 
won his form prize at least twice during his six years there; 
and in 1903, for the English essay he submitted as part of the 
entrance or Matriculation examination of the then University 
of the Cape of Good Hope, he was awarded the Queen victoria 
Memorial Prize, out of a field of 899 candidates. This was 
the first time the prize had been given, and it consisted of a 
choice of books. The titles Pessoa selected are instructive 
about his literary tastes at this time; the complete works of 
Ben Jonson, Keats, Tennyson and Edgar Allen Poe, and Johnson's 
Lives of the Poets. 
But it is a writer not mentioned in the sources -
Browning - who must surely be looked to as an influence on the 
development of the heteronymic theory. One can envision an 
easy development from 'dramatic monologue' to complete 
heteronymic independence. It is importa~t to realise that it 
was as a Durban schoolchild of fourteen or fifteen that Pessoa 
began writing his poems under assumed names, long before his 
contact with Futurism or the French Symbolists; and stories of 
his childhood mention invented playmates, endowed with 
characters and attitudes entirely of their own. 
It is clear that the two most important early heteronyms, 
Alexander Search and Charles Robert Anon (the names have a 
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certain melodramatic flourish about them, reminiscent of 
Algernon Blackwood's 'Doctor John silence') are already 
something more than mere noms-de-plume. Each is already 
distinguished by style and subject matter. To Anon are 
attributed, for example, many of the anti-religious poems that 
the always deeply mystical Pessoa was, paradoxically, then 
writing. Though Pessoa was to continue signing English poems 
with Search's name until well into the Portuguese period, 
these two early English-speaking heteronyms are by no means as 
carefully characterised as the later Portuguese figures Pessoa 
was to invent: nor are they given the same kinds of extended 
biography as are Caeiro, de Campos and Ricardo Reis, the most 
famous of his surrogates-to-be. Anon and Search are still 
covers for their author's stylistic experiments and 
imitations, rather than independent personalities in their own 
right. And yet it is curious how the import of their names, 
highlighting the aspects both of searching and of anonymity, 
have predictive value in relation to the later figures; it is 
as if their names represent the bare and opposing psychic 
forces which give birth to the more concrete personalities of 
the later time; just as Chronos and Chaos belong to a first 
generation from whom the Olympian gods arise; a little less 
elemental, more real. 
There is something less than ingenuous then, in the 
unstated implication in Pessoa's account that the apparition 
of his four major heteronyms coincided with the discovery of 
the heteronymic approach; that Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo Reis, 
Alvaro de Campos (and Fernando Pessoa) all entered his 
consciousness nearly at one blow, together with the poetic 
method that sanctioned their existence on this mortal plane. 
Pessoa's description of this - clearly apocalyptic - moment 
comes from late in his life (a letter dated January 13th 
1935), more than twenty years after the event (cf. Griffin2 
1971: 4). In about 1912, Pessoa recalls, he attempted some 
verses of a pagan kind and failed, yet retained 'a vague 
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portrait' of the man - someone other than Pessoa himself - who 
had been at work on the lines: 'without my knowing, Ricardo 
Reis had been born' (pessoa3 1971: 4). 
Nearly two years later, as a joke to play on a friend, he 
tried to invent an unconventional kind of bucolic poet ... 
On the day when I finally desisted - it was the 8th of 
March, 1914 - I went over to a high desk and, taking a 
sheet of paper, began to write, standing, as I always 
write when I can. And I wrote thirty-odd poems straight 
off, in a kind of ecstasy whose nature I cannot define. 
It was the triumphal day of my life, and I shall never be 
able to have another like it. I started with a title -
'The Keeper of the Sheep'. And what followed was the 
apparition of somebody in me, to whom I at once gave the 
name Alberto Caeiro. Forgive me the absurdity of the 
phrase; my master had appeared in me. This was the 
immediate sensation I had. 
(Pessoa 1971: 4-5) 
At this comment hints, it is deeply significant that 
caeiro was the first of the triumvirate of 'other' poets. The 
reasons for Caeiro's importance I will explain shortly; they 
do, I believe, reveal much about the sources of Pessoa's very 
individual inspiration. For the moment, it is worth noting 
that a kind of instant revulsion against his own violation by 
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the annunciating spirit intervened between Caeiro's birth and 
the arrival of the next of the brood: 
I immediately seized another sheet of paper and wrote, 
also straight off, the six poems that make up Fernando 
Pessoa's 'Chuva Obliqua'. Immediately and completely .•.. 
It was the return of Fernando Pessoa himself alone. Or 
better, it was the reaction of Fernando Pessoa against 
his own non-existence as Alberto Caeiro. (1971: 5) 
This respite over, but with the initial stream of 
inspiration still in flood, the full form of Ricardo Reis came 
at last into view: 
I jerked the latent Ricardo Reis out of his false 
paganism, discovered his name, and adjusted him to 
himself, because at this stage I already saw him. And 
suddenly, in a derivation opposed to that of Ricardo Reis 
there arose in me impetuously a new individual. At one 
go, and on the typewriter, without interruption or 
correction, there arose the 'Triumphal Ode' of Alvaro de 
Campos - the Ode along with this name and the man along 
with the name he has. (Ibid.) 
It is clear from what Pessoa is saying that none of these 
poets was ever a mere literary persona and nothing more: from 
the start they led a life apart from their literary creations 
and from their author; they were invested, almost 
spontaneously, with their own tastes, opinions, histories and 
eccentricities. Once given such frenetic life, they could 
hardly be further restrained by him: they began, almost 
immediately, to spar, to conflict, to interact: 
I graded their influences, recognised their friendships, 
heard, inside me, their discussions and divergencies of 
criteria, and in all this seemed to me that I, the 
creator, of it all, was the least thing there. It is as 
if it all happened independently of me. And it is as if 
it still happens like that... (Ibid.) 
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It is obvious that this coming-into being of the 
heteronyms made available to Pessoa abundant resources of new 
vitality. On one of their important gifts Jonathan Griffin 
comments: 
The emergence of the personae set him free. Free to 
develop divergent styles, as readers will quickly notice. 
Free to stay in Lisbon while Caeiro did his living in 
deep country for him, and Campos his travelling. Free, 
above all, to explore, to pursue with sincerity, 
different religions. What he wrote as Caeiro, Reis and 
Campos, as he explains in another letter (January 19th, 
1935, to Armando Cortes Rodrigues), 'is written 
dramatically, but is sincere (in my grave sense of the 
word) like what King Lear says, who is not Shakespeare, 
but a creation of his •••. Into each of them I have put a 
profound concept of life, different in all three, but in 
all of them gravely alert to the mysterious importance of 
life.' (Griffin 1971: 6) 
The mysterious importance and important mystery of life 
are always Pessoa's centre of focus. It is as if these 
objects were too imposing for Pessoa to confront as one 
person, too large for single human comprehension. To begin to 
encompass them he must needs diversify his resources. 
One answer is to split and diversify into other selves. 
But these selves cannot, then, be parted from the truths they 
reveal: they and what they are, become part of the equation. 
If a person's 'truth' is determined by who they are, then this 
is also to say that the mystery of truth, of Reality, is bound 
up for the modern mind with the mystery of human identity. 
2 
The question of identity was of course not just Pessoa's own 
concern: it seems to have been one of the chosen centres of 
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attention for that critical, questioning, irreverent 
concentration of intelligence that was Modernism. The idea 
that each of us possesses a fixed identity only began to be 
seriously challenged, even as a literary strategy, at the end 
of the nineteenth century: a kind of foreshadowing of the 
threat to the whole Newtonian universe and its contents. In 
Britain it is with Oscar Wilde's essay 'The Truth of Masks' 
that the case is put; it is wilde who ushers the subject into 
literature in its recognisably modern form. (Although Pater's 
Marius the Epicurean, even in its title, seems to herald 
much). Wilde was in many ways prophetic for British 
Modernism; Yeats's dispersion of himself into his 'masks', 
into his hero and fool, his Michael Robartes and Owen Aherne, 
must surely derive, although at several removes, from 
something in Wilde. It is not entirely dissimilar impulse 
which must have led Pound to call his early collection 
Personae. As we have seen, in his critical essays T.S. Eliot 
praises the impersonality of the artist, his continual 
extinction of himself in the service of the artistic 
tradition; personal identity, a passe romantic obsession, is 
subordinated to the demands of the individual work of art, or 
of Art as a suprapersonal entity in time. 
What I have sketched in very fleetingly, above, are the 
major moments in the development of an important idea as it 
affected parts of English literature. It would be foolish to 
suggest that as a phenomenon it is always in some way 
implicated with mysticism. Many would be satisfied simply to 
group these doubts about identity along with all the 
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questionings of accepted certainties and absolutes that belong 
to the age of 'Relativity' and 'Uncertainty'. They are of a 
piece with the reaction against Victorian valorisation of 
'great men' and their biographies, as in Carlyle; or the 
emphasis in the victorian novel on 'character' as fixed and 
comprehensible. Nonetheless at least in Hesse, Rilke, Yeats, 
and, as we have seen, in Woolf and Eliot, these doubts about 
the dependability and givenness of human personality are 
indeed underpinned by mystical beliefs. 
Pessoa probably did read Wilde; it would be surprising if 
he had not. But it is as a European, not an English writer, 
that we must initially see him. In Europe Wilde was also 
read. But other sources than Wilde are also indicated, and 
these must presumably have been equally or more important for 
European variants of the identity question or theme, of the 
sort we find in Gide, Hesse, Frisch, Rilke and Pirandello. 
Virginia Woolf, another writer for whose art, as we have 
discovered, this topic is central, and who once spoke of this 
'vast insanity of personal existence' (Woolf4 1953~ 57), 
identifies one of these sources5 : 
People, like Arnold Bennett, say I can't create, or 
didn't in Jacob's Room, characters that survive. My 
answer is ...• the old argument that character is 
dissipated into shreds now; the old post-Dostoievsky 
argument. (AWD: 57) 
So we find Dostoievsky's influence also at work; the 
pessimism of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer may also be 
implicated. Whatever its origins, we can see how Pessoa's 
examination of the meaning of his own individuality through 
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the method of dispersing it among other and opposing selves, 
is a plan not out of accord with the spirit of literary 
Modernism. But few writers have taken the experiment so far. 
F.E.G. Quintanilha6 indeed identifies some nineteen 
different names used by Pessoa in his work at one time or 
another (Quintanilha 1973: xix). For Fernando pessoa7 , the 
greatest writer is 
the one who gives away his affiliations the least and the 
one who will write in the greatest number of literary 
genres, making use of paradoxes and dissimilarities. No 
artist should have only one personality. On the contrary 
he should have several, each one from like states of mind 
which would discard the fiction that personality is one 
only and indivisible. (tr. Quintanilha 1973: 
xxiii) 
Such conceptions, given direct expression by himself in 
his Trilogy of poets (Caeiro, Reis, de Campos), do, I think, 
bear out the identifications I have suggested with the thought 
of other Modernist writers. But such identifications in 
thought and aesthetic attitude only begin to unravel the 
problem of Pessoa. (How much cosmic laughter lies behind the 
fact that his name in Portuguese means 'person'). 
It is true that the mysterious complexity of human 
personality - the fact that being at all means being as 
something, and yet not necessarily one thing - is the subject 
of so may of the limpid and yet delphic poems, tightly rh~ed, 
that have been given Pessoa's own name; many of the English 
poems too, touch on this theme. But the heteronyms seem to 
have freed themselves from this conflict at least on the 
surface. 
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For them, some of the contradictions and ambiguities of 
being a person - together with any conscientious reluctance to 
take up a position, or adopt a 'truth' - have been laid, with 
relief, aside. Pessoa sometimes portrays himself as a prince 
with an unknown quest; if his problem was anything like 
Hamlet's the heteronyms have freed him from it. By standing 
grandly aloof from contradiction, they have given him back the 
names of action. 
A first impression might be that another feature, his 
intense mysticism, is also absent from the work of the 
heteronyms - though still found in the 'Fernando Pessoa' (and 
many of the English) poems; but rather, one should see 
mysticism as the main quality common to Pessoa and his 
surrogates. The difference is that they claim to discover, in 
their entirely different ways, the mystical in the actual (or 
in an attitude to the actual); in Pessoa it is discoverable 
principally in the vague adumbrations that reach this life 
from an alternative world. These are found especially in the 
borderland between two regions; somewhere between the intense 
complexity of the structure of the self and that other 
alternative world, the complex structure of the poem. 
3 
A comparable picture of the human self is, as we have seen, a 
feature of the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan. 
Although after the Oedipus event, the search for its identity 
will occupy the child throughout life, the quest for self is 
in truth a hopeless one. The goal of identity, can, in these 
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conditions, never be finally achieved: the search is never-
ending, its object always elusive and ambiguous. 
So it is that both language and identity stand between 
the child and the 'Real world' from which it emerged. We see 
how in Lacan's system identity and mysticism are linked. This 
is especially so if we interpret the mystical search for the 
Real as a desire for return to psychic origins. Only in a 
deconstruction of these primary entities, identity and 
language, can we hope for some distant approximation to a Real 
state of being. 
In such a radical situation, Pessoa seems to be saying 
(though he would not have conceptualised it in exactly Lacan's 
way), let us dissipate identity again so far as we may; let us 
reconstitute the paradox of truth in terms of its binary 
oppositions. Let us divide ourselves according to the 
contradictions that sustain us. Such exercises, though 
provisional and limited, may offer us hope of glimpsing once 
again, somewhere between the terms of the exercise, the 
Reality, the mystic totality, from which we have strayed. The 
effect is rather like that of the ko-an offered by the 
Buddhist teacher as an aid to contemplation. Fernando 
Pessoa's division into his selves is, in its way, the sound of 
one hand clapping'. 
Indeed, a similar trope appears in a poem of 1916, 
'Taedium Vitae', in which Pessoa imagines a woman playing a harp, 
and explains: 'Could I but kiss/The movement of your hands, 
without the hands themselves' (tr. Rickard 1971: 19). 
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As I have said, Pessoa may not have expressed the matter 
like this, but that his thoughts ran along some such lines is 
revealed in another remark attributed to de Campos: 
All true emotion is false at the intellectual level, 
because that isn't where it happens. All true emotion 
therefore has a false expression. Expressing oneself 
means saying what one doesn't feel. (tr. Rickards 
1971: 19) 
In a note to be found amongst his English writings2, 
Pessoa states: 'Sincerity is the one great artistic crime. 
Insincerity is the second greatest. The great artist should 
never have a really fundamental and sincere opinion about 
life. But that should give him the capacity •.. to be 
absolutely sincere about anything for a certain length of time 
- that length of time, say, which is necessary for a poem to 
be conceived and written' (ibid.). 
Does this not even sound like Wilde, like a wildean 
epigram? For that writer, too, the truth was best expressed 
in terms of paradox. In 'The Decay of Lying' Wilde argues, in 
Niezschean fashion, that the only knowable truths are the 
pretend truths of art. Only in the fictional reality of art 
can one take one side of a paradox and affirm it with 
'sincerity'. 
Thus Pessoa's view is that the truly sincere - as opposed 
to the merely opinionated poet - is necessarily 'um fingidor': 
a faker, a mountebank. Only the fictional can be really true, 
since it alone does not confuse fact and truth. For anyone to 
2 The title is rendered into Portuguese as paginas intimas 
e de auto-interpretacao. The quotation appears on p. 210. 
s 
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suppose that mere 'facts' are the same as 'the Real' would be 
worse than paradoxical, it would be downright misleading. The 
poet's fabrications are truer than fact. 
Then again, if paradoxes are the only possible verbal 
intimation of the true, then the sincere poet attempting to 
say something inevitably wrestles with paradox. It is not 
simply that paradoxes are to be brought openly into the 
substance of his poem. He himself - to be truly authentic -
must lead his life as a living paradox, as disturbingly 
different from what he 'seems'. This is the main burden of 
the poem 'Autopsicografia', which I have translated below. It 
demonstrates all the play of paradox, the deceptive, almost 
child-like simplicity, the elusiveness, of the best Pessoa 
verse. 
o poeta e um fingidor 
Finge tao completamente 
Que chega a fingir que e dor 
A dor que deveras sente. 
E os que leem 0 que escreve, 
Na dot lida sentem bem, 
Nao as duas que ele teve, 
, I.... tl> Mas so a que e es nao em. 
E assim nas calhas de roda 
Gira, a entreter a razao 
Esse comboio de corda 
Que se chama 0 carac:sao 15 
AUTOPSYCHOGRAPHY 
The poet is a counterfeit; 
One whose feigning's so 
complete 
You will find he even feigns 
When pains he fakes are real 
pains. 
Those who read the lines he's 
written, 
As they read, are sharply 
smitten 
Not by his doubly unreal cares, 
But by one which can't be 
theirs. 
And so it runs round its toy 
track 
Diverting sense, it doubles 
back 
Uncoiling the line a toy train 
charts; 
That wind-up clockwork called 
the heart. 
(pessoa9 1980: 237) 
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A poem illustrating the concern with identity to be found 
in the Pessoa poems is the beautiful and delphic 'Entre e Sono 
e 0 Sonho'. I have translated this too, below, to give some 
further sense of the Portuguese work: 
Entre 0 sono e 0 sonho 
Entre mim e 0 que em mim 
E 0 quem eu me suponho, 
Corre um rio sem fim. 
Passou por outras margens, 
. l' Dlversas mas a em, 
Naquelas varias viagens 
Que todo 0 rio tem. 
Chegou onde hoje habito 
A casa que hogo sou. 
Passa, se eu me medito; 
Se desperto, passou. 
E quem me sinto e morre 
No que me liga a mim 
Dorme onde 0 rio corre-
Esse rio sem fim. 
(1980: 175) 
Between my sleep and deeper 
dream 
Me and the me I comprehend 
The future who, like whom I 
seem, 
Flows a river with no end. 
It flowed past the land-margins 
Myriad but aloof 
That flank the thousand 
thoroughfares 
By which all rivers move. 
My own abode, that's where it 
lapped: 
That vast bare house I am 
today. 
Slips past, if with myself I'm 
wrapped; 
If I awake, it's slipped away. 
He I think I am, have been; 
He who me to me mends -
Sleep bends beneath the waving 
stream 
Of a river with no end. 
In its density and elusiveness this poem is typical of 
its creator: it sees the mysteries of individual being 
depending finally on some purpose beyond the self. The image 
of the river implies a continuity of essence that underlies 
the personal variations that everyday demands impose on the 
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human personality. Something larger than self is there as an 
ultimate controlling presence, something from which 
personality nonetheless arises. In all this, the poet's 
conception of his own identity is the least valid of its many 
manifestations. 
Not many of the English poems have the spareness and 
depth of the Portuguese. It is interesting for the translator 
to compare the effort above with a manuscript piece Pessoa 
himself wrote in English, coincidentally using some of the 
imagery and indeed some of the meaning of the Portuguese work. 
Appropriately, it is called 'Rivers'. 
Many Rivers run 
Down to many seas. 
All my cares are one: 
On what river of these 
Could my heart have peace? 
Two banks to each river. 
None where I may stray 
Hearing the rushes shiver 
And seeing the river ever 
Pass, yet seem to stay. 
Maybe there is another 
River, but far in Me. 
There may I meet the Brother 
Of my eternity 
In what God will this be?1o 
In the English poem, the 'many rivers' are distinguished 
from the 'one river', which, when found by the poet, will 
reconcile him to his 'Brother', by which he appears to mean 
his missing 'self': all he is not, the other parts of himself. 
It is clear that there is a relation between the 'one river' 
of the English poem and the 'river without end', which is also 
the infinite source of personality, and personal being, in the 
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Portuguese. To distinguish oneself, to raise oneself out of 
the undifferentiated flow of the current, is clearly a painful 
exercise. It sets up a binary tension between the poet and 
all he leaves aside, for the moment, in order to be himself. 
He is lost, inevitably, in paradox, in order to survive under 
adult exingenciesj but there is still the thanatos, the 
longing in him for ease from the tension of paradox, for 
return to the stream. 
That the mystical 'one river' of the English poem may be 
identified with the so-called 'Real world' of Lacan (in other 
words with the experience of undifferentiated being that for 
the child precedes its acquisition of language and perception 
of difference) is revealed by another of the little-known 
English poems: one titled, significantly, 'Anamnesis'. 
Somewhere I shall never live 
A palace garden bowers 
Such beauty that dreams of it grieve. 
There, lining walks immemorial -
'Great antenatal flowers 
My lost life, before God, recall. 
There I was happy and the child 
That had cool shadows 
Wherein to feel sweetly exiled. 
They took all these true things away 
o my lost meadows! 
My childhood before Night and Day!" 
Hubert Jennings'2, relying on the dating (May 12th 1901) 
given in the Obra Poetica'3 collection (Pessoa 1965: 103), 
would place this, somewhat reluctantly, among the poet's first 
works (Jennings 1986: 33-4). Internally it is very unlike 
what Pessoa was producing at the time. Even Jennings is moved 
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~o wonder 'how could a young boy, living in a largely 
philistine environment, get hold of this essentially learned 
word "anamnesis"?' (ibid.). 
Indeed, I find the dating extremely doubtful: my own 
source is the manuscript (admittedly, typewritten) of The Mad 
Fiddler, most of the work for which was done in 1913. His 
acceptance of the dating leads Jennings into conjectural 
misinterpretations of the content: 'reflections by the young 
poet on his childhood in Lisbon' in combination with Platonic 
pre-existence. The one word that differs in the two 
versions - Jennings's has, awkwardly, 'soul' for 'God' in line 
6 - serves to emphasise that these may well be inadequate 
renderingsj unless 'soul' is meant as the equivalent of 
'self'. We see how the introduction of the Lacanian model is 
not mere romancing, but can help to elucidate matters of 
provenance and interpretation. 
4 
Though the Portuguese poems of 'Pessoa himself' are sometimes 
more complicated of idea, more fragmented, more elusive, and 
more original in style, they share a great deal in common with 
many of the English poems in the matter of feeling. In 
particular, the dissatisfaction with the present, and a 
mystical yearning for other 'selves' and states of being. 
Pessoa's poetry is not always, however, so overtly 
mysticalj his 'other poets' seem in reaction against the 
other-worldly tendency in him, perhaps more than against any 
other of his traits; they all attempt to ground their 
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respective visions firmly in this present physical existence. 
In a subtle and perverse way, their work somehow remains 
mystical, for all that. 
Despite Ricardo Reis's posture of enlightened detachment 
from the world, his air of watching the downgoings of 
cosmogonies, the falling-off of things, from the refined 
bulwark of his chiselled verse, and aesthetic, world-weary 
epicureanism ('Ah love, let us be untrue to one another', he 
might have said), there is in his conscious paganism more than 
a hint of Pessoa's longing for a prior, better place. This 
link between them is revealed by a comment on them both de 
Campos allows himself in his essay called Notes in Memory of 
My Master Caeiro: 
My master Caeiro was not a pagani he was paganism. 
Ricardo Reis is a pagan. Antonio Mora is a pagan, I am a 
pagan. Fernando Pessoa himself would be a pagan if he 
was not so balled up inside himself.... (quoted Green14 
1976: ii) 
It is in the odd verse or line that the metaphysical 
drift of Reis's poetry surfaces: 'Let us use existence/As the 
place in the country which the gods concede us' he writes, for 
example (Griffin1s 1971 b : 17); and again: 'Christ is one god 
b 
more,/Perhaps one who fell short' (1971 : 8). I quote two 
verses below from a work also presumably dedicated to Caeiro, 
this time by Reis, called 'Master, Serene' in Jonathan 
Griffin's translation (3-4). 
There are no sorrows 
Nor joys either 
In our life. 
Thoughtlessly wise, 
Not to live it. 
Sunflowers ever 
Enjoying the sun, 
From life let's go 
Tranquilly, not have 
Even the remorse 
Of having lived. 
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Alvaro de Campos rejects both Reis's pagan quietism and 
Pessoa's mysticism; instead he throws himself into a worship 
of the movement, noise, and orgiastic variety of the modern 
city. Physical reality is, with a vengence, the object of his 
venereation; his work is thus more than Pessoa's homage to 
Futurism. The sexual undertone to his frenzied enthusiasm, 
the sycophantic imitation of the city's most banal noises -
and the masochistic desire for self-immolation amid metal, 
glass, concrete, noise and steam, of self-dispersal into the 
chaos and buzz that passes for life at an extreme - all these 
are to be found in the 'Triumphal Ode', written in the 
sprawling free verse that is characteristic of early de 
Campos. But his masochism is really, beneath it all, Pessoa's 
own: the masochism of the temporarily defeated mystic, forced 
to feel to the full the moment when his desires for 
transcendence can proceed no further, but are stopped by the 
immanent and all too imposing reality of the city's fabric. 
I include a few lines of 'Triumphal Ode' (9de Triunfal) 
below, in my translated version. The poem begins in adulation 
of a modern factory: 
Bits of an Alexander of the fiftieth century, 
Atoms that will go on to inflame the mind of 
the Aeschylus of 10,000 A.D. 
Run through these fan-belts and pistons and fly-wheels 
Roaring, grating, scraping, thundering, ringing: 
An excess of caresses to my body making just one caress 
to my soul. 
Ah, to express myself as utterly as engines can! 
To be complete like a machine! 
To be able to breast life triumphantly as the newest 
model car! 
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Or at least, be able to penetrate myself physically with 
all this, 
To rip myself open, expand completely, acquiescent 
utterly 
To all the perfumes of oil and of heat and of coal 
Of this stupendous flora: artificial, black and 
insatiable! 
It has always been asserted that Pessoa made no 
translations of his own Portuguese works in English. One of 
the most exciting discoveries I made when exploring the 
extensive manuscript collection of his work in the Lisbon 
National Library in 1982, was that translations which may well 
be by Pessoa himself do exist among the papers: all of them 
are of work by de Campos. Of particular interest is the one 
long poem: a shortened form of the famous Ode Maritima , a 
poem Roy campbel116 once called 'the loudest ever written' 
(Campbell 1957: 156). It is to harbours and ships what Ode 
Triunfal was to the city and noise. While the original did 
contain English, in the form of snatches of sea-shanties, our 
entirely English version, 'Naval Ode', does not continue so 
far. Nonetheless, it is especially intriguing to have one of 
the famous works in what is probably the author's own English 
form. 
3 Dated 'London - June 1914'. Although Pessoa never visited 
England, de Campos studied in Glasgow. This poem, together with 
~Opiario appe~ared in the first number of the magaz:ine Orfeu 
in April 1915. 
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A further fascinating point is the fact that campbell, in 
ignorance of the existence of an English version by the poet's 
hand, attempted a translation of a part of the Ode (1957: 
15Sff.). Although, in campbell's own words, in its full 
version 'for a hundred pages it is a series of deafening 
foghorn blasts', the section he chose to translate by 
coincidence overlaps with the Pessoa fragment. The 
consequence is a situation perhaps unique in the history of 
letters, and a perfect battleground for controversialists over 
the matter of translation. Most inflammatory of all, it is 
undeniable that the Campbell version sometimes has the better 
poetry. 
NAVAL ODE 
Alone, on the deserted quay, this summer morning, 
I look towards the bar, I look towards the Indefinite, 
I look and find pleasure in seeing, 
Little, black and clean, a steamer coming in. 
It is very far yet, distinct and classic after its own 
fashion. 
It leaves on the distant air behind it the vain curls of 
its smoke. 
It is coming in, and morn comes with it, and on the river 
Here, there, naval life awakes, 
Sails arise, tugs advance, 
Small boats just out from behind ships in the port. 
There is a vague breeze. 
But my soul is with the things that I see least, 
with the in-coming steamer, 
Because it is with Distance, with Morn, 
With the naval meaning of this Hour, 
With the painful softness that rises in me like a qualm, 
Like a beginning of sea-sickness, but in my soul. 
I look from afar at the steamer, with a great 
independence of mind 
And a wheel begins to spin in me, very slowly. 
The steamers that enter the bar in the morning, 
Bring to my eyes with their coming 
The glad and sad mystery of all who arrive and depart. 
They bring memories of distant quays, and of other 
moments 
Of another kind of the same mankind in other ports. 
Every 'arrival', every departure of a ship, 
Is - I feel it in me like my blood -
Unconsciously symbolic, terribly 
Threatening metaphysical meanings 
That startle in me the being I once was ..• 
Ah, every quay is a regret made of stone! 
And when the ship leaves the quay 
And we note suddenly that a space is widening 
Between the quay and the ship, 
There comes to me, I know not why, a recent anguish, 
A mist of feelings of sadness 
That shines in the sun of my mossy anguishes 
Like the first window the morning strikes on, 
And clings round me like some one else's remembrance 
Which is somehow mysteriously mine. 
Ah, who knows, 
If I did not leave long ago, before Myself, 
A quay; if I did not depart, a ship in 
The oblique sun of morning, 
From another kind of port? 
Who knows if I did not leave, before the hour 
Of the exterior world as I see it 
Dawned for me 
A large quay full of few people, 
Of a great half-awakened city, 
Of a great city commercial, overgrown, apopletical, 
As much as that can be outside Time and Space? 
Ay, from a quay, from a quay, 
359 
The Absolute Quay on whose type, unconsciously imitated, 
Insensibly evoked, 
We men have built 
Our quays in our harbours, 
Our quays of actual stone overlooking true water, 
Which, once built, suddenly show themselves to be 
Real-Things, Thing-Spirits, Entities in Stone-Souls, 
At certain moments of ours of root-sentiments 
When it seems that a door is opened in the outer world 
And, without anything changing, 
Everything reveals itself to be different. 
Ah, the Great Quay, whence we embarked in Ship-Nations! 
The Great Father Quay, eternal and divine! 
Of what port? Over what waters? And why do I think of 
this? 
A Great Quay like all other quays, but the Only One. 
Full, as they are, of murmurous silences in the fore-
dawns 
And budding with the dawns in a noise of cranes 
And arrivals of goods-trains 
And under the black, occasional light cloud 
Of the Smoke of the chimneys of the near factories 
Which clouds its ground, black with small shining coal, 
As if it were the shadow of a cloud passing over dark 
water. 
Ah, what essentiality of mystery and arrested senses 
In a divine revealing ecstasy 
At the hours coloured like silences and anguishes 
Is the bridge between any quay and THE QUAY! 
Quay blackly reflected in the still waters, 
Bustle on board the ships, 
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Oh wandering and unstable Soul of the people who live in 
the ships, 
Of the symbolic people who pass and for whom nothing 
lasts 
For when the vessel returns to the port, 
There is always some change on board! 
Oh continual flights, goings, drunkenness of the 
Different! 
Eternal soul of navigators and of navigations! 
Hulls slowly reflected in the waters 
When the ship leaves the port! 
To float as soul of life, to depart as voice, 
To live the moment tremulously on eternal waters! 
To wake to more direct days than the days of Europe, 
To see mysterious ports over the loneliness of the sea, 
To double distant capes and see sudden great landscapes 
Of unnumbered astonished slopes! 
Ah, the distant beaches, the quays seen from afar, 
And then the near beaches and the quays seen from near. 
The mystery of each departure and of each arrival, 
The painful instability and incomprehensibility 
Of this impossible universe 
At each naval hour ever more deeply felt right in my 
skin. 
The absurd sob that our souls spill 
Over the ever-different tracts of seas with islands afar, 
Over the distant lines of the coasts we merely pass by, 
Over the clear growing-clear of ports, with their houses 
and their people, 
When the ship nears the land. 
Ah, the freshness of the morns when we arrive, 
And the paleness of the morns when we depart, 
When our entrails are gripped up 
And a vague sensation resembling a fear 
- The ancestral fear of going away and leaving, 
The mysterious ancestral terror of Arrivals and New 
Things -
Grips our skin and gives us qualms 
And all our anguished body feels, 
As if it were our Soul, 
An unexplainable desire to feel this in some other way: 
A regret at something, 
A perturbation of tenderness towards what vague 
fatherland? 
What coast? what ship? what quay? 
That thought sickens within us 
And only a great vacuum remains in us, 
A hollow satiety of naval minutes, 
And a vague anxiety that would be weariness or pain 
If it knew how to be that ••• 
The summer morning is, nevertheless, slightly cool, 
A slight night-dullness lies yet on the shaken air. 
The wheel within me quickens its motion slightly. 
And the steamer keeps on coming in, because surely it 
must be coming in, 
And not because I see it moving in its excessive 
distance. 
In my imagination it is already near and visible 
In all the extent of the lines of its portholes, 
And everything trembles in me, all my flesh and all my 
skin, 
On account of that creature that never arrives in any 
ship 
And whom I have come to await to-day on this quay, 
through an oblique command. 
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Responding to my initial publication of this poem, 
Professor Tony Voss'7 points out that the landscape described 
resembles Durban far more closely than Lisbon (Voss 1991). If 
Durban is, indeed, the imaginary site of the Ode, then the 
lines which especially seem to hark back ('what vague 
fatherland?') to the 'Absolute Quay' of our earliest 
awareness, 'before the hour/Of the exterior world', have a 
special significance. Since Durban is Natal's main port-
city, could it be, Voss asks, that Pessoa is influenced by the 
double meaning of the provincial name 'Natal'? 
Campbell, another exile who hailed from Natal, may have 
responded unconsciously to the connection. I include below a 
short extract from Campbell's translation of the Portuguese 
. 
version of the above lines. Comparison between the two 
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versions is a fascinating exercise, but I must leave those 
interested to look up the rest of the translation in 
Campbell's travel-book. His rendering begins at the start of 
our fourth verse-paragraph, and follows the text for a further 
forty-five lines. 
The whole quay is a memory in stone. 
And when the ship leaves it, and suddenly 
One sees the space widen 
Between the quay and the ship, 
I feel, I know not why, a recent anguish, 
A haze of mournful feeling, 
That shines in the sun of my grief 
Like the first pane on which the morning shimmers. 
It clothes me in the memory of another being 
Whose person was mysteriously mine. 
Who knows? Who knows if I have never 
Embarked, before myself, from such a quay? 
As a ship in the oblique rays of the morning sun, who 
knows 
If I have not sailed from a different kind of port? 
Who knows if I have not left (before the time 
Of this exterior world as I behold it 
Striping itself with colours for my sake) 
A great Quay filled with the fewness of the people 
Of as vast, as distended and apoplectic a city 
As can exist outside of Space and Time. 
Campbell's wording slightly underplays the reference to a 
primal state of awareness in the final line above; Pessoa, on 
the other hand, imagines a city which is overgrown and 
commercial 'As much as that can be outside Time and Space': 
for the mental port-city he is building is not, finally, in 
time and space at all - even if it does seem paradoxically to 
have particular physical characteristics. 
The second work under de Campos's name published 
alongside Ode Truinfal in the momentous first edition of 
Orfeu, in 1915, was opiario, written in rhyming four-line 
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stanzas. A few manuscript verses of this poem (unrhymed) are 
extant in translated form. It is largely autobiographical (on 
de Campos's part), and the full poem expresses a kind of 
world-weary cynicism. Even the fragment we have in English 
conveys something of this, and could be allowed to stand by 
itself. 
Life tastes to me like golden tobacco. 
I have never done anything but smoke life. 
After all of what use was it to me to have 
Gone to the East and seen India and China? 
The earth is similar and little 
And there is only one way of living. 
I pretended to study engineering. 
I lived in Scotland, I visited Ireland. 
My heart is a poor grandmother who goes about 
Begging at the doors of Joy. 
I am unfortunate by primogeniture. 
The gypsies stole my luck. 
Perhaps I shall not even find near death 
A place to shelter me from my cold. 
And I was a child like other people. 
I was born in a Portuguese province, 
And I have met English people 
Who say I speak English perfectly.4 
Despite the sprawl of de Campos's verse, his Portuguese 
work is by no means easy to render faithfully in English, 
especially when the translator lacks Pessoa's authority for 
the choice of the right word in the right order: hence the 
extreme interest of the surviving English pieces above. In 
addition to these 'translations' there are existing English 
poems which, while lacking de Campos's signature, bear the 
4 MSS. 49B 1-19, National Library, Lisbon. Since both the de 
Campos MSS are in typewritten form (as are, indeed, many of the 
authenticated Pessoa MSS) their provenance is, hypothetically, 
not beyond dispute. 
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hallmarks of his style and could be attributed to him. The 
following, for example18 j though it is perhaps to be exempted 
on account of its rhymes. 
Oh for a less meaningless horizon than the land and the 
sea! 
Oh for a rest from places and a lapse from the sense of 
times! 
Waves over waves, to and fro ••• Ever waves roll, and we 
What do we want, what do we seek, what do we pause for 
and flee? 
What in us lusts for more round us than the stretch of 
minutes and climes? 
Ah, and no bark to bear us towards 'the' Impossible, 
and that a real place, 
An attainable place, full of the depths and crests of the 
unattainable! 
But ever the sea, and the sea runs a restless and half-
hearted race 
Towards not the shore,. nor the land, but what? Who can 
measure or tell? 
No ship to bear us homeward, past earth and sea and the 
sky! 
None to spread sails to a breeze blowing but not with 
weather! 
And ever, like a lost meaning, the sea never passing by, 
Ever the measurable sea, sad as a formless cry, 
And the most hearts can be is to be two and sorrow 
together! 
To-morrow will tire us of all! But we lack heart to be 
tired indeed 
The purpose our souls came for is lost and never stared 
at ••. 
Let us at least by the shore construe our aches for a 
deed 
Into a meaningless ache and a desolate and purposeless 
greed .•• 
Become we one with the sea's lost purpose and dream 
and wish nothing but that .•• 
Here again it is to a kind of 'oceanic consciousness', to 
an ultimate, anterior Lacanian Reality, that the physical sea 
draws us. In this case it is the longed-for goal of the 
voyage as well as its beginning. 
5 
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It is perhaps not so much a loss as it might be that there are 
no translations of Caeiro's poems by Pessoa's own hand. On 
the whole, Caeiro translates easily. This is fortunate since 
in many ways Caeiro is the most interesting of the heteronyms, 
largely because he provides the most compelling opposition to 
all that Pessoa himself is and thinks. It is no accident that 
both Reis and de Campos acknowledge Caeiro as their 'master', 
as we have seen: such is the monolithic simplicity and 
assurance of his poetic stance, he invites discipleship, or 
rejection utterly. Indifference to him is impossible. 
He is the strong and simple - we imagine untutored -
'bucolic' poet who appeared to Pessoa on that fateful eighth 
of March 1914. His principal collection is entitled The 
Keeper of the Flocks; but, the first poem in the collection 
suggests that, whatever his occupation, his 'flock' is his 
'thoughts'. His philosophy - on the face of it, strongly 
anti-metaphysical - may be summed up in his own approval of a 
few untypical lines of Wordsworth which de Campos once 
translated for him (cf. Rickard19 1971: 29): 
A primrose by the river's brim 
A yellow primrose was to him 
And it was nothing more. 2D 
This approach is in stark opposition to Pessoa's own. 
The poems by Pessoa himself show him very clearly to be a poet 
for whom effects are important: the whole poetic stock-in-
trade of evocative technical mannerisms, of figures, tricks, 
poeticisms and word-play, are marshalled by him with 
deliberation of an almost over-conscious kind. This is, of 
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course, understandable in a situation where the poet is 
counterpoising the reality of everyday with the reality of the 
poem, as he is. In contrast, for Caeiro such poetry is based 
on a false metaphysic, on a failure of attention to what is. 
Our failure comes, in a sense, from our being human: from our 
attempt to humanise nature in philosophy and in poetry alike. 
By comparing them, by seeing them our way, we fail to see them 
as they are; and that is a kind of sickness - the sickness of 
the metaphysical - from which only the right kind of seeing 
can save us. 
There is considerable similarity in aim, and some in 
method, between the poetic oeuvre of Alberto Caeiro and Ludwig 
wittgenstein's TracatusZ', both taking shape at roughly the 
same time. If the Tracatus has the aim of rendering 
philosophy unnecessary, then Caeiro's poetry aims at rendering 
poetry unnecessary: if it has any function, then it, too, is a 
kind of ladder to truth which can be kicked away when the 
novitiate has arrived ... or perhaps we should say that this 
elimination of poetry would be Caeiro's achievement had Pessoa 
no other personae. It is the other, different, authors who 
keep Caeiro in being; who render him necessary. 
Poem XX of The Keeper of the Flocks (tr. Rickard 1971: 
125), for example, inveighs specifically against simile and 
comparison, ordinarily the poet's stock-in-trade: 
The Tagus is fairer than the river flowing through my 
village, 
But the Tagus isn't fairer than the river flowing through 
my village 
Because the Tagus isn't the river flowing through my 
village. (11. 1-3) 
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Though to both men, to philosopher and to poet, 'the 
world is all that is the case', Wittgenstein's tone in the 
Tractatus is triumphant, confident, and even dogmatically 
insistent; caeiro is pedagogic, too, but behind the assurance 
of his pronouncements lies a pervading sadness. It is sad 
that what appears is all - sad, because human beings are 
incurably Platonic in their outlook: they foolishly desire 
more. Their desire to find an underlying pattern is no more 
than a sign of man's misguided (to say 'tragic' is too 
portentous) nature. 
True, Caeiro admits that he, too, is human: ' ..• I lack 
the godlike simplicitY/Of being nothing but my outward self', 
he says (1971: 125). But he justifies his human sadness by 
giving it an almost aesthetic dimension (I,ll. 14-18; tr. 
Green22 1971: 5): 
In my sadness there is calm 
Because it is both natural and right 
And is what there should be in the soul 
When it is thinking it exists 
And the hands are picking flowers, not noticing which. 
For all this, he is entirely uncompromising in his 
rejection of metaphysical or poetic re-interpretations of the 
world. As regards poetry not only simile, but rhyme too, is 
rejected, as in Poem XIV (XIV, Lt. 1-3; Green 1971: 12). Hence it is no 
accident that Caeiro's versification is among the freest 
employed by Pessoa's poets: excessive form is a falsification. 
I don't care about rhyme. One seldom finds 
Two trees alike, standing side by side. 
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Yet poetry is clearly necessary to Caeiro, perhaps 
surprisingly. He gives various justifications for this. For 
example, in Poem I (11. 28-30; 1971: 5) he suggests that his 
poems have only a private importance: 
I have no ambitions or wants. 
To be a poet is no ambition of mine. 
It is my way of staying alone. 
Later he sees poetry much more in the light of Wittgenstein's 
ladder, to be kicked away: an 'apprenticeship in unlearning'. 
POEM XXIV 
What we see of things, are the things. 
Why should we see one thing if another were there? 
Why should seeing and hearing, be deluding ourselves, 
If seeing and hearing are seeing and hearing? 
It is essential to be good at seeing, 
Good at seeing without always thinking, 
Able to see when one is seeing, 
And not think when one is seeing 
Not see when one is thinking. 
But that (poor us who carry our soul fully clothed). 
That demands a thorough course of study, 
An apprenticeship in unlearning 
And a sequestration into the liberty of that convent 
Of which the poets say that the stars are the eternal 
nuns 
And the flowers the passionate penitents of one sole day, 
But where in the end the stars are nothing but stars 
And the flowers nothing but flowers; 
This is why we call them stars and flowers. 
(1971: 13) 
'Don't think, look' was Wittgenstein's maxim by the time he 
wrote the Philosophical Investigations23 • Emotionally, at any 
rate, this continuing parallel with Caeiro points to a 
constant in wittgenstein's attitudes, no matter how his 
doctrines changed over time. 
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Some of the poetic appeal of Wittgenstein's writing, 
especially in the delphic early work, lies in the way it uses 
a spare aphoristic style to alert the reader, through 
formulation and tight reformulation, to concepts for which 
there can be no one expression - to concepts which, when 
understood, dispense with the necessity for the expressions 
themselves. This mixture of elusiveness and clarity lies at 
the heart of the appeal of both philosopher and poet alike. 
To be fulfilled, existence is enough. 
I've written several poems. 
No doubt I shall write many more. 
Each of my poems says this, 
And all my poems are different, 
Because each thing that exists is one way of saying this. 
(tr. Rickard 1971: 139) 
Ultimately, the positions of both philosopher and poet 
are untenable. Wittgenstein tried an alternative approach in 
Philosophical Investigations, contradicting some at least of 
the Tractatus conclusions. (In a sense, his two works were 
also in their way separate philosophical personae.) Alberto 
Caeiro, for all the homage paid to him as their 'master' by 
Reis and de Campos, cannot in the end dominate. The human 
need to pattern life is too insistent, too 'natural' to be 
unlearnt. In some sense trees do repeat, in order to be 
trees. Then again, even Caeiro's own poetic activity and 
desire - however reluctant he is - to communicate, bely their 
subject-matter. His verse does after all offer a pattern -
even though it is a pattern of negation, one Pessoa himself 
ultimately found untenable: he attempted to invent the 'death' 
of Caeiro in 1920. However, the demise was evidently not 
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final: the fascination remained. According to J.C.R. Green, 
poetry Pessoa composed close to his own death 'can only be 
attributable to Caeiro' (Green 1971: 3). 
The problem, the origin of Pessoa's uneasiness, lies then 
in the very absolutism that Caeiro's status as persona allows 
him. Even for Caeiro that absolutism is not perfect: often he 
worries that his own human vulnerability will let him down. 
Musing on the nature of beauty, Caeiro is driven to reject it 
as no more than a name for a non-existent entity 'which I give 
things in return for the pleasure they give me' (11. 11-12; 
1971: 15); nonetheless, his own seduction by the concept makes 
him aware of how much he, too, is dependent on 'the lies men 
tell' (XXVI, 11. 14-18; Rickard 1971: 129): 
Yes, even to me, who live just by living, 
Come all unseen the lies men tell 
When faced with things, 
When faced with things which simply exist, 
How hard it is to be oneself and see only what is there. 
Not only hard, but impossible, in Caeiro's sense. And this is 
what Caeiro does not realise. Even 'flowers and rivers' (Poem 
XXXI) are known only as each of us individual human beings 
know them, and cannot be known otherwise. The 'truth' Caeiro 
so extols - what is really there - can be in reality neither 
part of, nor synonymous with, the common, objective world. 
That we never directly experience. (Even Wittgenstein's ideal 
objective forum, the public world of our shared language, is 
here suspect.) How distinguish a being like ourselves, 
whose whole mode of consciousness is interpretation, from the 
data such a being only knows through interpreting it? And 
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indeed, Caeiro cannot even refer us, properly speaking, to the 
so-called realities he wants us to look at. His poems use not 
the things themselves, but certain words, words like 'flowers' 
and 'rivers'. What these words convey, and what the human eye 
sees when it distinguishes rivers from flowers, is not the 
'things in themselves' but entities roughly defined by human 
discourse. In other words, even the language Caeiro uses to 
make his points is part of the human act of interpretation, 
and ultimate Reality escapes it. This is the flaw in Caeiro's 
position, seductive though it is. 
In the end, Caeiro's existence only serves to strengthen 
Pessoa's own poetic identity. Caeiro's failure to disperse 
mysticism affirms Pessoa as a mystic poet. We remember that 
mysticism returned upon Wittgenstein too, even in the Tractatus. 
caeiro is unrepentant. Yet there is something 
testy and defensive in his bluff dismissal below, his last 
words to be reported here. They are from Poem XXVIII, a 
comment on a specific unnamed 'mystic poet' (11. 4-5; Green 
1971: 16); it is Pessoa himself that Caeiro must surely have 
been reading: 
Mystic poets are sick philosophers, 
And philosophers are mad fools. 
6 
In spite of what I have said of the greater openness of some 
of the English work about the sources of Pessoa's mystical 
inspiration, it would not be fair to imply that readers might 
easily respond to the English work as a bolus with unmoderated 
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enthusiasm. Truth to tell, the standard of Pessoa's English 
poems varies enormously. It would be too easy to suggest that 
being cut off from the living language was detrimental to his 
ear as a poet; but certainly it is unfortunate that he was not 
more exposed to specifically English Modernism. Some 
interesting writing of his is marred until very late by the 
poeticisms and archaisms of the Romantic decline: it is as if 
Pessoa could not escape from what was considered poetic in his 
Durban schoolroom. The departure for Lisbon seems to have put 
an end for a time to the linguistic development of his poetry 
along the lines of a more modern natural diction; and one 
often yearns to translate not merely Pessoa's Portuguese, but 
also his English, into a more workable idiom, closer to that 
of his native poems. 
Indeed, to take the liberty of erasing an archaic word or 
two, or correcting an intrusion, often unexpectedly brings to 
light an interesting result, reminiscent of the Portuguese 
work. This is an especially worthwhile exercise where modern 
and archaic registers are in conflict, or there have been 
misjudgments of idiom, as is too frequently the case. Pessoa, 
with his desire for flight from himself, is drawn to the 
artificial and the literary as yet another mask: and in 
English, where his ear for register is not perfect, the result 
is sometimes unhappy. 
Perhaps the strangest of all his masks is his Shakespeare 
impersonation in the collection 35 Sonnets (1918), one of the 
few volumes to be published in his lifetime. In these he 
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imitates and exaggerates the convoluted literary 'figures' of 
the Elizabethan age, even to the point of parody. It is 
clearly the potential for masque and disguise, of concealment 
within these intricate Elizabethan mazes, that draws him 
there. But for an uncomfortable archaism or two, a very small 
handful of these sonnets come painfully close to the elusive, 
elliptical power of the Portuguese verse; the remainder are an 
exercise in the antique, no more. 
And yet there are appealing moments even among Alexander 
Search's early poeticisations. Perhaps the best place for 
comparison is alongside early Yeats: as I have intimated, 
there are may affinities with that other poet of masks. 'The 
Giant's Reply', printed below, is a good example of this type. 
THE GIANT'S REPLYS 
I met a giant upon my way; 
He looked more wise than Nature. 
'Tell me some truth': so my tongue betrayed 
My soul to that more than creature. 
'There is but one', in an old voice strange 
He cried: 'things are more, I say, 
Than Time in which they seem to change 
And than Space that seems more than they. ' 
A.S. 1908? 
Another work which reminds strongly of Yeats is 
'Epigram', below; it is likely that the Yeats ian echoes are a 
result of similar preoccupations, rather than a matter of 
direct influence, however. 
'I love my dream', I said, a winter morn, 
To the practical man, and he, in scorn 
Replied: 'I am no slave of the Ideal, 
But, as all men of sense, I love the Real.' 
Poor fool, mistaking all that is and seems! 
5 Emendations: 1. 3: 'thus my tongue did betray' 
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I love the real when I love my dreams. 
A.S. 1909? 
The later Lisbon period of his English work does produce 
one or two really fine poems - rather more than most critics 
have admitted. The two long erotic poems that saw publication, 
Antinous (1915) and Epithalamium (1913)24, are, again, 
competent enough exercises in the Romantic antique, but are 
empty works apart from their lubricity. The best pieces still 
remain in manuscript; some of them hidden within The Mad 
Fiddler, a collection unsuccessfully offered to an English 
publisher. This is no case of publisher's short-sightedness; 
the rejection of the volume was just. But one or two of the 
poems are of the highest standard. 'Horizon II', printed 
below, probably for the first time, is very fine. 
HORIZON II 
Already the sea is a whitening line 
Along my wish, 
And the wind is coming shadowy and fine 
with its eerie reach 
To touch my common despair and pain, 
My wonder and night, 
The subtle sense of the coming rain 
And my lost delight. 
The missing reason for having love 
Is quiet with these, 
The secret vision, the shining grove 
And the final trees. 
1912-13 
Perhaps the greatest single find of my time among the 
Pessoa manuscripts was the discovery that there had been a 
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remarkable resurgence of English writing close to the poet's 
death. Deciphering the hieroglyphic scrawl of these rapid 
jottings on scraps of paper was a painstaking process, but 
with a unique reward. From the near unintelligible lines and 
dots gradually took shape complete poems that had been read, 
in all likelihood, only by myself and Pessoa. It is rare that 
one can share, in even a proximate way, a jot of the emotion 
felt by the first scholar of the Codex Sinaiaticus or the Dead 
Sea Scrolls; even though this is to judge of the great by the 
comparatively limited. 
Nonetheless, the poems that resulted were a surprise, not 
only to me, but to Portuguese scholars of Pessoa to whom I 
showed them. They are far from his greatest works, but they 
do have their special interest. Although there are hints of 
their style in earlier poems, they are unlike any other of his 
works. A very free versification which is also tightly 
rhymed, humorous in tone yet painful in feeling, these are 
love-poems with a difference. Their language is entirely 
modern; social, polite, wistful on the surface, their dancing 
lines chronicle sad, unresolved love-affairs in the offhand 
manner of a latter-day Laforgue. So uncharacteristic are they 
that the suggestion was made to me by one noted academic, Dr 
Yvette Centeno, that they must in fact be translations of 
unlocated works by a fellow-poet6 • If they are translations, 
they must be extremely free: sometimes almost every other word 
rhymes, and one sees Pessoa trying alternative possibilities 
6 She suggested Eliezer Kamenetzky as a candidate. If such 
poems exist, they are locked away in private manuscript stores 
(cf., however, Alma Errante [Preface by Pessoa] Lisbon, 1932). 
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in the margins. occasional gaps are left, where inspiration 
fails. They are also rapidly written, which is untypical of 
translation; but then, Pessoa is a unique poet. If, on the 
other hand, Pessoa's own experience is implicated in these 
lines - and even if it is not - they justify by their very 
existence the precise sense of stephen Gray's lines (in 
'Fernando Pessoa'j Gray25 1976: 53): 
once the persona had gone/he cast a dozen 
others in his point of focus/the metaphysical 
the patriotic the sceptical/and always the lover. 
At least some, perhaps all of these personae are visible 
in the English poetry. 
The example below, untitled but marked 49 A7-11 in the 
National Library collection, is characteristic of the kind in 
question: 
Was it just a kiss? 
Was it more than this? 
Was he just too kind? 
Were you just too blind? 
Anyhow 
I want to know: 
I am not jealous 
No, I am just zealous 
That you should not fall. 
And I think I'll forgive, 
Oh, I'm sure I'll forgive 
If only you'll tell me all. 
Was it just a touch 
On your arm? Was it more? 
Was it just a kiss 
Or something more than this? 
Tell me, tell me, although 
It may pain me 
To know. 
Did you smile? Did you kiss? Did you fall? 
I really shall forgive, 
If only you'll tell me all. 
I know nothing about 
What happened, but say 
What happened. You may 
Don't leave me in doubt. 
The worst may make smart 
Or break my heart, 
But I shall have the better part, 
I'll really forgive, 
If only you'll tell me all. 
28.4.1935 
Interesting variant among Pessoa's many imaginary 
personae as this is, what really concerns us here is not 
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social poetry, however elegant, but his mystical inspiration. 
As we have found, the English poems are, if anything, more 
open and direct about his mystical longings than the 
Portuguese. I shall close with two works which dramatise this 
preoccupation in different ways. The first, not really 
surprisingly, tells us that Fernando Pessoa, the poet of the 
multiple heteronyms, is not after all interested in 'things in 
their many selves/But the being there of things.' 
Interestingly, what begins as a love-poem rapidly moves on to 
a yearning for Being itself: for a Reality beyond the personal 
and contingent, by which even romance is overshadowed. 
FLASHES OF MADNESS II 
When you see me spend hours 
Holding in a too-local glance 
Your mouth or teeth, or your hand 
And note how my soul devours 
With a sleep-like trance 
The commonest things that stand, 
And ask me what in them I see 
Since in to each my spirit delves 
As if each had a mystery, 
You err in your conjecturings, 
For whatever obsesses me 
Is not things in their many selves 
But the being there of things. 
1905? 
378 
The final poem is characteristic of Pessoa's nostalgia 
for the infinite, as it expresses itself in his English work. 
Here what we may understand as the pre-linguistic Real is 
figured as a 'home beyond the hills'; one whose memory 
etiolates and destroys the actual. Finally, as in the reversal 
of stanza three, it 'kills' even the hills which hide it from 
view. In Pessoa's eyes, linguistic actuality is. drained of 
life by the greater presence it attempts to replace. Pessoa's 
window onto this Reality, once broken open, can never be 
satisfactorily mended. 
THE BROKEN WINDOW 
My heart is silent as a look. 
There is a home beyond the hills. 
My heart is silent as a look. 
My home is there, beyond the hills. 
I bear my heart like an old curse. 
There is no reason for regret. 
I bear my heart like an old curse. 
Why should we reason or regret? 
My heart dwells in me like a ghost. 
Beyond the hills my hope lies dead. 
My heart dwells in me like a ghost. 
Beyond my hope the hills lie dead. 
They took away my heart like weeds. 
It was not true that I should live. 
They took away my heart like weeds. 
I could not think it true to live. 
Now there are great stains in my heart. 
They are like blood-stains on a floor. 
Now there are great stains in my heart. 
And my heart lies upon the floor. 
The room is closed for ever now. 
My heart is now buried alive. 
My heart is closed for ever now. 
The whole room is buried alive. 
1912-23 
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PART FOUR: HEAVEN AND HELL 
\ 
Chapter 8: FANGS FOR THE MAMMARIES: MEMORY, DESIRE AND THE 
FEMININE IN DRACULA AND THE EDWARDIAN OCCULT TALE. 
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This chapter has two main aims in view: firstly, it sets out 
to understand some of the deeper motives behind fictions 
dealing with the horrific and the eerie. To do so it will 
enlist the help of contemporary psychoanalytic insights about 
what we normally see as outcast and repulsive. Secondly, it 
attempts to isolate a distinct moment and period in the 
evolution of the supernatural horror story, one which I choose 
to title 'Edwardian Occult Fantasy'. 
I prefer the new term 'Occult Fantasy' to the more usual 
'ghost story', 'supernatural tale', 'horror story', etc., for 
the following reasons. For a start, in practice most examples 
combine several of these kinds, and to treat them as distinct 
is quite artificial. Also, where we are mainly looking for 
psychological motives, it suits our purposes well enough to 
treat all varieties of the 'fiction of fright' as effectively 
one. 
A more important consideration is that none of the 
traditional labels apply well to a work as strange as William 
Hope Hodgson's The House on the Borderland, or even to 'The 
willows' by Algernon Blackwood: here it seems right to use a 
less confining term like Occult Fantasy, even if Blackwood and 
Hodgson too - in Carnacki the Ghost-finder and in his novella 
The Ghost Pirates - could sometimes write ghost stories of a 
recognisably traditional kind. 
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As a further factor, the term I have chosen highlights 
the link between these inquiries and the broader project of 
research into Fantasy at large. It helps to keep this fantasy 
element clearly in mind, especially when it comes to assessing 
the functions and purpose of such work. 
Finally, as the description 'Edwardian' indicates, my 
principal quarry is the site of that extraordinary flowering 
of the ghost story and related forms which belongs to the turn 
of the twentieth century; although at first glance the 
'Edwardian' label seems to disregard plain facts and dates, 
for stories with much the same characteristic qualities can 
arguably be found as early as the 1880's and as late as the 
Second World War. What justifies the label here, I feel, is 
that the two decades after 1890 saw the appearance of many 
classic models of the kind; and what came before and after can 
in a sense be taken as leading up to or else depending upon 
their achievement. 
But perhaps what matters more is that the years of 
Edward's reign are those that almost all the writers concerned 
share in common, whether they were then at their prime or 
simply beginning their craft. And, as I shall argue, there is 
a particular potency and affinity between Occult Fantasy and 
the ethos, values, and contradictions of the brief age between 
Victoria's demise and the Great War - a link which I believe 
is worth emphasizing and exploring. 
Because of popular myths which these works themselves 
helped to foster, their late-victorian and Edwardian 'period' 
dress has become, over time, a positive advantage to them. The 
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Edwardian and late-Victorian gaslight world has become 
something like a "myth" in the Barthesian sense: a ready-
charged ready-made catalyst to understanding and atmosphere, 
which now feeds back into and intensifies our reading of the 
very works which originally set the myth going. One of my 
first purposes will be to analyse the nature and contents of 
this period factor; but of course to their original readers 
the settings of these works were 'modern' and not period at 
all. Their quite self-consciously 'modern' and even 'local' 
element needs to be kept firmly in mind; in my view it offers 
one important point of difference between much Edwardian 
supernatural writing and the Gothic which preceded it. For the 
Gothic, in contrast, exotic settings and a mediaeval or at 
least antique atmosphere were prerequisites. Whereas after the 
l890s horror came home to roost. 
As will be seen, I concentrate here on exposition and 
analysis of short works, particularly short stories. Except in 
the case of that indispensable and seminal book, Bram Stoker's 
Dracula, nothing longer than novella-length will be discussed. 
The reason for this goes further than mere critical 
convenience. Despite the fact that some of the writers 
mentioned did also dabble in the novel, it seems to me that 
the short story is the generic form par excellence for the 
Edwardian tale of occult fantasy. It can be no accident that 
it is the preferred medium for the most famous work of the 
mature masters of the genre, such as Algernon Blackwood, M.R. 
James, and later, H.P. Lovecraft - who is both the direct heir 
of the writers mentioned and a transition figure between the 
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Edwardian and the contemporary horror tale. And the reason for 
this preference is, I suspect, that force, sharpness and point 
are the special virtues of the short-story form; hence its 
dramatic and its structural dimensions make it especially 
well-fitted to relay the 'supernatural visitation', which is 
also of brief and intense duration, or so tradition tells us. 
Even the best longer works are essentially compilations 
of short individual experiences, even if these unfold to some 
unifying end. Dracula itself is obliged to remove its 
villain/hero from its foregound for four-fifths of its lengthj 
and this must surely be at least partly because the explosive 
intensity of the Count's malignant presence may be sustained 
only for short bursts of narrative. 
In preferring the short story and novella, Edwardian 
Occult Fantasy contrasts with contemporary horror fiction, 
which is often very lengthy. This is one clue that a 
fundamental change has occurred in what interests contemporary 
twentieth-century readers in the supernatural, as I will argue 
shortly. However, historical divisions are not my main theme; 
they are important here only as far as they allow me to 
concentrate on the specific area which interests me most: the 
works which belong to the middle-ground between early and new, 
and which consequently are already, in some sense, 
'literature'. 
Admittedly, this is not a literature which everyone would 
accept by that name. But perhaps this state of affairs is as 
it should be. These tales are created, one might say, to speak 
from the marginsj it is part of their nature to do so. To an 
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extent there are actual dangers - dangers of distortion and 
imbalance - in attempting to import them into the dignified 
mainstream of literary discussion, to a milieu which they have 
never courted: they are resisted there, and they themselves 
resist the importation. 
Even in their own day, these classics of the horror and 
occult genres often presented themselves as marginal, by 
deliberate self-conscious choice. In the wider sense, they 
could be experimental and even transgressive. From the chosen 
standpoint of their supposedly lowbrow popular readership the 
authors of the best of these works could speak with the 
freedom of the marginal. But what they addressed was, of 
course, the traditional centre. Though they often took 
positions of deliberate opposition to orthodoxies, both 
cultural and social, it was the existence of that centre that 
gave them their being. So much so, that in the end the 
differences collapse; the kinds - and even the underlying 
attitudes - intermix, as we shall see. 
So, since the occult tale was a curiously unappropriated 
- even intellectually disdained - area of literary culture, it 
could actually offer all the more freedom to the imagination 
of a certain kind of creative artist. In the event, it could 
even be the site of real (if sometimes unrecognised) 
innovation. Hence it seems no accident that important essays 
on literature by Barthes, Lacan and Derrida have chosen to 
centre themselves on stories by Edgar Allan Poe', who is a 
crucial transitional figure between Gothic and gaslight forms. 
Admittedly, Poe's status in France is different; there -
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through Baudelaire's translations - he looks considerably more 
'central' than he seems to us. Nonetheless, it is surely his 
reputation for deviant originality and daring innovation - and 
for a suspected 'marginal' stance towards moral issues - that 
are the prime source of his appeal to these equally innovative 
thinkers. 'Insidiously learned' was how Valery thought of Poe, 
and in France at least the judgment has stuck. 
2 
The vast territory of the supernatural story has few 
definitive maps. H.P. Lovecraft's essay 'Supernatural Horror 
in Literature,2 remains the primary conspectus of the genre up 
to his time, but its nature is mainly evaluative (it is to 
Lovecraft's insight, incidentally, that we owe the survival of 
Hodgson and others. Lovecraft's assessments are generally to 
be trusted, especially his recognition of the pre-eminence of 
Blackwood). 
Where there are so few guidelines available, I have 
preferred to follow a hint of Stephen King's3 and to make a 
threefold division in the material: to distinguish the 
Romantic Gothic on the one hand from Edwardian Occult, and 
these from contemporary Horror in turn. King has performed a 
notable service in identifying the characteristics of the 
present-day form, and in perceiving that there is a distinct 
divide between his own style of horror and its equivalent in 
the first half-century. Along the way, he manages to provide a 
useful diagnosis of the general ethos of contemporary culture. 
In his view, what distinguishes the present-day 
resurgence of horrific fiction from its predecessor is that 
its trappings no longer symbolize sexual interests 
and fear of sex but interest in the self and fear of 
the self ... the rise of horror fiction and horror 
films in the seventies and early eighties and the 
rise of such things as Rolfing, primal screaming, 
and hot-tubbing run pretty much in tandem •.• most 
of the really popular examples of the horror genre, 
from The Exorcist to Cronenberg's They Came from 
Within, are fine examples of the new American 
gothic, where we have, instead of a symbolic womb, a 
symbolic mirror. (316) 
King sees the contemporary culture of secondary 
narcissism as the defining characteristic of our present 
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times, where people who no longer feel responsible either for 
themselves or for the acts they perform turn obsessively 
inward only to confront a void: 'And in an American society 
that has become more and more entranced by the cult of me-
ism, it should not be surprising that the horror genre has 
turned more and more to trying to show us a reflection we 
won't like - our own' (316). 
As King indicates, the Edwardian equivalent to his own 
work was in contrast more concerned with trans-personal 
matters, relating primarily to sexual issues in the largest 
sense, and to the human relation to its unconscious. This is a 
hint to pursue in what follows; but it is still necessary to 
differentiate the Edwardian occult from the Gothic proper. 
Certainly, in their reaction against aspects of modernity 
itself our Edwardian writers do betray their ancestry in the 
Gothic: Dracula's journey from Transylvania to London in a 
sense encapsulates a move from Gothic to a later model. For a 
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great deal had happened since Monk Lewis and even Mary Shelley 
(whose Frankenstein is itself sometimes thought to be offering 
a new model [cf. Jackson4 1981: 101J) to make the new work 
significantly different, by force of necessity. Its authors 
belonged to a world where science and materialism had 
triumphed to an extent even Shelley could not have 
anticipated. Consequently the battle they were waging against 
these forces was no longer romantic in essence, or not 
significantly. This is visible in their style, which can 
frequently tend towards the clinical, and sUbstitute an odd 
kind of deliberate rigour for Shelleyan extravagance and 
rhetorical flights. 
This tells us that the Edwardians had re-grouped, had 
taken the measure of science and assimilated its findings 
(items like Dr Seward's phonograph diary in Dracula show this 
appropriation; transfusion and the telegraph playas large a 
part in the evil Count's subjugation as do hypnotism and ESP). 
Almost paradoxically, in view of scientific advances, there is 
a much greater conviction of the real validity of the 
supernatural alternative: which is, in effect, a metonomy for 
'all that escapes scientific explanation but is none the less 
real'. While the Society for Psychical Research, founded in 
1882, hoped to investigate the occult with scientific methods, 
the view of these writers was that there was 'more in heaven 
and earth' than science could dream of. Perhaps demons of some 
unknown kind still existed after all, unheeded by Edwardian 
orthodoxy; the writers desired, at least, to keep the 
possibility open. 
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In consequence, their attack on the well-cushioned but 
still less than secure surfaces of Edwardian life was sharper 
and more focussed, more aggressive, adversarial and 
deliberate, than anything in the Gothic. 
Van Helsing in Draculas is both a medical doctor and a 
'metaphysician'; with regard to the real existence of the 
supernatural phenomena which surround the Count he admits that 
'at first I was sceptic' (1981: 250); but true rationality, he 
implies, consists in the unprejudiced 'open mind' (the 'all-
believing open mind', as Mark M. Hennelly [1977: 16J aptly 
terms it6); earlier Van Helsing has hinted at the 
reconciliation between reason and faith that is demanded by 
the experiences he and his comrades undergo: 'I heard once of 
an American who so defined faith: "that faculty which enables 
us to believe things we know to be untrue". For one, I follow 
that man. He meant that we shall have an open mind •.• ' (1981: 
202). In other words, what Van Helsing advocates in his broken 
English is a greater rationality than the rationalists 
themselves exercise, one which eventually incorporates faith 
too. 'A year ago which of us would have received such a 
possibility, in the midst of our scientific, sceptical, 
matter-of-fact nineteenth century?' Van Helsing inquires 
(252). The kind of nineteenth (and twentieth) century 
anatomized here is the real opponent in the novel, far more 
than the evil Count. In a way he actually represents what 
ought to be conserved. 
Do you not think that there are things which you 
cannot understand, and yet which are; that some 
people see things that others cannot? ... Ah, it is 
the fault of our science that it wants to explain 
alIi and if it explain not, then it says there is 
nothing to explain. (200) 
And Van Helsing's sentiments above are echoed in 
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different words by many of the other authors whose works will 
be considered in the next chapter. 
In her wide-ranging and pertinent book, The Erotic World 
of Faery7, Maureen Duffy offers a useful encapsulation of some 
features of the spiritual temper of the times: 
That 'whole sensible appearance of things', which 
had caused the early Christian fathers such pangs in 
case it should keep men's minds from the 
supernatural with its strong magic, had so lost its 
power that twentieth-century man inverted the 
problem. Now it was the spell of the supernatural he 
hankered after to turn his mind from the dreariness 
of everyday, rushing even into the wholesale death 
of the First World War out of boredom and because 
his fantasy life had broken down in the endless 
labouring of industrial capitalism, backed by 
technology which ensured that he could go on working 
even when it grew dark, and all the year round, and 
that his life would conform as nearly as possible to 
that of the next man so that they could be satisfied 
in bulk. Monotheism had led to the monopolizing 
monolith of uniformity. The eccentricities of the 
Edwardian period are 'the iridescence of decay' 
before the wasteland. (294) 
strangely, the Edwardian fantasists saw themselves as 
ministering to revivification rather than to decay. Duffy's 
hint, however, at T.S. Eliot's coming indictment of society in 
his poem The Waste Land prompts a new question. The kind of 
popular writing we are talking of occupied much the same span 
of years as did the High Modernist movement of the early 
twentieth century. Could there be any relation at all between 
this neglected 'lowbrow' literary phonomenon and the elevated 
and exclusive world of literary Modernism? 
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In so far as Modernism was itself a reaction against 
surface realism and the representational in circumstances 
which were unpropitious there are certain obvious links to be 
drawn. But a few even closer parallels emerge. Though Eliot 
could, in the work mentioned, subject his clairvoyant Madam 
Sosostris to disdainful satire, and in 'The Dry Salvages' pour 
scorn upon the urge to 'converse with spirits .•• Describe the 
horoscope, horuspicate or scry', or else to 
evoke 
Biography form the wrinkles of the palm 
And tragedy from fingers; release omens 
By sortilege, or tea leaves, riddle the inevitable 
With playing cards, or dissect 
The recurrent image into pre-conscious terrors -
To explore the womb, or tomb, or dreams; all these are 
usual 
Pastimes and drugs, and features of the press; 
And always will be, some of them especially 
When there is distress of nations and perplexity 
(11. 185-197) 
yet his own decision to use the Tarot pack as an 
organisational device in The Waste Land is not merely 
satirical; the capacity of occult material to dredge up with 
itself a treasure of subconscious accretion and association is 
certainly of poetic value to Eliot. Yet beyond his formal 
experimentation lies Eliot's religious questings, and his 
interest in Buddhism and the Upanishads. It would probably be 
wrong to divorce these two sorts of experimentation and 
questing entirely; any more than in Yeats's case, where the 
remaking of his verse was accompanied by the development of 
his own brand of occultism and theosophy. If all the old 
faiths and certainties had been exploded, then all faiths and 
unfaiths were equal again. Implicitly, too, the authority of 
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the viewpoint of physical science was being challenged by the 
poets' views, as just another among faiths. 
To this limited extent, then, the new fantasists shared 
in the common psychic and spiritual experimentalism. From 
stoker and stevenson onwards there is something genuinely 
disturbing about the vision of reality the best stories offer: 
a sense that Frankenstein's monster is already within the 
house, and disrupting the settled scene. As a number of very 
divergent recent studies of supernatural fiction8 have, in 
their different ways, concluded, the remarkable openness in 
these tales towards ~, perhaps undiscovered, 'occult' as a 
real option, has a near-theological quality. The revelations 
their writers hint at are thus perhaps, in the end, of a 
religious nature. 
3 
Julia Kristeva, the French psychoanalyst and theoretical 
critic, has defined the 'powers of horror,9 in ways that are 
extremely suggestive for literary criticism, and her insights 
will be employed as my major model in what follows. This 
section will be given over, then, to as concise an account as 
I can manage of her views, difficult to summarize as they are. 
Kristeva coins the word 'abjection' to specify her 
subject area. She means this term to include all that is 
normally repulsive, horrific, revolting, repellent •.• even 
impure and dirty. (one might feel that 'the abhorrent' or 'the 
394 
objectionable' would have been better choices in English than 
'the abject'; but Kristeva means to set up an opposition in 
kind between 'objects' - even those we object to - and the 
real subject of horror, which is the essentially unnamable.) 
In short, what we truly find nauseating and terrifying is 
not anyone 'thing' as such, but a dread possibility the 
objects which excite our disgust suggest to us. What causes 
our gorge to rise in the emotion of 'abjection' is always, in 
effect, '[w]hat does not respect borders, positions, rules. 
The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite' (1982:4). 
Were this everything that distressed us - the inability 
of the monstrous and the repugnant to fit our stereotypes and 
expectations - its effects would be managable: susceptible to 
a good talking-to with oneself, perhaps. The problem is, our 
encounter with what is intrinsically unreasonable and 
unclassifiable raises in us earlier and regressive fears which 
are much more difficult to control, since they threaten us and 
our being so completely. In a true case of the horrific, the 
upheaval actually challenges our whole rational ordering of 
the world, based as it is on words and hence classes of 
things. The abject does this by evoking primal infantile 
memories, memories of a time we were without the means of 
control that words provide. 
What is the demoniacal - an inescapable, repulsive, 
and yet nurtured abomination? The fantasy of an 
archaic force, on the near side of separation, 
unconscious, tempting us to the point of losing our 
differences, our speech, our life; to the point of 
aphasia, decay, opprobrium, and death? (107) 
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This confirms Stephen King's intuition that terror 'often 
arises from a pervasive sense of disestablishment; that things 
are in the unmaking' (King 1987: 22). 
Accordingly, we would be right to see the chimerical 
monsters of Edwardian fiction as signs of horror specifically 
because they are essentially no one thing, and hence non-
things, non-objects, no-natures. Hodgson's swine-creatures, 
Blackwood's willows, and even the man-bat Dracula himself -
whose fangs hold in store the very threats Kristeva specifies 
above - all accord with this prescription. There is also 
Lovecraft's cthulhu, where the very name seems designed to 
prevent its pronunciation as a regular word. Rosemary Jackson 
calls these Lovecraftian names, like Azathoth and 
Nyarlathotep, 'signifiers without an object' where the 
signifier 'begins to float free' (cf. Jackson 1981: 40). 
But what is especially disturbing is the wave of archaic 
feeling these figures bring in their wake. Fear of everyday 
danger -of physical hurt or capture - there may be in plenty 
in these stories; but they only become truly horrific, can 
only induce a real feeling of the 'occult' and 'uncanny', when 
they are intermingled with that less explicable and more 
primary terror Kristeva speaks of (although all fear, 
according to her, retains shades of its deeper and earlier 
counterpart): 'the fear of which one can speak assumes all 
earlier alarms of archaic, non-representable fear. Spoken 
fear, hence subsequent to language and necessarily caught in 
the Oedipus structure, ... turns out to be a sUbstitute for 
another ... that conglomerate of fear, deprivation and 
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nameless frustration, which, properly speaking belongs to the 
unnamable' (1982: 35). (One of Lovecraft's stories is actually 
titled 'The Unnamable' [Lovecraft, 1985: 226]; other titles, 
like 'The Nameless city' [129] or 'The Thing in the Moonlight' 
[417], seem to point directly to this failure of the 
possibility of description.) 
Kristeva refers above to the central importance of the 
Oedipus structure, and hence to the moment when the child's 
world breaks from one in which self and other are merged and 
indistinguishable into the triad of self-mother-father. She 
suggests that part of what we fear - the dreadful hint in all 
these unnamable and repulsive non-objects - is our own being 
dissolved back beyond that point when our sense of personal 
identity originated. If verbal boundaries are helpless in the 
case of this particular repellent object that confronts us, 
may not our entire linguistic structure be untrustworthy? 
Hence the (animated?) corpse, or the death we fear in the 
horror story, represents just as much and more the 
obliteration of the self and language as it does physical 
extinction pure and simple. The former condition is perhaps 
even more intensely dreadful for us than the latter, because, 
in a sense, we can remember it; or, rather, we could, had we 
not repressed such knowledge. What gives rise to our 'occult' 
wave of anxiety is the dimly-grasped potential for failure of 
that repression: 
The abject shatters the wall of repression and its 
judgments. It takes the ego back to its source on 
the abominable limits from which, in order to be, 
the ego has broken away .... Abjection is a 
resurrection that has gone through death (of the 
ego). It is an alchemy that transforms the death 
drive into a start of life, of new signifiance. 
(1982: 15; 'signifiance' is Kristeva's term) 
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So, in a culture where religious law has collapsed and is 
unable to restrain us from the abhorrent plummet we 
anticipate, the artist, like Orpheus, makes the journey 
fictionally on our behalf (although in this case we ourselves 
are a Eurydice who fears to look back and must, subtly, be 
persuaded to do so): 
the aesthetic task - a descent into the foundations 
of the symbolic [i.e. verbal] construct - amounts to 
retracing the fragile limits of the speaking being, 
closest to its dawn, to the bottomless 'primacy' 
constituted by primal repression. Through the 
experience ... 'subject' and 'object' push each 
other away, confront each other, collapse and start 
again -inseparable, contaminated, condemned at the 
boundary of what is assimilable, thinkable: abject. 
Great modern literature unfolds over that terrain: 
Dostoevsky, Lautreamont ...• (18) 
We see how central and utterly implicated our sense of 
self-identity is for the whole experience of the horrific and 
repulsive, and how much more than mere hygiene is involved in 
our sensations of disgust and loathing. The real point is that 
the 'I' itself is menaced. As Kristeva insists, the 'abject 
has only one quality of the object - that of being opposed to 
~' (1). She means, of course, 'opposed' in two senses: both 
conceptually outside of and a threat to the identity. Waste, 
mucus, sputum, excreta, decay - or the fictive monstrous -
whatever is rejected, addresses the indignant or nauseated 
'self' directly, producing 
A massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, 
which, familiar as it might have been in an opaque 
and forgotten life, now harries me as radically 
separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not 
nothing, either. A 'something' that I do not 
recognise as a thing •••. On the edge of non-
existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I 
acknowledge it, annihilates me. (2) 
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The characteristic psychosomatic reaction of vomiting is 
so clearly symbolic of these facts: it voids the very 
nutriment which should be incorporated into and contributing 
to the physical self, a part of 'me': 'I expel myself, I spit 
myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through 
which "I" claim to establish myself .... it is thus that they 
see that "I" am in the process of becoming an other at the 
expense of my own death .... I give birth to myself amid the 
violence of sobs, of vomit' (3): 
refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust 
aside in order to live. These body fluids, this 
defilement, this shit are what life withstands, 
hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. 
There, I am at the border of my condition as a 
living being .... the corpse, the most sickening of 
wastes, is a border that has encroached upon 
everything. It is no longer I who expel, 'I' is 
expelled ••.. How can I be without border? That 
elsewhere ... is now here, jetted, abjected, into 
'my' world. Deprived of world, therefore, I fall in 
a faint. (4) 
What Kristeva's vivid language and extreme instances 
inspire in us is the perception that, if the revulsion we feel 
comes like an intrusion from the Other into our being, then 
where the Other challenges us is through the dimension of our 
moral and aesthetic feelings - indeed, through that ambivalent 
mental region where the two are so mixed up together as to 
become conjoint. We say, for example, that we find this or 
that event tasteful or distasteful (indicating through the 
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reference to food and orality that something visceral, the 
body envelope itself, is at issue; however much our judgments 
may dress themselves up as pure, detached, aesthetic ones). 
The Edwardian horror story begins its life during the 
period of the Aesthetic movement and the 'Decadence' at the 
end of the last century. The few comments above may help to 
explain why some of the Aesthetes themselves where drawn to 
the horror tale or else the horrific denouement (as in The 
Portrait of Dorian Gray and Salome) - as were also in fact 
their contemporaries, the Naturalists; witness, for example, 
Zola's Nana. Since both Aesthetes and Naturalists believed in 
the separation of art and morality, their desire to affront us 
in that area where conscience and the sense of beauty and 
ugliness are mixed is perhaps intended to make us aware of our 
own foolishness in so confusing them. 
The horror tale proper also plays on the paradoxical 
attractiveness of the repulsive. In the 'violent, dark revolts 
of being' produced by exposure to the horrifying there is also 
something compelling, forbidden, fascinating; 'just the same, 
that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an 
elsewhere as tempting as it is condemned' (Kristeva 1982: 1). 
The effect of this 'rape-like intrusion from outside', arising 
'from the source of all that is radically different', and 
which 'draws me toward the place where meaning collapses'(2), 
can be a troubling kind of attractiveness, once my disapproval 
has been overcome. (The protective sense of disapproval and 
disgust Kristeva ironically counts among the 'primers of •.• 
culture' [2].) 
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Where the emotions of horror ultimately lead us can be, 
in fact, through a strange moral (or immoral) freedom towards 
a kind of jouissance, tinged with an antinomian 'sublime'. 
('The abject is edged with the sublime', Kristeva tells us 
[11].) In terms of my general thesis, we are permitted to see 
this promised experience as inherently 'mystical'. Though 
Kristeva does not say so directly, this is what her words 
imply: 
the time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion and 
thunder, of veiled infinity and the moment when 
revelation bursts forth .•. Jouissance, in short .••. 
And, as in jouissance where the object of desire, known 
as object g (in Lacan's terminology), bursts with the 
shattered mirror where the ego gives up its image in 
order to contemplate itself in the Other, there is 
nothing either objective or objectal about the abject. It 
is simply a frontier, a forfeited gift that the Other, 
having become the alter ego, drops so that 'I' does not 
disappear in it but finds, in that sublime alienation, a 
forfeited existence. (9) 
Before I apply these Kristevan formulations of the 
horrific first to Bram stoker's Dracula and later to other 
examples of Edwardian occult fiction, there are two 
consequences of Kristeva's argument that need to be 
considered. 
The first is that the religious conception of sin (of 
'evil', in other words) - she shows this through analysis of 
religious formulations down the centuries - derives much of 
its force from an appeal to intellectual dread of these 
'archaic resonances that are culturally prior to sin' (18). 
The threat here is one inevitably posed to all systems of 
law and verbally-encoded rules of religious conduct by the 
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mere existence of a forbidden primal region which passes 
beyond them and their devices of control. Evil, to the 
traditional ritualistic upholders of such 'masculine' and 
'logocentric' ideas of religious life, has its true source 
here. Wrongdoing is identifed with any sort of real or 
imagined traffic with this proscribed dimension. And - what is 
particulary striking - this region is traditionally associated 
with 'the feminine'. 
Because it was out of a union between self and mother 
that the individual being was first startled into existence -
by, according to Freudian thought, the intrusion of the father 
and his rule - it is, in a sense, the feminine essence that 
lies on the other side of the Oedipal divide. Hence 
reabsorption by this powerful primitive female ethos is what 
the fragile individuality most fears, and castigates as 'evil' 
from the insecure redoubt of his acquired 'civilisation', his 
self-conferred 'purity'. 
And here we have an explanation of one of the most 
regular features of the fictional genre I have chosen to 
examine, a feature that unites many otherwise diverse works 
and authors. The association between woman and evil is one of 
the most surprising atavisms that the Edwardian Occult Fantasy 
persists in clinging to. For it, 'woman' and 'the formless' 
are one. 
Nor does this fiction ever escape the ambivalence of its 
stance - its peculiarly Edwardian stance, which returns us 
always to the well-padded and upholstered trappings of high 
Edwardian civilisation, its book-lined libraries and smoking-
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rooms, its weighty and dignified prose. These tales reveal to 
us that beyond the security of those shelves, those ivied 
walls, that rounded and evocative English, the boundless 
feminine stalks and threatens. To the last, writers of occult 
fiction are uncertain whether they should exorcise the beast 
or open the sash windows and allow her in. But that would be 
submission to a kind of suicide, however languid and delicious 
the prospect might sometimes even come to seem. 
Not simply suspect by her association with the mysteries 
of life and biological motherhood, her 'witch-like' link - to 
the popular view - with all that is intuitive, unstated, and 
wordless, the female is not forgiven for her original act of 
nurturing. 'The abject,' according to Kristeva, 'confronts us 
..• with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal 
entity even before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the 
autonomy of language ... a power as securing as it is 
stifling' (13). This drama is played out both in the prose 
style and the content of occult fiction. 
It is clear by now that there is an unstated assumption 
behind all these comments: that, whatever else it is, the 
supernatural that occult fiction directs us to is also and 
always the human unconscious. This is not really to disparage 
these authors' ideas about possible supernatural forms of 
existence. It is just to say that no matter what 'other 
dimensions' there are, the unconscious is always deeply 
implicated in them. 
The ghost story is both the oldest and the most widely 
circulated form of the occult story. It is uncertain just how 
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old it is in its oral form, but it probably goes back at least 
to the days of campfires and ancestor worship. Both Homer and 
The Epic of Gilgamesh include journeys to the underworld, the 
land of the dead. Few of the best examples of Edwardian Occult 
are ghost stories proper, but the spirit of this form 
continues to haunt the kinds derived from it. Even here 
extrapolation of Kristeva's model provides useful insights. 
It is possible to interpet the ghost as simply the fading 
trace of an 'identity' once real and concrete. As something 
closer to the vacant abstract form of identity itself, the 
ghost thus passes symbolic comment on the selving process. He 
is like one of its spectral and discarded 'shadows ': the 
possibilities the emerging self throws off like skins in order 
to survive as a coherent being. 
Perhaps in the end the ghost in fiction is really that of 
Barthes's deceased author, whose self-possession has itself 
become threatened in the face of his multiplication and 
dissolution through his characters and narrator. On the verge 
of the occult unknowable that threatens his being in the act 
of writing, he throws up this ghost as an illusory and fading 
index of his vanishing 'self'. The legend that Shakespeare 
performed the role of the ghost in Hamlet offers some support 
for this idea: after all, Shakespeare is a no less real father 
to Prince Hamlet than he was to Hamnet, his physical son. In a 
sense, he was Hamlet; but he could only be Hamlet at the cost 
of his own 'death' - the death of what it meant to be that 
'open and free nature', the man Shakespeare. 
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If Hamlet is neither of the men his fathers were, then to 
some extent the power of 'the Name of the Father' collapses at 
the threshold of the play; and this may be Hamlet's true 
problem. By writing his own play - in imitation of his 
author/father - he can perhaps command, in fantasy, the names 
of action; but only at the cost of becoming there an absent 
presence, his own ghost. 
What this tells us is that since the ghost hovers at the 
edge of an otherworld where signification collapses, perhaps 
its fate in fiction is always secretly to mark the place of 
its author's death - a death through the mystical immolation 
of writing. In this sense, all the ghosts of Hamlet senior are 
played by Shakespeare. 
What Kristeva says of the borderline patient in analysis 
can be made to apply here to the author's haunting of his own 
work. She sees an 
ego, wounded to the point of annulment, barricaded 
and untouchable, [who] cowers somewhere, nowhere, at 
no other place than the one that cannot be found. 
Where objects are concerned he delegates phantoms, 
ghosts, 'false cards': a stream of spurious egos and 
for that very reason spurious objects, seeming egos 
that confront undesirable objects. (47) 
This makes the doppelganger the double of us all, and the 
Jungian 'shadow' not so much a pre-existent archetype as the 
echo of a stage in every human development. 
When Jung10 speaks of his Collective Unconscious, the 
terms he uses are surprisinglY broad. We may if we prefer 
suppose him really to be speaking of the Occult Feminine, 
which is also, in quite another sense, 'before time'. It 
is a strange something that derives its existence 
from the hinterland of man's mind - that suggests 
the abyss of time separating us from the pre-human 
ages, or evokes a super-human world of contrasting 
light and darkness. It is a primordial experience 
which surpasses man's understanding and to which he 
is in danger of succumbing. The value and the force 
of the experience are given by its enormity. It 
arises from timeless depths; it is foreign and cold, 
many-sided, demonic and grotesque. 
(Jung, 1933: 180-181) 
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If at times I use Jungian suppositions and terms (such as 
'the anima') in the analyses which follow, they must be 
understood as fitting more appropriately within the scheme of 
understanding which Kristeva has outlined for us. What 
Kristeva shows is that what is collective about the 
unconscious is established not by the prehistory of the race 
but by the traumatic archaeology of the individual mind. Its 
archetypes and shadows are themselves ghosts: ghosts projected 
forward into the imaginative life by the complex and awesome 
events that attended our coming into personality and into 
language. 
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When Jonathan Harker, now aware that he is effectively a 
prisoner in Count Dracula's castle, concludes a vital page of 
his diary just as the dawn breaks, he likens his compulsive 
nocturnal scribbling to the 'Arabian Nights' (where each new 
day is hostage to the past night's stories); or else, he adds, 
it is 'like the ghost of Hamlet's father' (Stoker 1981: 31), 
who must disappear as the new day arrives. 
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What is not said here is that writing, even more than 
garlic and the eucharistic host, is a kind of desperate 
talisman against the Count's evil influence (a Jungian would 
see the host as a symbol of the 'integrated self'; the 
negative effect of garlic on sexual interest is well known). 
Everyone in the story (except, significantly, the Count 
himself) indulges in a positive orgy of writing. There is no 
omniscient narrator, and consequently we only know of any 
character's sayings or doings through some text or document: 
his own or another's. The exemplary Mina Harker seems under a 
compulsion to turn every event - even Dr Seward's spoken 
phonographic record - into readable documentary evidence, 
aided by her skill on the still new-fangled typewriter. It is 
almost as if a law case is being assembled against the 
Vampire, with no piece of paper too insignificant to count for 
his conviction. Dracula seems to agree with his opponents' 
estimate, since he wastes valuable time in destroying a copy 
of their copious file - in the evident belief it is the only 
one. All this in spite of the fact that when, on the last page 
of the novel, Harker scans their assembled 'mass of 
typewriting', he knows 'We could hardly ask anyone, even did 
we wish to, to accept these as proofs of so wild a story' 
(400). Van Helsing's enthusiastic riposte might seem a little 
belated, in the circumstances: 'We want no proofs! We ask none 
to believe us!' 
The truth of the matter is that the writing is of 
therapeutic, rather than documentary, value: it serves to fix 
and make seemingly concrete in words realities which appear 
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too insubstantial and untrustworthy to be left as simple 
unrecorded happenings. Words themselves are treated here as 
'proofs' of unlikely events, more telling than unwritten 
testimony, it seems. The 'night-time' setting of much of this 
activity (as of Dracula's own antics) shows that whatever this 
verbosity is meant to hold at bay belongs to that unspeakable 
world which lies below words and on the other side of sleep. 
And yet, paradoxically, words figure as an ultimately fragile 
recourse, unregarded and forgotten by the end. 
Dracula's affinity with the doings of the night means 
that in daylight his abilities as a shape-shifter are lost. 
During these hours of full consciousness he is, like others, 
susceptible to the domination of the word and must retain 
whatever form - whatever identity - he has when the sun's rays 
light upon him. 
The sun that rose on our sorrow this morning guards 
us in its course. Until it sets to-night, that 
monster must retain whatever form he now has. He is 
confined within the limitations of his earthly 
envelope. He cannot melt into thin air nor disappear 
through cracks or chinks or crannies. If he go 
through a door, he must open the door like a mortal. 
And so we have this day to hunt out all his lairs 
and sterilise them. (309) 
In his own chosen realm, the night, Dracula is free of 
limitations of personal identity, and can take what shape he 
will. This unusual liberty helps us to uncover the true 
location of his proper realm: before the onset of the Oedipus 
complex and the determination of the self through language. 
As Rosemary Jackson points out: 
Dracula is a symbolic reversal of the oedipal stage 
and of the subject's cultural formation in that 
stage. In relation to the theories of Lacan ... it 
could be claimed that the act of vampirism is the 
most violent and extreme attempt to negate, or 
reverse, the subject's insertion into the symbolic. 
(Jackson 1981: 120) 
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Like the Count himself, Transylvania is only directly 
present at the beginning and end of this novel, otherwise set 
in Britain. But in another sense it is present throughout. It 
represents the night-side, the foreign (Other) underside of 
London itself (cf. Hennelly: 14-15). That Transylvania is 
really identifiable with the unconscious and its powers is 
revealed by attention to the words of Van Helsing's 
description of it: 
The very place, where he have been alive, Un-Dead 
for all these centuries, is full of strangeness of 
the geologic and chemical world. There are deep 
caverns and fissures that reach none know whither. 
There have been volcanoes, some of whose openings 
still send out waters of strange properties, and 
gases that kill or make to vivify. (338) 
Improbably, the passage echoes Jung's description of the 
Collective Unconscious quoted above. As the name (Demeter) of 
the ship which brings Dracula up from Transylvania to Whitby 
seems to signify, some emergent elements from this underworld 
of the unconscious may actually be of creative and therapeutic 
benefit; even a wary and temporary descent into this 
proscribed ('evil') territory might be 'vivifying', to a 
degree - productive of fertility, at least. 
And yet the ship that takes the vampire away again from 
English shores has another name - it is named after the 
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monarch Catherine of Russia, a woman infamous in popular 
legend for her excessive sexual exploits. And, as George Stade 
notes in his introduction to the Bantam Classic edition, the 
'prevailing emotion of the novel is a screaming horror of 
female sexuality' (Stoker 1982: viii). Not all is well in 
relations with the underworld, clearly. And of course 
Transylvania is also the province of that disturbing company, 
'the Un-Dead', as Van Helsing calls them above. 
The relation between sexuality and death in this novel is 
a complex one, and yet most central. Stephen King's account of 
the sexual ethos of the work sets things out vividly: 
Count Dracula (and the weird sisters as well) are 
apparently dead from the waist down; they make love 
with their mouths alone. The sexual basis of Dracula 
is an infantile oralism coupled with a strong 
interest in necrophilia ••. It is also sex without 
responsibility ... This infantile, retentive 
attitude toward sex may be one reason why the 
vampire myth .•. has always been so popular with 
adolescents still trying to come to grips with their 
own sexuality. The vampire appears to have found a 
short-cut through all the tribal mores of sex .•. 
and he lives forever, to boot. (King 1987: 84-5) 
What King's last comment, in particular, helps us to 
realise is that the vampire myth keys directly into the 
ancient superstition that death has power over us only after 
the advent of sexuality and procreation in our lives: that 
men, in particular, are 'immune' to death until they traffic 
with the things of the female (cf. Luke 20, 34: after the 
resurrection men and women 'do no longer marry because they 
can no longer die'). The influence of this prejudice (that 
untried male genitality is also immortality) may be shown by 
the hint of its presence in Shakespeare's The Winter's Tale 
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(I, ii, 64-86). Polixenes and Leontes view their boyhood 
friendship as preserved and preserving against the 
depredations of time and change - until the arrival of the 
feminine, in the person of Hermione, pollutes their innocence 
and gives the pair over to death. Indeed, Leontes' attempt to 
deny the force of the feminine and to freeze time - as would 
be the case in a way if Hermione's metaphoric 'petrification' 
into a statue were real rather than feigned - is an impossible 
and unhealthy longing, as the play demonstrates. In indulging 
at last his own feminine side (admitting to his guilt, 
loneliness and pity) Leontes accedes to the onward movement of 
time and season, procreation and death. 
In Dracula's case, he too has dammed up time by avoiding 
procreative sex; hence he too belongs to the pre-genital, pre-
Oedipal era of infantile sexuality. The 'woman' Dracula 
compulsively devours over and again is the sexual mother. 
Drinking out her powerful vital essence from the throat he 
wounds her in the fundamental region of speech; he prevents 
that dread act of speaking coming into being and so 'heads 
off' his own separation and independence from her. By so 
cheating adult sex and language, by 'getting the jump on 
them', Dracula also cheats death. Through his symbolic and 
repetitive violation of the incest taboo he enables his own 
perennial stasis on the far side of the Oedipal crisis. His 
retribution for guiltless incest is to remain forever outside 
the world of maturity, daylight and full rationality, lying 
prone in the effective cellar of the subconscious, housed in a 
symbolic coffin - which is also, of course, a womb. For indeed 
the half-life he has chosen is a kind of death (though a 
'living death'), proof against possibility and change. 
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Women are Dracula's predestined victims, not men. He 
punishes them for their female maternal power by a kind of 
contemptuous and compelling fang-rape: Dracula's bite removes 
them forcibly back to his world, the world before procreation, 
where continuity is ensured only through the child's oral 
grasp (here transferred from breast to neck, mammary to voice-
box). 
What Stoker, as opposed to Dracula, may be punishing 
women for (as we may easily deduce from his biography) is the 
threat of a - literally - devouring maternal sexual presence, 
which threatens to absorb her child's identity into her own 
without ever setting him free into productive adulthood. As 
revenge against her engulfing voracity Stoker opposes the 
compensating fantasy of a perennially devouring child, who 
assimilates and repudiates her power by a form of cannibalism. 
significantly, as George Stade points out, many of Stoker's 
later books like Famous Impostors are about transvestitism; in 
Lady Athlyne (1908) one of his characters, a suicide, 
speculates upon the fact that '[a]ll men and all women 
have in themselves the cells of both sexes' (Stoker 1981: 
xiv). Nonetheless, in uniting evil and the feminine in an 
occult relation, Stoker is drawing upon psychic drives far 
larger and more universal than any of his merely personal 
history, as Kristeva has denonstrated for us. 
If Stoker was himself a kind of Hamlet, then his real 
father (Abraham Stoker) was the mere 'ghost of himself', 
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playing a decidedly subordinate role in the face of the 
ravening feminine, represented by his wife, Bram's mother. In 
contrast, Dr Abraham Van Helsing, Dracula's intrepid opponent, 
represents (as Orson Welles claimed [cf. xii]) the 'good 
father', who perhaps never was. In compensation, Van Helsing 
is a fitting adversary of the female realm, even though he 
possesses the name that Abraham Stoker, senior, shared 
(Hamlet-like) with his writer son. 
Van Helsing is all the more formidable for his sympathies 
with, and hence knowledge of, the feminine occult realm. But 
he is dedicated to crushing it out of existence, just the 
same. His pledge to free the world from the vampire curse 
inspires in his son-like disciple, Dr Seward, a telling 
prophecy, repeated below in the context of George Stade's 
judgments of it: 
'Oh, unconscious cerebration!' says Dr Seward, 'you 
will have to give the wall [give way] to your 
conscious brother,' a sentiment that anticipates 
Freud's famous formula: 'Where id was, there shall 
ego be.' ... these sons of Hercules track Dracula 
and his consorts to their lairs and impale them like 
specimens. (Stoker 1982: x) 
And yet the panacea chosen by such hardy disciples of 
reason and the Word is decapitation and a stake through the 
heart. So drastic a cauterization of the rational 
consciousness from its 'lower' sources can hardly be 
sympathised with. A far better solution would be a balance of 
head and heart; and there is considerable evidence that the 
novel is, in a subterranean way, aware of this; for Dracula 
has an intrinsic relation to the holy: 'this evil thing is 
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rooted deep in all good; in soil barren of holy memories it 
cannot rest' (254). 
It may come as a surprise to hear that Dracula, who is 
such a modern byword for rampant masculine sexuality, is 
really inextricably tangled in his mother's apron-strings. But 
attention to the structure of the book surely shows that 
nothing else can be the case. The fact is that by far the bulk 
of the tale is given up to the exorcism of a woman, Lucy 
westenra; and, as the chilling graveyard-scene before her 
second demise so vividly reveals, it is upon children and 
babies that Lucy preys, not adults. Her fiance's often-quoted 
'staking' of Lucy in her tomb which finally 'liberates' her 
spirit is almost universally accepted to be phallic in 
meaning: 
The thing in the coffin writhed; and a hideous, 
blood-curdling screech came from the opened red 
lips. The body shook and quivered and twisted in 
wild contortions; the white teeth champed together 
till the lips were cut, and the mouth was smeared 
with a crimson foam. But Arthur never faltered. He 
looked like a figure of Thor as his untrembling arm 
rose and fell, driving deeper and deeper the mercy-
bearing stake, whilst the blood from the pierced 
heart welled and spurted up around it. His face was 
set, and high duty seemed to shine through it •... 
(228) 
Earlier, Stoker has even had 'sperm' from Van Helsing's candle 
falling upon Lucy's unopened coffin (207). 
The sin which Lucy expiates here is evident in her first 
gossipy letters to her friend Mina: while she is everything a 
victorian lady should be, Lucy displays a mild amount of 
'feminine' coquetry when entertaining her three suitors, 
actually bemoaning the cruel necessity of limiting her choice 
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to only one of them. The exemplary Mina's fate is different, 
though she too suffers the Count's bite, presumably as a 
punishment for being female at all; but her saving grace is 
that she has 'a man's brain' (248) and 'a woman's heart' (this 
combination is evidently an antidote against the need for 
ritual beheading): she leads Van Helsing to rejoice 'that 
there are good women still left to make life happy' (194) - on 
male terms, presumably. 
In spite of these male eulogies, Mina is still feminine, 
and confesses the dire truth: 'We women have something of the 
mother in us that makes us rise above smaller matters when the 
mother-spirit is invoked' (243). But Mina's mothering-
instincts are not devouring or perverted, and the context 
actually sees her 'mothering' a grown man in distress: the 
American Quincey Morris, one of Lucy's former suitors ••. and, 
in a way, 'replacing' Lucy's faulty mothering with good. 
A few pages later she meets Dr Seward's prize patient in 
his lunatic asylum, the zoophage Renfield. Renfield's habit of 
gulping down insects and even birds in order to fill himself 
with life and immortality is a quite obvious symbol of the 
all-devouring orality and emotional cannibalism of the novel. 
In an odd sense Renfield is a kind of counter-mother; though 
we know nothing of his clinical past, it is as if he is 
compelled to outdo maternal emotional voracity with his own 
'imitative' orgy of eating. He prepares for Mina's arrival in 
his cell in domestic style by offering to 'tidy up the place'. 
Dr Seward is surprised to find that his 'method of tidying was 
peculiar: he simply swallowed all the flies and spiders in the 
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boxes before I could stop him. It was quite evident that he 
feared, or was jealous of, some interference' (245). His fear, 
we may assume, derives from his knowledge that he is about to 
be visited by a woman. He automatically assumes she will be 
more omnivorous than he is; and is awed and humbled to 
discover that Mina's femaleness is not of the devouring kind. 
(Even without this incident the setting of much of the novel 
in Seward's asylum-home with its below-floors inmates is 
enough to alert us to the fact that the human psyche is the 
real subject of this work.) 
Mina's ambivalent status and her suspicious femaleness 
are eventually of use to the allies: her capacity for ESP and 
telepathic contact with the Count is invoked by Van Helsing 
through hypnotic means. 
Stoker's strange comments about Dracula's 'child-brain' 
have generally been taken by critics to indicate the man-bat's 
identification with the uncontrolled instincts; Daniel Pick" 
sees here evidence of the nineteenth-century post-Darwinian 
fear of 'degeneration' (Pick 1988). But I believe we should 
take Van Helsing's description almost literally: 'In some 
faculties of mind he has been, and is, almost a child; but he 
is growing ..• ' (320) says the good Doctor. The fact is that 
Dracula has by his own efforts escaped ever becoming adult, 
and so remains untormented by the unnecessary moral feelings 
adulthood demands. He manages this by his domination of the 
potential mothers of the world (even Lucy's progress he halts 
significantly just before she attains the genitality of 
marriage, in reminiscence of Coleridge's wedding-guest, barred 
from the feast; The Ancient Mariner is, incidentally, quoted 
on p. 81). And now Dracula is growing in another sense 
altogether: his sphere is expanding and ravening beyond its 
rightful borders in an orgy of pre-verbal orality. 
The excessive and stuffy self-congratulation of Van 
Helsing's jeer about this link between Dracula and childhood 
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may really be a perverse sign of his sense of the 
vulnerability, the openness-to-threat, of the adult position: 
I have hope that our man-brains that have been of 
man so long and that have not lost the grace of God, 
will come higher than this child-brain that lie in 
his tomb for centuries, that grow not yet to our 
stature, and that do only work selfish and therefore 
small. (359) 
What Van Helsing's broken language and his Dracula-like 
foreigness may give away is that some of his own power comes 
unrecognized from the same pre-verbal source. 
The celebrated scene in which the vulnerable Jonathan 
Harker, alone in the Count's castle, encounters Dracula's 
three female accomplices, is only too frequently quoted as 
evidence for the disguised lubricity of the novel: especially 
the moment when the most seductive of the vampires 'went on 
her knees' (39) before him. While the presence of these three 
ladies is a key to the real dominant gender-orientation of 
things in the castle, the most telling detail in the scene is 
universally ignored. It comes when Dracula throws the three 
'weird sisters' a wriggling bundle in order to distract them 
from Harker's person. The bait he has thrown them turns out 
(47) to be a newly stolen infant, on which they prepare to 
gorge. This moment identifies for us the true relation of 
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events: these horrific females that share Dracula's powers of 
insubstantiality are really inverted mothers who consume back 
into themselves not only the child's body, but its very 
identity; they cut it off forever before it has the chance of 
maturity, genitality, and speaking selfhood. The most obvious 
physical symptom of maturation is of course 'growing-up'; for 
his part, Dracula's blood-feasts lead him to grow younger - to 
approximate more and more in tendency the condition of the 
child. 
So traumatic is Harker's exposure to this thwarting 
environment that after he escapes from the castle he goes 
through an extended period of enervation and effective 
silence; it is as if he forgets his adventure for a time. 
While this lasts, even his journal ceases to be an important 
source for the reader. It is as if he were reliving the trauma 
of primary repression, and experiencing physically the 
inadequacy of words in the face of what cannot be spoken. 
An artistically subtle moment is the minor incident early 
in the story connected with the old man Mr Swales. In a sense 
the narrative-within-a-narrative he offers to Lucy and Mina in 
the Whitby graveyard anticipates and encapsulates many of the 
psychological themes we have uncovered. Certainly his 
interpolated story links together the now familiar elements of 
sonhood, motherhood, and unsanctified death. In convincingly-
represented dialect Swales informs us that the legends on the 
tombstones, these apparently definitive 'texts', are not to be 
trusted; there is a 'deeper' reality that these symbols hide. 
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In the course of his story, he quaintly supposes the dead 
to carry their tombstones with them like references at the Day 
of Judgmentj but these metonymic testimonials will do them no 
good, he says. For the symbol, the name, the word, is not the 
reality: interpretation is neededj and even then there is an 
'underground' reality the verbal cannot convey. As an example, 
Swales turns to a grave whose headstone announces its erection 
by a 'sorrowing mother'in memory of a 'dearly-beloved son'. In 
reality the grave, though not actually untenanted like so many 
others here, is unsanctified: Swales tells a story of familial 
hate and suicide behind the polite appearances the stone keeps 
up. No wonder Dracula picks out this particular site, steeped 
in associations of premature death and unnatural mothering, as 
his favourite nocturnal abode when he first arrives in 
England! 
Swales passes himself off as sceptical of the occult and 
the afterlifej on a later occasion he confesses movingly to 
Mina that in reality he is frightened of the meaning of death 
as it approaches, and that this is the source of his 
mockeries. 
Swales's symbolism suggests that words themselves figure 
as lifeless tombstones above a reality they are powerless to 
describej one which may even be empty. What Swales's previous 
story of the empty grave hints is that Death in this novel is 
habitually characterised by an absence, rather than a 
presence, in relation to its signifiersj and a presence -
Count Dracula himself - where there should be an absence 
(although, as I have pointed out, it is significant that 
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Dracula's person should be largely missing from the novel 
which bears his name on the cover, like, of course, an 
epitaph). This is not simply because the novel is concerned 
with the conditions of a psychological 'living death', or that 
it dwells upon the strange 'eternal life' of fictional 
characters, as in a way it does. The vacancy mentioned is 
owing to the fact that the Count's physical appearance belies 
a 'missing self' which is its hidden reality. 
The discovery that vampires can throw no images in 
mirrors is highly symbolic of this absence; Dracula and his 
cohorts remain on the far side of the Lacanian mirror-stage, 
and figure only imperfectly in the world of language. Tied to 
this, of course, is that larger absence from language which 
these shapes of imagination paradoxically incarnate: the 
Occult itself, which lies on the night-side of 'things'. 
If Dracula himself is 'a present absence, an unreal 
substance' (Jackson: 118), then so is the land he comes from. 
Transylvania exists on the borders of what counts as Europe; 
even more, it is on the borders of the European consciousness. 
In a way the invasion of London by Transylvanian realities is 
a rebellion of the margins against the text, absence 
intermingling itself with presence - to reveal that what we 
took to be substantial was really streaked with unformed 
space, with unreality, all along. Finally, such revelations 
are simply the antinomian side of mysticism. 
Hennelly claims that Dracula is in the tradition of the 
'Archetypal Rebel' (1977: 23) of English literature, owning 
Milton's Satan, Manfred, Captain Ahab, and Heathcliff among 
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his ancestors. While this bears some truth, the fact that 
Dracula is irrevocably on the other side of an impassable 
divide - that his evil is 'irredeemable' - prevents him 
reaching tragic dimensions, of necessity. The catharsis he 
offers is of 'terror', but not of 'pity': he belongs to the 
worlds of nightmare and fantasy unmixed with dream. Though his 
identity is in a sense missing, this does not save him from 
one-dimensionality; indeed, it demands this condition of him. 
The novel he belongs in, in contrast, rests on deep 
ambivalences - not all of them perhaps known to its creator. 
At the end we are unsure whether the child the Harkers produce 
(with Dracula's demise, we note, procreation is at last 
permitted) is meant to represent a product of opposing forces, 
as Hennelly (23) suggests - for, unspeakably, Dracula's blood 
still runs in Mina's veins; or else if the situation is as 
Carol Senf12 avers: 
He is born on the anniversary of Dracula's death ... 
the Harker's son who is appropriately named for all 
the men who had participated in the conquest of 
Dracula. Individual sexual desire has apparently 
been so absolutely effaced that the narrator sees 
this child as a result of their social union rather 
than the product of the sexual union between one man 
and one woman. (Senf 1979: 169) 
It is curious to think that Freud was laying the first 
foundations of his new science of psychoanalysis just as this 
novel was being written. His period in Paris with Charcot at 
If.. • , 
the Salpetr1ere asylum was now well behind him, and he had 
largely given up the attempt to use hypnosis as a way of 
liberating repressed traumatic material. Hypnotism was the 
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first of the 'royal roads to the unconscious' taken by Freud, 
and it figures largely in this book. The nineteenth-century 
cult of mesmerism is supposed by Stephen King to be one of the 
imaginative models for Dracula's mysterious powers of 
domination (King 1987: 83). Mention of mesmerism makes room 
for a passing word here about George du Maurier's Trilby 
(1894): his impresario Svengali is also a kind of Dracula who 
uses hypnotism directly. By rendering Trilby as tractable and 
malleable as Dr Coppelius's doll, Svengali also exorcises the 
threatening feminine. 
Sitting alone at night in his asylum Dr Seward muses 
about Renfield's case and confides to his diary some strange 
ambitions of his own about the study of mental phenomena, that 
'most difficult and vital' aspect of science: 'Had I even the 
secret of one such mind - did I hold the key to the fancy of 
even one lunatic I might advance my own branch of science to 
a pitch compared to which Burdon-Sanderson's physiology or 
Ferrier's brain-knowledge would be as nothing' (75). Unbeknown 
to Seward, in old Vienna (not too far from Transylvania) the 
advance he envisaged was in preparation as these very lines 
were being penned. It is hard not to suspect that his creator 
might have gleaned some faint foreknowledge of its import. 
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Chapter 9: EDWARDIAN SUPERNATURAL AND OCCULT FANTASY: 
REANIMATIONS AND DISSECTIONS. 
In our discussion of Dracula we discovered, with the help of 
Julia Kristeva, that the book's conception of evil may be 
psychologically identified with the pre-verbal 'feminine' 
region of the unconscious memory. The purpose of this chapter 
is to show that these same findings are as productive when 
selectively applied to the genre of Edwardian Occult fiction 
as a whole. 
The most famous of Stoker's later novels is The Lair of 
the White Worm (1911)'. Enough has been said here to indicate 
how Lady Arabella in that work might signify as another 
monstrous representative of what Freudianism calls the 
'phallic mother'. Her affinity is with snakes rather than, as 
Dracula, with bats; and beneath her stately home, 'Diana's 
Grove', a vast ancient worm (she is herself an incarnation of 
this serpent-dragon) lives in its womb-like cave and feeds 
upon her romantic conquests. 
But by far the best of Stoker's work after Dracula is his 
posthumous collection of short stories Dracula's Guest (1914)2. 
Here too the same concerns emerge: with occult female 
propensities and with animal transformations. 'The Squaw' 
(Stoker 1966: 50-66) mentioned in this story's title plays, 
interestingly, no direct part in the narrative. The only 
reference to her is to a by-the-way anecdote told by a 
principal character, the hardy American Westerner Elias P. 
Hutcheson. He recollects the powers of implacable vengeance 
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once displayed by an Apache woman against a frontiersman who 
had killed her child. She tracked the culprit down and enacted 
horrible tortures upon him. Elias is reminded of this gruesome 
event while accompanying an English honeymoon couple around 
the antiquities of 'Nurnberg': he himself happens by chance to 
kill a kitten playing with its mother below the walls of The 
Burg. As it turns out, the mother-cat is invested with the 
same implacable and preternatural spirit of vengeance as the 
squaw. This is shown when Hutcheson steps experimentally 
inside a nasty device in the tower's torture-chamber 
(appropriately nicknamed the 'Iron virgin': it is a large 
hinged cabinet set with spikes made in the 'crudely-shaped 
figure of a woman' [59], and ornamented with 'a rude 
resemblance of a woman's face' [60]). At the crucial moment 
the cat leaps and Hutcheson is fatally impaled inside. 
The implication of the story is of course that the spirit 
of motherhood is preternaturally terrible and even animal in 
its extremes, capable of setting aside all the requirements of 
common morality. The lesson is an ominous one for the young 
couple, who are lightheartedly dallying with sex for the first 
time. On the whole though, the tone is both macabre and comic 
at once; there is some humorous byplay when the young lady, 
feeling faint, happens accidentally to sit upon a seat of nails! 
2 
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As I have indicated, the association between femininity, evil, 
and the occult that we find so markedly in stoker is by no 
means confined to his work, but is a fixed and steady feature 
of the genre - at least where male writers are concerned. In 
occult stories by Sherlock Holmes's inventor, Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle, there are interesting variations of the theme; and 
Doyle's craftsmanlike if mostly uninspired work is typical 
enough to allow us to make some remarks along the way about 
general stylistic features of the genre. 
Doyle is, incidentally, the only consistent proponent of 
spiritualism as such among our writers. His support for the 
spiritualist cause is now mainly remembered through one 
instance of his credulousness, when he unwisely gave his 
support to a series of faked 'fairy' photographs. Perhaps his 
convictions actually inhibited his powers of free invention in 
this field, as Lovecraft (1987: 489) suspects of occult 
believers in general. 
While numbers of his occult fictions3 , like 'The Leather 
Funnel' and 'John Barrington Cowles', have to do with the 
daemonic woman (the last-named is an especially revealing 
example of the type), Doyle's most successful story in this 
vein is probably 'The Captain of the Polestar' (Doyle 1979: 
15-42). The value of there being two medical doctors and a 
lawyer among the main protagonists of Dracula has already been 
explained: they are representatives of the masculine-rational 
type. The prominent use of such sober figures is not peculiar 
to Stoker and Dracula, however; as it happens, doctors, 
scholars and scientists are widely popular as narrators or 
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protagonists. This is informative in itself; it shows us that, 
of all the forms of fantasy, the supernatural tale is under 
the greatest obligations of apparent realism. Paradoxically, 
readers of occult stories must be all the more assured of the 
credibility and authenticity of the world presented. To place 
characters of impeccable credentials in the principal 
experiencing or judging roles is an obvious aid to preserving 
a realistic atmosphere. 
That this form of fiction makes stock use of the respect 
afforded scientists in our culture is somewhat ironic; for 
their discipline is often the chosen enemy in these tales. The 
scientific outlook is opposed as the greatest hindrance to an 
open-minded awareness of the occult (and a useful symbol of 
those logocentric mental habits which ignore unseen - or 
unspoken - realities). Invariably the sceptical man of science 
is gradually convinced as the narrative unfolds - against his 
better judgment. Dr Seward is a high example of the type. 
Doyle's advantage here is that he himself was an ex-
doctor, and experienced the transition in his own person. This 
gives him a special authority in the fictional portrayal of 
this process of awakening. John McAlister Ray, the 
participating narrator of the Polestar story, is a ship's 
doctor on a whaler, as Doyle had once been. He is also highly 
sceptical at first; his scientific habits are shown in his 
meticulous recording of facts in his personal log, which 
happens to be our source, too: he prefaces all entries with 
precise times and positions of longitude and latitude. 
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All this is part of what Barthes would have termed the 
'code' of the dependable and the objective, the documentary or 
'scientific code,4; we find its almost absurd proliferation in 
the case of Dracula, which is entirely a compilation of notes, 
entries, bills and letters. But the truly interesting thing, 
as Barthes himself was quick to point out, is the actual 
helplessness of these spurious codes: they are of course part 
of a work of 'fiction', and so can never be absolutely 
believed in. Were we literally to credit the fiction, we would 
be 'mutilating the real of its symbolic supplement' (Barthes 
1988: 179), and so ignoring the verbal construction of 
realitYi a mistake which 'involves refusing the other scene, 
that of the unconscious'. 
What Barthes seems to me to be suggesting is that these 
codes act not to convince as such: they are more like a 
ritual, which induces a kind of voluntary hypnotic trance in 
the reader, reminiscent of Dracula's or Van Helsing's more 
engulfing mesmerism. Their (conventional) presence is like the 
one or two words the hypnotist may use on a hardened subject 
to invoke in him - in this case - the 'fictional disposition', 
the temporary and imagined condition of belief. 
Be this as it may, everything about the tone of Doyle's 
narrator betrays scottish canniness and practicality -
qualities which are on the face of it entirely at odds with 
the mounting supernatural atmosphere of the story. His journal 
entries play down the increasing danger to the ship and its 
crew posed by its remaining so late in arctic waters, long 
after the ice has begun to build. Only the occasional terse 
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aside serves to enlighten us: 'No whaler has ever remained in 
these latitudes till so advanced a period of the year' (Doyle 
1979: 16). 
Every day we note in the log the dissipating or 
encroaching state of the ice-banks, dependent on the weather. 
There is a real threat of the vessel being ice-bound forever 
in this spot: the source of the terrible risk is the 
apparently arbitrary will of the ship's master, captain 
Craigie. This strange man is impulsive, fiery, and 
unpredictable: a typical 'other' character, though sharing 
more of Van Helsing's human canniness than Dracula's uncanny. 
In other words, although a Scot like Ray, he is more 
vulnerable to his lower emotional nature; though Ray, we 
learn, is no complete iceblock himself: he has a fiancee 
waiting for him back in Scotland. 
Here we see a notable example of a recurrent feature of 
the genre: the settings of these tales are almost invariably 
isolated, removed from the ordinary everyday world of humans; 
and especially from their speech, the cliches and reiterations 
of which help to maintain the customary realities. This is the 
point, of course: the topography both symbolizes and helps to 
induce the 'altered states of mind' which are conducive to 
occult experience. Strangeness and foreigness are always the 
keynote, however presented. Transylvania or Poe's mid-European 
settings remove us from the familiar; the arctic wastes of 
Frankenstein's conclusion are a more extreme case. This frozen 
and tortured white expanse is a landscape devoid of life and 
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colour; and nothing could more repel the sense of the human 
than its corpse-like cold. 
Secondly, in the relations of Ray and Craigie we meet a 
common phenomenon - the 'bifurcation' of the experiencing 
centre of the story into two figures: sceptic and convert, 
novice and initiate, dullard and 'sensitive'. It turns out 
that the plain Doctor and the Captain with the mysterious past 
are closer than they first knew, for Craigie too has been 
engaged to be married; but his fiancee has died in some 
accident. Ray happens by chance to catch sight of the woman's 
portrait: 
No artist could have evolved from his own mind such 
a curious mixture of character and weakness. The 
languid, dreamy eyes, with their drooping lashes, 
and the broad, low brow, unruffled by thought or 
care, were in strong contrast with the clean-cut, 
prominent jaw, and the resolute set of the lower lip 
.... That anyone in the short space of nineteen 
years of existence could develop such strength of 
will as was stamped upon her face seemed to me at 
the time to be well-nigh incredible. She must have 
been an extraordinary woman. (30) 
The shock of this impression is an essential ingredient in 
what follows. We need to remember that the world of the ship 
is essentially a male one; and the quality of this intrusive 
female element is emphasized the more in consequence. The 
portrait displays a mixture of sensuality, indomitable will 
and lack of relective faculties which is disturbing in its own 
right. 
Meanwhile, as if its physical dangers were not tension 
enough, the superstitious crew reports an outbreak of 
supernatural phenomena around the ship. This meets with the 
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doctor's scorn: 'I sometimes think that I am the only really 
sane man aboard the vessel' (33). The manifestation takes the 
form at first of an odd non-verbal vocalisation: 'plaintive 
cries and screams in the wake of the ship, as if something 
were following it and were unable to overtake it' (20). It can 
sound human ('sometimes like a bairn crying and sometimes like 
a wench in pain' [21J) and also animal: 'like a bit lambie 
that hae lost its mither' (32). 
Inevitably Ray himself at last hears the horrific sound. 
At moments like these the device of the journal becomes most 
effective, enabling the narration to skip over intervening 
time and so directly contrast moods and states of mind - to 
shocking effect, as upheavals occur. The preternatural and 
impossible quality of the sound is emphasized: 'beginning, as 
it seemed to me, at a note such as prima donna never reached, 
and mounting from that ever higher and higher until it 
culminated in a long wail of agony' (34). And yet, in the 
midst of pain, even more unnervingly, 'there was an occasional 
wild note of exultation'. The hint of an irrational and 
animal-like predatory force is unmistakable. 
Ray has reached the moment of his own crisis and 
consequent recantation: 
The fact is, that I have gone through a very strange 
experience, and am beginning to doubt whether I was 
justified in branding everyone on board as madmen 
because they professed to have seen things which did 
not seem reasonable to my understanding ...• I have 
experienced that which I used formerly to scoff at. 
(33) 
431 
Visual sightings of the paranormal entity follow. It 
appears to a crewman as 'a sort of white figure moving across 
the icefield in the same direction that we had heard the 
cries' (21). Tantalisingly, this figure has all the lineaments 
of the unnamable - it defies verbal classification altogether: 
'I don't know what it was. It wasn't a bear, anyway. It was 
tall and white and straight, and if it wasn't a man nor a 
woman, I'll stake my davy it was something worse'. 
The elemental and primitive force which dogs the ship is 
of course meant to be the psychic residue - it is hard to call 
it more than that - of the Captain's former sweetheart. 
craigie alone seems to recognise the fiancee he knew in this 
'dim nebulous body, devoid of shape, sometimes more, sometimes 
less apparent, as the light fell on it' (39). At last he 
leaves the ship in its pursuit, and is found white and dead by 
the search-party on a narrow spit of the vast ice-floe. Over 
his form hovers momentarily a 'vortex' of 'tiny flakes' (a 
chance uniting of physical nature and spirit, we wonder?) 
which looks, for some of the crew, like the departing woman. 
The tale comes back to the everyday with a final 
documentary flourish: an appended testimonial from McAlister 
Ray's father, attesting to the honesty and reliability of his 
son's account. 
Doyle has found a (literally) chilling medium for the 
evocation of the occult-feminine and its association with 
death (of the self) in this white waste of nothingness. But 
Captain Craigie - as Ray's less controlled alter ego - acts as 
a kind of propitiatory sacrifice to this half-inhuman or pre-
432 
human 'natural' force. The ice melts and the ship returns home 
to prosaic normality. 
with Doyle even more than with Stoker, or with Stevenson 
too, one is made aware of the force of Stephen King's 
insistence upon horror story as being, when all is said and 
done, on the side of 're-integration' (King 1987: 28) and the 
status quo, despite its extensive flirtations with their 
opposite: 'We love and need the concept of monstrosity because 
it is a reaffirmation of the order we all crave as human 
beings' (55). Nonetheless, one sign of greatness in an occult 
writer is perhaps the courage to problematise reality without 
any compensating reassurance at the close. Of all our authors, 
it is only Blackwood who is prepared to risk such final 
ambivalence - and even then, usually by offering half-
explanations, or two or more contradictory explanations, for 
the same occult phenomenon. We may take up the fragment of 
understanding he offers or disdain it if we can. 
In the example above the occult is both feminine and 
animal; sometimes it is animal alone, but always the 'monster' 
indicates the archaic and pre-verbal reaches of the human 
personality. In other stories the occult atmosphere - really 
an intimation of our own personal psychological 'pre-
history' - is displaced onto the fact of antiquity alone 
as in those tales which have to do with ancient relics or 
Egyptian remains, or with other forms of the return of the 
ancient past, as in for example Doyle's 'Lot No. 249'. 
A story, partly comic in tone, which combines the 
Egyptian and the feminine elements, is found in the same 
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author's 'The Ring of Thoth' (1979: 202-222). The story 
contains its own internal narrative, the story of Sosra, an 
ancient Egyptian priest who has found through chemical 
experimentation the secret of (like Dracula) living forever. 
He takes the elixir, but his beloved dies before she is made 
immune to death. A rival priest discovers an antidote to the 
elixir, but hides it maliciously in a ring on the woman Atma's 
body before embalmment. Desiring to join her in death, Sosra 
spends millennia searching for the mummy of his former love, 
uncovering it at last in the Louvre collection. There he is 
momentarily interrupted by a young archaeologist, who hears 
his tale. 
The story has a number of morals. Sosra belittles modern 
Egyptology for failing to understand that it was the occult 
mystic and hermetic philosophy of Egypt that was the true 
centre of its life; and as a kind of scientist himself, he too 
has suffered for insensitive curiosity about 'the workings of 
Nature' (213). Once again, we encounter the theme of the 
insufficiency of merely rational knowledge. 
More important symbolically is Sosra's story and its 
details. Jungian interpretation would have no difficulty in 
finding in the museum a representation of the Collective 
Unconscious, in Atma the personification of Sosra's neglected 
Anima, and in her restorative ring an emblem of the healed and 
'integrated self' which is desired - all of this being an 
object lesson to the overdeveloped intellectuality of the 
restless scholar who hears the tale. Such an account has its 
force; but the problem lies in the fact that the reward of the 
ring is death. What is initially denied and then achieved 
through the ring is really the realm of the occult-feminine 
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which is indistinguishable from death of the self. Only with 
the poison antidote within the gem will Sosra return to the 
now 'deeply buried' world, obliterated by the sands of time, 
from which he came. He is enabled thus to move from a 'living 
death' the opposite of Dracula's, one cut off from this Other 
dimension, to a true completion of life in death. 
3 
Even among our self-consciously 'marginal' authors, perhaps no 
reputation has suffered so much from time as that of Arthur 
Machen. When Martin and Secker brought out the signed limited 
edition of his complete works in 1923 his fame was at its 
zenith. Despite his chosen subject-matter, he was an 
established and respected literary figure. The public at large 
/ , knew him, at the very least, for his part in a cause celebre: 
as the author of 'The Bowmen', the story which, taken as fact, 
had inspired the wartime legend of the 'Angels of Mons's. 
Lovecraft reserves his most fulsome praise of all for Machen's 
work, both for its style and content, ranking him on a par 
with or above Blackwood, and, in a veritable fanfare of 
appreciation, reprints a poem by Frank Belknap Long written in 
his honour (1987: 495). 
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Certainly, there is often an intriguing colouring to 
Machen's work, and his powers of 'occasional' evocative 
description - though somewhat Pateresque and nineties-ish, 
perhaps - lead to memorable passages, particularly when he is 
describing goblinesque visions of a distinctive and alien 
kind. It could be that Machen is due for a revival - to my 
knowledge, none of his major works have been in print for some 
considerable time. I suspect, however, that his curiously 
bodiless characterisation and rather casual and quirky 
narrative construction are not readily appealing to modern 
tastes: he is the one author to suffer from an abundance of 
period qualities. Daring in their time, his works edge now 
upon coyness and whimsy. 
Machen was unusual in creating his own haunted fictional 
landscape out of the Monmouth area of Wales through the course 
of many separate stories - in a way that reminds of Hardy's 
Wessex and of Lovecraft's own New England fantasies. The Roman 
relics that occur in the area were of particularly sinister 
and archaic significance for him; presumably with much the 
same symbolic meaning that Medieval times or ancient Egypt 
commonly have for other authors, like Doyle in the instance 
above - recalling, finally, the deep uncanny prehistory of the 
individual mind. 
The Roman presence is felt in the background of his most 
noted early fiction, the novelette The Great God Pan (1894)6. 
The story can be simply stated. A young woman of a simple and 
loving disposition is subjected to a peculiar brain-operation 
by the ruthless hyper-rational scientist who raised her. This 
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is performed in the presence of one witness, a friend of the 
surgeon's. Redeemingly, this friend at least has occasional 
misgivings about endorsing such a curiously heartless and 
immoral act of human vivisection, but both men are caught up 
in the experimental temper and the operation goes ahead. Its 
purpose is to alter human perception out of its customary 
socially and verbally constructed bounds, so that something 
closer to reality, to the ding an sich, may be perceived. The 
scientist terms this 'seeing the great god Pan'. When the 
woman wakes from the anaesthetic her facial expressions 
indicate first a moment of rapture and ecstasy, followed 
immediately by horror, babbling idiocy and - some painful 
months later - death. 
These events take up the first chapter only. Most of the 
remainder of the story is the apparently unrelated attempt of 
two men-about-town to track down and expose the doings of a 
mysterious socialite woman, whose beauty and fascination 
enable her to move freely in sophisticated society. And yet 
she appears somehow responsible for a wave of suicides among 
her debonair, overprivileged and aristocratic male guests. 
This trail of destruction extends from London to South 
America, and is hidden behind a collection of assumed names. 
Hints of Satanic orgies and a double life in the red light 
district of Soho attach themselves to her in the course of the 
investigation. The friend and observer of the first chapter is 
later enticed into the hunt: he adds horrifying information to 
the dossier about her teenage years, spent in Wales; stories 
of woodland indulgences close to Roman remains that end in 
idiocy and death for the youthful participants. Eventually, 
under the threat of exposure by our sleuths, the woman is 
blackmailed into committing suicide. 
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This social vampire was, it turns out, the daughter of 
the human guinea pig of the first chapter, conceived in some 
supernatural and monstrous fashion following on the operation. 
The unknown and absent father was, presumably, 'Pan' himself -
whether in the guise of god, demon, or Satan, is not made 
clear. It may even be that the foetus was immaculately 
generated - in an inverted 'virgin birth'? - by the orgasmic 
and awful exposure the young woman underwent. At any rate, the 
growing child itself was often caught umawares by its foster-
father in company with some unspeakable playmate - whether 
mythological or supernatural is not revealed. 
For our purposes here, we need note only a few salient 
points. Most obviously, the bulk of the story is again devoted 
to the exorcism of the demonic woman, a testimony to the 
'feminine' character of the occult powers. We see in the first 
chapter how it is through a woman that 'ultimate reality' -
which is also, it appears, the occult dimension - is to be 
contacted; and the offspring of this contact is feminine in 
form as well. Females are clearly identified as psychopomps of 
the occult realm. And through them, 'evil' - especially of a 
sexual character - is transmitted to the upper world. 
In this instance especially, we might feel they have a 
justifiable case for behaving demonically. The feckless 
moneyed dandies upon whom Helen Vaughan (or Beaumont) preys 
deserve what they get. Here the 'death' associated with sex 
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seems a just return for vapid uselessness: these men, after 
all, themselves intend to 'prey' upon Helen sexually, though 
this form of exploitation is not condemned by the narrative. 
The male hypocrisy of our detective, Villiers, who is able to 
track Helen down by means of his own 'contacts' in the sexual 
underworld, is patent enough to a modern reader. And the moral 
dubiousness of the culminating 'blackmail' leading - somewhat 
improbably - to Helen's suicide hardly helps to compensate for 
the appalling circumstances of her entry into the world. The 
scientist who experimented on her mother (rather terrifyingly 
named 'Mary', as her daughter is named Helen) believes that 
since he 'rescued Mary from the gutter ... I think her life is 
mine, to use as I see fit' (Machen 1923: 8). 
Such blatant and thoughtless chauvinism is to an extent 
moderated by the doctor's more hesitant friend Clarke, who 
only goes ahead when he is persuaded that the operation will 
be harmless. But this element of condemnation is not very 
firm; no heavier retribution is extracted from the main 
perpetrator of everyon's ills himself than a mild final 
regret; whereas the demise of the woman Helen, his own 
effectual creation, is spectacular indeed. 
Behind the chauvinism, what we have here again is the 
intrinsic opposition of the scientific mentality and the 
occult realm: our neurologist intrudes in the name of science 
upon areas for which his mental set has not fitted him. In 
essence the theme is as old as Faustus; what is far more 
interesting, for our purposes, is the nature of the occult 
that his meddling exposes. Especially significant is Mary's 
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double response to possession of her new super-senses: she 
feels ecstasy as well as horror at what she sees. This is a 
sign that the 'otherworld' may reach us in two distinct ways: 
as the rapturous and mystical sublime; or else as the abject 
and horrific. 
This double aspect of visionary experience - its heavenly 
and hellish sides - is plainly laid out in the tale. Before 
his experiment, Dr Raymond explains his view of reality to 
Clarke quite explicitly, as hard scientific fact. Yet it is 
clear that his conceptions run parallel to those of mystics: 
You see me standing here beside you, and hear my 
voice; but I tell you that all these things - yes, 
from that star that has just shone out in the sky to 
the solid ground beneath my feet - I say that all 
these are but dreams and shadows: the shadows that 
hide the real world from our eyes. There is a real 
world, but it is beyond this glamour and this vision 
•.. beyond them all as beyond a veil .... the 
ancients knew what lifting the veil means. They 
called it seeing the god Pan. (4-5) 
Clarke is able to understand this updated Neo-Platonism 
emotionally, at least, because he has had comparable 
experiences of his own to draw on, mostly in childhood. These 
are clearly of an authentic mystical (rather than Pan-ic) 
character; and, as reminiscences, they are tellingly evoked 
through the rhythms and imagery of Machen's prose. 
Above all there came to his nostrils the scent of 
summer, the smell of flowers mingled, and the odour 
of the woods, of cool shaded places, deep in the 
green depths, drawn forth by the sun's heat; and the 
scent of the the good earth, lying as it were with 
arms stretched forth, and smiling lips, over-powered 
all. His fancies made him wander, as he had wandered 
long ago, from the fields into the wood, tracking a 
little path betweeen the shining undergrowth of 
beech-trees; and the trickle of water dropping from 
440 
the limestone rock sounded as a clear melody in the 
dream ... (10-11) 
This has the stamp of authentic nature mysticism; but it 
is also highly symbolic. Clarke's entry to the wood in the 
positive and inviting context of a smiling and maternally 
personified nature signifies submersion in his own 'natural' 
unconscious process. The recurring word 'dream' gives this 
away. The experience is indeed trance-like, sustained as it is 
by the trickling and regular sounds of the womb-like forest. 
Clarke, in the deep folds of a dream, was conscious 
that the path from his father's house had led him 
into an undiscovered country, and he was wondering 
at the strangeness of it all, when suddenly, in 
place of the hum and murmur of summer, an infinite 
silence seemed to fallon all things, and the wood 
was hushed, and for a moment of time he stood face 
to face there with a presence, that was neither man 
nor beast, neither the living nor the dead, but all 
things mingled, the form of all things but devoid of 
all form. And in that moment the sacrament of body 
and soul was dissolved, and a voice seemed to cry 
'Let us go hence,' and then the darkness of darkness 
beyond the stars, the darkness of everlasting. (11) 
This shows many typical features of the 'mystic' and 
cosmic moment. Away from 'his father's house' - with the 
influence of the logocentric 'masculine' vision of things 
abated - he comes upon the essentially unnamable (and hence 
unseparated and indistinguishable): 'all things mingled, the 
form of all things but devoid of all form'. Beyond lies the 
darkness of the ego's death. 
But of course this ecstatic moment is only the other side 
of a coin that could just as easily reveal horrific 
dimensions, as in Mary's vision. For any unprepared or too 
'masculine' mind, all the sublime cosmic content of this 
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vision could change character utterly, and appear to be of the 
quintessence of evil. Pan, as source of the horror, is also 
'devoid of form', after all: he is 'an exquisite symbol 
beneath which men long ago veiled their knowledge of the most 
awful, most secret forces which lie at the heart of all 
things; forces before which the souls of men must wither and 
die and blacken ...• such forces cannot be named, cannot be 
spoken, cannot be imagined except under a veil and a symbol 
that which is without a form taking to itself a form' (75-
6). When Villiers senses the evil atmosphere of Helen's now 
empty flat his experience is not entirely unlike Clarke's own 
presentiment of the extinction of self: 'my eyes began to grow 
dim; it was like the entrance of death' (49). 
Like her supernatural source, Helen too is unnamable, her 
alias constantly changing. As Herbert comments about her: 
'Only human beings have names, Villiers; I can't say any more' 
(31). Helen's beautiful appearance denies her hidden reality: 
she is at once 'the most beautiful woman and the most 
repulsive ••. a sort of enigma' (36). During her short 
marriage to the unfortunate Herbert, he listens to her 'as she 
spoke in her beautiful voice, spoke of things which even now I 
would not dare whisper in blackest night ..•. I have seen the 
incredible .•. and ask whether it is possible for a man to 
behold such things and live' (29-30). 
The most imaginative moment in the story is probably 
Helen's final dissolution on her deathbed. After death, her 
beautiful appearance gives way to what it hides - a writhing 
formlessness that reaches back to the origin of things. It is, 
indeed, the 'nameless' incarnate, its connections with its 
archaic sources (in the mind) laid bare: 
Here too was all the work by which man has been made 
repeated before my eyes. I saw the form waver from 
sex to sex, dividing itself from itself, and then 
again reunited. Then I saw the body descend to the 
beasts whence it ascended, and that which was on the 
heights go down to the depths, even to the abyss of 
all being. The principle of life, which makes 
organism, always remained, while the outward form 
changed. (81) 
This report is composed by our perennial ideal witness, a 
doctor - though why his tone turns biblical as it does in 
medias res here, is not clear. Even his impeccable record 
breaks down and becomes illegible (like most prescriptions) 
towards the end: language itself fails under such an 
onslaught. Once the mass on the bed has undergone a complete 
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phylogenetic unmaking in scientific and evolutionary terms, it 
remakes itself in terms of occult myth - even becoming the 
satyr-god himself before its human form returns at last. To 
some onlookers, a likeness of the good, submissive Mary's 
expression is glimpsed before the close: a prevision of the 
exorcisms of Dracula, perhaps. As with the nature of cosmic 
reality, mankind cannot bear too much of this: the final 
admission of Raymond, the scientist-perpetrator of all this 
woe, is fitting here: 'I forgot that no human eyes could look 
on such a vision with impunity' (87). 
4 
A feeling of deep resentment filled me, and 
miserable questionings. Why could I not have gone 
with my Love? What reason to keep us apart? Why had 
I to wait alone, while she slumbered through the 
years, on the still bosom of the Sea of Sleep? The 
Sea of Sleep! My thoughts turned, inconsequently, 
out of their channel of bitterness, to fresh, 
desperate questionings. Where was it? I seemed to 
have but just parted from my Love, upon its quiet 
surface, and it had gone, utterly. It could not be 
far away! And the White Orb which I had seen hidden 
in the shadow of the Sun of Darkness! My sight dwelt 
upon the Green Sun - eclipsed. What had eclipsed it? 
Was there a vast, dead star circling it? Was the 
Central Sun - as I had come to regard it - a double 
star? The thought had come, almost unbidden; yet why 
should it not be so?7 (Hodgson 1983: 149) 
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William Hope Hodgson's The House on the Borderland (1908) is 
certainly one of the most imaginative and visionary works in 
this or any language. The towering quality of his inventive 
gifts is equally evident in The Night Land (1912) - but that 
is fantasy of a different kind, and is a little marred by its 
incongruous William Morris-style trappings. 
Though less than 200 pages, the former book invites 
comparison with Dante's trilogy: it has a similar (unevenly-
apportioned) three-part structure, suggestive of an Inferno, a 
Purgatorio and a Paradiso. The corresponding elements are more 
mixed in each section than this idea presupposes, however. 
Hodgson's own introductory remarks (not included with all 
editions) hint that he himself saw a religious application for 
his story, though his heaven and hell are of a kind no 
clergyman would either envision or tolerate. 
I have already suggested that Occult Fantasy was wrought 
in part to fill a gap left by the decline of religious 
experience, and Hodgson's own words need to be taken seriously 
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in this regard. But what the work draws upon is no 
conventional iconographYi instead it plumbs the archaic 
sources of religious need and feeling in the psyche itself, as 
its innate symbolism reveals. 
The two suns of the extract above encode the fact that 
Hodgson maintains the double-sided view of the occult we found 
in Machen. His principal character and narrator, the Recluse, 
is barred from extended contact with the Anima-like 
manifestation of his dead beloved in episodes in the central 
and also the final sections of the book, because to merge 
completely with his feminine side would mean death -
absorption back into the pre-ego that the amniotic Sea of 
Sleep in the background hints at. Its very name indicates how 
the unconscious and its workings are implicated here. All the 
Recluse's doings near the Sea of Sleep are ecstatic in 
nature - a much-needed balm to his more horrific experiences 
elsewhere. And yet the coming of the dark sun reveals that 
there is a considerable danger if he continues in that state, 
and in consequence he is swept away - despite his 
incomprehension and resentment. Only in or after his true 
death will he be able to merge entirely with his Love, the 
beautiful symbolic 'mother I who both guards and bars the way 
to pre-Oedipal dissolution. (The Recluse1s sister, the cipher-
like companion of his waking life, is a wasted and etiolated 
image of the feminine he craves.) His personal title - he is 
unnamed in the story - shows not only that he is deeply 
engaged with the consequences of his own primary narcissistic 
desires, but also that he is a part of everyman; and, of 
course, that the 'self' is fundamentally at issue in this 
tale. 
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On the first occasion he meets his dead Love he cries 
'strangely to her, in a very agony of remembrance' (101); the 
memories, of course, go back further than he knows. But this 
incident and the middle section which records it are brief 
because a kind of 'static' intervenes. Not only is contact 
with the Beloved interrupted by some agency, but so is 
communication with the reader: these pages are damaged or 
missing from the MS journal. The events they relate are 
represented by only a few sentence fragments. The meaning of 
this feature is really that words themselves are helpless 
before the ineffable - and later diabolical - nature of the 
experience. The spoiling of these particular pages tells us 
how central this part of the story is at an unseen level: the 
reader of course deduces that the Recluse was obsessively 
scanning these very pages at the point of death, for the 
damage is caused by the final collapse of his house. 
Nonetheless, they are unnecessary to the narrative as 
such, for much the same events occur again later; on that 
occasion the Recluse is reminded of the cause of his removal 
from the Sea - and so tells the reader, at last. He speaks 
cryptically of a 'Formless Thing that had haunted the shores 
of the Sea of Sleep. The guardian of that silent, echoless 
place' (145). This agent of annihilation and silence is 
appropriately both formless and unnamable. It is, after all, 
simplY the personification of the wordless blankness which 
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necessarily disintegrates the tale's verbal fabric at the edge 
of its archaic divide. 
As the case of the Sea confirms, the four Empedoclean 
elements appear with symbolic force. If earth is of the body 
and the material plane, and, at the last, the fire of the 
Green Sun purifies the dead Earth of its remaining swine-
things, then water, in contrast, is a spiritual essence. It is 
the diversion of his lake into the cavern beneath his house 
which similarly frees the Recluse at last of his own haunting 
by these subterranean creatures. Elemental colours, too, are 
symbolic. The colours Green and Red are clearly meant to 
connect with the Occult Plane, but their meaning is ambiguous. 
The Platonic Form or model of his own strange house which 
appears, like an echo, in the middle of the Red Plain in his 
earliest vision is coloured green, which links it with the 
god-like Green Sun; and yet the evil supernatural arch-swine-
thing who comes to claim the Recluse in the final pages also 
leaves a green luminous trace, that spreads like a disease. 
What the mixed colours and the co-presence of the dark 
and the green suns indicate is, I think, that Hodgson has 
solved a theological difficulty in the manner of the early 
heretic, Marcion, and made the universe's first principle 
binary in nature: dark and light, good and evil, complement 
each other. In this he is responding intuitively to the close 
equivalence nature of the mystical and the abject forms of the 
occult. 
Similarly, when the Recluse has lived through the whole 
history of the universe and comes to its final centre (there 
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is nothing else in literature like the 'fast-forward' picture 
of a time-compressed universe in the final section), he 
discovers that all souls (all 'selves') cluster about the 
central suns. In essence, these last are together the primal 
undifferentiated ground of selfhood out of which individual 
differences risei and into which perhaps they eventually 
merge. To be alone in the hereafter, and yet never be lonely!' 
- that is how the Recluse phrases his ultimate desire of the 
afterlife (146). 
As already implied, the strange house of the title is an 
equivalent for the self, just as is often the case in dream-
symbolism. Houses with cellars or lower apartments invariably 
suggest the unconscious dimensions of self: as with Dr 
Seward's asylum in Dracula where the patients are housed 
below-stairs, or with the crypts attached to Dracula's own 
dwellings. (stephen King presents an informative analysis of 
the front and rear aspects of Dr Jekyll's [or Mr Hyde's] 
establishment in stevenson's novel along the same lines [King 
1987: 90ff].) In the mysterious house of his title, Hodgson 
presents us with a picture of the self housed precipitously 
but unawares on the borderland of the unseen - taken either as 
the unconscious, the occult, or the spiritual dimension. As 
the vision of the red Plain of Silence demonstrates, this 
house is potentially eternal - situated, in its deepest being, 
beyond the depredations of time and space. But it is also 
menaced by foul and demonic subterranean swine-creatures, who 
may be heard scuffling and laughing in the dark below the 
trapdoor in the cellar floor. 
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If these swinish beings, Hodgson1s chosen monsters, have 
lost some of their repulsion for us today, it may be that we 
have got over the shock of Darwinism, a heritage which still 
haunted the Edwardian imagination. If the archaic and 
primitive side of the human unconscious presented itself 
frequently in bestial shape, or disguised as animal 
transformations or regressions like those of Hyde (King: 91), 
then this may be Darwin1s legacy. What was at least intended 
is that we experience through these symbols the intrinsically 
alien character of the deeper aspects of our own nature. 
Opposed to these demonic forces stands the religious or 
spiritual life. But the psychic vestiges of our religious 
heritage seem hardly less alien than the demonic, as the 
Recluse1s visions present them. From the vantage-point of the 
green house in the centre of the vast deserted Plain of 
Silence a circling amphitheatre of mountains comes into view. 
Careful scrutiny of the upper slopes reveals that they support 
the petrified shapes of ancient and modern deities. Bathed in 
the wordless silence of the ineffable, these alien and 
cyclopean effigies, some of them unknown, gaze unwinkingly 
down - as if eternally demanding their dues of fear, blood and 
awe. 
Far to my right, away up among inaccessible peaks, 
loomed the enormous bulk of the great Ass-god. 
Higher, I saw the hideous form of the dread goddess, 
rising up through the red gloom, thousands of 
fathoms above me. To the left, I made out the 
monstrous Eyeless-Thing, grey and inscrutable. 
Further off, reclining on its lofty ledge, the livid 
Ghoul-Shape showed - a splash of sinister colour, 
among the dark mountains. (156) 
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Once again, the virtual equivalence of the mystically awesome 
and the demoniacally appalling is intimated. 
Enough has already been said about the employment of the 
documentary element in Occult Fantasy, and its attempt, 
through the fictional multiplication of witnesses, to add both 
a kind of credibility and variety of perspective to the 
imagined scene. The MS's editor and the two figures of the 
framing narrative who come upon the overgrown estate and find 
the journal have these functions. The measured credence given 
to the MS and its contents by the non-narrating - and hence, 
perversely, more remote and authoritative - figure is 
especially important. However, these two men are more valuable 
as a transition between our reality and the symbolic occult 
reality of the narrative proper. They belong to a time closer 
to that of the novel's writing; and they negotiate the actual 
journey to this remote area of Ireland where even the speech 
cannot be understood. 
Of course, these levels mask a forbidden truth: one 
ultimately knows that all the characters and narrating voices 
are reduceable to the resources of an author-figure; and this 
is a little like the way all the monadic 'selves' of the 
Recluse's final vision are collapsible back into the universal 
undifferentiated selfhood of the central sun. 
5 
with the help of Kristeva's insights into the horrific and its 
connection with pre-Oedipal intimations of the 'feminine', it 
450 
has been relatively easy to demonstrate that writers who 
perhaps believed they were dealing with a supernatural 
otherworld were really treating of an other harboured by the 
mind itself. But in the case of Algernon Blackwood, who is 
indubitably the most accomplished artist of the sub-genre we 
are dealing with, there is some overt recognition of a 
directly psychological element. At the same time, it is 
necessary to pay more respect, in its own terms, to the 
genuine metaphysical element in his vision. 
Of all the authors so far discussed, it is Blackwood 
especially who asserts that his 'interest in psychic matters 
has always been the interest in questions of extended or 
expanded consciousness. If a ghost is seen, what is it 
interests me less than what sees it?' (Blackwood 1973: xiv)8. 
Again, he relates the 'supernatural' subjects of many tales to 
certain 'shocks' he was dealt in coming to terms with life as 
a young man (xiii) - rather than to ghostly presences as such. 
And yet the subject-matter of many of Blackwood's best-
remembered stories is not, loosely-speaking, 'personal' at 
all, but revolves upon a confrontation with what is 
supernatural about nature itself. Nothing, in one sense, can 
be more 'natural' than nature, as the adjective itself 
proclaims; and yet in certain moods - moods which may possibly 
be far closer to the truth of things, who knows - nothing can 
be more strange. It is this special 'shock' that Blackwood's 
occult draws upon: when our customary modes of apprehension no 
longer support us and we seem to lay bare something 
unutterably strange in our familiar environment, something we 
451 
had known of but which civilisation and its verbal discourses 
had helped us to suppress. 
Simpson, in the notable story of the vast Canadian wilds 
called 'The Wendigo'(158-207), senses almost from the start of 
his exposure 'that other aspect of the wilderness: the 
indifference to human life, the merciless spirit of desolation 
which took no note of man' (169). In revealing an intrinsic 
alienness in all we feel most assured of, Blackwood has found 
and tapped an irreducible source of quite genuine terror. Part 
of the descriptive and dramatic power of his writing comes 
from his ability to extend the same unrelenting sense of 
cosmic strangeness into every part of his narrative - even 
into the verbal texture itself. 
Clearly what Blackwood learned most from the 'shocks' of 
his development - his young manhood was colourful and 
diverse - was the force of revelation in the moment of shock 
itself, its power suddenly to make us see things anew. He has 
an unerring instinct for the touches which, laid together, 
convince us that 'things are in the unmaking', as King put it. 
I would like to quote an extended passage near the start 
of 'The Wendigo' to illustrate how skilfully Blackwood goes to 
work. His small hunting party - some of them tried, some 
untried by the wilderness - turn into their sleeping-bags, 
leaving the field to the Canadian night. Blackwood's 
description does not retire with them, however; released of 
human domination, the forests return to their alien 
character - and reveal the secret scent of their inmost 
denizen, the Wendigo of Indian legend. 
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Though this ahuman spirit figures in the story as a real 
being of sorts, one able to shift its shape and -
imperfectly - imitate humans, it is, nonetheless, a 
manifestation of the unnameable; and, though no individual 
statement has authority in the story, its real character may 
well be as the sceptical Dr Cathcart asserts: 'the Wendigo is 
simply the Call of the wild personified, which some natures 
hear to their own destruction' (196). Indians who go mad are 
said to have seen the Wendigo (in this, it is clearly not 
unlike the great god Pan). Blackwood's idea of it depends a 
lot on the less precise, more primitive senses of smell and 
sound: 'the Voice, they say, resembles all the minor sounds of 
the Bush - wind, falling water, cries of animals, and so 
forth.' So much, indeed, it is like nothing tangible at all. 
Its being is pieced together from atoms of the sphere it 
influences. 
Deep silence fell about the little camp, planted 
there so audaciously in the jaws of the wilderness. 
The lake gleamed like a sheet of black glass beneath 
the stars. The cold air pricked. In the draughts of 
night that poured their silent tide from the depths 
of the forest, with messages from distant ridges and 
from lakes just beginning to freeze, there lay 
already the faint, bleak odours of coming winter. 
White men, with their dull scent, might never have 
divined them; the fragrance of the wood-fire would 
have concealed from them these almost electrical 
hints of moss and bark and hardening swamp a hundred 
miles away. Even Hank and Defago, subtly in league 
with the soul of the woods as they were, would 
probably have spread their delicate nostrils in 
vain •••• 
But an hour later, when all slept like the 
dead, old Punk crept from his blankets and went down 
to the shore of the lake like a shadow - silently, 
as only Indian blood can move. He raised his head 
and looked about him. The thick darkness rendered 
sight of small avail, but, like the animals, he 
possessed other sense that darkness could not mute. 
(163-4) 
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'Motionless as hemlock-stem' at the water's edge, the native 
American cook sniffs the air. The scent he dimly divines comes 
closer and troubles the tree-tops about the camp only after he 
also has finally retired. Then, 'too faint, too high even for 
the Indian's hair-like nerves, there passed a curious, thin 
odour, strangely disquieting, an odour of something that 
seemed unfamiliar - utterly unknown' (164). 
The combination of coldness, vast spaces, the one 
restless character (who is also the least verbal) - and the 
linguistic tact which unsettles the lulling description with 
words like 'pricked' and 'electrical' - all do their work 
upon us. Intuitively we grasp that there is something 
annihilating in this apparent harmony of things. 
And indeed, so it is. Oefago, the half-breed guide, is 
lured away by the wendigo, who returns to impersonate him to 
his helpless and unbelieving friends, and then, when all hope 
seems lost, deposits him back in the camp, the mere ailing 
inarticulate shell of his former self. The exposure to these 
more than human realities which Oefago undergoes results in a 
kind of death - first of the self, and then a physical demise. 
Which of course alerts us to the fact that Blackwood's occult 
is not after all so different from those we have encountered; 
the danger of extended immersion in the mystical is just 
this - that it demands the sacrifice of self, as well as of 
the distinctions among things that uphold the sense of 
individual identity. 
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While the great woods are hardly a feminine reality as 
such, they are a reality opposed to the logocentric, 
exclusively male order the human characters represent. Dr 
Cathcart, like Van Helsing, is a somewhat ambivalent 
scientist-figure; rationalist as he is, he has an amateur's 
curiosity about the things of the mind - yet he grinds all 
mysteries through the same intellectual mill. In the face of 
the terrible events, his rationalising tendencies are strained 
to the utmost: 'Like many another materialist, that is, he 
lied cleverly on the basis of insufficient knowledge, because 
the knowledge supplied seemed to his own particular 
intelligence inadmissible' (191). After Defago's 
disappearance, he and Hank talk wildly together, for words are 
their medium of control over experience: what they 'dreaded 
more than anything else was - silence' (197). 
Simpson, the young man who shares Defago's exposure to 
the Wendigo, has greater proof against its harmful effects 
because of his youthful lack of preconceptions (lSS), and also 
because his religious vocation has opened some reaches of his 
mind to possiblities such as the Wendigo presents. Among the 
various (insufficient and incompatible) explanations offered 
at the end, through the mouths of varied characters, Simpson's 
realisation is that there were 'Potencies lurking behind the 
souls of men, not evil perhaps in themselves, yet 
instinctively hostile to humanity as it exists' (205). He it 
is who alone in Defago's company is sensitive to the character 
of the natural scene: 'Other life pulsed about them - and was 
gone' (171). From an expression on Defago's face he is 
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suddenly brought to realise 'that in a hinterland of this size 
there might well be depths of wood that would never in the 
life of the world be known or trodden' (174). 
Once his guide is abducted, his attempts to control his 
panic are finally defeated, and what breaks through has the 
force of revelation: 
Behind the screen of memory and emotion with which 
experience veils events, he plunged, distracted and 
half-deranged, picking up false lights like a ship 
at sea, terror in his eyes and heart and soul. For 
the Panic of the Wilderness had called to him in 
that far voice - the Power of untamed Distance - the 
Enticement of the Desolation that destroys. He knew 
in that moment all the pains of someone hopelessly 
and irretrievably lost .... A vision of Defago, 
eternally hunted, driven and pursued across the 
skiey vastness of those ancient forests fled like a 
flame across the dark ruin of his thoughts .•.. 
(187) 
It is above all Blackwood's psychological approach which 
lends credibility - through details such as, for example, 
Simpson's self-frustrating lapse into the ordinary modes and 
limits of polite speech when he re-encounters the others. For 
in other circumstances credibility might easily be wanting; 
Blackwood's vision of the occult is a mass of incompatibles: 
the massive, bleeding stride of the monster's snowy 
footprints, the mysterious cry of Defago from overhead, the 
degrading travesty of the monster's imperfect human imitation. 
But this is exactly the point: there is no way of 
rationalising these elements together into a whole; any more 
than we can imagine why the dialect-speaking Defago should 
suddenly break into perfect, and incongruously poetic, English 
from overhead. His pitiful words, repeated like a kind of 
incantation - 'Oh, oh! This fiery height! Oh, oh! My feet of 
fire! My burning feet of fire ... !' (203-4) - are pure 
surrealism, signalling the defeat of language and of reason 
before the occult. 
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In another of his stories, Blackwood has an elderly man 
who is fascinated by the life of trees gradually succumb to 
their alien charm and their ahuman awarenessesj he leaves his 
human society and is spiritually and physically absorbed into 
their life and being. This conception of the Other life of 
nature clearly has nothing Wordsworthian about it - and not 
much Darwinian either. In this Blackwood is even more radical 
than Hardy, who is his only comparable predecessor in 
portraying the essential strangeness of nature. 
I have preferred initially to deal in detail with 'The 
Wendigo' rather than with Blackwood's justly most admired 
tale, 'The Willows' (1-52), even though this traverses much 
the same ground, at least thematically: the isolated setting 
is this time the marshy lower reaches of the Danube. 
Blackwood's preference for foreign locations is typical of his 
genre since its origins in the Gothic, but his reasons are 
more realistic, I think: he wishes to capture as a starting-
point that mild dislocation and disorientation that all 
holidaymakers experience away from home. A favourite beginning 
involves also some sort of physical transition - the train 
journeys which open 'Secret Worship' and 'Ancient Sorceries' 
are apt examples. What is involved here is really the reader's 
own movement into a different and unsettling reality - which 
is also the reality of the tale. 
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The ordinariness of at least one of the main participants 
(the silk merchant Harris in 'Secret Worship', the 
insignificant Vezin in 'Ancient Sorceries', or the hearty 
Swede in 'The Willows', are cases in point) may be there to 
provide easy identification for the reader; though Blackwood's 
treatment of these roles is rarely stereotypical. Invariably, 
he suggests that the ordinary is not what it seems. 
Gradualness and the cumulative injection of unease is one 
key to his magic - hence the length of his stories. The Danube 
river itself provides the necessary slow transition in 'The 
Willows', being described in light and sunny guidebook fashion 
at the start and then taking on an alien and disturbing 
vitality (3) as the central and remote location is reached. 
There, as the pair of youthful canoeists decamp upon a 
little island of sand and willows, the unrelenting wind in the 
leaves suggests applause (3). Familiarity with this wilderness 
of pliant and etiolated trees brings a different impression. 
From being a magic kingdom one might need a passport to enter 
(2), the willows become 'antedeluvian creatures' sopping up 
the water (7). The island itself is unstable; it alters shape 
and shrinks under the rush of the flooded river, and vague 
sights are seen in the uncertain glare - a peasant crossing 
himself, and a dead body turning in the current (or is it an 
otter?). This supposed body is, in fact, like an obscure 
previson of the corpse which will wash against the bank and 
provide the sacrifice of 'self' at the end - so rescuing our 
heroes from having to share its fate. Blackwood is very good 
at conveying the fallibility of human senses in such 
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situations (the increasing familiarity to Harris of the 
terrifying and hearty monks who insistently entertain him in 
'Secret Worship' is a chilling instance). 
All in all, the island behaves like a symbol of man's 
insecure grasp upon the reality of his cosmos, or even upon 
his own senses. Through argument, rationalisations, and 
refusal of their own perceptions, our susceptible narrator and 
his 'unimaginative' Swedish friend are led at last to 
acknowledge that 'The willows were against us' (15). 
The narrator has been relying on the 'otherness' of his 
stalwart companion to preserve his own sanity; his greatest 
shock comes when even his preconceptions about the Swede have 
to be abandoned - along with all the other mental safeguards 
which limit his vision. At night he seems to witness great 
forms writhing upward through the blown leaves on the larger 
trees. 
They were interlaced one with another, making a 
great column, and I saw their limbs and huge bodies 
melting in and out of each other forming this 
serpentine line that bent and swayed and twisted 
spirally with the contortions of the wind-tossed 
trees. They were nude, fluid shapes, passing up the 
bushes, within the leaves almost - rising up in a 
living column into the heavens. (18) 
The horror here is again the perception of an essential 
formlessness, denying categories and escaping the power of 
language - as do the other incompatibles and paradoxes of the 
experience. When a floating, untracable gong-like sound 
reaches their ears, inexplicably connected with funnels that 
form in the sand, the Swede describes it as 'a non-human 
sound: I mean a sound outside humanity' (37). 
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The powerful drama of the piece is really within, and has 
the participants wrestling by every means to deny what they 
must slowly and reluctantly acknowledge, in spite of the 'dim, 
ancestral sense of terror' that engulfs them: that they have 
'''strayed'', as the Swede put it, into some region or some set 
of conditions where the risks were great, yet unintelligible 
to us; where the frontiers of some unknown world lay close 
about us .•• we would be carried over the border and deprived 
of what we called "our lives", yet by mental, not physical 
processes' (37). 
It is because this place is 'unpolluted by men, kept 
clean by the winds from coarsening human influences' (38) that 
it has become itself a borderland, at the edge of a '''beyond 
region", of another scheme of life'. The various odd and 
incompatible elements of their ordeal, the narrator realises, 
combine to change reality, to give it a new aspect reflective 
of what is across that border; 'this changed aspect was new 
not merely to me, but to the race ...• It was a new order of 
experience, and in the true sense of the word unearthly' (38). 
And its actual location is within, not without. 
It must be apparent by now that the 'new' reality 
Blackwood has in mind is in truth a very old one, founded in 
the same psychic sediment plumbed and sifted by mystics down 
the centuries. But this does not alter the fact that in one 
aspect - its annihilation of the rational constructs humans 
impose upon reality - it can be terrifying in the extreme, 
especially when its intrusion is imperious and unbidden. 
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In these circumstances it might seem surprising that the 
allusions to the daemonic feminine we have found elsewhere are 
missing in these tales. So far they describe an exclusively 
masculine world - an odd enough feature in itself. But this 
exclusive masculinity is deceptive. The Danube, for example, 
is transcribed as feminine in 'The Willows', and the narrator 
fancifully imagines a troop of Undines fleeting below its 
surface (5). And in a story like 'The Glamour of the Snow' 
(137-157) we have one of the clearest evocations of the deadly 
anima-figure the genre possesses, albeit as a personification 
of nature in its cold, snowy guise. 
In this story an inhibited lonely man, significantly a 
writer, sojourning in an Alpine resort, becomes obsessed with 
an other-worldly skater he meets one day upon the ice. Before 
her final disappearance she lures him nearly to his death 
among the snowy heights. The terms in which the narrator 
describes his fascination for the elusive girl (an attraction 
which, one suspects, shares its 'fatal' and annihilating 
quality in common with almost all extreme passion) are 
especially revealing of the hidden psychological sources which 
animate her, especially 
the half suggestion of some dim memory that he had 
known this girl before, had met her somehere, more -
that she knew him. For in her voice - a low, soft, 
windy little voice it was, tender and soothing for 
all its quiet coldness - there lay some faint 
reminder of two others he had known, both long since 
gone: the voice of the woman he had loved and - the 
voice of his mother. (143) 
The final typographic dash is especially illuminating. But the 
maternal 'tenderness' of this woman is deadly, as the hero's 
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intuition tells himj he connects it with the 'light and tiny' 
snowflakes which, as a mass, are 'able to smother whole 
villages •.• cold, bewildering, deadening effort with its 
clinging network of ten million feathery touches' (143). 
The trouble is, he is drawn to her glamour, called by 
something remote in his own naturej he knows he has an 
affinity, like Defago, with the environment she is so much 
part of: 'He belonged so utterly to Nature and the mountains, 
and especially to those desolate slopes where now the snow lay 
thick and fresh and sweet' (148). Blackwood's evocation of 
this writer's narcotic but suicidal self-seduction is 
masterly; for ultimately the woman means death of all that he 
is as a human being. When, at last, he is almost overcome in 
the snow and ice, he calls upon her to return home. 'Our home 
is - here!' she answers demoniacally, meaning the inhuman 
natural scene (154). The plural is itself a shockj does she 
refer to the pair of them, or to other companions of her own 
kind? The final seduction begins: 
The snow was to his waist •... She kissed him softly 
on the lips, the eyes, allover his face. And then 
she spoke his name in that voice of love and wonder, 
the voice that held the accent of two others - both 
taken over long ago by Death - the voice of his 
mother, and of the woman he had loved. He ••. sank 
back into the soft oblivion of the covering snow. 
Her wintry kisses bore him into sleep. (155) 
In what they represent for this man, the two departed women 
are now on the side of Death. Their condition means they can 
only amplify the deadliness of this girl as incarnation of the 
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occult feminine, not mitigate her force. Now dead, they are in 
a sense inevitably her sisters. 
There are other prominent occult themes which I have 
negelected in the pursuit of this same demonic figure: 
lycanthropy; shape-shifting; the ancient past; and especially 
childhood and its perceptions. But this is because they all 
are relatable to my main theme. Animal transformation is a 
symbol of the solvent effect of the archaic drives on identity 
and verbal classification; the ancient past reflects the 
individual's own psychological history; and childhood brings 
its fabled freedom of imagination, its untried openness, and 
corresponding nearness in time to pre-Oedipal psychological 
conditions. 
There are superlative instances of all these kinds in 
Blackwood's work. 'The Camp of the Dog' involves lycanthropy; 
it features his Holmes-style psychic detective, John Silence -
whose very name is a negation of the verbal. Blackwood's late 
Egyptian stories are some of the finest of their sort. And 
'Ancient Sorceries' combines the lure of the ancient past 
together witp cat-transformations and the witch-like power of 
its feminine seductresses; indeed both regal mother and 
sensuql daughter here are feline witches, avatars of the two 
kinds of feminine power - as represented also by the mother 
and wife in 'The Glamour of the Snow'. Blackwood's cat-story 
effects its most telling transformation simply through the 
power of his own prose: in metaphor, the ancient and sleepy 
French village of its setting turns into another cat, its twin 
mediaeval steeples forming the pointed ears. His ability to 
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make event and setting co-operate is probably his most potent 
artistic spell. 
6 
In 'The Other Wing' (208-227) Blackwood has an appealing 
child-character. The wing of the house mentioned in the title 
is a seemingly immaterial one, known only to this child. It 
represents of course his unconscious, and through his 
privileged contact with this haunted region the young hero can 
actually bring about changes in his 'real' world. 
But the child-story to which I wish to pay attention here 
is 'Lost Hearts' by M.R. James, another highly regarded 
representative of the craft. 
James was provost of Eton, Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge 
from 1913-15, and a theological scholar. His anthology of 
Christian Apocryphal scriptures9 is still a standard work. 
Accordingly, James adds real and bogus scholarly references to 
provide authenticity in his stories. His version of the occult 
is both supremely Edwardian and almost medieval in character: 
his 'ghosts' arise out of the forbidden and pagan reaches of 
scholarly research, suggesting surprisingly that James as a 
Christian felt the dangerous attractions of all that the 
Church throughout its history most chose to suppress - and 
exorcised this in his fiction. His 'Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come 
to You, My Lad' (James 1984: 75-91)'0 involves a wavering ghoul 
with a face of crumpled bedlinen invoked through meddling with 
464 
a ruined chapel of the Templars. As we see, in his hands the 
unnamable is almost comically Edwardian, redolent of 
chambermaids and hotel bedmaking as much as of the forbidden 
past. 
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Terseness and brevity remove some of the taint of cliche 
and melodrama in James. His villain-scholar in 'Lost Hearts' 
(21-9) is immersed in Mithraic, Hermetic and Neo-Platonic 
texts. Somehow - improbably - from these sources he conceives 
the idea of prolonging his life by eating the hearts of 
children whom he entices into his mansion. The youthful hero 
of this tale manages to evade these foul rites, aided by the 
wailing animal-like spirits of two past victims - a low-class 
Italian boy and a wasted girl - who exact their own bloody 
revenge. As may be apparent, the evil scholar is an embodiment 
of the false and inadequate parenti a cold and demonic father, 
in this rare instance, who, like Chronos or Saturn, gobbles up 
his children - or, at least, feeds upon their emotional life, 
turning them in consequence into mere 'ghosts' of themselves. 
The cause of his malady is no doubt his intellectual neglect 
of the child in himself. In this instance of failed parenting 
there is a strange echo of the situation in The Turn of the 
Screw, product of that other, more famous James. The governess 
in Henry James's celebrated story is an emotional vampire just 
as the scholar is here; but of course in James's hands the 
psychological bearings are only too overtly elaborated. 
One last story involving both children and the feminine 
deserves a place here - which is hardly to do justice to the 
range, stylistic elegance and skill of its author, Walter de 
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la Mare. De la Mare is often thought of as a Georgian; but the 
Edwardian supernatural continued on to lead a somewhat 
moderated life in the 'Georgian' world, too. De la Mare, as it 
happens, was an eventual, though sceptical, reader of Freudi 
he was certainly aware of a 'psychological' dimension to the 
supernatural. (What he objects to is a diminishing and 
reductive element in Freud's thought11 : 'That a Blatant Beast, 
with virtues of its own nature, is confined in the cellar 
known as the Unconscious, of which it is advisable as far as 
possible to keep the key, is undeniable; there is also a caged 
bird in the attic, and one of a marvellous song' [De la Mare 
1931: 81-2J.) 
Just as in Henry James's novella, it may be there are no 
real ghosts at all in Seaton's Aunt (de la Mare 1983: 74-
108)12. What is certain is that it contains the mental 
'haunting' of a schoolboy, Seaton, by the dominating 
personality of his aunt and guardian. The power of this aunt's 
character is masterfully dramatised by de la Mare, who 
communicates her force mainly through her own speeches. This 
subtle and possessive woman, who may 'affect the occult' a 
little, is perceived by her nephew as a spiritual vampire 
draining away his lively essence. Seaton is an orphan like the 
children of 'Lost Hearts'; he has clearly transformed his aunt 
into the equivalent of the antinomian 'wicked mother' who 
desires to absorb her child back into her womb - or into the 
occult region of the pre-ego. Revealingly, he believes her to 
have murdered his true mother. Under this obsession, it 
remains impossible for him to gain any independent sense of 
self or to act effectively in the world. 
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The real state of affairs remains problematised, for the 
narrator is - or was, at least, at the time of the events 
another schoolboy, Withers, who displays all the conventional 
prejudices of a 'good sort', and is pretty sure he despises 
seaton as a faintly foreign-looking outsider, in spite of 
being inveigled into paying a visit to see his home and aunt. 
De la Mare's knowledge of all the needful blindnesses that are 
survival-equipment for an English schoolboy produces another 
convincing impersonation here - of schoolboyishness this time; 
but withers's resolute conventionality means he misses the 
depths and heights - and is more ripe for the shock of the 
final encounter, when it comes. 
seaton dies near the end of the tale - just before his 
marriage, significantly. It is as if the aunt will not permit 
this demonstration of independent adult genitality (her 
manipulative powers are conveyed despite - or because of -
withers's wilful imperception). The engagement seems a 
vulnerable thing, doomed from the start; for the denigrating 
and belittling aunt is seaton's real lover, on the 'occult' 
inward plane. In the final lines, Withers is moved to the 
revelation that, for him at least, seaton truly always had 
been among the dead: 'he had never been much better than 
"buried" in my mind' (108). 
De la Mare's richly subtle story, beautifully contoured 
in its impeccable and evocative English prose, betrays an 
understanding of the literary 'occult' in its this-worldly (as 
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much as other-worldly) senses, for it redirects attention from 
the 'ghosts' themselves to the human participants in a ghostly 
experience. As the close of 'All Hallows' (288-324) and his 
considerable output of supernatural children's poetry 
indicate, he values and cUltivates the connection between 
childhood and that endemic waking dream-state which is 
supernatural in the widest sense: 'If .•. one ventures down to 
the sea of childhood ... the further one wades the greater the 
danger of drowning, and the more the ocean deepens and widens, 
spreading out its waters at last towards the illimitable 
horizon of human life' (de la Mare 1935: xx)13. 
It would be unjust to call H.P. Lovecraft an 'Edwardian' 
by any objective standard, both as an American and as a writer 
whose first efforts did not appear until the end of the First 
World War. Nonetheless, it is through Lovecraft that the 
spirit and style of British Occult Fiction was imitated and 
united with the native American 'supernatural' strain with its 
ancestry in Bierce and Hawthorne. As a symbol as well as an 
artist, Lovecraft has received perhaps relatively more than 
his fair share of attention, particularly on the Continent, 
where he has suffered the same ambivalent fate as Poe: to be 
more highly-regarded by intellectuals abroad than at home. In 
France critics of no less standing than Bachelard have paid 
him the compliment of extended studies. He is mainly 
interesting in the present context as the channel through 
which the British tradition was tansmitted to America. For 
better or worse, the genre was invested in the process with 
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new qualities of excess, earthiness, and bizarre 
sensationalism, to produce the up-tO-date variant of the form. 
His contribution to this was probably unintentional on 
Lovecraft's part, and speaks more of his limitations than his 
gifts; indeed, he seems really a misplaced aesthete at heart. 
If he has a creed, then it is that even the most grotesque of 
emotions are fit material to fan the unreal and exotic 'gem-
like flame' of artistic experience. If he marks the outside 
boundary of the 'Edwardian Occult', he inherits much of its 
secret motivation. We need not search too far to understand 
the real nature of his 'mythos' about the aeons-old cthulhu 
and his gods. Together they represent the lurking ahuman force 
that ruled the Earth before the rise of humans - and which now 
slumbers Kraken-like beneath the sea, waiting to intrude upon 
our rational conscious world when it may. 
The essence of all this is spelled out baldly enough by 
Stephen King, who comments on the fact that 'sex will almost 
certainly continue to be a driving force in the horror genre; 
sex that is sometimes presented in disguised, Freudian terms, 
such as Lovecraft's vaginal creation, Great cthulhu. After 
viewing this many-tentacled, slimy, gelid creature through 
Lovecraft's eyes, do we need to wonder why Lovecraft 
manifested "little interest" in sex?' (King 1987: 85). 
Sex appears nowadays in its more blatant fleshy guise, 
however; and with this recent surfacing it has ceased to 
operate as the deep, cthonic centre of a supernatural tale. In 
a sense it has turned male in consequence; so that the desires 
of its fantasies are for power, not experience. 
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Lovecraft was aware - perhaps more than anyone since 
wilde - of the essential artificiality of the supernatural 
fiction: of its power to create, rather than to reproduce, a 
world. This comment is seemingly belied by his 'pickman's 
Model' (Lovecraft 1985b: 44-60)14, however, where a brilliant 
painter of demonic half-animal forms that crawl and tunnel 
beneath the earth and honeycomb the mantle under graveyards, 
is proved to be drawing not on his imagination, but on life. 
He has access to the denizens of this underground realm 
through a well sunk in his cellar floor. 
A moment's thought about the subterranean symbolism of 
this grim fantasy will reveal that the 'life' on which such an 
artist draws is after all not that normally visible to mortal 
eyes; and that - despite pickman's 'photography' - it rarely 
reveals all of its true nature in its embodied shapes. 
Consideration of the stories like 'pickman's model' and 
'The Glamour of the Snow', which involve artists as 
characters, leads us to a singular revelation: that the 
authentic clairvoyant 'medium' - the figure whose occult art 
is best fitted to gain us access to another dimension, deeper, 
darker and more strangely scented than our own - is the artist 
himself. His or her imagined universe of words occupies, even 
more precariously than ours, that unstable self-mutating 
borderland between being and dissolution - and is open to more 
transformative realities in consequence. 'Quiddity' in Clive 
Barker's The Great and Secret ShOW15 or the unravelling carpet 
of his Weaveworld16 show that contemporary fantasists are 
rediscovering some of these truths. 
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In his recent The Dark Half'7 stephen King has a policeman 
capable of strange epiphanies: 
how crazy it would be to believe not just in a 
vengeful ghost, but in the ghost of a man who never 
was. But writers INVITE ghosts, maybe; along with 
actors and artists, they are the only totally 
acceptable mediums of our society. They make worlds 
that never were, populate them with people who never 
existed, and then invite us to JOln them in their 
fantasies. And we do it, don't we? (King 1990: 381) 
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CHAPTER 10: THE 'SOURCES' OF REVELATION: TOWARDS THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN SPIRITUAL ETHICS. 
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In my last two chapters, my subject has been the nature of 
'evil', at least as this force was understood in certain early 
twentieth century works of supernatural fantasy. In them, evil 
is being interpreted, of course, not merely as a sum of 'bad 
actions' or as the equivalent of moral failure, but as an 
independently existing spirit, a kind of wilful extrahuman 
entity capable of exerting its influence upon the human 
psyche. 
That we think of such moral and psychological influences 
in personified form is natural enough, given the personifying 
tendency of all religions, and the legacy of their history 
upon our mental habits. In the case of Western thought the 
dominant influence of this kind is Judeo-Christianity; and it 
is probably not wrong to see the spirit of evil in 
supernatural fantasy as an inverted reflection of its 
spiritual opposite, the Holy Spirit, the third 'person' of the 
Christian Trinity. 
If, as we found in the preceding chapters, it was 
possible to interpret the occult plane and its evil forces 
along psychoanalytic lines, it should surprise no-one if the 
heavenly realms are capable of similar analysis. Unaccustomed 
as most people are to having the spiritual dimensions of 
orthodox religion treated as occluded allegories of our 
psychoanalytic or psychological-makeup, there seems no valid 
prima facie obstacle to our adopting such an approach. 
Though this is not the method of conventional religious 
hermeneutics, it need not necessarily be thought of as 
'diminishing' or reductive. After all, Christianity's own 
founder seems - on some readings - to have perceived that 
religious realities have a psychological aspect; as when he 
reputedly informed his followers that 'the kingdom of God is 
within you' (Lk. 17: 21). 
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My purpose here is to show that the mystical experience, 
interpreted on psychoanalytic lines as the drive beyond the 
dominant reality of words, is a central element in 'holiness' 
just as much as it is in 'evil'. To carry out such a project I 
could have explored ideas of goodness and holiness in some 
appropriate fictional or poetic text; instead, I have 
preferred what seemed the most direct method. I have chosen to 
look at some founding texts of Christianity, with special 
emphasis on st Matthew's Gospel. 
Of course the Bible is a powerful source and wellspring 
for a great deal in western literary culture, which alone 
should justify its investigation from any perspective helpful 
to literature. From Dante, Chaucer, Milton and Spenser 
onwards, the fortunes of literature and religion have often 
gone hand in hand. The influence of English translations of 
the Bible upon its prose style have been enormous; and the 
salient examples of T.S. Eliot and Dylan Thomas in our century 
suggest that the process is not ended. 
If, in consequence, the treatment of Biblical texts (or 
of their English translations) as literature is no longer 
controversial, then a psycho-literary analysis of the present 
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sort would seem as allowable as any other critical method. The 
difficulty is that to talk of religious beings as 
psychoanalytic phenomena seems inevitably to call in question 
our understanding of their ontological status. 
Literary men who have ventured into Biblical terrain of 
recent years, like Northrop Frye', Robert Alter2 or Gabriel 
Josipovici3 , have not only come armed with extensive learning 
of their own; they have, with some circumspection, reshaped 
the province of religious scholars to fit their own practice. 
By primarily treating the literary texts of the Old and New 
Testaments as formal entities, they largely postpone questions 
of religious claims. 
Of course, in supposing that the Bible is an appropriate 
object for the sort of aesthetic attentions due, say, 
Shakespeare, certain assumptions of religious status have 
already been made; in turning it from numinous icon into 
literary artifact an unspoken process of secularization has 
already taken place. However, this process can in practice be 
allowed to take its course without undue emphasis or overt 
announcement on these critics' part. 
Unfortunately, this same expedient - the postponement of 
religious questions - is not entirely open to me in what 
follows. Inevitably, I shall have to touch on certain 
sensitive areas. Hence, this chapter is an unusual one in a 
literary thesis. It may seem to stray over a number of 
boundaries and intrude on scholarly preserves where the 
literary critic is taken as a trespasser of sorts. 
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Though I too wish to look upon the New Testament as a 
literary text, my main emphasis will be on what this text 
cannot say, on what remains unconscious in its communication. 
Such a Lacanian exercise in exploring the 'unconscious of the 
text' is part of my wider aim of inquiring into the mystical 
character of literary language, and will inevitably lead me 
further than the words themselves - to certain hypotheses 
about the nature of the religious entities we are dealing 
with. In this pursuit I am insisting only that these entities 
have a psychological character, and that this character may be 
delineated. My present interest ends with these inward forces 
and their effects; any further specifically theological 
functions or status are beyond the~ope of my debate. 
My excursions beyond the 'purely literary' are confined 
within the boundaries of the kinds of connection which Matthew 
Arnold once made. A long time ago Arnold insisted upon a 
certain equation between the poetic and the holy. In both 
their instructive and their numinous functions poetry and 
religion are continuous with each other - this was Arnold's 
insight, and not all such insights are superseded. 
What principally concerns me in my investigation of the 
textual 'unconscious' of passages of New Testament religious 
writing is precisely that very individual if largely unsayable 
informing essence which underlies these gospels, determining 
not only the character of their religious and mystical 
language but also their particular religious world-perspective 
or 'reality' - and the kind of actions they resultingly 
advise. That this hidden element will be an underlying yet 
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unexpressed structure of sorts is to be expected from Lacan's 
definition4 of 'unconscious': 
The unconscious is that part of the concrete 
discourse insofar as it is trans-individual, which 
is not at the disposal of the subject to reestablish 
the continuity of his conscious discourse. 
(Wilden 1968: 20) 
In the case of the religious texts to be studied, whether 
apocryphal or orthodox New Testament works, one such important 
submerged 'structure' is equivalent to what in certain 
contexts is named the Holy Ghost. 
My principal aim in all of what follows will be to track 
down and elucidate the nature of the Holy Spirit, which I 
shall treat as neither a cosmic entity entirely independent of 
humanity nor a mere intellectual invention of the first 
Christian teachers; I shall be looking rather at the Holy 
Spirit as a pre-existent psychological force and internal 
presence to which these teachers simply directed appropriate 
attention. 
Whatever else my project in this thesis has been, it is 
certainly a dissection of the nature of the muse: which is to 
say, of the psychological factors and forces which inspire and 
determine the transformations of language in literary art. And 
the importance to literary creation of understanding the muse 
and its powers would surely be admitted. If the New Testament 
writings have a muse, then that muse is proclaimed by the 
writings themselves to be the Holy Spirit - no less than the 
third and equal person of God, as at least later theology 
insisted. 
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If it seems audacious to treat the Holy spirit in its 
textual relations as a muse, there is no very evident reason 
why this should be so. For whatever its other attributes, this 
is unmistakably one of them. It has most traditional 
characteristics of a muse: it inspires writing, and is a 
daemon-like guide to action and speech from an unseen place 
(Luke 12:12). But it is not only the inspirational source of 
verbal production from beyond the words themselves, it is also 
in a sense the end and goal of the texts it produces and 
informs. Acquaintance with the Holy spirit is where these 
religious writings are supposed to lead us - again, to an 
(immaterial) extratextual reality. 
However, the 'Holy Ghost' is unlike the ghostly realm of 
occult fiction, or even the Romantic Sublime, in the 
extratextual functions claimed for it. It is considered to 
possess a life even more independent of its texts than are 
either of these other sources of inspiration; and it is 
supposed - even in its Pauline variant - to have a special 
relation not only to verbal utterance but to conduct. This 
connection with conduct will provide one of the threads I must 
follow in attempting to track down its hidden nature in what 
follows. 
Because the Spirit is meant to continue to lead an 
autonomous existence with practical effect upon the life of 
the reader quite apart from the act of reading itself, it is 
hence appealed to and invoked in a different way in the 
religious writings. Though the epistles and even the gospels 
may use both poetic image and rhetorical exhortation for this 
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invocatory purpose, the most powerful literary method is the 
exemplary and representative narrative - as in the symbolic 
parables and the gospel story itself, or in the tales of 
Paul's sufferings: his 'bearing witness' to the Spirit. 
The simplicity and directedness of such narratives, the 
way their stories cumulatively repeat and reinforce one theme, 
are part of their effectiveness. The properties and the 
settings are so providentially right: the simple people, the 
removed lakeside setting (which must have been a potent but 
distant precursor and model for the Wordsworthian exercise) 
are a triumph of authorship. And yet this mode of authorship 
is of the most extraordinary kind: Jesus's deliberate distance 
from the texts he produces gives both great meaning and great 
symbolic poignancy to the Death of this particular Author. 
This 'remote authorship' is another theme I shall have to take 
up again here later. 
If there are significant differences, attention to the 
popular symbolism which has represented the Holy Spirit down 
the ages reveals many similarities to other muses. For 
example, we have earlier looked at the occult muse, and that 
of the Romantic sublime; and there is a reason, we have 
ultimately found, why most muses turn out to be feminine. 
Though orthodox Christianity has tended to deny the Holy 
Spirit a sexual nature, that has not always been so. There is 
evidence that the translation from a Judaic to a Greek 
environment altered popular understanding of the Holy Spirit's 
gender: as Elaine PagelsS puts it: 'The Greek terminology for 
the Trinity, which includes the neuter term for spirit 
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(pneuma) virtually requires that the third IIPerson ll of the 
Trinity be asexual' (1982: 74). But Hebrew writers would have 
thought in terms of ruah which is feminine, or, as is equally 
the case, of shekinah (cf. Mollenkott6 1984: Ch. 7). 
The same is true for the related Judaic idea, personified 
divine wisdom. Its feminine aspect (as hokhmah) would later be 
hypostatized in Gnostic Christian literature as Sophia; and 
Jesus in The Gospel according to the Hebrews7 (James 1955: 2) -
a text which is quite early enough to have been a strong 
candidate for canonical acceptance - certainly speaks of his 
'mother the Holy Spirit'. M.R. James's comment on this phrase 
supports Pagels's assumptions: 'The description of the Holy 
Spirit as limy mother ll is due to the fact that the Hebrew word 
for spirit is of the feminine gender' (ibid.). 
Again in The Gospel of Thomasa (Grant and Freedman 1960: 
Logia 98 and 102) Jesus claims both a spiritual Father and 
Mother, who are most likely God and the Spirit. Thomas has 
Jesus saying, indeed, 'my (earthly) mother [gave me death], 
but [my] true [Mother] gave me life' - a logion which later 
'official' Marianism would have found especially shocking 
(Pagels 1982: 74). 
Yet if the preferred symbol in traditional Christian 
iconography, the dove, is most often taken as being of neutral 
sex, then the image is maternal at least in its traditional 
link with love, caring and fertility. It bears postdiluvian 
connotations of messengerhood and yet is regularly depicted 
beneath Christ's feet: below, creature-like, pre-human, a 
force. 
481 
The present essay embarks, then, on an investigation of 
this - for western Culture - most fundamental and archetypal 
of muses, with a multitudinous progeny in writing of all 
kinds, including creative literature. My title speaks of a 
search for origins, and in its archaeological (or 
genealogical) quest for origins9 my present study may actually 
resemble one of Foucault's many enterprises; but the origin it 
seeks is psychological, and not some regulating mechanism of 
power and authority, as it would be for Foucault. 
Indeed, one of the very striking characteristics of the 
Holy Spirit as a point of psychological 'origin' is its 
intrinsic antipathy to all such systems of worldly power. So 
unimportant are these systems in the true unseen scheme of 
things, they are hardly even worth the effort of actively 
opposing, as Christian guidelines for conduct towards the 
Roman state seem to imply. Unluckily, such indifference to 
worldly power became unfashionable during the subsequent 
history of Christianity: as we know, the later Catholic Church 
could be every bit the paradigm of a Foucauldian institution. 
2 
To provide a conspectus of all theories of the Origin of the 
Religious Impulse would be undesirable here; it is a study in 
itself, and its history is by and large the history of our 
culture. 
A full survey would have to include such opinions as, for 
example, that of the Marxists, for whom religion arises as an 
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ally of the state and a means of social control over the 
masses by the few. On this view, religion aids the state by 
lulling away the desire to redress this-worldy grievances; 
while for Nietzsche in contrast it gives licence to the 
democratic domination of the few by the many, in the name of a 
dubious supra-sensible equality. Then there is the view of 
structural Anthropology that the sacred is a reflection of, 
and gives divine sanction to, the social institutions of the 
group. On the other hand there is Freud's conviction -
developed from Feuerbach's idea of religion as personifying 
human ideals - that the gods are the human family writ large, 
with God the Father upholding the authority of reason and of 
conscience. Also deserving a place is Jung's belief that 
religion is a communal expression of the activities of the 
Collective Unconscious and its archetypes. 
Perhaps the most influential and persistent theory is 
that voiced by David Hume'o in his Natural History of Religions 
(1757): 
We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, 
where the true springs and causes of every event are 
entirely concealed from us; nor have we either 
sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent 
those ills, with which we are continually 
threatened. We hang in perpetual suspense between 
life and death, health and sickness, plenty and 
want; which are distributed amongst the human 
species by secret and unknown causes, whose 
operation is oft unexpected, and always 
unaccountable. These unknown causes, then, become 
the constant object of our hope and fear, and while 
the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an 
anxious expectation of the events, the imagination 
is equally employed in forming ideas of those 
powers, on which we have so entire a dependance. 
(in Wollheim, ed. 1963: 40) 
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Fear of the unknown future, with a desire to placate fate and 
to control its mysterious principles, is the motive of the 
religious life, according to Hume. His emphasis on the 
negative emotions of fear and propitation of the unknown no 
doubt suited his own sceptical bent; however it was also to 
prove adaptable to the temper of nineteenth-century man, 
subject to his own evolutionary pessimism and fear of the 
primitive. As early as Comte, cultural evolution from religion 
to positivism is interpreted as a rise out of superstition and 
ignorance. And even in that standard twentieth-century work, 
Kellett's A Short History of Religions", the introductory 
speculations (1962: Ch. 1) on religious origins are still 
Hume's, in essence. Kellett by and large agrees with Sir James 
Frazer, whom he quotes (12): religion, in Frazer's view, is 'a 
propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which 
are believed to control the course of nature or of human 
life'. 
To list the varied alternative views is not to deny that 
many are in some measure compatible with each other: most of 
them rest upon the centrality of authority and fear, or 
projection upon the cosmos of certain authority-functions of 
the super-ego. Upon more detailed scrutiny, Freud's version of 
the rise of religion actually echoes Hume's quite closely. I 
have chosen to quote here from his more developed The Future 
of an Illusion'2 (1927), rather than the better-known mythic 
account in Totem and Taboo (1912-3). Again, in Freud's view, 
it is in the context of his helplessness against nature, fate, 
and social impotence that man first invokes the gods: 
There are the elements, which seem to mock at human 
control: the earth, which quakes and is torn apart 
and buries all human life and its works ... there 
are diseases, which we have only recently recognized 
as attacks by other organisms; and finally there is 
the painful riddle of death •.•• with these forces 
nature rises up against us, majestic, cruel and 
inexorable; she brings to our mind once more our 
weakness and helplessness, which we thought to 
escape through the work of civilization'b 
(Freud 1961: 15-6) 
Man's initial strategy in the suborning of these powers 
is 'the humanization of nature' (16). If behind nature there 
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are beings like ourselves, then the situation, if dire, is at 
least familiar; we can 'feel at home in the uncanny and can 
deal by psychical means with our senseless anxiety' (17). 
Furthermore, against these 'violent supermen outside' we are 
actually not without some recourse: 'we can try to adjure 
them, to appease them, to bribe them, and, by so influencing 
them, we may rob them of a part of their power. ' 
The inspiration for this move is ready and available 
within the unconscious psyche, since the tactic repeats an 
event in the developing experience of every infant - and so 
unwittingly reinforces its 'magic' potency through an 
'uncanny' invocation of the forgotten past: 
It has an infantile prototype, of which it is in 
fact only the continuation. For once before one has 
found oneself in a similar state of helplessness: as 
a small child, in relation to one's parents. One had 
reason to fear them, and especially one's father; 
and yet one was sure of his protection against the 
dangers one knew •... In the same way, a man makes 
the forces of nature not simply into persons with 
whom he can associate as he would with his equals -
that would not do justice to the overpowering 
impression which these forces make on him - but he 
gives them the character of a father. He turns them 
into gods ...• (17) 
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On this basis, 'a store of ideas is created, born from man's 
need to make his helplessness tolerable and built up from the 
material of memories of the helplessness of his own childhood 
and the childhood of the human race' (18). And yet the 
subordination to and dependence upon an imago that follows is 
not really a happy state of affairs; though it relieves some 
anxieties it only substitutes others for them: 'Religion would 
thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like 
the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the 
Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father' (43). 
Freud's insistence upon the father-relation as the key to 
the question of religious origins may be said to unite neatly 
in one, through the agency of a single symbol, the apparent 
variety of the other thinkers. For most of them, despite 
differences of detail, authority and fear are the keynotes, 
and in Freud the divine Father is created to wield the first 
and command the second. 
Recently, through the work of Julia Kristeva and others, 
it has begun to be realised that the historical account above 
does not exhaust all possible characterisations of religious 
need. There is, it appears, a maternal and feminine religious 
mode which can be set against Freud's cosmic father. Some 
argue that its earliest manifestation was the cult of the 
earth-mother, whose worship is claimed to be historically 
prior to the arrival of the authoritarian male-dominated 
pantheons, all of which attempted to depose her and obliterate 
her sect. Jung'3 is fond of adducing the cases of Tiamat and 
Marduk, and Cybele and Attis (in storr 1983: 273). There is 
evidence of this demotion having taken place in the Greek 
world, at least, where the pythian priestesses of Delphi's 
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oracle were classical survivals of an earlier Dionysiac-style 
worship of the fertile Earth. By historical times, however, 
they had become unlikely votaries of Apollo, deity of reason 
and of the sun. Ephesian Artemis, in origin no doubt a very 
ancient deity (Ephesus itself was founded in the 11th century 
BC, and was associated immemorially with the cult) had to face 
a double indignity: appropriation by the Attic pantheon,- and 
later contention with and defeat by the male Christ. 
In a wider perspective, though, the priority of the 
Earth-Mother may rest primarily upon an intuitive aptness: for 
the child, mother comes before father, after all. 
strangely, in view of his support for 'male' priority, 
the first clear modern psychological expression of this 
alternative 'feminine' religious force is relayed to us 
through Freud's own agency. His friend Romain Rolland, after 
reading The Future of an Illusion, outlined his different 
perception of the essential religious emotion in a letter to 
Freud. Freud's meditation upon - and demystification of -
Rolland's testimony occupies the initial chapters of his major 
civilization and its Discontents14 (1930). On its first page 
Freud outlines Rolland's idea of the 'true source of religious 
sentiments' : 
This, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which 
he himself is never without, which he finds 
confirmed by many others, and which he may suppose 
is present in millions of people. It is a feeling 
which he would like to call a sensation of 
'eternity', a feeling as of something limitless, 
unbounded - as it were, 'oceanic'. This feeling, he 
adds, is a purely sUbjective fact, not an article of 
faith; it brings with it no assurance of personal 
immortality, but is the source of the religious 
energy which is seized upon by the various Churches 
and religious systems, directed by them into 
particular channels (Freud 1961: 64) 
Freud endeavours to explain away this 'feeling of an 
indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a 
whole' (65) as having its psychological origin in the 
phenomenon of primary narcissism, in the earliest child's 
imperfect separation between his own ego and the world at 
large - represented especially by his mother's being. 
Freud, as we have seen, was ultimately unconvinced by 
Rolland's 'oceanic' consciousness, and his discovery of its 
source in primary narcissism is an attempt to trivialise the 
notion. Julia Kristeva would no doubt happily leave Freud's 
psychological analysis uncontested; but his reference to 
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primary narcissism would not be taken by her as denigratory or 
dismissive, as Freud intended. Indeed, she would probably 
find his patronising attitude to this period of complete 
maternal dominance, together with his continued insistence on 
the religious primacy of the fath~r, to be symptoms of his 
unconscious chauvinism: as if in his own person Freud is 
compulsively re-enacting the archaic and yet perennial 'drama 
of the gods' we have spoken of. 
Indeed, for Kristeva this repeated pattern, the 
replacement of the Earth-mother by male deities, is only a 
symptom of an inevitable dynamic of religious history. In her 
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view, the whole purpose of most sacred rules and rites is the 
encoding of a variety of talismanic safeguards against the 
works of the female, in an attempt to anathematise the female 
influence. Kristeva's intellectual example might thus inspire 
us to view the combat between the 'female' and 'male' types of 
religious expression - the progressive engulfment of forms of 
'oceanic' spirituality by creeds based on law, precedence, 
ritual and priestly hierarchy - as a recurring event in the 
evolution of religious forms. 
In her Powers of Horror15 she frames her initial 
perception of these differences as follows: 
Could the sacred be, whatever its variants, a two-
sided formulation? One aspect founded by murder and 
... atonement, with all the ... obsessive rituals 
that accompany it; and another aspect, like a 
lining, more secret still and invisible, non-
representable, oriented towards those uncertain 
spaces of unstable identity, toward the fragility -
both threatening and fusional - of the archaic dyad, 
towards the non-separation of subject/object, on 
which language has no hold but one woven of fright 
and repulsion? •.. What will concern me here is 
the confrontation with the feminine .... 
(1982: 57) 
While Freud found his psychological 'origin' in a primal 
Oedipal need to placate the father, so Kristeva's different 
version looks further back over the Oedipal divide, to a time 
when the mother's presence was dominant, indeed all-exclusive. 
This pre-linguistic realm which predates the establishment of 
rules and boundaries or the formation of identity continues to 
influence those later structures which are reared upon it: it 
becomes, as it were, their 'lining' - but this lining is of a 
nature opposed to what it is made to sustain. 
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The primal war between these two conditions of earliest 
life becomes translated into latter-day religious terms, and 
is expressed in many of its common rites: 'The function of 
these religious rituals is to ward off the subject's fear of 
his very own identity sinking irretrievably into the mother' 
(64). Such formal rites - very different from the Dionysiac 
celebrations of more ancient times, which actually revelled in 
the inchoate 'feminine' influence - are usually performed or 
prescribed by a male priesthood, exclusive in character. 
Unusual as this analysis may seem, the independent 
conclusions of a more orthodox theologian, William L. 
Countryman, can be made to support aspects of Kristeva's 
thesis. In his recent Dirt, Greed and sex16 , an extensive 
analysis of the meaning of purity and purification in the New 
Testament, he perceives that the Levitical rules are based on 
a fear of what does not accord with expected 'kinds'. Pigs and 
their meat are excluded principally because, to rather narrow 
ancient Semitic notions of taxonomy, they are hybrid 
entities - regrettably unconforming to type. Jesus's 
contribution, in Countryman's view, is to sUbstitute a new 
internal criterion of intention for traditional rules of 
external purity (1989: passim). 
Kristeva anticipates at least his former findings, when 
she reveals that 'The pure will be that which conforms to an 
established taxonomy; the impure, that which unsettles it, 
establishes intermixture and disorder' (98). She adduces much 
telling scriptural evidence that older Jewish law is heavily 
based on an inflexible loyalty to the authority of the word, 
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and to the word's conceptual boundaries and determinations. 
For example, Leviticus 11: 3-4 insists that though beasts with 
cloven hooves which chew the cud may be eaten, those - like 
the camel - which show only one of these attributes, may not -
suggesting that the cow is the model on which the idea of a 
domestic animal was formed. Leviticus 19: 19 announces lYe 
shall keep my statutes. Thou shalt not let thy cattle gender a 
diverse kind: thou shalt not sow thy field with mingled seed: 
neither shall a garment mingled of linen and woollen come upon 
thee.' Leviticus 21: 18-21 declares unclean any man who is 
blind or lame or who carries a blemish, a flat nose, 'or any 
thing superfluous': in other words, whoever fails to conform 
to the stereotype of a human male. Worst of all, the woman 
falls under the same definition: because of 'her parturition 
and the blood that goes with it, she will be "impure": 
"according to the days of the separation for her infirmity 
shall she be unclean'" (Leviticus 12:2; Kristeva 1982: 99). It 
is uncertain, Kristeva feels, whether blood itself is anathema 
because it represents life (even if life which has lost its 
'form') or because of its menstrual connection with woman. 
What Kristeva finds inescapable here is that these rules 
of purification encode the desire to legislate and preserve 
the purity of the word: of that transcendent talisman of the 
Oedipal victory over the unspeakable, and the prime instrument 
of the Father's control. Confirmation of her opinion comes 
from Jewish attitudes to the deity's name: Yahweh's name 
remains unutterable not because he represents the ineffable, 
but because the primal word with which he names himself is 
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itself holYi as the first and most powerful of all words, the 
holiness of speech itself derives from it, at an appropriate 
remove. In interpeted form, Yahweh's name announces that he is 
in being and in possession of identity, that he has escaped 
the formlessness of the maternal chaos by a self-willed act of 
speech. 
'I am the Lord your God, which have separated you from 
other people' declares Leviticus 20: 24-5. A system for the 
preservation of the authority of the word is upheld by 
exclusions and founded upon differencesi as Leviticus implies, 
its distinctions between clean and unclean are a reflection of 
the necessary distinctions between nations that give them 
force. That the Jewish ritual food-laws set this race apart is 
one of their original purposes. 
Thus the holy of holies in the temple - containing 
nothing, as Pompey found to his disgust - is simply the 
fountainhead of a system founded upon interposed conceptual 
'nothings', a system by which elements of existence are 
formally decreed to be separate. What we discover in Jewish 
religious life is, according to Kristeva, a 'series of 
separations .•• in the last analysis relating to fusion with 
the mother' (94) - or, rather, to separation from the mother. 
It is possible to interpret circumcision, in this light, as a 
second umbilical separation applied ritually to the phallus: a 
last symbolic reinforcement of the mature male's freedom from 
the enclosing feminine, by which act he takes his rightful 
place in a male order which commands through phallic rules and 
precise divisions. The disputes and lucubrations of 
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generations of Pharisees were aimed at ever finer grades of 
this kind of legal precision; what they achieved in the event 
was only a kind of absurd argumentative infinite regress. 
Kristeva seems to support such interpretations when she 
asks of the purity laws if they are 'an attempt to keep a 
being who speaks to his God separated from the fecund mother? 
In that case, it would be a matter of separating oneself from 
the phantasmatic power of the mother, the archaic Mother 
Goddess who actually haunted the imagination of a nation at 
war with the surrounding polytheism' (99): 
The pure/impure mechanism testifies to the harsh 
combat Judaism, in order to constitute itself, must 
wage against paganism and its maternal cults. It 
carries into the private lives of everyone the brunt 
of the struggle each subject must wage during the 
entire length of his personal history in order to 
become separate, that is to say, to become a 
speaking subject and/or subject to Law. (94) 
We do not know how ancient were the rites of the Earth-
Mother, or how old the myth of Eden. (Certainly the snake-
priestesses of Delphi have ancestresses depicted among the 
figurines of Minoan Crete.) Nonetheless, it is hard not to see 
the same Python worshipped at Delphi - as the inverted 
phallus, product of, not simply intruder into, the depths and 
chasms of the maternal soil - behind the form the adversary 
takes in the Eden myth. 
In Eden, as with the Pythia, the woman is the serpent's 
natural ally. Paradoxically it is his reptilian presence which 
acts as catalyst in the acquisition of knowledge of good and 
evil; he makes necessary what was not formerly required: 
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reason, conscience and the word. The Eden story is thus the 
supreme example of phallic bad faith, as so many Gnostics were 
later to insist (cf. Pagels 1982: Ch. 3, 'God the Father/God 
the Mother'). The author of the fable succeeds in implying 
that the woman's frailty is instrumental in the casting out 
from Paradise. This author blames her for provoking the fall, 
when in fact the flower-bejewelled Feminine Paradise is the 
'evil' Adam must denounce and deny in order to come into 
being. The fabulist projects the frustrated anger of his own 
ambivalence upon Woman herself, in the person of Eve - who is, 
of course, not only metonymically but literally all womanhood. 
Secretly Adam knows it is his wish to leave: only then can his 
expiatory religion of authority and penance come to exist, can 
his nostalgia be transmuted into the manipulations of power of 
which he dreams. 
Where does Christianity stand in all this? The question 
is complicated by the further one: Which Christianity do we 
mean? That Jesus represents a break with all the above in some 
sense is evident, even if the later Church, with power 
interests of its own, reinstated by degrees as many rituals 
and regulations as had been overthrown. I think the consensus 
would be that Jesus effected some sort of reconciliation of 
the two warring religious modes (although the exact nature and 
pattern of this synthesis remains in dispute). 
At least to this extent, then, Kristeva is right when she 
avers that Pauline Christianity's rejection of the 
purification laws was a highly symbolic act: 'Christian 
defilement is ... a revenge of paganism, a reconciliation with 
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the maternal principle. Freud moreover stressed the point in 
Moses and Monotheism, revealing that Christian religion is a 
compromise between paganism and Judaic monotheism' (116). To 
be fair, of course this last suspicion had dawned on a good 
many before Freud's 1939 essay. 
We have looked here at suggestions about two competing 
principles, discoverable behind the history of religions, both 
supposedly inherited and absorbed by Christianity itself. In 
terms of these opposing principles, Kristeva's Mother-goddess 
confront's Freud's phallic Heavenly Father. In Jesus's new 
spiritual order, both are somehow subsumed together. 
I have a third suggestion to offer, to be sUbstantiated 
in what follows. In the case of any human family, the child's 
being assumes the pre-existence and different natures of its 
mother and father, but cannot properly be seen as a 
'reconciliation' of them. In the same way, the new and central 
spiritual principle that Jesus counterposed against others 
valorised neither the father nor the mother, but the child. 
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To validate such a claim, or even properly to expose its 
meaning, means laying out a great deal of evidence, both 
historical and textual. The remainder of this chapter and the 
start of the next will be concerned with the implications of 
both text and tradition; the sifting of both is necessary 
before I am able to return to a more Kristevan and 
psychoanalytic perspective in my final pages. 
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Among the various matters raised, the question 'Which 
Jesus?' is both preliminary and paramount. If this chapter 
purports to investigate the unconscious of one or other of the 
gospels as religious texts, then heady textual questions of 
the sort which have beset biblical scholarship since the late 
eighteenth century can hardly be altogether sidestepped. 
At the very least, some position on textual matters must 
be adopted, some stand announced. For of course, we are not 
dealing here with a single, but a composite authorship: both 
anonymous oral traditions and a plethora of unknown documents 
lie behind the gospels we know, rendering any claim to a 
unitary consciousness or even 'unconscious' problematic. 
By itself, this difficulty might not be insuperable; it 
is hardly worse than that which confronts the critic of Homer, 
for example, or the Arthurian cycles. Again, in the case of 
occult fantasy, we have found that very diverse authors who 
write under a single inspiration will be found to reveal the 
same or very similar 'deep structures' and psychic patterns. 
One obvious way out in our case might be to emphasise a 
central coherent core of influences emanating from the 
historical figure of Jesus himself, or from what the early 
church made of him. But a further impediment stands in the 
way, which has been recognised ever since the 'quest for the 
historical Jesus' foundered in the last century. None of the 
accounts of Jesus's life, even the earliest, are historical 
documents in the modern sense: all of them are heavily and 
divergently theological - or, in a more modern phrase, 
'ideological'. Early Christianity itself was beset by 
substantial differences of interpretation of the acts and 
words of its founder, which its documents reflect. 
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The later acrimonious attempts to reduce this variety to 
order by the Catholic church from the late second century 
onwards eventually imposed a standard hermeneutics which, by 
its political success and wide dissemination, itself makes it 
difficult for us to 'read' the gospels, whether canonical or 
apocryphal, except by its light. The very idea of 'heresy' is 
in fact, part of a rhetoric of persuasion: an additional and 
extra-critical means to compel acceptance of a 'thesis' about 
a set of texts. 
Whether or not we should perceive this ideological 
element as an 'obstacle' as such, it raises the possibility 
that we have no single 'centre' to speak of, or perhaps even 
centres. Luckily, however, the situation is not so despairing 
as it once seemed, or as it appeared after Rudolf Bultmann's 
sophisticated 'form criticism' had done its work earlier this 
century (cf. Bultmann 1963)17. Since then, increasing scholarly 
knowledge and a changed perspective have persuaded many that 
the synoptic evangelists accept a certain integrity of method; 
as believing early Christians as well as men of their time, 
they worked subject to conventions which imposed limits upon 
what they could freely add or invent, and they were obliged 
also to take religious pressure to preserve the past into 
account; though, of course, their latitude for adaptation and 
invention was still considerable. As Edward Schillebeeckx18 
puts it: 'we are led to conclude that the New Testament, not 
in spite of its diverse kerygmatic [i.e. active ideological 
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and theological] projects but because of them, gives us 
sUbstantial information about Jesus of Nazareth, at least as 
reliably as any other serious secular book whatever of that 
period. But it is intellectually irresponsible simply to 
assume this in advance' (Schillebeeckx 1989: 437). 
To consider the textual evidence in the body of these 
chapters might seem like too great a digression from my main 
argument, or to do violence to the needs of a literary thesis. 
However, since I believe some account of the texts themselves 
is essential I have deferred their extended discussion to 
Appendix I at the end of this volume, where the reader who is 
so inclined may consult the relevant findings. Naturally, I 
have depended there very widely on the scholarship of others; 
though where conflicting opinions exist I have felt free to 
come to conclusions of my own. 
The central textual and historical matters are, however, 
hardly in dispute. The evidence shows that three dominant 
forms of the Christian religion were influential in the first 
and second centuries AD. These were associated, respectively, 
with Jerusalem and the apostle James; with Paul and the 
mission to the Gentiles; and with the diverse Gnostic sects 
which flourished in the second century, especially. 
Each of these led to textual production of some kind. Not 
all the influential texts are extant, however, and some that 
are known only in fragments or in isolation are still 
disputed. What I presume to offer in subsequent sections of 
these final chapters is, indeed, an alternative means to 
textual scholarship alone of reaching the single central 
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structure of emotions and ideas which seem to underly all the 
divergent forms of early Christianity, and which, in 
consequence, there seems little reason not to attach directly 
to its founder. These methods are at once both literary and 
psychoanalytic: they are aimed at finding and interpreting the 
common ground which does exist between the early movements. 
Ideally, all the routes of early religious development -
Judaistic, Pauline, Gnostic - should lead back to this one 
point, and share it essentially in common. (Of course, my 
findings too will be an 'interpretation', to be provisionally 
relied upon only where scholarship confirms them.) 
For the present purposes of linking these movements 
according to their common ground, I shall select only a 
restricted handful of their texts to represent each. In the 
case of Jerusalem Christianity, I shall take the so-called 
'Epistle of James' as sufficiently representative of an aspect 
of the Jerusalem point of view. st Matthew's gospel, as well 
as the Q document which partially underlies it, also strongly 
reflect this tradition, although the version of Matthew we 
have incorporates much of Mark, and is sporadically influenced 
by its very different theology, reflective of Pauline 
attitudes. Paul himself will thus be represented both by 
Marcan passages and by certain of his own epistles, as well as 
by the partially pro-pauline Epistle of Barnabas. The Gnostic 
strain is mediated through several of the newly-discovered 
texts from Nag Hammadi, but principally through the 
extraordinary Gospel of Thomas, which undoubtedly contains 
some very early material. 
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My project is a little eased by the fact that our 
specific interest is in Jesus as teacher, not as Messiah-king, 
prophet or divinity. Thankfully, we have no need of going into 
the various kerygmatic models inherited from Judaism, as 
Schillebeeckx does skilfully in the third part of his Jesus 
(1971) . 
Of these three early Christian schools, the Pauline 
division grew out of certain Hellenistic-Jewish strains 
present in Christianity from the first, but it burgeoned under 
pressure of the demands of the Gentile mission - advocating 
especially, in Paul's hands, the primacy of 'faith' in the 
risen, ascended and returning Lord, and a consequent freedom 
from the demands of the torah. 
The Jewish-Christian group centred around James and the 
apostles in Jerusalem, on the other hand, saw Christianity 
first of all as a reform movement within Judaism itself. Its 
belief, in contrast to Paul's, was that morality was quite as 
important as faith in the religious life. Its adherent groups 
no doubt grew and hardened defensively in their separate 
stance(s) after 70 AD when the original ideal of Jewish unity 
was no longer attainable. 
The various Gnostic sects, in contrast, rejected this 
essentially practical bias: instead they sought an earthly 
union with a transcendent realm beyond this vale of tears, 
through the practice of meditation. Their particular strain 
only becomes fully recognisable with the teaching of 
Basileides around 117-138 AD, but its varied theological roots 
are no doubt much earlier. 
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The tendency has been to align the historical Jesus with 
one alone of these campsj the liberal critical school from 
Tubingen onwards has almost universally sought, for obvious 
reasons, to place him in Judeao-Christian company alongside 
his apostles. Jewish scholars like Hyam Maccoby19 and Geza 
Vermes20 (1976) have taken this process particularly far, their 
findings tending on the whole to diminish the supposed 
differences between Jesus and Judaism. To Maccoby (1986) the 
real Jesus was a Pharisee of Pharisees(!) and Paul a scoundrel 
opportunist who distorted his master's teachings to found a 
new religion; Hugh J. Schonfield (1965)21 agrees with both that 
Jesus's real aim was that of political uprising. All these 
must, however, be taken as views of an extreme kind. 
What such speculations most reveal, perhaps, are the 
limitations of the purely historical method, which is 
inherently more apt to reveal the 'like' than the 'different': 
Jesus has inevitably to be 'like' other historical figures of 
the time with whom it is feasible to compare him. 
Nonetheless, whatever evidence may be gleaned from the 
history of early Christianity must be brought to bear in what 
follows, along with the textual evidence, in order the better 
to guide my initial approaches to the deeper psychological 
layers of the source material. It is the points where these 
different elements coincide to reveal a similar story that 
are, I think, especially authoritative. Such points have 
governed my sense of probability and directed my choices among 
viewpoints in reconstructing the Christian religious past. 
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The following section attempts to trace in more detail what 
may be learned of the outlook of the Jerusalem school. 
Paulinism and Gnosticism will be examined and compared with 
Jerusalem Christianity and with each other in my next chapter. 
No matter what special attitude each historian takes to 
Paul, his testimony in his epistles is treated as a major 
historical source of information about James and his followers 
in Jerusalem. What especially seems to have gone unquestioned 
in all the discussion of the first Jerusalem Church is the 
portrait painted of it in Acts and the Pauline Epistles; as if 
Paul would have no vested interest in caricaturing his 
opponents! 
A key document for this question is perhaps the most 
remarkable epistle in the New Testament - remarkable in that 
it was ever included at all by the Catholic editors, let alone 
given pride of place after the Pauline letters. This work is 
unostentatiously entitled 'A Letter of James' in The New 
English Bible. Its tone is gentle, firm, authoritative, and 
its theme is simple: 'what use is it for a man to say he has 
faith when he does nothing to show it?' (James 2:14). 
In other words, its target is the Pauline doctrine of 
'faith' before 'works' painstakingly laid out in the preceding 
epistles. 'You have faith enough to believe that there is one 
God. Excellent! The devils have faith like that, and it makes 
them tremble. But can you not see, you quibbler, that faith 
divorced from deeds is barren?' (2:19-20), counters James. 
Away then with all that is sordid, and the malice 
that hurries to excess, and quietly accept the 
message planted in your hearts, which can bring you 
to salvation. Only be sure that you act on the 
message and do not merely listen; for that would be 
to mislead yourselves. A man who listens to a 
message but never acts upon it is like one who looks 
in a mirror at the face nature gave him. He glances 
at himself and goes away, and at once forgets what 
he looked like. But the man who looks closely into 
the perfect law, the law that makes us free, and who 
lives in its company, does not forget what he hears, 
but acts upon it; and that is the man who by acting 
will find happiness. (James 1:23-5) 
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If we wish to see these as the words of Jesus's brother, 
the first Christian leader after Jesus himself, then it has to 
be admitted at once that this letter is one of the most 
disputed texts in the New Testament. On the one hand it has 
its defenders to this day. Bishop John A.T. Robinson, of 
Honest to GOd22 fame, believed it to be genuine; scholars in 
Britain and on the continent are to be found to argue the same 
case (cf. Schillebeeckx: 714, Note 47). But since there seem 
actual textual dependencies on the Pauline letters both in 
verbal structure and imagery, the majority verdict is that it 
cannot be of very early date. 
However, this verdict is hard to reconcile with the fact 
that the first Epistle of Bishop Clement23 , the earliest of the 
extant Church Fathers - writing from Rome about 95 AD -
clearly presupposes this epistle, along with many of Paul's 
(cf. 1 Clement ch. V, VI, and XI:11. Indeed, V apparently 
tries to reconcile the 'Abraham' dispute; see below) . 
The majority verdict also assumes that James, who died 
only four years before Paul - he was assassinated in 62 AD -
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could not have read some of Paul's letters; or that literary 
influence could not have proceeded also in the other 
direction. None of this is, however, finally established. The 
opening invocation - 'Greetings to the Twelve Tribes dispersed 
throughout the world' - suggests that James's words were 
widely disseminated in the Jewish-Christian diaspora, to which 
Paul also preached and where he could have scrutinised them. 
Indeed, Acts itself tacitly admits that James had what is now 
called a media-network at his disposal (see below). That his 
'Abraham' illustration (2:21-4) appears with the opposite 
inference in Romans 4:13-25 would, to my logic, suggest the 
immediacy of argumentative cut-and-thrust rather than 
'dependence' as such. 
Of all the arguments against 'James's' authenticity, the 
strangest is that which points out that its views do not fit 
Paul's picture of James or of the 'circumcision church'! It 
would be naive indeed to expect perfect objectivity in worldly 
matters from so combative and spirit-driven a man as Paul. 
Whatever the real truth about the authorship of this 
epistle, its content and manner were sufficiently like the 
James the early church remembered to be graced with his name; 
and that, I think, is evidence in itself. Whether the writer 
is or is not James the Just, the epistle is no cobbled-
together forgery, intended to deceive. Textual evidence aside, 
its monumental sincerity and its quiet but insistent authority 
are still stylistically compelling. If this at all resembles 
how the original James sounded, then - one begins to feel -
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there is no question of his qualifications for leadership of 
the first church, which some have wondered at. 
As expected, the, 'law' is mentioned; but this law does 
not concern rites of external purification or the observance 
of imposed rules of conduct. James appeals not to conventions 
but to the 'perfect law' implanted naturally within us from 
the beginning, like a mirror of the self; a man may refer to 
this or ignore it, but to live by it is to be most human: it 
is then 'the law that makes us free'. 
The difference between Pauline 'faith' and Jamesian 'law' 
is simply that the latter always must and will find its 
natural outlet in action: it is entirely one with its external 
results, and it makes no sense to discuss them separately. 
Though undoubtedly Paul argues in almost the same terms about 
the power of faith, his doctrine is essentially more passive, 
a contemplative waiting for grace rather than a binding will 
to do. It is not that James rejects outright the entire basis 
of Paul's theology; it is that he sees potential dangers in 
its emphases that he wishes to forestall. 
If 'James' is anything at all like the historical figure 
whose name it bears or borrows, then Paul's insistence (e.g. 
Gal. 2: 11-15) that it was his own converts' non-observance of 
the torah which set the apostles against him is partly a 
'blind'; the first doctrinal question to divide Christendom 
was really that which re-emerged at the Reformation with a 
different alignment of forces: 'Is justification by "faith" or 
by "works"?' within this, the torah was a subordinate issue. 
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The idea that men who had travelled with Jesus and felt 
the force not only of his teachings but his actions could 
overnight become the most rigid of formalists does not really 
bear thinking on. Jesus described himself as 'a glutton and a 
drunkard' (Lk. 7:37); he associated with such men as tax-
collecters and publicans; he not only spoke with women but 
prostitutes were numbered among his following - 'behaviour 
which could only be seen by God-fearing Jews as leading to a 
loss of ritual cleanliness' (Wilson~ 1984: 94). 
His words, too, portray him as insisting that no human 
should be called 'Rabbi' or 'Father'; that the greatest among 
the disciples should be their servant (Mt. 23:8-11); as a man 
who belittled those who 'pay tithes of mint and dill and 
cummin' but overlook the weightier demands of the law: 
justice, mercy, and good faith (23-4); and whose favourite 
quotation (from Hosea) was 'I require mercy, not sacrifice' 
(e.g: 12:7; 9:13). Indeed, his known opposition to the temple 
and its sacrificial cult may have been an indirect cause of 
his death. His willingness to contravene the Sabbath for the 
sake of good, as in the healing of the man with the withered 
hand, is no Marcan invention (Mk 3:1-6) either; according to a 
gloss of Jerome's it appeared also in 'the Go~pel which the 
Nazarenes and the Ebionites use .•• and which most people call 
the authentic [Gospel] of Matthew' (in Throckmorton25 1979: 51; 
here The Gospel according to the Hebrews actually seems to be 
meant, and this was one of the principal 'Jerusalem' texts). 
Disciples who failed to understand the tendency of these 
teachings would have to be duller than even the pro-Pauline 
Mark paints them. Had they excluded converts simply to 
preserve the Jewish ritual law the living Jesus might 
justifiably have accused them of 'straining off a midge, yet 
gulping down a camel' (Mt. 23:24; NEB). 
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It would be quite wrong, however, to portray Jesus as an 
out-and-out antinomian, as some of Paul's followers evidently 
believed. What James was afraid of, on a theological plane, 
was the appearance of converts who believed that obligations 
of action were secondary, or that belief in Jesus's 
Messiahship was by itself a valid ticket to heaven, quite 
enough to merit a place among the elect. And it is important 
to note that James's argument outlined above is entirely in 
accord with the spirit of Jesus's own sayings, outside Mark 
and John. It was Jesus who insisted that the condition of 
men's souls must be known by-their 'fruit' (Mt. 7:18-20); 'Not 
everyone who calls me "Lord, Lord" will enter the kingdom of 
Heaven, but only those who do the will of my heavenly Father' 
(21); the man who hears his words and 'does not act upon them' 
builds a house upon sand (26). Lines to similar effect appear 
in The Gospel of the Nazaraeans (again most likely Hebrews is 
meant; cf. M.R. James 1953: 7) and are alluded to in II 
Clement26 2:15: 'If you be in my bosom and do not the will of 
my Father who is in heaven, I will cast you away from my 
bosom' (cf. Throckmorton: 28). 
The basis of most of the canonical sayings above is to be 
found in Q, representing the oldest identifiable stratum in 
our gospels (cf. Havener27 1987: 127, 135); and many of the 
Matthean parables are on exactly the same theme: those of the 
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'talents' or 'the ungrateful debtor' (18:23-35) are of this 
stamp. Even more in accord with James is the following: when 
'a teacher of the law has become a learner in the kingdom of 
heaven, he is like a householder who can produce from his 
store both the new and the old' (Mt. 13:52). Matthew has Jesus 
say 'Do not suppose that I have come to abolish the law and 
the prophets; I did not come to abolish, but to complete' 
(5:17) • 
Countryman (1989: see above) has advanced the idea that 
the essence of Jesus's ethics lies in their accent on the 
importance of intention; but this is to make him a little too 
like an Oxford philosopher, perhaps. Certainly Jesus has in 
mind like James the inseparableness of the inner and the 
outer: the kingdom which is within and the world of action 
outside. A primary merit of Humphrey Carpenter's Jesus28 is 
that his analysis of the ethical sayings leads him to the 
following formula: Jesus's distinctness lies not in the 
abolition of law but in the view that 'keeping the Law is not 
enough' (Carpenter 1980: 42). It is not that Jesus is an 
antinomian, but he does see that 'fixed rules do not work' 
(47); and 'it is the spirit in which someone acts that matters 
rather than mere conformity of his actions to a set of rules' 
(55). If rules are just and the spirit is sound, then the 
rules will automatically be complied with. Yet this position 
is hardly less rigorous than following rules: to maintain 
continuity of the right spirit in all one does is really far 
more exacting than mechanical obedience. After all, it applies 
to everything in life, both outward and inward. 
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Despite the importance of action, impulses do not have to 
be put into action to merit praise or blame. Nursing anger or 
improper lust may threaten the desired condition of spirit 
just as much as if they were acted out (Mt. 5:22-8), or if 
rules were broken by them. Admittedly, this means that the 
'inner' half of the combination is still the final court: and 
such an inward-determined world is a 'kingdom' in Jesus's 
symbolic vocabulary - a kingdom we build and share 
with others, in spirit and through our actions - and its 
integrity must be preserved. One may blaspheme, if one must, 
against even the person of God's messenger; but whoever in his 
heart blasphemes against the all-completing spirit of holiness 
is entirely lost (cf. Mt. 12:32). 
Though this spirit circumscribes all our thoughts and 
deeds, as rules do not, its effect is to simplify wonderfully 
the basis of moral action. In James's view we need only be 
most 'natural' to the 'son of man' within to accord with 'the 
perfect law, the law that makes us free'. It is in this 
context Jesus can say, somewhat whimsically, 'my yoke is good 
to bear, my load is light' (Mt. 11:30). 
We see that there is actually some ever lap between 
James's and Paul's position: both make final appeal to a 
special inward state of being that informs and regulates all 
our responses. And, once Pauline prejudgments are set aside, 
it is actually possible to view the historic James's concrete 
dealings with Paul with some sympathy. Paul painted James 
(when out of his company) as the arch-conservative of the 
'circumcision party' (Gal. 2:12); but in fact James seems to 
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have treated Paul with considerable tolerance. For his part, 
Peter's own rather wary encouragement of Paul (Gal. 1:18) was 
probably in the spirit of what I for one believe were Jesus's 
true words: 'He who is not against me is with me' (preferring 
Mark 9:40, Luke 9:50 and Oxyrynchus papyrus 1224. fol 2 recto, 
col. 1 - 'For he who is not against you is for you. He who 
today is far away will tomorrow be near you' [in Throckmorton: 
96] - to Luke 11:23, Matthew 12:30 and - dare it be said - Q 
[Havener 133: Logion 31]). Later, Paul seems to have alienated 
Peter (all the canonical Petrine letters which suggest 
otherwise, including the first, are cobbled-together late pro-
Pauline forgeries). 
For his part, James was in an extremely delicate position 
in Jerusalem. While in favour of the advance of Christianity 
into the Gentile world as such, he was afraid that any rumour 
about a disregard of the basic requirements of the torah might 
undermine his own primary purpose - nothing less than the 
conversion of all Judaism to the recognition of Jesus as 
Messiah (Kellett 1962: 181). In this he was simply being true 
to the specific injunction of Jesus himself: 'Do not take the 
road to Gentile lands, and do not enter any samaritan town: 
but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel' (Mt. 
10:5-6). It is doubtful that James saw this as entirely 
restrictive, or he would have offered Paul no houseroom 
whatever; but the main work was the conversion of the Hebrew 
nation, who would be a light thereafter to the rest of the 
world. With this in mind, he wanted to convince the religious 
leaders that his followers could be as good or better Jews 
510 
than they were themselves. Though close examination might 
reveal differences of doctrine, James wanted to assure his 
potential converts that these differences were no threat to 
Judaism as such, but were rather its completion. Hence 
retaining circumcision - 'external' sign though it was - might 
be a tactical necessity in the circumstances. There was no 
hope of winning over Jerusalem otherwise. 
There had been other regrettable setbacks to this plan 
before Paul. First Stephen and then Philip among the 
particulary wayward Hellenistic-Jewish group of Christians had 
found the regime of ritual observance irksome, and out of key 
with exactly what they remembered of the Master (Acts 6ff.). 
In the first instance a compromise was effected and a 
different organisation accepted for the Hellenes. But James 
must have felt the wisdom of his stance confirmed after the 
tragic martyrdom of Stephen at the hands of an inflamed 
Jerusalem mob; the very existence of the fledgling Christian 
movement had been placed in jeopardy. In spite of Maccoby's 
views (1986: Ch. 8), there seems little doubt that Stephen's 
Hellenistic group was a primary source of inspiration for 
Paul, then and later. 
Nonetheless diplomacy continued to be James's way of 
dealing with dissent, nomatter how this endangered his 
ultimate goal. At the later Antioch conference with Paul and 
Barnabas, it was James himself who found the compromise 
solution, according to Luke: 
My judgment therefore is that we should impose no 
irksome restrictions on those of the Gentiles who 
are turning to God, but instruct them by letter to 
abstain from things polluted by contact with idols, 
from fornication, from anything that has been 
strangled, and from blood. (Acts 15:19-21) 
This outcome was mostly reasonable rather than formalistic 
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(note also James's ability to instruct nascent Christendom 'by 
letter'). Indeed, perhaps there should be a colon after 
'idols': James may have been preserving only those elements of 
ritual that spurned idolatory, and therefore had a more than 
merely conventional significance. 'Fornication' implied 
cohabiting with pagan temple prostitutes; meat not killed in a 
kosher way recalled pagan sacrifice and should be disdained. 
Such an accommodation - a separate rule for Gentile 
converts - must have cost James a good deal, since it is clear 
that most of his Jewish-Christian followers were quite 
incapable of appreciating the case's subtleties or of 
tolerating Paul for a minute. To them it seemed that the 'law' 
was a final sticking-point; and they were to cling to this 
position all the more obstinately after James's death, as 
Paulinism gained ascendancy. Paul, for his part, seems to have 
received the concessions as a carte blanche (Gal. 2:10) and 
thereafter gone his own way, ignoring even their mild 
provisions. 
We have to consider now whether Jesus himself would have 
stood with James or Paul, given the changed aspect of things 
twenty years after his death. The verdict is not as self-
evidently in James's favour as it might seem; perhaps James 
had made too many compromises with the original spirit of 
Christianity in pursuing his final objective. A lot rests on 
the potential for success of his efforts; later - considerably 
512 
after 70 AD - the E~ionites were to claim that Judaism was 
just on the point of conversion when James's heritage came to 
nil through the fall of Jerusalem. They blamed even this on 
Paul, testifying in effect that it was the successive 
agitations caused by his over-enthusiastic converts in Rome 
which finally turned the Roman authorities against the Jews 
(cf. Maccoby: 181). But at best it is more probable that 
Gamaliel's 'time will tell' attitude (Acts 5:33-42) had 
actually spread somewhat among the liberal Pharisees, largely 
owing to the respect James personally commanded. When James 
was fatally flung from the crest of the temple steps at the 
prompting of a Sadducean High Priest, the indignation of 
leading Pharisees was such that they caused the culprit to be 
deposed from office (cf. Luedemann29 1989: 169ff.). 
But if the inferred testimony of Q is to be trusted, the 
real state of affairs was blacker than this - especially for 
the travelling prophets beyond Jerusalem. They themselves had 
met with rejection and were turning to a more receptive 
audience: potential Gentile converts to Judaism (Havener 1987: 
100-103). Perhaps well before 70 AD the future progress of 
Christianity rested entirely with the Gentiles. 
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CHAPTER 11: JESUS AND OEDIPUS: 'JERUSALEM', PAULINE AND 
GNOSTIC INTERSECTIONS IN 'THE MIRACULOUS CHILD'. 
It was above all Paul, then, who for good or ill set the 
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Christian faith on its route to Nicaea and eventual status as 
a world religion. It must be said that in comparison with the 
legalistic groups who inherited the tattered mantle of James 
in Palestine, Paul's vision was closer to that of his 
founder - a man whom he had never met. 
Paul's own self-promotion has tended to obscure what, in 
my opinion, is the true but unrecognised nature of his gifts 
and calling. The high profile of his evangelistic role has 
overshadowed another, prior vocation for which he displayed no 
less talent. That it has been overlooked is understandable, 
since this occupation barely existed in any distinct and 
discernible form in his time. Nonetheless, it is also Paul's 
own doing that he is not nowadays appreciated as what he 
really was: a literary critic. Failure to recognise the 
'literary-critical' factor in his life has opened the way to 
scholars like Maccoby, who claim that Paul simply invented 
Christianity. 
Paul was certainly brilliant, intellectually precocious 
and a gifted writer. And yet, an excessive insistence upon his 
own originality is a weakness in a critic, and this was Paul's 
principal fault. To maintain the authority of his message, he 
claimed to derive it almost entirely from his Damascus road 
experience. 
This desire to emphasise his own interpretational 
priority is visible in his actions. When he returned to 
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Jerusalem three years after his 'revelation' he seems to have 
taken pains to avoid the primary 'authorities', the apostles -
except for minor contact with Peter and James - as if he 
desired to maintain the purity of his private inspiration 
intact. He even boasts of the fact in his epistles (Gal. 1:18-
20), as if reserving to himself all claims to his own 'thesis' 
about Jesus. 
Certainly, his attitude to the original apostles seems to 
be characterised by a sense of competition (not least when he 
tries to deny it, as in 1 Cor. 1:10-17): 
Are they Hebrews? So am I. Israelites? So am I? 
Abraham's descendants? So am I. Are they servants of 
Christ? I am mad to speak like this, but I can outdo 
them. (2 Cor. 11:22-3) 
It would be quite absurd to see Paul as a solitary for 
all the intervening time between his revelation and the 
appearance in Jerusalem, mulling over his private vision in 
grand seclusion in the Syrian Desert. As we have seen 
(Appendix I), there were already Christian texts available, 
and, however sparse his references to them, Paul knew and had 
meditated on this 'scripture' and the older writings that led 
up to it. And, of course, he listened to the Damascus 
Nazarenes, allowing his mind to form. 
But - in a sense he was right: in a sense it all did come 
from that moment on the Damascus road. Above all, he meditated 
on that revelation itself - not so much its content but its 
quality. It was essentially from that quality and those 
meditations that Paul's understanding of Jesus's meaning 
generated itself. 
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Speaking of this event or, probably, of another like it, 
he uses the following words: 
I know of a Christian man who fourteen years ago 
(whether in the body or out of it, I do not know -
God knows) was caught up as far as the third heaven. 
And I know that this same man (whether in the body 
or out of it, I do not know - God knows) was caught 
up into paradise, and heard words so secret that 
human lips may not repeat them. 
(2 Corinthians 12:2-5) 
Paul was, then, infrequently subject to spontaneous 
mystical experiences, and his understanding of the meaning of 
the spirit of faith and of the risen Christ was conditioned by 
them. As usual, their essence lies in the 'unspeakable', that 
which entirely diffuses the importance of the 'word'. If 
Paul's account of the heavenly rewards in Corinthians 
As it is written, what eye has not seen and ear has 
not heard, and what has not entered into the heart 
of man, such things God has prepared for those who 
love him. (1 Cor. 2:9) 
(whose terms the Gnostic Thomas appropriates [Logion 17] and 
Bottom in A Midsummer Night's Dream [IV,i, 11. 209-12] 
parodies [see Appendix I]) renders them equally indescribable, 
then the further disruptions of the sense of the saying by 
Bottom and Thomas only further carry its message into its 
dismembered form. After all, Bottom too has had an experience 
in the fairy wood which defies and undoes verbal description. 
He too is 'born again' in the spirit, it seems. 
Paul did not need a modern psychologist to tell him that 
the source of his experience lay within himself: he describes 
his Damascus road encounter as occurring 'when it pleased him 
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who had separated me from my mother's womb to reveal his son 
in me' (Gal. 1:15; Authorised Version, as in Kellett: 184). 
The New English Bible rendering - 'had set me apart from 
birth' - overlooks an important psychological connection here. 
What Paul discovered is that the 'Son of Man' lay unsuspected 
within him all the time - since birth and before. Presumably 
then, he reasoned, it waits thus in everyman. 
Commentators have hurried to point out that the 
terminology Paul uses in his mystical passage above is Gnostic 
- multiple heavens and the like (though it reminds me rather 
of the ancient Jewish world's Paradise Lost: the 
intertestamentary Secrets of Enoch', a central sourcebook on 
Messianism [50-150 AD]; or else of the almost equally old 
Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs [in Platt II, 81-105; 220-
269]). Certainly in his 'metaphysical' emphasis on the 
difference between the lower material world and the bright 
world of spirit Paul's theology offers a transition to 
Gnosticism, it is true (though probably in the first-century 
AD context, where Christian beliefs varied so widely, such 
labels are not actually very meaningful). Again, Paul's 
position involves not just a Gnostic repudiation of the 
material plane, but also its limited transformation into 
spirit: 
Scripture says, 'The first man, Adam, became an 
animate being' whereas the last Adam has become a 
life-giving spirit. Observe, the spiritual does not 
come first; the animal body comes first and then the 
spiritual. The first man was made 'of the dust of 
the earth': the second man is from heaven. The man 
made of dust is the pattern of all men of dust, and 
the heavenly man is the pattern of all the heavenly. 
As we have worn the likeness of the man made of 
dust, so we shall wear the likeness of the heavenly 
man. (1 Cor. 15:45-9) 
If the Gnostic Anthropos or archetypal man was derived 
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partly from the 'unconscious' of the Pauline texts and partly 
from the Hermetica, then Paul himself before that was drawing 
upon the 'unconscious' of the Christian texts, too. There is a 
continuity of development here which should not be ignored. 
Paul's theological interpretations were grounded in his 
understanding of what he had read, and were not born simply of 
his own desires. 
Nonetheless, there is certainly a proto-Gnostic trend in 
Paul; especially in his tendency to underrate the events of 
this world at the expense of the next, a largely non-Jewish 
trend which seems to be Paul's own importation (derived, 
perhaps, from the Hermetic writings, if these existed so 
early). For him spirit tends to be seen not so much as a 
psychological entity or an unconscious drive but as a 
metaphysical sUbstance at war with matter. 
Perhaps it is in this Pauline metaphysical conception 
that the whole root of his difference with James lies; for it 
seems the law became identified in Paul's mind with mere 
control of man's lower material nature. Matter, according to 
Paul, was an aspect of the universe that Christ had 
'vanquished' and spiritualised in a way which made law 
redundant: 'he annulled the law with its rules and 
regulations' (Eph. 2:14-5). This conception becomes the basis 
of many characteristic statements: 'in Christ Jesus the life-
giving law of the Spirit has set you free from the law of sin 
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and death' (Rom. 8:2); 'Those who live on the level of our 
lower nature have their outlook formed by it, and that spells 
death; but those who live on the level of the spirit have the 
spiritual outlook, and that is life and peace' (Rom. 8:5-6). 
In (Deutero-Pauline) Colossians we read: 'he has forgiven us 
all our sins; he has cancelled the bond which pledged us to 
the decrees of the law. It stood against us, but he has set it 
aside, nailing it to the cross' (2:14). 
Large as they were to loom in the later turbulent history 
of Christianity, in their historical setting the differences 
between James and Paul reduce to differences of emphasis, not 
to entire doctrinal opposition. Setting these emphases aside, 
what we need to note is the common ground: what for Jesus was 
'the kingdom' was for James 'the law' and for Paul 'faith'. 
Both Jesus and Paul could speak of 'the Spirit' in this 
connection with equal ease, and almost interchangeably with 
the other terms. For all of them, these entities lay first and 
foremost 'within'. 
But while Paul's vision was directed forwards to the 
second coming, to the parousia and its redemptive power, James 
and Jesus hoped for its expression in this world too, through 
the work of men's deeds. 
Lest it seem I have been dismissive of Paul's 'reading' 
of the Christian message, it is worth noting that right in the 
heart of Q itself is a cryptic saying which could easily be 
Pauline: 'The law and the prophets were until John; since then 
the kingdom of God has suffered violence, and the violent take 
it by force' (Logion 62, Havener: 143). Matthew (11:12-13) 
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slurs over it in evident puzzlement; but Luke's interpretation 
of the second clause makes credible sense: 'since then, there 
is the good news of the kingdom of God, and everyone forces 
his way in' (16:16). Evidently, Jesus believed that some 
transformation had been effected in the law by his coming; and 
now enthusiasm and power of feeling took precedence above mere 
rules. But as the next Logion (cf. Luke 16:17; Mt. 5:18) re-
emphasizes, this meant putting the law into its proper place, 
not its abrogation. 
If the ancient Jewish historian Josephus's evidence is to 
be believed, this strain of 'partial antinomianism' actually 
preceded Jesus (which is further evidence that it really did 
exist in his teaching): it was, indeed, part of John the 
Baptist's legacy to Christianity, as this desription of John 
suggests: 
He was a good man, and exhorted the Jews to lead 
righteous lives, practise justice towards one 
another and piety towards God, and so to join in 
baptism. In his view this was a necessary 
preliminary if baptism was to be acceptable to God. 
They must not use it to gain pardon for whatever 
sins they committed, but as a consecration of the 
body, implying that the soul was thoroughly purified 
beforehand by right behaviour. 
(Josephus in Wilson: 84) 
Baptism is the one ritual to which, upon unequivocal 
evidence, Jesus gave some credit. And yet, if what John 4:2 
records is accurate, as it may be, then only his disciples 
baptised and not Jesus himself - which suggests reservations 
on his part. It is unlikely at any rate that baptism meant the 
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same for Jesus as the later church: a sacred and magical act, 
essential for salvation, by which sins were washed away • 
. Perhaps Paul's most potent theological revision lies in 
his concept of sin, as Kristeva suggests (1982: 128) -
especially in his remarks that 'sin is not imputed when there 
is no law' (Rom. 5:13); and 'the law entered, that the offense 
might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more 
abound' (5:20). 
The considerable sophistication of Pauline doctrine is 
shown through his assumption that law creates sin. What men 
take to be law, however arbitrary and absurd, i§ law; hence 
man is judged perennially by the standards he sets up for 
himself. He is dragged down by toils of his own making, 
hampered by his own leaden vision. In Paul's eyes, Christ 
frees man from his own intransigence; faith and grace together 
act in the place of law. 
And yet Pauline theology rests on its quite clear 
anticipations of the doctrine of original sin (usually 
attributed, in its evolved form, to st Augustine), of which 
the need for law is but one sign: Christ is the 
personification of grace, and his sacrifice in the crucifixion 
is the testament and apotheosis of God's grace. For man had no 
hope of salvation until this act was effected. His simple 
responsibility is reception of the divine gift, without which 
he might never be free. Thereafter, no earthly act of his has 
power to save or damn him: 'A man is happy if God considers 
him happy, irrespective of good deeds' (Rom. 4:6). 
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Now this is a powerful vision, as history has attested. 
Yet its flaw lies where Kristeva diagnoses it: 'One could say, 
in fact, that sin is subjectified abjection' (128). What 
Kristeva means is that Paul has simply internalised and 
spiritualised the Jewish purification laws, not abolished 
them; worse, Paul must abase man's nature in order to make 
room for grace. 
As far as one can tell, this emphasis on what would later 
become 'original sin' is not marked in the Gospels. One might 
derive some support for it from, for example, Jesus's cryptic 
response to a compliment: 'Why do you call me good? No one is 
good but God alone i (Mk 10:18). Yet if original sin is 
intimated here, it implicates even the future bearer of grace 
himself, at least in his earthly guise; which is hardly 
altogether good news for Pauline Christology. 
The other side of the coin - Paul's most positive 
contribution to Christianity - is his formulation of Christian 
love, as Kristeva makes clear when she returns to biblical 
topics in her Tales of Love2 : 'Far from needing to deserve it 
or to fear its withdrawal by God, the Christian is assured of 
being loved, independently of his merits' (1987: 139). Here we 
have a different presentation of the Law, where 'Love ••• is 
the answer to everyone of the commandments' (Rom. 13:10). 
Paul's contribution is to put the accent on the first word of 
Jesus's injunction, when he repeats: 'The whole of Law is 
summarised in a single command: "Love your neighbour as 
yourself'" (Gal. 5:14). 
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For Kristeva the Christian love-feast perfectly expresses 
this doctrine of love, where the communicant devours the loved 
object, a symbol of the sacrifice of self: 'Turning love into 
an identification with the ideal father and having that 
identification based on an absorption, an oral assimilation of 
his body, introduces into Christianity a relief of oral sadism 
directed at the archaic maternal body. The mother will not eat 
you ... look for the sign of the father within her' 
(1987:149). 
Kristeva here engages the communicant at the altar rail 
in a ritual re-enactment of the child's situation at the 
mother's breast: this time, however, the nourishment received 
is 'spiritual', not physical, and the mother has been replaced 
by a composite entity, a spiritual Father who usurps the 
mother's role. It is clear that in Kristeva's view the 
powerful 'spiritual' effects of such symbolism really depend 
on its profound, if concealed, psychological references. 
These are hints which will be developed in what follows. 
Although I shall be following my own line of symbolic inquiry, 
not always identical with Kristeva's, her suggestions offer a 
useful model to work from. An essential pointer is her 
interpretation of these spiritual matters as imaginative and 
symbolic projections of the Oedipal crisis of childhood. 
As she infers, what Christianity seems to offer at this 
level is the possibility of a new and different revisiting of 
the Oedipal transition. In this process, the passion of the 
cross is 'raised to the level of a universal narrative', 
whereby the subject must re-enact its own death: 
introducing into the preconscious the idealizing 
necessity of one's own death, at once favors my leap 
into the Name of the Father. A subtle machinery for 
idealization rather than repression in the precise 
meaning of the term, agape-passion turns into the 
erotic unleashing of the death drive only when a 
narrator - an I - takes it upon himself to recompose 
the Writing of the Universal Subject and join his 
own name to the Name of the Father .•.. The son, and 
the believer who identifies with him, will be 
welcomed by the Father, made homologous to him ... 
beyond the sacrifice of the body and as very 
condition for that sacrifice •••. The obliteration 
of the body and the Body's image are nevertheless 
hypostatized in Christ, and this leads to the 
abolition of the Self (of the body-Self) and at the 
same time to its renewal within the Subject who is 
the Adopted Son through the Name of the Father: 'I 
live now not with my own life but with the life of 
Christ who lives in me. The life I now live in this 
body I live in faith: faith in the Son of God who 
loved me and who sacrificed himself for my sake' 
(Gal. 2:20). (144-146) 
What Kristeva dramatises here is the process whereby the 
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Christian subject identifies itself with the Other in the role 
of law and authority, and so links itself with the Lacanian 
'Name of the Father', rather than opposing that rule. In order 
to overcome the subject's natural independence and Oedipal 
antipathy, Christianity offers a cannibalistic oral ritual in 
which the eating body is symbolically killed and absorbed by 
the body eaten. In so acting, 'I' as subject imitate the 
example of the primal Son who died 'into the Father' before 
me, and accede in my own death. Christian agape, in this view, 
identifies closely with the thanatos, the death of self, which 
eros on the other hand opposes. 
Such an interpretation depends closely on Kristeva's 
understanding of the way Christianity operates on the axis 
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between the Oedipal Father and Mother 'gods' of ancient 
religion. The 'reconciliation' between them that Christianity 
provides is apparently only an act of cosmic transvestitism: 
if the Father's law comes newly dressed in maternal guise it 
is still the law for all that; only its techniques of 
persuasion have softened. 
As I suggested in section 2 of my last chapter, this 
vision of the psychic forces underlying Christianity is not 
the only one possible. There is another route we may take to 
uncover the inner sources of Christianity's appeal, one which 
leads not primarily through the Mother or Father, but bears 
instead upon the symbolic power of the Child. Indeed, this 
figure will provide the main topic of my final three sections. 
2 
Jesus was aware of the unconscious and it$ power; his own 
implicit literary theory makes this clear. Jesus's literary 
form was the parable. Not unknown in Jewish writing, it was a 
form in which he excelled, and yet it is notable that he 
committed none of his sayings or his parables to papyrus. But 
we should not infer from this that he intended them to be 
forgotten or that there was not implicit in this a kind of 
art: the reckless prodigality of his oral method is itself a 
communication, not unlike the symbolic statement of the cross. 
He trusts to the minds of others to carryon, to ponder and 
adapt. The extraordinary faith in his listeners his method 
demonstrates, illustrates how from the start his art was not 
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the art of the self: he anticipates a community, and by making 
his words a community possession gives them an organic life 
independent of his own ego. 
As in the parable of the sower, he 'seeds' the 
unconscious of his audience with 'the word that tells of the 
Kingdom' (Mt. 13:18): the various kinds of soil represent the 
ways its meaning will be differently received, as Jesus 
himself explains (19-23). It is now independent of its 
original teller; he has no more claim on it. But this does not 
mean others may do with it as they wish - outside certain 
limits. What regulates and ensures its transmission is the 
grain of truth it implicitly contains: this is the source of 
the artist's impossible confidence; and, in a sense, this 
truth was never his possession from the start. If the words 
convey it, they will endure; and if not them, then the 
essential core of unspoken meaning that underlies them, which 
is other than they are. What does not feed off this inner 
truth cannot survive: 'A vine was planted outside of the 
Father, and it has not become strong; it will be uprooted and 
it will perish' (Thomas, Logion 41, Grant and Freedman: 146). 
Just such an unsayable reality is the Kingdom itself: it is 
invisible and yet 'as lightning comes from the east and shines 
as far as the west' (Mt. 24:27; Lk. 17:24) it stretches out 
upon the earth. (Though, as in Q [69] the parousia is the 
actual subject meant, in Thomas's version we have 'the kingdom 
of the Father is spread out upon the earth, and men do not see 
it' [cf. Logion 111, Grant and Freedman: 185]; and here I 
prefer Thomas to Matthew, Luke, and hence Q.) 
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What Jesus as artist trusts so implicitly to is the power 
of the unconscious. For, in the end, 'Nothing is covered that 
will not be revealed, hidden that will not be known. What you 
have said in the dark shall be heard in the light, and what 
you have whispered into the ear shall be proclaimed upon the 
housetops' (Q Logion 37, Havener: 136; Mt. 10:26-7;Lk. 12:2-
3) • 
The Kingdom itself has this same quality: it lies within 
and only with time reveals itself: 'The kingdom of Heaven is 
like a mustard-seed, which a man took and sowed in his field. 
As a seed, mustard is smaller than any other; but when it has 
grown it is bigger than any garden-plant; it becomes a tree, 
big enough for the birds to come and roost among its branches' 
(Mt. 13:31-2). Again, it is like 'yeast, which a woman took 
and mixed with half a hundredweight of flower till it was all 
leavened' (Mt. 13:33; cf. also Q in Havener: 140-1; Lk. 13:18-
21) . 
The parabolic method makes several assumptions. Firstly, 
the ineffable may be conveyed through the simple and concrete; 
if spiritual truths are mysteries which reveal themselves 
differently upon interpretation, plain and concrete things 
participate in their realities nonetheless and are continuous 
with them. Secondly, humans may be directed towards the 
unsayable understanding which lies dormant within them all 
through the agency of words, even though the words can never 
encapsulate that meaning; as with access to the Son of Man 
within, communication is evocation, not transmission of facts. 
As Thomas puts it: 'When you beget in yourselves him whom you 
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have, he will save you' (Logion 71, Grant and Freedman: 164). 
Hence it is that Jesus eschews abstract statement or rational 
demonstration. He chooses instead the indirect methods of art 
which appeal so readily to the unconscious. 
It is confidence, not negligence or indifference which 
leads him to his 'wasteful' method so like that of the 
therapist or the artist. If it requires self-denying patience 
to involve the listener in the act of creation and discovery, 
this does not imply carelessness about the results: 'I came to 
cast fire upon the earth; and would that it were already 
kindled! I have a baptism to be baptised with; and how I am 
constrained until it is accomplished!' (Q Logion 48 in Havener 
139; Lk. 12:49-50). 
The follower of Valentinus who wrote the Gnostic Gospel 
of Philip talks of religious language as necessarily one of 
'types and images' since it is 'a language of internal 
transformation; whoever perceives divine reality "becomes what 
he sees" .... Whoever achieves gnosis becomes "no longer a 
Christian, but a Christ'" (Pagels 1982: 141). 
Though the realities religious language seeks are in 
their essence unsayable, this does not mean they are not 
susceptible to analysis. It is in pursuit of this unsayable 
pre-existent 'inner understanding' we have spoken so much of, 
supposedly capable of transforming the world, that we are led 
to the third and independent archetype, that of the Child: one 
which assumes the symbolic meanings of both Mother and Father, 
and yet is not to be identified with them. 
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It is important to note how central a symbol the child is 
in Christian iconography; the apt prompting which caused both 
Matthew and Luke to begin with mythical infancy narratives has 
left a legacy of imagery to the world of which Christmas is 
the perennial celebration: the hope and possibility of 
rebirth, of 'beginning again', is the universal meaning of the 
child-king in the humble manger, which entirely overrides such 
considerations as lack of historicity in the accounts. 
They brought children for him to lay his hands on 
them with prayer. The disciples scolded them for it, 
but Jesus said to them, 'Let the children come to 
me; do not try to stop them; for the kingdom of 
Heaven belongs to such as these.' (Mt. 19:13-15) 
And again: 
He called a child, set him in front of them, and 
said, 'I tell you this: unless you turn round and 
become like children, you will never enter the 
kingdom of Heaven. Whoever receives one such child 
in my name receives me .... I tell you, they have 
their guardian angels in heaven, who look 
continually on the face of my heavenly Father.' 
(Mt. 18:2-6;10) 
The meaning of Matthew's 'turn around' (i.e 'go back') is 
made explicit in John 3:3: 'Truly, truly, I say to you, unless 
one is born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God'; or else 
in the first part of the so-called 'Johannine logion' of the 
synoptics: 'I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, 
that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and 
understanding and revealed them to babes' (Q Logion 24, 
Havener 131; Mt. 11:25 AVj Lk. 10:21). In Matthew 29:16 Jesus 
asks, 'have you never read that text, "Thou hast made children 
and babes at the breast sound aloud thy praise"?' 
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A remarkable feature of Jesus's way of addressing God is 
the name 'Abba', which the early church copied. While this had 
limited precedent among some hasidim (cf. Wilson: 89), it is 
accepted as being distinctly characteristic of Jesus 
(Schillebeeckx: 259, 267); Abba is something like the modern 
'Papa' in register, both infantile and yet reverent. In other 
words, Jesus's mode of addressing God was curiously personal. 
But this does not mean that Jesus saw his relation as 
exclusive; 'sonship' was a condition others could attain: 'He 
who has God for his father listens to the words of God' (John 
8:47); and 'Call no man your father on earth, for you have one 
Father, who is in heaven' (Mt. 23:9). 
For all who are moved by the Spirit of God are sons 
of God. The spirit you have received is not a spirit 
of slavery leading you back into a life of fear, but 
a spirit that makes us sons, enabling us to cry 
'Abba! Father!' In that cry the spirit of God joins 
with our spirit in testifying that we are God's 
children; and if children, then heirs. We are God's 
heirs and Christ's fellow-heirs, if we share his 
sufferings now in order to share his splendour 
hereafter. (Rom. 8:14-17) 
This extract captures perfectly the strange dark ominous 
colouring and the deferment of all hope to the parousia we 
associate with Paul's metaphysical pessimism; and yet, 
surprisingly, it retains the basic doctrine intact: there is 
nothing unique about being a son of God. As we see in all the 
above, Jesus is actually persuading people to replace the 
condition of earthly sonship with the heavenly. This 
understanding will be especially important in what follows. 
There is an unusually mysterious passage in John 3:6-12: 
it is spirit that gives birth to spirit. You ought 
not to be astonished, then, when I tell you that you 
must be born over again. The wind [pneuma] blows 
where it wills; you hear the sound of it, but you do 
not know where it comes from, or where it is going. 
So with everyone who is born from spirit ..•• If you 
disbelieve me when I talk about things of earth, how 
are you to believe if I should talk about the things 
of heaven? 
It is the indefinable and magical character of this being 
'born over' that John tries but fails to convey here; not 
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through lack of skill, but because it is inherently intangible 
and unsayable. 
Jesus's habit of calling his followers 'children' tends 
to get lost in some translations. It is, however, common in 
The Gospel of Thomas, where the general emphasis on the child 
is even stronger than in the canonical texts. If there is no 
authentic historical root to the Thomas sayings, they 
nonetheless tell us how Gnosticism grasped at this foundation 
element and meditated on it. The strangest of such logia (3) 
has: 'An old man in his days will not hesitate to ask an 
infant of seven days about the place of life, and he will live 
... ' (Grant and Freedman: 117). Another (47) refers to the 
revolution in values (as in Q 62 above) since John's death: up 
to that time no human stood higher in stature than the 
Baptist; yet now 'he among you who will become as a little 
child will know the kingdom and will be greater than John' 
(Throckmorton3 : 48; Grant and Freedman: 149; see also Mt. 
11:11-2; Lk. 7:28). 
A saying from Thomas with similar import sounds almost 
like T.S.Eliot: 
Jesus said: 
You have indeed uncovered the beginning 
so that you may seek the end; 
for in the place where the beginning is, 
there the end will be. 
Blessed is he who will stand in 
the beginning, 
and will know the end and will not taste death. 
(Logion 18i Grant and Freedman: 131) 
We have so far seen firm evidence of the importance of 
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the child - and hence of rebirth - as a spiritual symbol in 
the strands of early Christianity variously represented by 
Matthew, John, and the Gnostic Thomas. Rebirth has its Pauline 
representation too, but to illustrate this I have chosen -
somewhat perversely - to quote from yet another extracanonical 
work, The Epistle of Barnabas4 • Whether or not it was written 
by Mark's cousin and the one-time companion of Paul, this is a 
thoroughly Pauline composition, and actually has some claim to 
canonical authority. To judge only by internal evidence, it 
was set down some time not very long after the fall of 
Jerusalem, and is an entirely orthodox Pauline work, except 
only that it still sees good works as important aids on the 
path to redemption; it was cited by Clement of Alexandria, 
Eusebius - and also Origen and Jerome, both of whom believed 
it genuine. Part of its interest is that it is directed to 
potential Jewish converts or else a backsliding Jewish-
Christian community. It quotes the Old Testament extensively, 
but the only gospel Barnabas knows is a version of Matthew (or 
even, in VII:5, the Ebionite gospel?). 
Quite possibly it owes its absence from the canon not to 
spurious doctrine but to its gauche style and embarrassing 
quaintness (much of it is devoted to tortuous attempts to turn 
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the Old Testament and the law into Philonian allegories about 
Christ). If so, it has the distinction of being the first such 
work properly rejected on artistic, not doctrinal, grounds. 
What concerns us here is Barnabas's belief in the heart 
as the true temple, rebuilt by God so that 'we are become 
renewed, being again created as it were from the beginning. 
Wherefore God truly dwells in our house, that is, in us' 
(XIII:21). 
Seeing therefore he has renewed us by the remission 
of our sins he has put us into another frame, that 
we should have souls like those of children, forming 
us again himself by the Spirit. (V:ll) 
As we see, both Gnostics, evangelists, and patriarchs of 
the Church delighted in the notion of re-birth which baptism 
came to symbolise. The othodox Justin (c. 155 AD, in 
stevenson5 : 66) points out how we have no choice about our 
first birth; but so that 'we may not remain the children of 
necessity and ignorance' (67) we have been given the 
opportunity 'to be born again'. Clement of Alexandria (c. 180) 
elaborates the complementary image of Christians as children: 
'the Word alone supplies us children with the milk of love, 
and only those who suck at this breast are truly happy ..• to 
those infants who seek the Word, the Father's loving breasts 
supply milk' (in Pagels: 87). Here orthodoxy and Gnosticism 
meet in the contemplation of an androgynous parent God. 
The third-century apocryphal Acts of Peter transfers this 
androgynous significance from God to Christ himself: 
Thou art unto 
brother, thou 
steward; thou 
and thou art, 
thee only. 
me f~ther, thou my mother, thou my 
my friend, thou my bondsman, thou my 
art the All and the All is in thee; 
and there is naught else that is, save 
(in Mollenkott: 9) 
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The Gnostic Valentinus claimed after learning the secret 
of Paul's teaching from one of Paul's disciples, to have had a 
vision in which he 'saw a newborn infant, and when he asked 
who he might be, the child replied "I am the Logos'" 
(Hippolytus; in Pagels: 49). Like Valentinus, the Gnostic seer 
zostrianos in his manual of discipline at last attains a 
vision of spiritual things in the form of 'the perfect child' 
(142) • 
since the child-Logos springs from Heaven, this accords 
with a symbolic discourse attributed to the infamous pre-
Gnostic simon Magus: 'Grant Paradise to be the womb' Simon 
begins (in Pagels: 75), 'and Eden the placenta'. To the 
Sethian Gnostics the womb of every pregnant woman represents 
'an image of the heavens and the earth' (Ibid.). 
The 'sign of Jonah' by which Jesus sought to symbolise 
his ministry (Mt. 16:4; Mk 8:12; Lk. 11:29) has always been 
difficult to interpret. Matthew is particularly tortuous in 
this regard (12:38-42). For the Mediaeval church it symbolised 
rebirth from the uterine belly of the whale (Wilson: 98) and 
'rebirth' may indeed be the correct symbolic import, in the 
Christian context. The choice of the ICHTHOS symbol by the 
early Church seems a fortunate one for similar reasons: the 
fish is an independent product of the sea and yet is 
inseparably linked with its oceanic origins, like an embryo 
with its amniotic fluid. Similarly, the 'reborn' Christian 
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supposedly bears the permanent mark of his or her baptismal 
immersion, reflecting that person's link with all-encompassing 
psychological and spiritual depths. 
It is easy enough to see that this mass of imagery 
associating religious truths with the facts of birth and early 
childhood must point to a recurrent underlying meaning. The 
sheer universality of its appeal is a clue that this is where 
the central point of common origin we seek is to be found; 
that it is to the child-image and its significance that the 
various trails - Gnostic, Johannine, Pauline - conjointly lead 
us. 
Yet the different schools vary in the way they deal with 
this central spiritual and psychological datum. What is 
especially visible is that the Gnostic route overshoots the 
firm stopping-point of Jesus in the child, and finds its 
termination in the inchoate 'feminine' pre-ego; perhaps Paul, 
too, tends to miss the mark in their way, though to a lesser 
degree: it is significant that he finds glossolalia - which 
signifies return to the pre-verbal condition (it is, in fact, 
a 'speaking in no-tongues') - more an embarrassment than an 
aid (1 Cor. 14). In contrast, the beautiful Gnostic poem 
'Thunder, Perfect Mind', spoken by a feminine divinity (cf. 
Pagels: 16; a fuller version in Filoramo6 1991), movingly 
invokes the paradoxical and unsayable qualities of this deep 
pre-verbal region - but in all essentials this is no longer a 
Christian poem. 
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To their credit, most Gnostics continued to show little 
sign of practical sexual discrimination in their communities -
as little, in fact, as the very earliest Jewish Christians; 
and this is probably a result of their belief in the power of 
the divine feminine and in an androgynous God. (The orthodox 
Church rapidly returned to a discriminatory stance, once 
hierarchy was again important to it [cf. Pagels 1982: 83-4; 
cf. also Pagels 19887].) And yet the penalty of the Gnostic 
obsession with this other-worldly prelinguistic zone was lack 
of concern with the things of this world, including gender. 
Jesus's heaven, in which there is no marriage or giving in 
marriage, becomes for some Gnostics - the Carpocratians, for 
example - an excuse for the abuse of all earthly existence, 
including sexual abuse of the flesh. Something like their 
remarkable doctrine had made its appearance even in Paul's day 
(cf. e. g.: 1 Cor. 6: 12 ff • ) • 
James stands however on the other side of this imbalance, 
tending, if anything, to obscure the divine child and its 
attributes in his desire for practical, even political, action 
in the world. If only through re-naming the inward and outward 
realm of the heavenly child as 'law', specifically, he leaves 
room for the 'fearsome' Father-god's re-entry, and for a re-
emphasis upon external rules. 
3 
For the fact is, Jesus's archaic starting-point is neither the 
formless pre-ego nor the Name of the Father. The structure of 
538 
his moral and spiritual vision is erected rather on the 
beginning self in its own right. What the imagery and 
exhortation of his sayings promise is not at all a one-sided 
rejection of this world; rather he offers us the chance to re-
negotiate the Oedipal crisis, the far-reaching effect of which 
will be to transform our world in turn. 
Under stress of his final cross-examination, Jesus might 
have denied that his kingdom was 'of this world' (John 18:36). 
But the world he meant is the social sphere we daily 
encounter: this mundane product of human hands, as it appears 
to perceptions founded upon the established Oedipus; not as it 
might be if we learnt to see - and hence act - differently. 
For the time being the kingdom is an embattled enclave in a 
larger, inherently antipathetic realm governed by wealth, 
power and subordination. But this dark vale is man's (and 
Oedipus's) creation, not God's or the Gnostic demiurge's. The 
true parousia, the eternal millennium, the ultimate victory, 
would surely be whenever the Kingdom 'within' and the physical 
world are at last sucessfully united. 
There is an important contrast here between the boundless 
'feminine' and God as Jesus evidently conceives him. As 
infinite chaos, the feminine formless is potentially infinite 
in a way that God is not. Since God is 'All', his infinite 
nature is rather to be conceived as the product of his 
totality; within it, presumably the feminine is encompassed 
and resolved. Hence, God's self must be a unity, a boundless 
form, and not a chaos. He is god of the existent, not of non-
existence; of the living, not the dead. 
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What is central here is that there is a continuity, in 
Jesus's eyes, between the unity of God's self and the human 
subject as it prepares for the onset of the Oedipus. As all 
his statements on the child make plain, Jesus sees a radical 
potential in the nascent infant identity at this point, a 
point when it has all but crossed the borderline into personal 
existence, but is still, so to speak, an empty category in 
worldly terms, for its content is still undefined, still 
essentially the Real. Ideally seen, its state of being at this 
moment is closest to that of the Creator's own. It is this 
curious affinity between God's situation and that of the 
beginning self, still by and large untrammelled by the world, 
that the various traditions which grow out of Jesus explore. 
Before the arrival of law and its corresponding guilt, or 
of the arbitrary divisions of the world which hang upon its 
values, there are hints and glimpses of a better way. And yet 
Jesus is not supposing that the wordless state itself is all 
that we-might read into it; nor is he desiring for us simply a 
physical and actual regression, but only its revalued 
equivalent in adult terms. What is required is the sacrifice 
of the Oedipal Self in favour not of no-self on the one hand, 
nor of submission to the Name of the Father on the other, but 
of a better self - justified entirely in its own terms - which 
we can assume if we so will. 
This self is the equivalent of God's true universal Self, 
or - if that is an impossible ideal - of the mode of being of 
the Son of Man, who imitates His harmony and unity in human 
form. What Christianity invites us to do is to undertake the 
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oedipal transition again, but to take on at its conclusion not 
'our' self but that of the universal Son of Man. Thus it is 
that Jesus can aver, without essential hubris (and without the 
Trinitarian implications which John and the later Church were 
to find in the saying): 'no one knows the Son except the 
Father, no one the Father except the Son and anyone to whom 
the Son chooses to reveal him' (Q Logion 24, Havener: 131; Mt. 
11:27; Lk. 10:22). Not God's Name but his Self must be the 
ambition of the true disciple: to be discovered first of all 
in emotional terms in the precarious place where Subject and 
Other are indeed indistinguishable: in our innate memories of 
the transition between the Real and the Imaginary, when the 
formless in us comes to form. 
But this desired state is not a condition of rest, for 
the universe itself is not at rest. For the adult it is above 
all in the deed, in action, that the physical and the 
spiritual are shown to be inseparable. If action and bodily 
movement are aspects of our adult life which stand closest to 
the Real, which are most attuned to non-verbal reality, then 
it is in a sense the 'purification of the deed' that most 
concerns Christian morality. 
An indication here is to be found in the healing miracles 
themselves; they, in their way, are a bodily 'beginning 
again'. But this is not simply a bodily matter. For Pauline 
dualism the miracles have always been hard to take: Paul does 
not indeed mention them at all. But as an affirmation of 
psychosomatic wholeness - a regeneration of body and spirit 
together 'from scratch' - they seem especially meaningful, and 
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a sign of where Jesus's sympathies lay on the dualist issue. 
It is in this context that we may best understand Jesus's 
tendency to begin a healing by saying 'your sins are forgiven 
you' • 
Hence Jesus's central logion: 'If anyone wishes to be a 
follower of mine, he must leave self behind; he must take up 
his cross and come with me' (Mt. 16:24). The rest of the 
saying is to be found in Q as well as twice in Luke (there is 
on this rare occasion even a variant version in John 12:25): 
'Whoever finds one's life will lose it, but whoever loses 
one's life will find it' (Q Logion 72, Havener: 145); but only 
Matthew's version conveys, I think, the full sense: 'if a man 
will let himself be lost for my sake, he will find his true 
self. What will a man gain by winning the whole world, at the 
cost of his true self? Or what can he give to buy that self 
back?' (16:25-6). (The version in Thomas [Logion 109, Grant 
and Freedman: 184] adds a Gnostic colouring: 'He who will find 
himself, of him the world is not worthy'.) Jesus's sacrifice 
and loss of his earthly Self upon the cross was in this 
context a parable by example. 
Christian ethics are, then, not an arbitrary set of 
rules, but simply a consistent expression in action of what it 
means to inhabit this single archetypal Self beyond the self, 
the materials of which are present in all from the beginning. 
The Sermon on the Mount is not a comprehensive list of 
isolated prescriptions like the Ten Commandments, but examples 
and indications towards a single end which its balanced maxims 
do not, cannot, specify or say outright. 
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Instead they function to illustrate what is needed to 
preserve the unity, peace, harmony, and wholeness of an active 
state of being in which the Oedipal self is no longer the main 
issue; the consequences - being sons of God and inheriting the 
earth - are signs of the growing Kingdom in this world. 
'Eternal life', too, whatever its future advantages, could be 
seen as beginning here and now; for, of course, a Self which 
is universal and archetypal, which anyone may appropriate and 
which is unique to no-one, does not die. Those who inhabit it 
participate in its eternal qualities, but do so in the 
present. 
In fact the true personal rewards intended are not 
directly mentioned in these maxims: they include an end to the 
loneliness of the personal self, an openness to creation 
unblinkered by the Oedipus (with its inevitable emphases on 
domination, differentiation, possession and power), and the 
joys of living in accord with a primal condition which 
provides the ground and meaning for terms like 'innocence', 
'purity' and 'beautY'i those elements which combined together 
constitute the spirit of holiness, the Holy Spirit, the active 
personality of the Archetypal Human. 
'The heavens will curl up and the earth before your eyes, 
and he who lives from the [Living] One will not see death' 
says Jesus, according to Thomas (Logion 108i Grant and 
Freedman: 184). On another occasion in Thomas, the disciples 
ask Jesus to name the day of the parousia and the start of 
'the new world'; he replies that what they are waiting for has 
already come, 'but you do not recognise it' (Logion 52, 152-
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3). This is probably the most explicit profession of a 
'realised eschatology' in antiquity; and, interestingly, it 
places the Gnostic Thomas in the company of Q (cf. 
Schillebeeckx: 410 ff.), rather than with Paul and Mark as one 
might anticipate. 
A generous view would be to conclude that the later 
developments of Christianity divided Jesus's corpus among 
themselves, without any of them retaining complete authority. 
The flaw in Gnosticism as a whole - which Thomas, as we see, 
does not always follow - was its displacement of the kingdom 
entirely out of this plane of being; the tiny leftover spark 
of gnosis was not, literally, 'knowledge' (as many 
commentators still suppose) but the mystical inward umbilical 
mark of an utterly transcendent otherworld. Gnosticism's 
spiritual vision thus turned inward, in contemplation of this 
navel-like vestige of a higher and more fitting origin beyond 
this plane. 
Gnosticism has not entirely departed, as a movement. 
Psychoanalysis has its own Gnostic branch in the work of Jung, 
and Jung's identification of Christ with the perfected ego, 
with the 'integrated self', is well known. Having established8 
that 'I have chosen the term "self" to designate the totality 
of man, the sum total of his conscious and unconscious 
contents' (in storr, ed. 1983: 242), Jung goes on to say that 
'Christ is our nearest analogy of the self and its meaning' 
(299) . 
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But Jung is critical of Jesus's full adequacy for the 
role. Since the archetypal self subsumes all opposites, Jesus 
should have incorporated into himself evil; he should have 
assimilated his shadow Antichrist. After an extensive and 
interesting analysis of the Church Fathers up to Aquinas 
(1983: 300-309), who unanimously declare evil to be 'nonbeing' 
and hence ontologically negligible, Jung remains unconvinced 
by their dismissals. For him, evil is an undeniable psychic 
and hence ontic reality: thus Christ in completeness should 
represent it as a part of his being, his archetypal selfhood. 
Jung raises a thorny issue, certainly. But curiously, it 
is the very character of infantile experience that allows us 
to escape the crux he presents. Lacan, analysing the elements 
of pre-Oedipal being, distinguishes firmly between the Lust-
Ich and the Unlust (Lacan 1986: 239ff.): 'a distinction is 
made between that which brings Lust and that which brings 
Unlust, pleasure or displeasure' (240). The infant's pre-
Oedipal world is not after all unified, for it contains pain; 
but since its single criterion of reality is pleasure, a 
barrier and split is introduced between the realm of its own 
being and the location of pain. Unlust is thus 'what remains 
unassimilable, irreducible to the pleasure principle. It is 
out of this, Freud tells us, that the non-ego will be 
constituted' (241). 
In the field of the Real, the seminal Lust-Ich 
privileges only that which is reflected in its field 
by an effect of Lust, as a return to homeostasis. 
But that which does not favour homeostasis and is 
maintained at all costs as Unlust bites still more 
into its field. Thus, what is of the order of Unlust 
is inscribed in the ego as non-ego, negation, 
splitting-off of the ego. The non-ego is not to be 
confused with what surrounds it, the vastness of the 
real. Non-ego is distinguished as a foreign body, 
fremde Objekt. (Lacan 1986: 245) 
545 
What this means is that pain is effectively banished from the 
reality the nascent ego will accept; interestingly, the infant 
consciousness actually begins to form itself as a preliminary 
'self' by this act, before the mirror stage and the Oedipus 
event. It does so by allowing a primal split in its reality, 
one which relegates pain to the 'non-ego' beyond itself. We 
are probably right in finding the psychological origin of evil 
not so much where Kristeva does, in an external view of the 
primal feminine, but in this 'pain': in the child's rage and 
desolation at its mother's absence. 
Lacan uses this fact to criticise too simple-minded an 
acceptance that the meanings of 'good' and 'evil' are 
dependent on each other. He takes 'the expresssion, No good 
without evil, no good without pain, which preserves in this 
good and in this evil a character of alternation, of a 
possible calibration' (241), to represent a 'binary' point of 
view, something like Jung's. On his side all he will assent to 
is 'no evil without there resulting some good from it, and 
when the good is there, there is no good that holds with evil' 
(242). 
So for the child these states of mind of joy and rage are 
not continuous but entirely discrete, in a way which can never 
occur again, and which means 'good' and 'evil' do not function 
precisely like the binary oppositions of acquired language. 
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The angry and bereft infant is not the same person as the 
happy and contented infant; and of the two the euphoric state 
has priority, for it preserves its continuity with the foetus 
and the womb. Hence, in affirming the euphoric state of being 
as a psychic unity, it may be Jesus is not betraying psychic 
realities but enforcing them. There is a sense, a 
psychological sense, in which the Church Fathers were right, 
and 'evil' is ontologically separable from 'the good'. 
Unhappily, the problem raised does not end here, but may 
simply be continued on another level. Nietzsche9 sees his work 
as revealing an irresolvable fundamental antagonism between 
two attitudes to the world, represented initially by the 
symbolic natures of Dionysus and Apollo. Eventually he comes 
to recognise that the symbolic enactment of this conflict 
takes place not between Dionysus and Apollo, as he had 
supposed, but between Dionysus and 'the crucified' (cf. 
Deleuze 1983: 14). 
In presenting things thus, his basic assumptions are 
quite correct, as far as they go. For Nietzsche, the amoral 
joy of Dionysus incorporates and affirms every part of the 
colourful reality of process, change and appearance. It 
includes indiscriminately in its euphoria even the elements of 
tragedy and grief; finally, as in Yeats's poem 'Lapis Lazuli', 
even the tragic is elevated and subsumed into Dionysus's 
cosmic gaiety. Christ on the other hand disgusts Nietzsche as 
he who finds life sordid, who expiates sorrow on the cross, 
who looks to a better life to come, denying this one. 
The opposition of Dionysus and Christ is irreconcilable: 
On the one hand, the life that justifies suffering, 
that affirms sufferingj on the other hand the 
suffering that accuses life, that testifies against 
it, that makes life something that must be 
justified. For Christianity the fact of suffering in 
life means primarily that life is not just, that it 
is even essentially unjust, that it pays for an 
essential injustice by suffering, it is blameworthy 
because it suffers. The result of this is that life 
must be justified, that is to say, redeemed of its 
injustice or saved .••. Christian joy is the joy of 
'resolving' pain in this way, pain is internalised, 
offered to God, carried to God, 'that ghastly 
paradox of a "God on the cross", that mystery of an 
unimaginable and ultimate cruelty', this is a truly 
Christian mania, a mania which is already wholly 
dialectical. (Deleuze 1983: 15; Nietzsche 
quotation from On the Genealogy of Morals) 
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Nietzsche thus sees Christianity as the apotheosis of a 
negative Platonism, that which seeks the meaning of this world 
outside this world's boundaries. It is 'dialectical' in the 
sense that it seeks resolution of an irresolvable human 
problem that just 'is', as Nietzsche's Dionysus accepts. 
Yet as the foregoing analysis should have shown, Jesus -
as opposed to Paul and the Gnostics, who perhaps have more in 
common with Nietzsche's picture - is offering not a deferred 
but a 'total' picture of reality, which still includes more 
than the merely material, just because these 'beyond' things 
are there - in the Real. He opposes to Nietzsche's realism a 
deeper Realismj one that does not disregard the present world, 
but demands commitment to it through action. 
What he does insist on is that the Oedipus event gives 
rise to an illusory and one-sided point of view upon the 
world. In retrospect, this is perhaps Jesus's major 
achievement: the recognition that the Oedipus structure is not 
immutable and fixed, but may happen differently - and change 
all our perceptions along with it. 
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In contrast, Nietzsche's (later) Dionysus repudiates the 
pre-individuated Will of Schopenhaueri he joys in the 
phenomenal and denies the noumenal. He delights, in effect, in 
the violent emotions of the Oedipal struggle, and accepts its 
products - a world of 'things' - even if he ultimately sees 
these as undermined by process itself. Here, then, is 
Dionysus's deceit: his euphoric affirmation of a world which 
includes force and domination - 'the will to power' - is 
opposed to that of Jesusi but it is no less regressive. It too 
sends us back to an only slightly later phase of the Oedipal 
transition, and calls the violent emotions of that phase 
'reality' - which is to promote those conflictual feelings as 
inevitable and an intrinsic part of the human situation. It is 
entirely appropriate that Nietzsche's philosophy has its 
logical beginning in a primary act of parricide, the 
announcement of God's death. 
By hoping, in contrast, to free mankind from the 
pessimism of the Oedipal event, with its origin in murder, 
Jesus is hopefully not being less 'realistic'; rather he wants 
to open a new door onto reality by demoting part of that which 
divides us from it. As Edward Schillebeeckx puts it: 'Jesus 
sees in the kingdom only an end to all overweening relations 
based on power, to every repressive domination of one human 
being over another' (Schillebeeckx 1974: 145). Such a position 
is possible only as a rejection of the consequences of the 
Oedipal event. 
549 
How one reacts to Jesus's alternative is, I suppose, 
determined by one's opinion as to the inevitability of the 
Oedipus in its present form. For Nietzsche there was no 
question, and his Dionysus glories in the existence of pain. 
It cannot be disguised that this same pragmatic fact of pain 
was an overwhelming problem for Jesus, too. Whether the 
strength of his vision could overcome and incorporate the 
existence of pain and death, could find a place for these 
things in its spiritual economy, occupied his mind up to the 
end. The necessity for the Son of Man to assimilate and 
situate pain in his ideal person led Jesus to the cross. For 
many, his success may still remain an open question; but as an 
expression of unity between theory and action, between the 
spirit and deed, it is certain that few braver things have 
been attempted. 
Strangely, it is in Thomas (Logion 23) that we find the 
completest statement of Jesus's intentions for the Oedipus; 
though this saying is certainly not authentic as it stands it 
may have some basis in genuine tradition; it is certainly very 
ancient. Even if - at worst - it contains only some other 
person's meditation on Jesus's ministry, it is nonetheless 
instructive. Unfortunately, one cannot feel equally kind about 
the work of the Coptic Gnostic redactor himself; he has 
evidently doctored the last part of the saying in the 
interests of making it sound even more mysterious and delphic, 
by adding his own feeble imitations to its list of items. The 
same saying is garbled with similar ferocity in another 
apocryphal work The Martyrdom of Peter (see Grant and 
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Freedman: 75). It is alluded to also in the Apocryphal Acts, 
which demonstrates its wide currency in ancient times [cf. 
M.R. James 1953: 335, 429, 450). 
Luckily, what must be the correct termination is 
preserved in the Gospel of the Egyptians (cf. James 1953: 11) 
and in 2 Clement 12:2 (or V:1 [Platt). 2 Clement's different 
elucidations of the passage may usefully be compared with mine 
below [see Platt: 144; 2 Clement ch. V). 
I offer a composite version here: 
Jesus saw little ones receiving milk. He said to his 
disciples: 
'These little ones rece1v1ng milk are like those 
who enter into the kingdom'. 
They said to him: 'If we are "little ones", will 
we also enter the kingdom?' 
Jesus replied: 'When you make the two one, and 
make the outside like the inside (and the inside 
like the outside, and the upper like the below), and 
the male with the female neither male nor female, 
then you will go into the kingdom'. 
(cf. Grant and Freedman: 136) 
Here we are presented with a not-entirely-Gnostic Jesus who 
insists that the external world must be reshaped on the 
pattern of the inner 'kingdom', but that this pattern is 
itself the mirror of the absolute totality beyond; in 
accomplishing this unification, we find that the unconscious 
is made continuous with our everyday experience and that the 
unified 'feminine pre-verbal' becomes a lining for the 
differentiated world we meet. 
The Coptic version has at least the merit of suggesting 
the completeness of renewal that new vision should bring. Its 
elaborate list includes among its signs: 'when you make eyes 
in the place of an eye, and a hand in place of a hand, and a 
foot in place of a foot, an image in place of an image •.. '. 
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Nietzsche's slur upon Jesus suggests above all that Jesus 
denies the world of process in favour of illusory perfection. 
But I think this is to misunderstand the Jesus of the gospels, 
as even his 'literary' practice makes clear. To trust all to 
the ways of oral transmission is certainly not to deny the 
processes of the world, or their ultimate ambivalences -
especially ambivalence about what verbal symbols as symbols 
can convey. 
An example of the way the parables maintain over and 
again the tension between the sayable and the unsayable is 
provided by the tale of the Prodigal Son, in the special Lucan 
material (15:11-32). Both brothers are their Father's sons; 
but the first by squandering his inheritance denies the 
father-relation for a time. Neither the 'justice
' 
on the elder 
brother's side nor the latitude the younger requires are 
denied; the parable is indeed about the incompleteness of 
concrete judgments, their need for endless supplementation 
like the parable itself. The elements are not 'reconciled I in 
the tale1s conclusion - for in a sense sayable and unsayable 
would lose their power to generate meaning if the tension 
between them lapsed. The hidden truth is that perhaps the 
prodigal's homecoming does not entirely take place in the 
parable: the reality may be that we cannot entirely come home. 
But, according to whoever framed this story, the obstructive 
and unhelpful nature of the reality we have created around 
ourselves fails to relieve us of the constant need to try. 
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There are aspects of the Christian message which every new age 
finds shocking or especially difficult. Perhaps the hardest of 
Jesus's sayings for our own post-Freudian age is, 
paradoxically, that found in Matthew immediately after the 
prohibition on divorce (Mt. 19:3-9): the recommendation of 
celibacy. 
The disciples, themselves taken aback at the severity of 
his ruling on divorce, comment incredulously 'If that is the 
position with husband and wife, it is better to refrain from 
marriage'. To their further surprise, Jesus takes their 
proposal seriously, as the opportunity for a new injunction 
upon sexual matters: 
To this he replied, 'That is something which not 
everyone can accept, but only those for whom God has 
appointed it. For while some are incapable of 
marriage because they were born so, or were made so 
by men, there are others who have themselves 
renounced marriage for the sake of the kingdom of 
Heaven. Let those accept it who can.' (Mt. 19: 11-
2) 
The speech and its qualifications are particularly 
revealing, in many ways. For a start, the passage demonstrates 
how Jesus sees spiritual realities as there to be translated 
into the realities of the world, as the medium of actuality 
permits; but with no less determination, for all that. Actual 
and 'beyond' realities must meet and adapt. 
However, for the spiritually gifted or dedicated, one 
way of giving expression to religion's underlying truths would 
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be to become 'a eunuch for the kingdom of Heaven's sake'. How 
sexual celibacy could - for those who freely choose it -
reflect a deeper spiritual truth might at first seem something 
of a mystery. Certainly, a wrong assumption would be the 
Puritan one: that there is a strengthening virtue in privation 
itself. 
The psychoanalytic interpretation of the Christian 
message offered on the preceding pages perhaps enables us to 
understand why this sacrifice might be required. If we are to 
'turn back' and undo the Oedipal process, taking the 
beginning self as our model - then this is in some way to 
bypass sex understood as gender, which is after all the 
product of the Oedipus event. 
Much that seems (and sometimes is) bizarre in the 
Gnostic interpretation of sexuality becomes at least 
intelligible on this understanding. Gnosticism chose perhaps 
the most extreme and 'inward' ways of embodying and enacting 
Christianity's original insight. However, the differently 
realised sexual situation these words leave us with seems an 
appropriate one for those who intend to proceed under the sign 
of the androgynous Mother/Father. 
So if the 'miraculous child' is taken as our spiritual 
centre, then we have to keep in mind that this being is - in 
all the more obvious ways, at least - pre-sexual. But of 
course, without procreation there can be no real children; 
this is where Christianity must vary in its accommodations to 
bodily experience, and find alternative ways of expressing the 
ideal through the concrete. 
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Hence in the Christian view the One may also be served 
through the 'becoming one flesh' of marriage: through becoming 
one member of an androgynous partnership, rather than through 
the spiritual androgyny of the individual. We see why it is 
that the sequence of sayings in Matthew which includes the 
passage above begins with the prohibition on divorce and 
proceeds naturally through the topic of celibacy to the call 
for children to 'come to me' (19:14). 
Jacques Lacan's former pupil, Serge Leclaire'o, has 
written on the topic of the 'marvellous child', which he terms 
an 'unconscious representative' or a 'primordial signifier'. 
(If he is deliberately avoiding the word 'archetype', that is 
nonetheless effectively what he means.) The 'primordial 
signifier' of the 'marvellous child' figures as an unconscious 
presence in our thinking, yet in itself it is strictly 
unnamable: 'it doesn't speak nor will it ever speak' (1975: 
22; tr. in Gunn" 1988: 43). 
The marvellous child is a primordial unconscious 
representation where, more than anywhere else, 
everyone's wishes, nostalgia and hope are bound 
together. What the transparent reality of the child 
almost entirely unveils, and renders visible, is the 
reality of all our desires. It fascinates us, and we 
are no more able to turn away from it than we are to 
grasp it. (1975: 12; tr. Gunn 1988: 43) 
Leclaire goes so far as to say 'Whoever does not mourn and 
mourn repeatedly the marvellous child that he would have been, 
remains in limbo' (12). The biblical parallel to our normal 
human relation to this child is, for Leclaire, the episode of 
the murder of the innocents: 'For everyone there is always a 
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child to kill, a representation of plenitude and immutable joy 
to mourn and mourn repeatedly'. 
As Daniel Gunn explains: 
The 'marvellous child' inhabits the familiar terrain 
of a many-sided ambivalence. It is both necessary, 
to be welcomed as a source of energy and excitement, 
and debilitating, to be killed a necessary first 
step on the road through language to desire. '''I'' 
begins at that moment in time' Leclaire writes. 
(1988: 45) 
The 'primordial signifier' Leclaire has identified, then, 
resembles in many essentials the proto-Oedipal being whose 
imitation, as the primordial Son of Man, Jesus enjoins upon 
us. Moral action consists in the living-out of this figure's 
various qualities and attributes, a living-out which preserves 
his being intact and whose purpose is to build a varied 
spiritual kingdom on earth for this 'child-king', who is also 
ourselves. 
As Paul correctly divined, such a morality is less to do 
with rules, with the Names of the Father, than with process 
and activity: actions undertaken 'in the spirit' and 
personality of an imagined and yet living being whose real 
self underlies our own. Its reward is a more 'real' existence 
in which some at least of the Oedipal veils obscuring the 
world have been removed. 
Though the openness of the child-vision to the world 
reflects affinities between its own form and that of the Real, 
it evidently cannot be achieved without some excision, some 
sacrifice. Of necessity, a part of human nature has had to be 
jettisoned like Christian the Pilgrim's burden. In the 
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unfolding of this theology of the ichthos, this Lacanian 
ichtheology, we must accept that the marvellous child is 
marvellous precisely because he is linked to, and is in a way 
a reincarnation of, the Lust-Ich which has shed its 
connections with the Unlust. 
Hence in responding to the 'marvellous child' we 
privilege one tradition only of our being's history. That is 
what the Sermon on the Mount means when it blesses the pure in 
heart (Mt. 5:8). The reward of those 'whose hearts are pure' 
is that 'they shall see God'; we may, if we wish, suppose that 
this is no deferred reward: inward purity and 'seeing God' can 
be effectively the same thing. 
A 'gentle spirit' (5:5) and the making of peace (5:9) are 
equivalently blessed: the harmony and integrity of the inner 
being are not only cultivated for themselves, but extended 
into the world at large. All along, the continuity of the self 
with its surroundings, its neighbours and its environment, is 
recognised. However, the inward takes priority over the 
material; we should not mistake our real good for food, 
clothes, or another's possessions: our real object transcends 
all these. To concentrate our desires on things is to reverse 
the proper order, to lose ourselves in the divisive and, 
finally, illusory world of names and objects. In worshipping 
things, we become the Other's, not our own. Condemning others, 
we align with the Other, not the One: again, that is to lose 
our link with the primal being within. 
These examples reflect the fact that the primal self is 
in one way the most individual thing we know, in another it 
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belongs to no individual alone, but is effectually everyone's. 
To this view, humans differ morally only in the different 
degrees they allow this being expression in their practical 
lives. The hardest thing is to accept that the universality of 
this relation is true even of those who are at odds with us: 
that they too possess the primal subject potentially within 
themselves. Even so, Christianity insists upon such an outlook 
towards others: preservation of its essential Spirit in a 
consistent and unbroken fashion requires that we do not 
especially privilege the differences among humans that are, in 
the end, the products of the Oedipus. 
Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors; 
only so can you be children of your heavenly Father, 
who makes his sun rise on good and bad alike, and 
sends the rain on the honest and the dishonest .... 
You must therefore be all goodness, just as your 
heavenly Father is all good. (Mt. 5:43-8) 
The strength of the Christian position depends very 
largely on the way its gospels offer a concrete and practical 
expression to what are still, at bottom, mystical insights. 
This plain, vivid, everyday character is most striking in the 
synoptic gospels, which openly offer directives for living; 
for bringing reality and its events into line, as far as we 
may, with the psychic Unity which underlies them. 
Hence while Paul is right in marginal ising the importance 
of the moral law, even when 'introjected' and assimilated by 
the moral individual, the emphases of Jesus and James upon 
action are also necessary. Justification by inner experience 
alone may well lead to self-indulgence and utter relativity, 
as James feared. The Real for Jesus is process, not stasis: 
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its human equivalent is a kingdom constantly in the middle of 
construction. 
Non-verbal action, while inherently more 'Real' than 
speech, is nonetheless an outward expression of an inner 
principle, even when most apparently spontaneous. As James 
implies, it may be made to reflect the form of a universal 
human truth within. 
Hence the model for Christian moral action is the caring 
offered to the infant by its parents, an insight even Freud 
seems to have been working towards: 'the original helplessness 
of human beings is thus the primal source of all moral 
motives' (quoted Eagleton12 1990: 285). 'Good' is what an 
infant experiences, when it feels itself sustained by adult 
love; as Eagleton comments: 'Morality has its origin not in 
the superego, but in the small infant's affectionate gratitude 
for the care of its elders' (1990: 285). But for adults, it is 
more blessed to give than to receive (Acts 20:35; a saying, 
surprisingly, included in no gospel). It is not simply that in 
these new terms to receive incurs a debt, while to give 
strengthens an investment; it is that action, being closer in 
nature to the inward, is both an expression of the inner, and 
has the power to modify and sustain it. The infant's feelings 
are recaptured in behaving with the emotions of parental care 
towards the universe and its inhabitants at large. 
The reason we must be, while sharing empathically in the 
child's nature, not infantile but parental (which is not the 
same as 'paternal' or 'patronising') is that, after all, 
Christianity is not regression but a mode of being in the 
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actual world. It properly belongs, not to the chaotic pre-
Oedipal 'feminine', but to a stage when individuation is 
already in progress. Instead, however, of simply affirming 
self-preservation and the integrity of the newly marked-off 
internal territory, it partially re-introduces and 
reincorporates the 'something left over' by the process. It is 
here, in the permanently ambivalent territory between self and 
other, that Christianity finds its moral ground. 
In this connection, there is an important contrast to be 
drawn between the fervent personal lyricism which takes 
possession of Paul's inspired style and the largely anonymous 
and communal language of the synoptic evangelists (outside the 
flourish of Luke's initial chapters). For them, religious 
truth is always much more than a merely personal possession, 
though it is that too. 
It is in the Gospels especially that the elusive parable 
and the striking but gnomic maxim serve not as complete 
embodiments of articulated thought, but as guides and stimuli 
to deeper meditation on the themes they invoke. Behind this 
lies a view of religious truth which holds that no definition, 
no single injunction, can be adequate and final; for what is 
really at issue is a body of knowledge entirely different from 
any of its verbal expressions. 
The sayings and illustrations of Christianity are hence 
necessarily oblique: for often all they can do is stimulate 
our faculty of inner vision by patching in a partial outline 
or suggesting the location of a space. Ultimately they are 
meant to lead to an encounter in the Real, beyond and outside 
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the words in which they are framed. Christianity's especial 
contribution to the history of world religions is its moral 
mysticism, its sacramental vision, where the Incarnation's 
real meaning is to be found: this vision awaits the moments 
when mysticism and the physical, the inner Real and external 
reality, co-operate and conjoin. 
For this reason Lacan's suggestion that there is a 
similarity between the stoic and 'the Christian register' 
(1986: 254) is somewhat wide of the mark. Both are bound, in 
his view, by 'the absolute authority of the desire of the 
other, that Thy will be done!' However, stoicism's submission 
of self to outward necessities is not echoed in the Christian 
vision, for there inward being and external ideal become 
identified, their desires conjoint. 
If one is to judge by the closing words of The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of psychoanalysis, then Lacan's own final 
position - that the most authentic spiritual values are not 
those that are measured by rules, but are found in their 
'beyond' - is perhaps closer to Christianity's than he 
realises. Indeed, Lacan appears to give voice to his own brand 
of Paulinism: 
Love, which, it seems to some, I have down-graded, 
can be posited only in that beyond, where, at first, 
it renounces its object ...• There only may the 
signification of a limitless love emerge, because it 
is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may 
live. (1986: 276) 
However, a reader with an ear for ironies might well claim 
Lacan to be saying that such perfect transcendental love is 
actually impossible anywhere this side of the 'beyond'. 
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CONCLUSION 
Broad-ranging in its examples as this thesis has been, it is 
still necessarily incomplete. If, as I believe, a relation to 
the mystical experience is a very widely occurring impulse in 
literature and in art, then this study has been abl"e to show 
that this is true in practice only over a limited compass. 
I have tried partially to compensate for this inevitable 
incompleteness through the structure of my thesis, by building 
it upon contrasts: contrasts which both divide and, more 
importantly, link my divergent examples, so setting them 
within what could only be - if my connections are justified -
a much broader supportive context; although the largeness of 
this context can sometimes only be implied, or else 
represented in a token way. 
Since concentration was also necessary in order for 
fruitful interactions to emerge among my examples, I have 
restricted my scope to specific areas, and to texts within 
these areas which do, I think, interact and inform each other. 
Nonetheless, I have ranged between kinds - fiction, 
poetry, numinous religious texts - and between 'highbrow! and 
popular forms, moving on from Eliot and Woolf to supernatural 
horror stories, written at much the same time as the work of 
these more august contemporaries. Such contrasts of kind and 
intended audience were employed to show that reference to the 
mystical experience overrrode such differences, and united 
otherwise very diverse literary enterprises. 
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The central contrast built into the main body of this 
study is that between two periods of literary history, the 
Romantic and the Modernist. Though the second of these periods 
is generally felt to be at least in some ways a reaction 
against the first, the mystical impulse continues to be found 
in examples drawn from both. The creative outputs of Eliot, 
Woolf and Pessoa are, in their distinctive ways, as closely 
founded on the mystical experience as are those of Wordsworth 
and Coleridge. Such continuity hints at the ubiquity of the 
mystical impulse in its capacity to inspire writing. 
The dominating theme connecting my chapters is not simply 
the importance of childhood and of 'cosmic consciousness', or 
the meaning of the archetypal feminine, or the drive towards 
the Lacanian borderland of language. It is also the clear 
perception, on the part of many writers, of the dual character 
of the mystical experience: that it is just as capable of 
providing glimpses into annihilation and hell as into a pre-
verbal paradise. 
Though hinted at by Aldous Huxley in my introductory 
section, and again in Lacan's reference to dark gods, this 
division first strongly affects this thesis in section two, 
'The Romantic Sublime', through Coleridge and Wordsworth's 
different perceptions of the mystical, a mystical derived, 
ultimately, as they saw, from childhood awareness. For 
Wordsworth, 'those first affections' not only continue to be 
'a master light of all our seeing' but also uphold and cherish 
the human soul. Unreservedly he celebrates 
those first affections, 
Those shadowy recollections, 
Which, be they what they may, 
Are yet the fountain light of all our day, 
Are yet a master light of all our seeing; 
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make 
Our noisy years seem moments in the being 
Of the eternal Silence .... 
These lines, from the ninth stanza of the 'Immortality 
Ode' (IX: 11. 20-27) are preceded, admittedly, by a perhaps 
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more exploratory, less euphoric perception of the true effects 
of undermining the Symbolic Order in search of the Real, which 
involves 
obstinate questionings 
Of sense and outward things, 
FaIlings from us, vanishings; 
Blank misgivings of a Creature 
Moving about in worlds not realised 
(11. 13-17) 
the forbidding shocks of which upon the human frame, which can 
make us 'tremble like a guilty thing surprised' (1. 19), are 
redeemed only by their tutelary character, it appears. 
Nonetheless, it is left to coleridge alone to perceive 
that the mystical sublime conceals the possibility of an 
equivalent 'beyond' that is less benevolent, less concerned 
with human ambitions: it is, indeed, an annihilating reality 
which contains the essence of the horrific. 
Significantly, Coleridge dashed off his own 'twin' poem 
to the 'Immortality Ode', his 'Dejection: An Ode', when he had 
heard only the few initial stanzas of Wordsworth's effort. The 
Dejection Ode's terrifying images of disintegrating and 
fragmented reality, passages inspired by the sound of the wild 
wind 'raving' upon a wind-harp - 'a scream/ Of agony by 
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torture lengthened out' - seem a kind of riposte to the sombre 
and elevated dignity of Wordsworth's workj a protest that 
there are other, darker realities existent. This wind is like 
a poet out of nature, playing upon the human device, the lute, 
just as human poetic consciousness would work upon the natural 
world; but what it has to say, this voice from the source of 
Wordsworth's mystical sublime, is not encouraging to 
Coleridge: 
Thou mighty Poet, e'en to frenzy bold! 
What tell'st thou now about? 
'Tis of the rushing of an host in rout, 
With groans of trampled men, with smarting wounds -
At once they groan with pain, and shudder with the cold! 
But hush! there is a pause of deepest silence! 
And all that noise, as of a rushing crOWd, 
with groans, and tremulous shudderings - all is over -
It tells another tale, with sounds less deep and loud! 
A tale of less affright, 
And tempered with delight, 
As otway's self had framed the tender lay, -
'Tis of a little child 
Upon a lonesome wild, 
Not far from home, but she hath lost her way: 
And now moans low in bitter grief and fear, 
And now screams loud, and hopes to make her mother hear. 
(11. l09-125) 
The child of the last lines, who seems a kind of dismal and 
dishevelled answer to the child who trails 'clouds of glory' 
in Wordsworth's vision of things, of course represents 
Coleridge himself - interestingly presented here in a feminine 
guise. with reference to the Elysian infant state Wordsworth 
envisages, Coleridge confesses that his own relation to and 
understanding of childhood is now different; but he wishes 
heartily he could find his way back to the sunny reality of 
the Wordsworthian ideal. 
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This interpretation is partially confirmed by the excised 
lines which follow after line 133, where Coleridge calls upon 
'Edmund' (i.e. Wordsworth) to 
sing his lofty song and teach me to rejoice! 
o Edmund, friend of my devoutest choice, 
o rais'd from anxious dread and busy care, 
By the immenseness of the good and fair 
Which thou see'st everywhere •••• 
(PW: 368) 
The pattern established here, the contrast between the 
holy and the hellish visions of the 'beyond' of language, is 
made the main motive of my own final section, 'Heaven and 
Hell'. In this section, a discussion of supernatural 'evil' as 
represented in Edwardian occult horror fiction is juxtaposed 
with a 'psychoanalytic' reading of Christian texts as texts, 
concentrating in particular upon st Matthew's Gospel. My 
reading, which builds upon Jesus's own logion upon the matter, 
strives to show that heaven, like the hell of Edwardian 
fiction, is within - as also are representative figures from 
the Christian pantheon, including the 'Holy Ghost'. 
Surprisingly, this entity seems initially to share some of its 
characteristics with the daemonic feminine deity who presides 
over the supernatural world of the occult authors. 
The same division of light and dark also operates, in a 
rather more complex way, between the first two chapters of my 
intermediate section, 'Mysticism and Modernism'. Eliot's 
emphasis on the intersection of time and the timeless is there 
juxtaposed with Virginia Woolf's accommodation of mysticism 
and the Death wish in Mrs Dalloway. A related insistence upon 
'death of the self' informs Pessoa's multiple personalities. 
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since the structure of my thesis points to a common 
concern with mysticism in both Modernism and Romanticism, it 
is appropriate to ask what, after all, distinguishes the 
Romantic sublime from Modernist mysticism. If a concern with 
mystical experience appears in both movements, is there 
anything in their respective treatments of this common area 
which reflects their different characters as divergent and in 
some ways opposing literary currents? 
One can, I think, point to a different functioning of the 
mystical element in the works involved. The Romantics, on the 
whole, tend to see the totality of the poem working like a 
kind of consciousness-altering drug, drawing the reader into 
its different experiencing world. Like the effect of La belle 
Dame sans merci upon Keats's knight-at-arms, a poem works an 
enduring change upon the consciousness of the reader. Yet this 
is not the sort of character-building change that Leavisites 
piously hope for: instead, it represents a mystical 'death-
spell' in which the reader's final relation to his own 
individuality is fundamentally altered, and his practical 
stance to the ordinary world undermined and changed, if 
anything, for the worst. 'The world well lost' is the best 
face that is often put on this situation; though some poets, 
like Shelley, Byron (and the younger Coleridge, Wordsworth and 
Southey), did translate their sense of the possibility of 
'other worlds' into a political need to make this world a more 
poetically appropriate place. Others might seek out an 
enclave, like the Lakes or fabled Italy or 'the East', in hope 
that there the poetic and the actual happen to coincide. 
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The world, at least if it is to be taken on its own 
terms, is an even more decisively lost cause for Modernist 
poets, writers and artists. But what these figures exchange it 
for is different. A Modernist work typically begins by 
offering not an experience so much as a 'performance': the 
reader retains more of his critical judgment and his distance, 
at least as regards the work's content. He is encouraged to 
'work at' the text or surface, rather than be seduced by it. 
On its side, the work 'enacts' the mystical, rather than 
creating its conditions. It may even choose to operate largely 
through the thoroughly unmystical idiom of abstraction. 
To some extent these surface features are strategic, 
only. What really happens is that the main attention is 
deflected from the content to the form: to the way things are 
said and to their relation with their medium. The alien 
strangeness of the work's formal elements is intended to 
provide a meeting-point between the human and the ahuman. It 
is here, for many Modernists, that the mystical is located: at 
the precipitous 'edge' where what is said merges into the 
concreteness of its own medium. The mystical arises, 
supposedly, in the work's unsayable formal aspect, which is 
the point where statement is transmuted into 'thing', where 
the artifact combines with the Real. 
Words, after speech, reach 
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still 
Moves perpetually in its stillness. 
(T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, 11. 139-143) 
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Clive Bell was an important theorist of English formalist 
Modernism, and a figure in Eliot's social and cultural milieu; 
it was Bell who invented the term 'significant form', which 
allowed Eliot to talk with special meaning about 'significant 
emotion' (Eliot' 1988: 196). In his book Art2 Bell announces 
(in spite of his own scepticism about religious institutions 
and doctrines) that '[a]rt and religion belong to the same 
world' (Bell 1961 [1914]: 82). This is true because 'both seem 
to express emotions different from and transcending the 
emotions of life' (ibid.), and both are concerned with Man's 
'sense of ultimate reality' (91): 'the task of the artist is 
either to create significant form or to express a sense of 
reality - whichever way you prefer to put it' (67-8). 
Now the emotion that artists express comes to some 
of them, so they tell us, from the apprehension of 
the formal significance of material things; and the 
formal significance of any material thing is the 
significance of that thing considered as an end in 
itself .•• we can only suppose that when we consider 
anything as an end in itself we become aware of that 
in it which is of greater moment than any qualities 
it may have acquired from keeping company with human 
beings. Instead of recognising its accidental and 
conditioned importance, we become aware of its 
essential reality, of the God in everything, of the 
universal in the particular, of the all-pervading 
rhythm. Call it by what name you will, the thing 
that I am talking about is that which lies behind 
the appearance of all things - that which gives to 
all things their individual significance, the thing 
in itself, the ultimate reality. And if a more or 
less unconscious apprehension of this latent reality 
of material things be, indeed, the cause of that 
strange emotion, a passion to express which is the 
inspiration of many artists, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that those who, unaided by material objects, 
experience the same emotion have come by another 
road to the same country •.•• Be they artists or 
lovers of art, mystics or mathematicians, those who 
achieve ecstasy are those who have freed themselves 
from the arrogance of humanity. 
(Bell 1961: 72-3) 
2 
The different character of the two mysticisms, Romantic and 
Modernist, will, I hope, make themselves felt in each of my 
final examples. In these closing sections I wish, by way of 
recapitulation, to turn briefly to two poets: the first a 
Modernist, the second a Romantic. For both men, in their 
different ways, the mystical is allied to the creative. 
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In the first case I wish to consider a single work by the 
German poet Rilke. I shall not be looking at the poem 
independently, but considering it in the context of an 
explication by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's 
account appears in his essay 'What Are Poets For?,3 in his 
Poetry, Language. Thought (1975 [1971]); the interaction 
between poet and philosopher is valuable in this context from 
a variety of points of view. Most importantly, it examines 
matters which have been central in this thesis from a 
philosophical, rather than a psychological or a religious, 
perspective. 
On the whole, I have tended indefinitely to defer 
discussion of the specifically metaphysical claims that are 
often made for the Reality of the mystics, as being beyond the 
scope of this thesis, which prefers a psychoanalytic model. 
However, there are really only two contrasting attitudes that 
can be decisively adopted: either the Real is, despite its 
name, a solipsist illusion of primary narcissism, an entirely 
subjective artifact of consciousness; or it is an occasion of 
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temporary access, before the arrival of words, to a universal 
Reality beyond the self, which includes awareness within 
itself. A third position might be that human words and 
concepts are incapable of conveying, even to this degree, the 
relation of the child's pre-linguistic experience to the 
ontological reality beyond it. Between these varying 
standpoints this thesis does not presume to judge. 
In Martin Heidegger's case, 'Being' is definitely treated 
as a self-existent metaphysical entity, about which it is 
humanly possible to speak; though, according to the later 
Heidegger, one has to be a poet to do so effectively. 
Heidegger's attitudes to Being are on several counts different 
from the main assumptions about Reality followed in this 
thesis. In the first place, he believes in the 'being' of 
particular things, which it is their nature to express, and 
which the mind may phenomenologically apprehend in the mode in 
which it is offered to mind; secondly, in his view language is 
capable of fully embodying this indivisible interaction 
between mind and beings. As Terry Eagleton4 puts the relation 
between Being-as-disclosure and Dasein: 'The primary form of 
that disclosure, in the later Heidegger, is language. Language 
is the privileged mode in which Being articulates itself in 
humanity, and poetry is its essence: "Poetry is the saying of 
the unconcealedness of beings'" (Eagleton 1990: 301). Despite 
these very evident differences from the perspective of this 
thesis, there are also points of similarity, as will appear 
below. 
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Rilke's poem, 'improvised verses', is given here in the 
version the translator, Albert Hofstader, provides (Heidegger 
1975: 99): 
As Nature gives the other creatures over 
to the venture of their dim delight 
and in soil and branchwork grants none special cover, 
so too our being's pristine ground settles our plight; 
we are no dearer to it; it ventures us. 
Except that we, more eager than plant or beast, 
go with this venture, will it, adventurous 
more sometimes than Life itself is, more daring 
by a breath (and not in the least 
from selfishness) .••• There, outside all caring, 
this creates for us a safety - just there, 
where the pure forces' gravity rules; in the end, 
it is our unshieldedness on which we depend, 
and that, when we saw it threaten, we turned it 
so into the Open that, in widest orbit somewhere, 
where the Law touches us, we may affirm it. 
Martin Heidegger is a metaphysician who, in his late 
work, presides over the dismantling of metaphysics as a 
separate discipline. He continues to its logical conclusion 
the Nietzschean project of identifying the philosophical with 
the poetic: poetry, for the later Heidegger, becomes the only 
philosophical way of saying. 
Because of his Nietzschean influences, one would not 
expect Heidegger's idea of poetry to coincide with that 
presented in this thesis. Indeed, as we have seen, one side of 
Heidegger's picture has poetry unashamedly celebrating the 
Dionysian appearances of existence, and somehow directly 
expressing through words the 'Being of beings'. 
And yet there are hints, even in this picture which 
implicitly accepts the power of words to reveal 
'phenomenological' truth, of another potentiality in the poem, 
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involving a direct relation to Being itself. In his discussion 
of this second level of reality, Heidegger may be drawing 
Nietzsche back to his own Schopenhaurean beginnings, and to 
the earlier form of Dionysus who figures in The Birth of 
Tragedy: the Dionysus who undermines individuation and 
represents the primal, undifferentiated form of will. 
In his discussion of Rilke's 'improvised verses' 
(Heidegger 1975: 118), Heidegger notes that 'Man is sometimes 
more venturesome than the venture' upon which life sends him; 
he is capable of running ahead of the limits Being sets for 
his own nature. 'He who is more venturesome than that ground 
ventures where all ground breaks off - into the abyss, ' 
Heidegger announces (118-9). 
Heidegger's concept of the Open resembles in some 
respects Lacan's idea of the Real. Technological man wills 
heroically, expresses his inherent 'being' through his 
productions, and yet by 'building the world up technologically 
as an object, man deliberately and completely blocks his path, 
already obstructed, into the Open ...• The man of the age of 
technology ... opposes himself to the Open' (116). 
According to Heidegger, creation is of an entirely 
different nature from 'production': 'Production is possible 
only in objectification. Objectification, however, blocks us 
off against the Open' (120). In contrast, poetic creativity, 
by eschewing the idea of a 'product', is an even more daring 
kind of willing, a special kind of utter vulnerability to 
Being: 'To create means to fetch from the source' (120). 
This kind of daring known to poets gains its only 
security from its utter carelessness. The poet alone is 
willing to venture all on' the possibility of being in the 
Open. This region of the Open is what Rilke seems to be 
referring to in a letter which Heidegger quotes: 
... like the moon, so life surely has a side that is 
constantly turned away from us, and that is not its 
opposite but its completion to perfection, to 
plenitude, to the real, whole, and full sphere and 
globe of being. (January 6, 1923; 1975: 124) 
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Interestingly, Rilke speaks of this 'other side' as a 
kind of Death, a perception which aligns him with writers 
dealt with earlier, like Virginia Woolf: 'Death is the side of 
life that is averted from us, unillumined by us' (November 13, 
1925; ibid.). In the former letter quoted he says that the 
point is 'to read the word "death" without negation' (125). 
Such by now familiar expressions reveal that, as with many 
principal figures in this thesis, there is a mystical 
dimension to creativity in Rilke's eyes; an impression which 
letters like the following (August 11, 1924) confirm. 
Noteworthy is Rilke's clear perception that this other 
'dimension' is within: 
However vast the 'outer space' may be, yet with all 
its sidereal distances it hardly bears comparison 
with dimensions, with the depth dimensions of our 
inner being, which does not even need the 
spaciousnesss of the universe to be within itself 
almost unfathomable. Thus, if the dead, if those who 
are to come, need an abode, what refuge could be 
more agreeable and appointed for them than this 
imaginary space? To me it seems more and more as 
though our customary consciousness lives on the tip 
of a pyramid whose base within us (and in a certain 
way beneath us) widens out so fully that the farther 
we find ourselves able to descend into it, the more 
generally we appear to be merged into those things 
that, independent of time and space, are given in 
our earthly, in the widest sense worldly, existence. 
(Rilke's own emphases; in Heidegger 1975: 128-9) 
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These last perceptions echo almost exactly those of Virginia 
Woolf's Mrs Ramsay in To the Lighthouse ('The Window'i section 
11), who perceives herself as a 'wedge-shaped core of 
darkness'. In the very depths of her or his creative being, 
Rilke implies, the poet touches a new reality where the 
worldly identities of things dissolve and merge with her/his 
own. The barriers to the Open, in other words, become 
permeable at last. 
It is words themselves which normally provide the most 
obvious barriers to Being, as agents of 'objectification'; but 
in Heidegger's view words - which are themselves formed from 
Being (he calls language 'the precinct' of Being [132]) - may 
actually act as passages to this 'other realm', when they are 
treated not as 'products' but in the poet's special 'creative' 
or 'opening' way: 
The nature of language does not exhaust itself in 
signifying, nor is it merely something that has the 
character of sign or cipher. It is because language 
is the house of Being, that we reach what is by 
constantly going through this house. When we go to 
the well, when we go through the woods, we are 
always already going through the word 'well', 
through the word 'woods', even if we do not speak 
the words and do not think of anything relating to 
language. (132) 
Heidegger is thus unlike Lacan in feeling that 
contemplation of the wordiness of words themselves may 
actually take us towards the experience of Being, may give us 
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intimations of what those exceptional souls dare 'who are 
sometimes more daring than the Being of beings. They dare the 
precinct of Being. They dare language' (Ibid.). Heidegger 
actually asserts that it is only in some relation to language 
that the poets' (and the mystics') special sense of pure Being 
manifests: 'the return from the realm of objects and their 
representation into the innermost region of the heart's space 
can be accomplished, if anywhere, only in this precinct' 
(Ibid.; Heidegger's emphasis). 
To speak as the poet does solely for the sake of speaking 
is, in Heidegger's view, not only to turn 'our unprotected 
being into the Open' (140), but to make of the wholeness of 
the poem an equivalent to 'the sound wholeness of the Open, in 
that it makes room within itself for man' (138). The poet's 
special brand of daring is, then, a recognition of a something 
'more' (132) - more than we ordinarily acknowledge - belonging 
both to being and the word. But this something 'more', being 
conveyed by language, is no 'more' than a breath: 
Those who are more daring by a breath dare the 
venture with language. They are the sayers who more 
sayingly say. For this one breath by which they are 
more daring is not just a saying of any sort; 
rather, this one breath is another breath, a saying 
other than the rest of human saying. The other 
breath is no longer solicitous for this or that 
objective thing; it is a breath for nothing. 
(Heidegger 1975: 140) 
Though Lacan is the principal moving spirit of this 
thesis, which has followed a psychological rather than a 
philosophical bearing, it has agreed with Heidegger upon the 
possibility of employing language itself to pass beyond 
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linguistic determinations. The aim is thus to use words 
against themselves in the service of contacting, however 
briefly or tangentially, the vast 'depth dimensions' of Being 
of which Rilke speaks. The wide and varied application of this 
principle is something which this thesis has hoped to 
adumbrate metonymically through its examples. As I have said, 
it is at least my own belief that in doing so it uncovers one 
of the fundamental drives of creative literature. 
3 
The first literary figure to be examined at length in this 
thesis (in Chapter 2) was Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and in a 
way Coleridge is a paradigmatic figure for the work as a 
whole. This shows itself in his recognition from the first of 
the importance of the 'two sides' of the 'beyond' experience: 
its heavenly and its hellish aspects, the mystical and the 
'abject'. 
He himself acknowledges in Biographia Literaria his own 
'obligations to the Mystics' (BL: 79); to exlude them from his 
personal history, he says, would be 'the denial of a debt, the 
concealment of a boon' (83): 
For the writings of these mystics acted in no slight 
degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned 
within the outline of any single dogmatic system. 
They contributed to keep alive the heart in the 
head; gave me an indistinct, yet stirring and 
working presentiment, that all the products of the 
mere reflective faculty partook of death, and were 
as the rattling twigs and sprays in winter into 
which a sap was yet to be propelled from some root 
to which I had not yet penetrated, if they were to 
afford my soul either food or shelter. (BL: 83) 
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other factors - the writings of Kant and Schelling - helped to 
refine these early intuitions, and make them graspable and 
manipulable. But, Coleridge implies, the influence upon him of 
the mystics remained fundamental, something which was not 
replaced by, but continued to inform, his later studies. 
In Chapter 2 I attempted to recover, both from 
Coleridge's theory and his poetic practice, the meaning of the 
'supernatural element' which he saw as central to poetry (at 
least as he thought poetry should be). My argument then was 
concerned with the link between the 'supernatural' and the 
'mystical'j but what Coleridge's poetry, especially, reveals 
is that the mystical sublime also has the power to appear in a 
very different guise, as the transcendentally horrific. In 
both cases there is no essential difference in the content of 
the experiencej what differs is only the way it is received. 
Coleridge's second long supernatural poem, 'Christabel', 
seems, just as much as the 'Ancient Mariner' (and some shorter 
lyrics like 'Kubla Khan'), to be, in a concealed way, about 
the writing of poetry and the nature of the poetic work. As I 
suggested in Part II, the 'reconciliation of opposite or 
discordant qualities' (BL: 174) achieved by poetic imagination 
resembles the collapse of the binary opposites of reason and 
the effective unification of subject and object in the 
mystical experience. 'Christabel' certainly explores the 
problem of opposites, and finds their ultimate authority to be 
questionable and contingent. 
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As many have seen, both on the level of style and 
subject-matter, the poem is predicated upon uncertainty. It 
offers us a situation where undecidability reigns and where 
opposites - including good and evil - interpenetrate each 
other. What seems to follow here is that this merging together 
of apparent 'fixities and definites' CBL: 167) is something 
which poetry is specially constituted to reveal. 
The first encounter of Geraldine and Christabel takes 
place at night, in poor visibility, where the cloud-layer 
'covers but not hides the sky' (1. 16), and where the moon is 
full and 'yet she looks both small and dull' (1. 18). The 
supernatural atmosphere and the awareness of anomalies in our 
ordinary expectations of things - like the cock which crows at 
midnight - are closely linked. 
The apparently pure Christabel and the apparently evil 
Geraldine are curious counterparts, as the poem progressively 
discloses. This hidden - unconscious - truth of their 
connection is something which, significantly, Bard Bracy's 
dream symbolises (just as his own songs might embody a similar 
'reconciliation of opposites' on another level). In his dream 
he sees a white dove, bearing Christabel's name, lying in 
fearful distress, a bright green snake 'coiled around its 
wings and neck' (1. 550) and moving with the dove, 'swelling 
its neck as he swelled hers!' (1. 554). 
Geraldine herself seems to incorporate similar 
oppositions in her own person: when she undresses to share 
Christabel's bed, she accidentally reveals an unpleasant 
secret - that she is half deformed. Christabel is immediately 
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obliged 'by magic' or hypnotism to suppress her own knowledge 
of the sight, in a way that perhaps echoes the mechanisms of 
primary repression. Once in bed and in Geraldine's arms 
Christabel thinks of her own good but departed mother: a fact 
which may suggest that Geraldine has some covert connection 
with these maternal memories. Geraldine may indeed be linked 
with the unrevealed 'bad side' of such deep recollections. 
For Coleridge, the difference between the paradisal and 
the hellish 'sublime' seems to be represented by Christabel 
and her counterpart Geraldine, respectively. The transition 
between parts one and two of the poem emphasizes this 
difference: part one ends with Christabel asleep, envisioning 
her mother near and remembering the prophecy 'That saints will 
aid if men will call:/ For the blue sky bends over all!' (11. 
330-331). The picture here is really of a universe in 
principle benevolent since its 'supernatural' element is 
benevolent. However, during the night Geraldine casts her 
spell over Christabel, and the positive note is not sustained. 
Part two opens in much gloomier fashion with the words: 'Each 
matin bell, the Baron saith,/Knells us back to a world of 
death' (11. 322-3). 
The power of Geraldine's evil is shown in, for example, 
Christabel's inability the next day properly to answer her 
father's question: Geraldine's influence attacks her powers of 
speech. As Charles Tomlinsons puts it: 'Christabel bewitched 
suffers simultaneously with the disintegration of personality 
the disintegration of the will' (Tomlinson 1973: 237). This 
effect, the overwhelming of identity itself by a larger force, 
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parallels the conditions of mystical experience: but it 
figures here as something to be resisted, something terrifying 
and uncontrollable. 
The culminating moment in the fragment we have is the 
effective seduction by Geraldine of Sir Leoline, Christabells 
father. Symbolically this seems to mimic the overwhelming of 
the Name of the Father and the subversion of the Father's 
speech by the pre-verbal negative sublime, the daemonic 
feminine. Sir Leoline, like a logocentric critic, only half-
listens to Christabel's story and rushes to his own, 
rationalising interpretation of it. The strainful rhetoric of 
his utterances demonstrates how Geraldine's influence has 
succeeded in undermining the authority of the word -
especially 'the word' too emphatically relied upon. What is 
perhaps most astonishing is that she subverts the poet, too, 
bringing to an untimely end the creative work which is the 
vehicle in which she herself exists - apart from a strange 
twenty-two line conclusion to Part II, which begins with the 
child's image: 'A little child, a limber elf,/Singing, dancing 
to itself' (11. 656-7). 
The paradox that Coleridge, who is the supreme theorist 
of poetic unity, should also be the poet most associated with 
fragments and unfinished pieces, is too striking to ignore. 
There is some suspicion that 'Kubla Khan' and 'Christabel' 
both merely masquerade as unfinished, however; that they are 
really complete works in disguise. If so, then in both cases 
their completeness lies at some deeper level than their merely 
narrative aspect. 
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As if such a statement were not paradoxical enough, it 
may be that 'Christabel' actually offers itself as the 
archetype of the failed and incomplete work, and that is 
exactly where its hidden unity lies. In this case, it presents 
itself as an example of imbalance, of a failure to reconcile 
opposites successfully, to blend the 'sunny pleasure-dome' 
with 'caves of ice'. 
What results is an irruption of the non-verbal which 
terminates the ability of the poem to go on speaking, just as 
Christabel's linguistic ability is hampered by Geraldine's 
spell. The poem's harmony, balance and form - all that would 
control the 'beyond words' experience and render it positive 
and sublime - are irrevocably disrupted by the poet's fearful 
intuition that the mystical and ineffable have the power to be 
the horrific too: '(0 sorrow and shame should this be true!)' 
(1. 674). 
Thus in both its form and its 'incomplete' content 
'Christabel' brings poetry to the edge of an impassable 
divide: the divide between words - even poetic words - and the 
unsayable which, whether as the ineffable or the unspeakable, 
lies beyond them. 
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APPENDIX I: THE EARLY TEXTS OF CHRISTIANITY 
The modern consensus on the question of texts and their dependence is 
associated, for English readers, with the name of Canon Streeter'. 
Streeter's broad plan, which is taken as a working hypothesis by most 
theologians, is that Mark is the earliest of the gospels and that Luke and 
Matthew both use it, combining it with the source-document Q and with 
independent written or oral tradition exclusive to each of them alone (cf. 
Streeter 1927). If Mark was written in Rome after the fall of Jerusalem (70 
AD) as seems likely, then Luke and Matthew are a decade or so later. John, 
which shows little dependence on the others, is assumed to be the latest 
work, different in kind, written a little before the turn of the first 
century. None of the evangelists were, on this view, eye-witnesses of the 
events they describe; even the names tradition ascribes to them are much in 
doubt. 
Not all textual questions are laid to rest by this scheme, but 
alternatives can seem impenetrably complex (even if equally likely or 
unlikely). Schillebeeckx2 records one recent proposal for us, that of P. 
Benoit and M.-E. Boismard of the synoptic Institute at Nijmegen: 'instead 
of the "Two Sources" theory they postulate "four foundation documents": a 
Jewish-Christian gospel-text from Palestine (A), a Gentile-Christian 
revision of A (called B), an undefinable third document (C), and finally 
the Q source, so called. What is more, the evangelists are said to have 
made use of these sources not directly, but via yet other intermediary 
gospels that relate and refer to one another in various ways. A very 
complex account of things .... ' (1989: 102). 
Another complicating element is posed by the lost Gospel according to 
the Hebrews which is generally recognised to be of a different character 
from the fanciful apocryphal gospels of a later age. It was in Hebrew, not 
Greek, and used by Jewish Christian communities associated with descendants 
of the original Jerusalem church in Palestine and Syria: 'a work which is 
especially acceptable to such Hebrews as received the Christ' says 
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Eusebius3 with subtle deprecation (stevenson4 1960: 339). It closely 
parallels our Matthew Gospel, and was supposed at an early time to be its 
original. Jerome himself who knew it thought so, though he later changed 
his mind (JamesS 1953: 4). Certainly its wording was substantially similar 
in places, as we know from many marginal 'glosses' in early manuscripts of 
Matthew (4-8). According to an extant library list, the Stichometry of 
Nicephorus (3), it was 2,200 lines long, 300 less than Matthew. Most likely 
it lacked Matthew's infancy narrative or the virgin birth, since its 
theology was 'adoptionist' (i.e. Jesus became Christ only through the 
agency of the Holy Spirit at his baptism). This alone was reason for its 
rejection by the later orthodox Church, who took very little time to deify 
Jesus. But since, as now appears, Q itself6 was adoptionist (Havener 1987: 
124), this may be a point of contact between the two traditions, and 
testimony to the earliness of Hebrews theological standpoint on this issue. 
Indeed, it accords with the Jewish idea of the Messiah: that he would be 
divinely appointed and inspired, but certainly not divine in his own right. 
Many German scholars, such as Schwegler (cf. Luedemann7 1989: 8), 
have argued at different times for Hebrews as a source for one or other of 
the gospels. However, from the extracts that remain to us, it is unlikely 
that this gospel as it stands is at all primitive; it elaborates a 
developed and sophisticated theology of its own, presumably in reaction to 
other Christologies already in existence. Interestingly, it assigns the 
first Jerusalem resurrection appearance to James, Jesus's brother and the 
primary pillar of Jerusalem Christianity after his death. Though there is 
some support for this in Luke, where James is almost certainly the 
(deliberately) unnamed companion of his uncle Cleopas on the road to Emmaus 
(cf. WilsonS 1984: 138), the clear 'political' jockeying associated with 
resurrection appearances makes the real priority difficult to establish. 
Thomas9, incidentally, has Jesus warn his disciples before his crucifixion 
to 'go to James the Just, for whose sake the heaven and the earth came into 
existence' (Grant and Freedman 1960: 124, Logion 11); despite the authentic 
Hebraic flavour of the compliment (and the testimony of history that this 
is exactly what the disciples did), Thomas may be merely echoing some 
saying in Hebrews, rather than offering material based on a true primitive 
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source. Our earliest clear account is Paul (I Cor. 15, 5-8); Paul indeed 
acknowledges an appearance to James, but places it far down his list, with 
Peter at the head - but then, he saw James as his principal opponent, and 
the Gentile church he influenced has followed his lead in exalting Peter 
and abasing or obscuring James. On the whole, we can conclude very little 
even from the resurrection account about the relative authenticity of 
Hebrews as a source. 
Other unexpected testimony in its favour, however, comes from 
Eusebius the first church historian, in the course of an anecdote about the 
patriarch Pantaenus, who flourished c. 180: 
Pantaenus ••• is mentioned as having gone to India; and the 
story goes that there he found, in the hands of some persons 
who had come to know Christ in that land, the Gospel according 
to Matthew, which had anticipated his arrival; for that 
Bartholomew, one of the apostles, had preached to them and left 
behind the writing of Matthew in the actual Hebrew characters, 
and that it was preserved up to the said time. 
(in stevenson 1960: 192) 
Eusebius, misled by the idea that there was a separate Hebrew 
'original' of which our Matthew was no more than the Greek translation, 
fails to realise he is accrediting a work which fits the description of 
Hebrews, by placing it in the possession of an authentic apostle. ('India' 
in this context seems to mean simply the Southern or Eastern borders of the 
Middle East, as in the case of the Thomas traditions; here it refers to 
Southern Arabia [Stevenson ibid.). The work in question may not, after 
all, be Hebrews; as we shall see below, it may be an even earlier work, a 
possible ancestor of both this gospel and of of our Matthew, but already 
linked with the apostle Matthew's name. 
All in all, it would be safest to assume that The Gospel according to 
the Hebrews may be at best (if it is not mainly founded on a translation of 
Matthew from Greek into Hebrew, as some earlier scholars conjectured) the 
contemporary of the Gospels we know, owing its similarity to its 
independent derivation from the same sources, though one would expect it to 
by-pass Mark, if so. Though its theology may be closer to the Q sayings 
source than any of the canonical gospels, it is not identical with either 
the earlier or later phase of Q, but may represent some development upon 
it, evolved after the collapse of Jerusalem. Its hints of Jewish-Christian 
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theology were, however, sufficiently distasteful to the early orthodox 
(predominantly Johannine and Pauline) church for it to be excluded from the 
canon and eventually suppressed. 
Significantly, Eusebius, in his critical account of the canon (in 
Stevenson 1960: 339), places Hebrews neither among the acknowledge nor the 
rejected writings, but in the middle 'disputed' category - along with the 
Apocalypse of John, the epistle of James, II Peter and John III, all of 
which made it into the New Testament. Evidently Hebrews missed acceptance 
by no more than a hairsbreadth. 
While accepting Streeter's broad schema as a basis, there are other 
views possible of the development of the canonical gospels, as we have 
seen. My own preference among these has at least the advantage of 
explaining why they originally received the names they did, which is 
otherwise problematic. This view holds that John and Matthew, at least, 
include in their lineage original documents actually composed by the 
apostles whose names they bear. Support for this idea is offered by the 
early Bishop Papias (60-130 AD), who collected together as much hearsay and 
oral tradition as came his way. Unfortunately much of what we have of this 
is probably unreliable, but it may contain hints of the truth. 
He remarks, for example, that 'Matthew compiled the Sayings in the 
Aramaic language, and everyone translated them as well as he could' (in 
Wilson 1984: 44). Whether or not Matthew was the first compiler of Q, it 
seems conceivable that an early and no doubt rather disordered and 
unplanned 'miracle' gospel (as argued for by Canon Harvey of Westminster; 
cf. Wilson: 100) existed that mayor may not have borne his name and was a 
possible source for Mark. Such a theory has indeed been advanced before, 
under the name of the 'Ur-Markos' hypothesis (cf. Powell Davies10 1956: 
109). Perhaps this was even combined with a version of Q at an early stage 
to create a Mark-like gospel, but with a Jewish-Christian base. Eusebius's 
Pantaenus story above may be one sign of the existence of such a combined 
gospel under Matthew's name; I will offer what other evidence there is 
shortly. With some probability, perhaps a number of the 'many' gospels Luke 
speaks of (Luke 1-3) as extant in his time were erected upon this stem. It 
is notable that the only recognisable name among the disciples attached to 
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'Yeshu' by early Rabbinical literature is that of 'Mattai' (Wilson: 62); is 
this a legacy of the apostle Matthew's early literary prominence? 
Whatever else may be true about it, our own 'Matthew' is a strange 
compound work. Apart from its evident desire to find as many Septuagint 
(Greek Old Testament) prophecies for gospel events as possible, its 
theology is an accommodating mixture of colours (cf. Maccoby" 1986: 173), 
some of them more favourable to the Jewish-Christian emphasis on 'law' and 
the need for works than any other canonical evangelist. 
The case for The Gospel of st John is equally complex. The received 
opinion of scholarship - that John was late and largely a 'theological 
romance' of sorts - received a jolt with the discovery of the Rylands 
fragments in Egypt (Grant and Freedman 1960: 55), verses from John's 
crucifixion narrative which are datable to early in the second century. 
Despite its uniquely developed Christology, ultra-Pauline if it is Pauline 
at all, John is more trustworthy than Mark on (particularly Judean) 
geographical details and perhaps even chronology. It is not hard to 
postulate an underlying authentic narrative stratum of earlier date in 
which the crucifixion bulks large, upon which a late theological excursus 
has been imposed. 
If we will, strange corroboration for a multiple authorship is 
provided by Papias once again; for on Papias's authority we learn that 
there were indeed two Johns, an earlier and a later, both based in Ephesus 
and buried there separately. Both shrines were venerated as the final 
resting-place of the apostle and evangelist. Papias was known as a 'hearer 
of John', but, as Eusebius points out, it is the second John, John the 
Elder, who was his mentor (in Stevenson 1960: 50). The historian suggests 
that the Revelation should be attributed to this latter figure (51) rather 
than the apostle. The bizarre possibility that there was a later John whose 
commentaries and meditations upon his namesake's gospel were later combined 
with them is an unnerving speculation (or perhaps 'the beloved disciple' 
was not named John at all); it may, however, go some way to explain the 
extreme age tradition attributes to the author of Revelations, for this 
second John would of course have been extant long after his predecessor. 
And the location of Ephesus, where Paulinism had a stronghold, may confirm 
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Paul's influence among the varied mix of influences which C.H. Dodd12 (1960: 
cf. esp. 4-5) infers in its composition. 
Epiphanius (310-403) speaks of Hebrew versions of John and Acts 
(probably the Ebionite, not our Lucan, ~) kept in the treasuries at 
Tiberias (James 1953: 9); perhaps the former was the early narrative 
version of John. The presence of an Aramaic substratum to the John gospel 
has been argued for notably by C.F. Burney13 (1922), and of a separate 
narrative element by A.T. Olmstead14 (1942). Dodd eventually accepted a 
variant of Olmstead's thesis, it should be added. 
The attribution of Acts and the third gospel to Luke, the physician 
companion of Paul, is probably the weakest ascription of the four. Ernst 
Haenchen's commanding work on Acts15 establishes decisively that the author 
was no eye-witness of the Pauline history he describes (cf. Haenchen 1971). 
Papias is also the probable source of later tradition which 
identifies Mark as Peter's amanuensis (in Stevenson: 52); but the story has 
a concocted and post hoc flavour to it. Perhaps the truth is that Mark was 
employed by Paul in this capacity. Certainly a Mark, the cousin of 
Barnabus, is often mentioned in the epistles (Phil. 24, 2 Tim. 11, Col. 
3:10) and figures in Acts as a somewhat unreliable companion; in Acts 15: 
36-41, he is the occasion of a decisive quarrel between Paul and Barnabas. 
If he is by chance the author of Mark's gospel, this tendency to go his own 
way is evident there, too. Unlike Paul, who was comparatively uninterested 
in the earthly ministry of Jesus (since the 'risen Christ' was all that 
mattered to him) Mark wishes to ground his Christology in history and is 
even negligent over the events of the Resurrection. 
On the other hand, despite its early date, this is the most 
virulently 'theological' of the gospels, and that theology is Pauline in 
essence. It is pro-Roman and pro-Gentile, portraying 'the entire Jewish 
establishment' as being 'out to kill Jesus'; even his Jewish disciples are 
presented as 'a dull, quarrelsome lot, always jockeying for position, 
failing to understand Jesus, denying him when they are in trouble ••• and 
finally deserting him at the time of his arrest' (Wilson: 46). Only Peter, 
the single apostle to show Paul even conditional sympathy, comes out of 
this story to any advantage. The original apostles, together with James, 
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the first leader of the Jerusalem church, were for Paul the 'circumcision 
party', opponents of his theology of faith and grace and cosmic sacrifice; 
in consequence of the Pauline triumph after 70 AD, James is almost missing 
from the history most Christians know; and a denigration both of the 
apostles and of Jesus's family may be inferred in Mark. 
There is direct 'theological' evidence also for alignment of Paul and 
Mark. Edward Schillebeeckx points out that Romans 1:3-4 is a miniature pre-
vision of the Marcan gospel structure (1989: 510). He insists that in spite 
of the absence of information about the resurrection '[t)he Pauline Easter 
kerygma forms from a Marcan standpoint an essential component or 
constituent part of the gospel, which no less essentially comprises Jesus' 
activity throughout his life on earth' (110); Mark's theology, though 
presupposing Paul's, is hence more balanced than its model: it does not 
ignore Jesus's earthly life, but chooses instead to see it as expressing 
his symbolic status. A particularly revealing clue is that the term 
'gospel' appears in no other synoptic writing, except where its author 
relies on Mark; whereas Mark even employs it in his title. Paul for his 
part uses it constantly -'forty-eight times in the authentically Pauline 
writings' (108). The term 'gospel' itself originates in the Jewish Wisdom 
literature (cf. 510) - which suggests one source of influence upon Paul's 
theology. Others that have been advanced are the Orphic and other mystery 
religions of the dying and resurrected god (Kellett16 1962: 193; cf. also 
Maccoby), and even Iranian religion or the Hermetica. The Pauline influence 
on our Matthew comes partly through Mark. 
Since most 'trees of descent' begin with Mark, it is possible that he 
has been credited with more compositional originality than he ought. Only a 
little amateur 'form criticism' with a coloured pencil shows that Mark 
falls apart almost instantly into twin strands of sayings and narrative, 
suggesting the combination and selective rearrangement of two or more prior 
sources. If so, the sayings at least have been re-ordered by Mark to make a 
theological point. Those up to 3:7 are liberal verdicts on fasting, the 
Sabbath, the need for ritual purity - all Pauline themes, fitting his 
campaign for freedom from the torah. In Ch. 7, the abolition of ritual 
washing and the distinction between clean and unclean foods is further 
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broached ('Thus he declared all foods clean' [7:19]), combined with an 
ostensibly Gentile healing. All grist to the mill of the successors of the 
self-styled 'apostle to the Gentiles'. 
It is important to emphasise that there are prior sources involved, 
or else we may fall into the Maccoby-like trap of supposing that Paul 
effectively invented Jesus (cf. Maccoby 1986). It is the arrangement and 
the commentary that result in the exaggerated Pauline emphasis. Indeed, one 
surprise Mark has for those of us taught to believe that Q is what Mark did 
not share with the other synoptic~, is that Mark seems to know a version of 
Q - or else his sayings source is contaminated by Q. The point is, he deals 
with Q material very selectively and seldom in the 'original' words. Mark 
3:22-30; 6:10-12; 8:12-3; 8:36-8; 11:25; and 13:21-2 are non-parable Q 
vestiges that have crept into his text. 'The Lord's Prayer', for example, 
is reduced to the following: 'if you have a grievance against anyone, 
forgive him, so that your Father in heaven may forgive you the wrongs you 
have done' (11:25). (New Testament Evangelists as a breed are somewhat 
chary of their sayings-sources and choosy about what they take up, 
according to Havener [1987: 30-31].) Incidentally, Mark seems to know some 
Q parables in non-Q versions: the 'mustardseed' (4:30-32) is one such (cf. 
Havener 26-7); Thomas has an independent version too, which shares some 
details with Mark's. 
It is the other 'half' of the mix, Mark's narrative source, which is 
especially elusive. I have expressed concurrence with Harvey's view that a 
primitive 'miracle' narrative probably lies behind Mark (see above). The 
two versions of the feeding of the multitude (6:30-52 and 8:1-21) certainly 
suggest the collation of two divergent copies of a written source, and 
illustrate Mark's fidelity to the substance of what he read; but he does 
not scruple to place his own Anti-Pharisaic interpretations into the mouths 
of Jesus and the disciples (8:14-21). 
In this connection it is perhaps worth mentioning another - perhaps 
marginal - work that nevertheless belongs in some way within the same 
tradition we are discussing: the ancient lost Gospel of the Ebionites. 
Simply on the (perhaps mistaken) ground that its Jewish-Christian sect 
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would be unwilling to cannibalize a Pauline work like Mark, it might have 
light to shed on an extra-Marcan (or even pre-Marcan) narrative tradition. 
Irenaeus (d. 200) gives us the following information about the 
Ebionite sect: 
They use the Gospel according to Matthew only, and repudiate 
the apostle Paul, maintaining that he was an apostate from the 
law. As to the [Jewish) prophetical writings, they endeavour to 
expound them in a somewhat singular manner: they practise 
circumcision, persevere in the observance of those customs 
which are enjoined by the law, and in their Judaic style of 
life, that they even adore Jerusalem as if it were the house of 
God. (in Stevenson: 97) 
Since the time of Baur in the early nineteenth century there are 
scholars increasingly willing to admit that Irenaeus is recording the dying 
stages of a tradition that stems (with certain twists and breaks) from the 
original Jerusalem Christianity of the first apostles. Their name 
'Ebionites' means 'poor ones', which suggests they took to heart Jesus's 
injunctions about wealth and possessions. Not that the Ebionites were free 
from a special brand of their own quirkiness: they were, for example, 
vegetarians (at least by the time of Epiphanius [310-403 AD) - which seems 
to have been true also of James but not Jesus - and they rewrote their 
scriptures to mirror this custom (cf. Epiphanius in James 1953: 9-10). They 
possessed their own non-Pauline Acts and an Ascents of James (Wilson: 155), 
and Ebionite influence is detectable in parts of the Pseudo-Clementine 
writings (cf. Maccoby 180-3). Gerd Luedemann (Luedemann 1989) has provided 
a careful recent analysis of early anti-Pauline writing - including 
Ebionitism and its history among the scholars. 
As we see, like Hebrews and our own first gospel, their scripture 
(in Hebrew) was identified with Matthew's name. It is often hard to know 
which of the various gospels attributed to Matthew any given ancient author 
is actually referring to, or to judge just how distinct they really were; 
but as far as we can ascertain, the Ebionite gospel was discernible from 
its brothers derived from the same (Matthean?) root. Epiphanius (c. 310-
403) says it was 'called according to Matthew, but not wholly complete, but 
falsified and mutilated (they call it the Hebrew Gospel)' (James: 9); he 
knows it also as 'according to the Hebrews, as the truth is, that Matthew 
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alone of New Testament writers made his exposition and preaching of the 
Gospel in Hebrew and in Hebrew letters' (8). The bits of it that are extant 
show it to be a comparatively crude work, reminding of those early 
evangelists whom Origen censures; those who 'came to the task rashly, 
without the needful gifts of grace' possessed by canonical writers (James: 
10). Undoubtedly by the fourth century, too, it was adulterated by contact 
with the canonical gospels - if it is not wholly derived from them. And yet 
if this is not entirely the case, we have another link with the tradition 
that underlies the 'Matthean' gospel narratives. 
It begins, like Mark and the ministry sections of the canonical 
gospels, with John the Baptist; but proceeds directly to the calling of the 
disciples: 
There was a certain man named Jesus, and he was about thirty 
years old, who chose us. And coming unto Capernaum he entered 
into the house of Simon who was surnamed Peter, and opened his 
mouth and said: As I passed by the lake of Tiberias, I chose 
John and James the sons of Zebedee, and Simon and Andrew and 
[Philip and Bartholomew, James the son of Alpheus and Thomas] 
Thaddeus and Simon the Zealot and Judas the Iscariot: and thee, 
Matthew, as thou satest at the receipt of custom I called, and 
thou followedst me. You therefore I will to be twelve apostles 
for a testimony unto Israel. 
(James 1953: 9) 
This is quite clearly related to the list of the disciples in Mark 3: 
16-19. But Mark has earlier followed the mention of the lake (1:16) with 
the rather unlikely story of the miraculous 'instant' calling of the two 
groups of fishermen, who at once drop everything to follow Jesus. If he was 
confronted by anything like this passage in his source, then perhaps the 
'calling' idea was suggested to him by the abruptness and rapidity of its 
style. Note that Jesus is supposedly addressing Peter, who nonetheless 
still appears in the list; and yet his listener turns into Matthew before 
the end. Mark, too, separates the calling of Levi (Matthew) from the other 
names (2: 13-14), with no obvious narrative motive for doing so. Such a 
motive would, however, have been provided if Levi was the author of Mark's 
source. Again, though the lists seem very similar, in Mark, as one might 
expect, Simon appears not third but at its head. And yet it would be unwise 
to rest anything very substantial upon points of comparison like these; our 
knowledge of the circumstances are really too slight. (Like Hebrews and Q, 
incidentally, the Ebionite Christology was 'adoptionist': Jesus was a 
normal man upon whom a divine essence rested at baptism.) 
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Last in this list of texts is one of a very different kind, the 
Gospel of Thomas unearthed in 1945 at Nag Hammadi in Egypt, amid a mass of 
lost Gnostic Christian writing. Unlike other Christian apocrypha, the 
original of this text was known to be comparatively early (c. 140 AD), and 
it is widely quoted by the Church fathers (2 Clement, Justin [c. 160], 
Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and the Didascalia Apostolorum all 
draw upon it) - sometimes perhaps unconscious that they recalled a 
purportedly heretical work. Unfortunately, the Coptic version we have is 
not, as many believe, complete. According to the Stichometry of Nicephorus 
(James: 15), the original was 1,300 lines long (about half the size of 
Matthew), whereas our version is palpably shorter than this. It is also 
heavily Gnosticised and in all probability much adulterated by a Gnostic 
redactor - since it may not originally have been a Gnostic text: a few 
fragments unearthed earlier at Oxyrynchus in Egypt are clearly from this 
same gospel, though in Greek, not Coptic. The Greek text is certainly both 
more intelligible and more orthodox - and arguably more like the original. 
Oxyrynchus was an ancient conventional Christian settlement, not a Gnostic 
community, which lends weight to this judgment. 
By virtue of their comparative contempt for the things of this world, 
Gnostic writers were not under the same - still fairly flexible -
constraints of conservation and preservation as their more orthodox 
fellows, and readapted texts freely. Luedemann (1989: 170-177) compares the 
Gnostic Second Apocalypse of James also from Nag Hammadi with the 
Martyrdoms of James in Hegesippus and in the Pseudo-Clementine 
Recognitions, and demonstrates that a single source underlies them all; it 
is clear that the Gnostics with their belief in a continuing revelation 
felt no compunction whatever in rewriting authentic texts for their own 
purposes. Irenaeus has some interesting things to say about the complex 
literary methods they used (Adv. haer., 1,8,1; Grant and Feedman 1960: 87). 
Our hope that Thomas, which is a sayings collection like Q and 
containing material from it (in a sometimes hardly recognisable form: 
occasionally, the link is no more than a phrase), might turn out to be 
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based on on an authentic early Christian compilation of the same kind, can 
hardly be satisfied by what we have; though recently Professor Helmut 
Koester of Harvard has argued that Thomas 'may contain some traditions even 
older than the gospels of the New Testament, "possibly as early as the 
second half of the first century" (50-100)' (pagels 1982: 16). 
Unfortunately, it is hard to know of which of the sayings or parts of 
sayings this might be true. Grant and Freedman's careful and wary analyses 
of 1960 still contain arguments which must be overcome; though even they 
admitted that '[t)he fact that as a whole Thomas reflects a Gnostic 
environment does not permit us to say that everything it contains is to be 
rejected' (87). 
Whatever else is clear about Thomas, it is not simply a free literary 
composition, though it may now contain such elements. Though it may have 
started life as a collection of oral sayings and traditions - just possibly 
known even to Mark - it looks now rather like an anthology from other known 
gospels, some of them lost. Sayings appear which have known equivalents in, 
for example, The Gospel according to the Hebrews, and in the The Gospel of 
the Egyptians, the latter perhaps a rather dubious work. 
A fascinating example of the problems it raises is given by Logion 17 
(Grant and Freedman: 130): 
Jesus said: 
I will give you 
what eye has not seen 
and ear has not heard 
and hand has not touched 
and which has not come into the heart of man. 
Though it faintly recalls Isaiah 64:4, this saying occurs in none of the 
canonical scriptures; and yet Paul, writing earlier than any of them, says 
in 1 Corinthians 2:9: 'As it is written, What eye has not seen and ear has 
not heard, and what has not entered into the heart of man, such things God 
has prepared for those who love him'. (In this form, it was parodied in 
Bottom's dream-inebriated speech of Act IV scene i, 209-12 of A Midsummer 
Night's Dream; so presumably Shakespeare thought it sufficiently delphic 
even in Paul's version.) If Paul's form is the authentic one, then we may 
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see what a Gnostic redactor has made of it, reworking it so that it appears 
to refer to the mysterious insight of gnosis. 
But is Thomas's original source Corinthians or the unknown sayings-
collection upon which Paul draws? On the negative side, the redactor of our 
third-century MS would have a wide range of alternative sources to draw 
from. The words appear in I Clement 34:8, 2 Clement 11:7 and 14:5, in the 
late second century Martyrdom of Peter (ch.l0) and the Acts of Peter with 
Simon (ch. 39); also in Mart. Pol. 2:3, The Book of Baruch of the Gnostic 
Justin (in Hippolytus 5:19,22). Stephanus Gorbanus quotes a version from 
Hegesippus. And even the fifteenth century Ethiopic Apocalypse of Ezra 
contains a close parallel to Paul's (see Luedemann 1989: 292-3). 
On the positive side, Thomas includes many sayings which are not 
Gnostic in bearing at all, and its relation to our canonical gospels is 
very close - from a time before they had even been assembled together. 
Throckmorton's Gospel Parallels17 has glosses with variant readings from 
Thomas, but his representation is hardly complete: in reality, there is 
barely a page of parallel text which nothing in Thomas bears upon; of 
twenty-three identifiable parables in Matthew, for example, Thomas has 
versions of ten of them. It contains however only one parable from the 
specifically Lucan material (12:16-21). 
All-in-all, I have thought Thomas of sufficient intrinsic interest 
and early date to justify quotation from it in my main text. I take 
Gnosticism to represent a very early fusion between the Hermetic literature 
and Christianity proper; other groups than the orthodox Jews were awaiting 
the arrival of a redeemer, an archetypal 'Son of Man'. If our purpose in 
what follows is to follow the various trails that lead back to the original 
inspiration of Jesus, then Thomas is, if nothing else, a sufficient 
representative for us of the Gnostic route. 
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